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ABSTRACT

A RE-EXAMINATION OF PENTATEUCHAL HAMARTIOLOGY
AND ATONEMENT AS A HERMENEUTICAL FRAMEWORK
FOR INTERPRETING THE LAYING ON OF HANDS

by
Slaviša Janković

Adviser: Richard M. Davidson

ABSTRACT OF GRADUATE STUDENT RESEARCH
Dissertation

Andrews University
Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary

Title: A RE-EXAMINATION OF PENTATEUCHAL HAMARTIOLOGY
AND ATONEMENT AS A HERMENEUTICAL FRAMEWORK
FOR INTERPRETING THE LAYING ON OF HANDS
Name of researcher: Slaviša Janković
Name and degree of faculty adviser: Richard M. Davidson, PhD
Date completed: October 2020

The ritual gesture of laying on of hands in Scripture has generated significant
interest among theologians from rabbinic times until now. Still today, scholars assign
various meanings to the ritual. In the second half of the 20th century, the fresh interest
that put forward new meanings for this gesture came primarily through the introduction
of the new sub-discipline of Ritualistics within Old Testament studies. This relatively
new discipline is not founded upon premises found in biblical texts, but rather, upon
those found in various secular social, philosophical sciences, and other disciplines such as
sociology, philosophy, anthropology, literary criticism, and the study of religion. These
disciplines often reject major presuppositions found in biblical texts, and scholarly
studies based on these approaches have produced multiple proposals regarding the

meaning of this gesture. Such proposals generally offer incomplete, limited insights into
the biblical meaning conveyed by laying on of hands. I have sought to avoid this
interpretative misstep in the context of identifying the meaning of laying on of hands by
(1) adopting premises found in the biblical text, especially concerning the nature of
human beings and the concepts of sin and atonement, and (2) conducting a reading of the
biblical text that applies a terminological/contextual/intertextual approach.
This study is divided into three sections. In the first section, I explore the concept
of sin in the Pentateuch (ch. two) and establish terminology to express the nature of sin
(ch. three). I utilize simple legal terminology based upon my reading of Lev 4-6. In the
second section, I conduct an in-depth study of the Hebrew  כִּ פֶּרto establish the concept of
atonement (ch. four) and critically evaluate the commonly-accepted automatic defilement
hypothesis (ch. five). In the third section, I present the ritual theory created by biblical
scholars that coincides with the theoretical framework that I identified in the course of
this study, which assisted in achieving the main and initial goal of this study, namely, to
identify the meaning of laying on of hands in cultic contexts in the Pentateuch. The
resulting data of this study enables me to expose limitations and errors included in
various scholarly proposals concerning the meaning of the laying on of hands.
The traditional meaning of laying on of hands in cultic contexts has been that of
transfer, with various qualities transferred such as sin, guilt, authority, general human
sinfulness, and others. Very often the idea of substitution is included in the meaning of
the ritual. Through a fresh study of the concepts of sin and atonement, and building upon
biblical premises concerning the nature of human beings, I conclude that the meaning of

transfer emerges from the biblical texts more than any other, and constitutes the
foundational meaning of this ritual.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Problem
The initial goal of the present study was to identify the particular ritual gesture of
the laying on of hands. The study of rituals1 significantly increased in the second half of
the 19th century and continues to flourish until the present. The growing interest in ritual
studies resulted in the introduction in the 1960s of a new sub-discipline within Old
Testament (OT) studies called Ritualistics.2 The laying on of hands in the OT is one of

1

This study refrains from assigning any of the numerous definitions suggested by the ritual or
biblical scholars studying ritual because they are informed by various scientific disciplines which focus on
certain aspects of ritual and because of the diversity of philosophical presuppositions involved in their
production. Jan Plavoet listed twenty-four different definitions produced since 1909, starting with van
Gennep, through 1991 with David Parkin. Jan Platvoet, “Ritual in Plural and Pluralistic Societies,” in
Pluralism and Identity: Studies in Ritual Behaviour, eds. Jan Platvoet and Karel van der Toorn, SHR 67
(Leiden: Brill, 1995), 42–45; Gerald A. Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap: Ritual and Ritual Texts in the Bible
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2007), 14. The biblical text demonstrates that ritual consists of certain
dimensions/characteristics which are discussed in ch. 6 of the present study. Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap,
208–24. Biblical ritual and non-ritual texts contain certain premises that can provide grounds to form a
conceptual framework and theoretical principles for the study of ritual which is also discussed in ch. 6 of
the current work.
2

Gerald A. Klingbeil, A Comparative Study of the Ritual of Ordination as Found in Leviticus 8
and Emar 369 (Lewiston, NY: Mellen Press, 1998); Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap, 26–69; Patrick D. Miller,
“Israelite Religion,” in The Hebrew Bible and Its Modern Interpreters, eds. Douglas A. Knight and Gene
M. Tucker, BMI 1 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 201–37; J. P. Sørensen, “Ritualistics: A New
Discipline in the History of Religion,” in The Problem of Ritual: Based on Papers Read at the Symposium
on Religious Rites held at Åbo, Finland, on the 13th-16th of August 1991, ed. Tore Ahlbäck (Åbo, Finland:
The Donner Institute for Research in Religious and Cultural History, 1993), 9–24.

1

the most studied ritual gestures.3 Interest in this topic was already noted in rabbinic
literature, wherein the rabbis argued that this ritual gesture meant the transfer of sin from
the offerer onto the sacrificial animal. As a consequence, the animal died, instead of the
offerer. This conclusion was reached by taking Lev 16:21 as the model for interpreting
the ritual gesture of laying on of hands in the sacrificial context.4 The same understanding
of the ritual gesture was accepted by the Church Fathers, as well,5 and transfer in various
contexts was the prevailing interpretation until the end of 19th and the beginning of the
20th century.6 In scholarly parlance, this theory is labeled the transfer/substitution theory.

3

Roy E. Gane, Cult and Character: Purification Offerings, Day of Atonement, and Theodicy
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2005), 53–54, 176, 224; B. J. van der Merwe, “The Laying on of Hands in
the Old Testament,” OTWSA 5 (1962): 38–40; Ángel Manuel Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew
Cultus and in Cultic-Related Texts” (PhD diss., Andrews University, 1979), 201–8; David P. Wright, “The
Gesture of Hand Placement in the Hebrew Bible and Hittite Literature,” JAOS 106 (1986): 433–46.
4

The Mishnah Tractate Yoma, 3:8, 6:2 in The Mishnah: A New Translation, trans. Jacob Neusner
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Bernd Janowski, Sühne als Heilsgeschehen: Studien zur
Sühnetheologie der Priesterschrift und zur Wurzel KPR im Alten Orient und im Alten Testament, WMANT
55 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2000), 205; Nobuyoshi Kiuchi, The Purification Offering in the
Priestly Literature: Its Meaning and Function, JSOTSup 56 (Sheffield: Academic Press, 1987), 113; J. H.
Kurtz, Offerings, Sacrifices, and Worship in the Old Testament, trans. James Martin (Peabody, MA:
Hendrickson, 1998), 85; Solomon Zeitlin, “The Semikah Controversy Between the School of Shammai and
Hillel,” JQR 56 (1966): 242–43.
5

Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 113; Kurtz, Offerings, 85.

6

Significant studies that affirmed the transfer meaning of laying on of hands in the New Testament
were done by Johannes Behm, Die Handauflegung im Urchristentum: Nach Verwendung, Herkunft und
Bedeutung in Religionsgeschichtlichem Zusammenhang Untersucht (Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1911); Joseph
Coppens, “L'imposition des mains et les rites connexes dans le Nouveau Testament et dans l'église
ancienne: Etude de theologie positive” (diss.es ad gradum magistri, Universitas Catholica Lovaniensis,
1925); John Fleter Tipei, The Laying on of Hands in the New Testament: Its Significance, Techniques, and
Effects (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2009). The understanding that this ritual gesture means
transfer, among others, was also established by scholars who studied it in the context of ordination.
Johannes Neumann, “Salbung und Handauflegung als Heilszeichen und Rechtsakt,” in Wahrheit und
Verkündigung: Michael Schmaus zum 70. Geburtstag, eds. Leo Scheffczyk, Werner Dettloff, and Richard
Heinzmann (München: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1967), 2:2; Eduard Lohse, Die Ordination im Spätjudentum
und im Neuen Testament (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1951); W. Everett Ferguson, “Ordination in
the Ancient Church: An Examination of the Theological and Constitutional Motifs in the Light of Biblical
and Gentile Sources” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1959); Allen Podet, “Morenu Harabh: Elements in
the Development of Rabbinical Ordination in the Codes” (PhD diss., Hebrew Union College-Jewish
Institute of Religion, 1964); Keith Edward Krieghoff Mattingly, “The Laying on of Hands on Joshua: An
Exegetical Study of Numbers 27:12–23 and Deuteronomy 34:9” (PhD diss., Andrews University, 1997).

2

At the beginning of the 21st century, some scholars still consider it defensible.7
The first opposition to this theory appeared, if not prior to, then certainly in the
19th century. Johann K. von Kurtz has listed the main proponents and opponents of this
theory between 1859 and 1890.8 Significant among the theologians at the beginning of
the 19th century who opposed the transfer/substitution theory was Karl Bähr. He held that
laying on of hands was “nothing but a formal and solemn declaration, on the one hand,
that this gift was his [the offerer’s] actual property and, on the other hand, that he was
ready to give up this property of his entirely to death—to devote it to death for Jehovah.”9

Paul Volz, “Die Handauflegung bein Opfer,” ZAW 21 (1901): 93–100; William P. Paterson,
“Sacrifice,” DBDL 4:340; H. G. Schütz, “ἐπιτίθημι,” NIDNTT 2:152; SDABD, s.v. “Laying on of Hands”;
Zeitlin, “The Semikah Controversy,” 242; P. R. Akroyd, “יד,” TDOT 5:423–24; J. C. Lambert and M. H.
Shepherd, “Laying on of Hands,” DB 572; Nicholaus Adler, “Laying-on of Hands,” BEBT 2:495–96;
CBTEL s.v. “Imposition of Hands”; TBD, s.v. “Hand”; David W. Baker, “Leviticus,” in Leviticus,
Numbers, Deuteronomy, ed. Philip W. Comfort, CBC 2 (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House, 2008), 22;
Michael Fink, “Laying on of Hands,” HCBD 413; Allan M. Hartman, “סמך,” NIDOTTE 3:270–71; F.
Stolz, “סמך,” TLOT 2:805; New International Dictionary of the Bible, s.v. “Laying on of Hands”; Alexis
Médebielle, “Le symbolisme du sacrifice expiatoire en Israel,” Bib 2 (1921): 141–69, 273–302; Mark F.
Rooker, Leviticus, NAC 3A (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2000), 87–88; John E. Hartley, Leviticus,
WBC 4 (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1992), 233; Gordon J. Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, NICOT 3
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1979), 233; BEB 2, s.v. “Laying on of Hands”; NNIBD s.v. “Laying on of
Hands”; Jacob Milgrom, “Sacrifices and Offerings, OT,” IDBSup 765. Later on in his work, Milgrom
switched from identification/transfer theory to ownership/transfer theory. David Daube, The New
Testament and Rabbinic Judaism (New York: Arno Press, 1973), 225; J. R. Porter, Leviticus, CBC
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 19, 38; A. Noordtzij, Leviticus, trans. Raymond Togtman,
BSC (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1982), 57; Noam Zohar, “Repentance and Purification: The
Significance and Semantics of  חטאתin the Pentateuch,” JBL 107 (1988): 612–13; Erhard S. Gerstenberger,
Leviticus: A Commentary, OTL 3 (Louisville: Westminister John Knox Press, 1996), 26, 30; Derek Tidball,
The Message of Leviticus, BST (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 39–40.
7

8

He noted that scholars understood the laying on of hands differently, depending on which
sacrifice it was related to. Starting from Kurtz’s time, several scholars advocated that transfer occurred with
regard to the sacrificial animal when laying on of hands took place on the animal of the burnt offering (Lev
1), peace-offering (Lev 3), sin-offering (Lev 4), and trespass offering (Lev 5). Opposing this interpretation
was another group of scholars who held that transfer took place only in regards to the sin and trespass
offering, and they attributed a different meaning when the rite was related to the burnt and peace offerings.
Kurtz, Offerings, 86–87.
9

Karl Christian Wilhelm Felix Bähr, Symbolik des Mosaischen Cultus, 2 vols. (Heidelberg: J. C. B.
Mohr, 1839), 2:341.

3

It seems that in Bähr’s opinion, the meaning of the ritual activity consisted of two
components: declaration of ownership by the offerer over the sacrifice which is
considered as a gift, and giving up of that ownership so that the sacrifice can be devoted
to God.
Johann K. von Hoffman, on the other hand, held that the rite meant that “what the
person offering the sacrifice inwardly purposed to do, when bringing the animal to the
Holy Place, was to render a payment to God; and he had full power to appropriate the life
of the animal for the rendering of this payment.”10 Later, in the second edition of his
book, he modified his position and said that “an appointment of the animal for a
slaughter, the object of which (as Delitzsch admits) was twofold, viz., to obtain the blood
for the altar, and the flesh for the fire-food of Jehovah, whether the intention was to
supplicate the mercy of God toward sinner, i.e., to make expiation, or (as in the case of
the thank-offering) to present thanksgiving and prayer for the blessing of life.”11 It seems
that Hoffman held that the ritual meant an appropriation or appointment of the animal for
slaughter, which would eventually bring expiation for the offerer’s sins.
Opposition toward the transfer/substitution theory continued in the 20th century,
as well; George F. Moore proposed a very similar conclusion to the one presented by
Bähr. Moore summarized his position as follows: “The prevailing conception of sacrifice
in the OT is that of the gift or present to God.”12 As a gift, the sacrifice was a means of

10

Johann C. K. von Hofmann, Der Schriftbeweis: Ein Theologischer Versuch (Nördlingen: C. H.
Beck, 1857), 2:153–54.
11

Kurtz, Offerings, 84.
George. F. Moore, “Sacrifice,” EncyBib 4:4216.

12

4

gaining God’s favor. He strengthened his argument with the claim that the sacrificial
substitution was neither present in biblical times, nor in post-biblical Judaism.13
In his paper from 1913, Henry P. Smith recognized that this ritual cross-culturally
conveys transfer. This same understanding was effected in Ancient Israel in Lev 16:21
and Deut 21.14 However, he proposed a totally unique understanding of this ritual in Lev
8 and regular sacrifices—that laying on of hands transfers the sanctity from the sacrifice
to the offerer.15 This understanding never received noteworthy attention by other
scholars.
Six years after Moore published his article, William P. Paterson argued
conversely that sacrificial substitution was indeed present in post-biblical Judaism.16
Paterson collected five arguments established by different scholars who wanted to
dispute the transfer/substitution theory at the beginning of the 19th century, the time
when Paterson wrote his article.
In the judgment of most modern scholars, the theory in question is untenable, and for
the following reasons: (a) the death of the victim cannot have been vicarious, since
sacrifice was not allowed for sins which merited death (Nu 15:30), only for venial
transgressions; (b) a cereal offering might also atone (Lv 5:11–13), and in this case
there could be no idea of a penal substitution; (c) the victim was slain by the offerer,
but on the theory in question should have been put to death by the priest as God’s
representative; (d) the assumption that the imposition of hands involved a
transmission of guilt is inconsistent, not only with other references to this practice,
but with the fact that the sacrificial flesh was treated as most holy, and might be eaten
Moore, “Sacrifice,” 4:4226.

13
14

In texts from Greece, Egypt, and India, laying on of hands was practiced to convey transfer.
Henry Preserved Smith, “The Laying-on of Hands,” AJT 17 (1913): 48–50, 55.
Smith, “The Laying-on of Hands,” 53, 55–57.

15

Paterson, “Sacrifice,” DBDL 4:339–41.

16

5

by the priest; (e) the central act of the sacrifice was, not the act of slaughtering, but
the manipulation of the blood, which was presented to God.17
While some scholars rejected the transfer/substitution theory, others favored it
and sought to prove its correctness. Thus, between 1921 and 1923, Alexis Medebielle
published three articles and eventually a book as an attempt to defend the sacrificial
substitution theory.18 Summarizing Medebielle’s position, Rodríguez identified his four
basic principles: “(1) Sacrificial substitution was a well-known practice in the ancient
Near Eastern religions; (2) the basic meaning of the sacrifices is found in Lev 17:11; (3)
the laying on of hands means transfer and substitution; and (4) the immolation of the
victim represents the death of the sinner.”19
However, Medebielle’s arguments for the transfer/substitution theory did not
change growing negative attitudes towards this theory, and soon after his articles and
book appeared in print, Dionys Schötz published his study of expiatory sacrifices in
1930. Schötz concluded that the idea of sacrificial substitution cannot be found in
expiatory sacrifices. His argument is that slaughter was not the essential act in the animal
sacrifice, but rather, blood manipulation, which he held was an act of consecration, not
transfer.20 He found support for his claim in the fact that Gen 22:1–19 and Deut 21:1–9
cannot be used to support the transfer/substitution theory because the sacrifices

Paterson, “Sacrifice,” DBDL 4:340.
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Alexis Médebielle, L'expiation dans l'Ancien et le Nouveau Testament (Rome: Institut Biblique
Pontifical, 1923); Alexis Médebielle, “Expiation,” DBSup 3:1–262; Médebielle, “Le symbolisme du
sacrifice expiatoire en Israel,” 141–69, 273–302.
Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 9.
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P. Dionys Schötz, Schuld- und Sündopfer im Alten Testament (Braslau: Muller & Sieffert, 1930),

111–12.
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mentioned in these verses were not expiatory sacrifices.21 He also noted the difficulty of
finding grounds for sacrificial substitution in the case of the peace sacrifice which, in his
opinion, was probably the most common one. Thus, for Schötz, the sacrifice was
essentially a gift to the deity and did not contain the idea of substitutionary atonement.22
Schötz agreed that the LXX translation of Lev 17:11 gives the notion of sacrificial
substitution, but claimed that it is not present in the MT.23
In 1980 Angel M. Rodríguez defended his dissertation entitled, “Substitution in
the Hebrew Cultus and in Cultic-Related Texts,” which is the most comprehensive
defense of the transfer/substitution theory up to the present time.24 Resistance towards
this theory has continued, however. In 1985, David P. Wright collected five additional
objections to this theory, adding to the list provided by Moore:
1. It is informed by the substitution theory of sacrifice which is untenable.
2. The main support of the transfer/substitution theory is the hand placement rite
in Lev 16:21. Wright assumes that hand placement in Lev 16:21, performed with two
hands, is different from hand placement with one hand, which is the procedure for other
offerings. Hence, a difference in form suggests, a priori, a possible different meaning. He
also claims that the scapegoat is not a sacrifice; it is merely a rite of elimination and
therefore, cannot be used to interpret the gesture of hand placement in sacrifices.

21

Schötz, Schuld- und Sündopfer im Alten Testament, 109.
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Schötz, Schuld- und Sündopfer im Alten Testament, 113. See also Rodríguez, “Substitution in the
Hebrew Cultus,” 10.

Schötz, Schuld- und Sündopfer im Alten Testament, 114. See also Rodríguez, “Substitution in the
Hebrew Cultus,” 11.
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Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 11.
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3. It is difficult to apply the idea of transfer to guilt in the case of the well-being
offering since it is not an expiatory offering like the purification and reparation offerings,
and, to a certain extent, the burnt offering.
4. If the laying on of hands means transfer of guilt, then it is difficult to
understand why it was not practiced on the purification or burnt offering commuted to a
bird (Lev 1:14–17; 5:7–11).
5. The view of transfer of sin or penalty by hand placement is usually
accompanied by the view that confession of guilt took place at the time of the hand
placement There is no evidence, however, that confession took place at that time. The
few examples of confession with a sacrifice place the confession before the sacrifice is
even brought (Lev 5:5; Num 5:7).25
At the beginning of the 21st century, five distinct theories were maintained as a
possible explanation for the meaning of the ritual gesture of laying on of hands: (1)
transfer/substitution theory, (2) identification theory, (3)
consecration/dedication/presentation theory, (4) appropriation-ownership/designation
theory, and (5) manumission theory. The last four theories will be summarized below and
compared with the transfer/substitution theory.
The majority of the proponents of the identification theory claim that by placing
one hand on the sacrificial animal, the offerer identified him-/herself with the animal, and
by offering the animal, was offering him-/herself through it.26 However, when the ritual

Wright, “The Gesture of Hand Placement,” 437–38.

25
26

Everett Fox, The Five Books of Moses: Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, SB
1 (New York: Schocken Books, 1995), 511; René Péter-Contesse and John Ellington, A Translator's
Handbook on Leviticus, UBS Helps for Translators (New York: United Bible Societies, 1990), 14.
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gestures included placing both hands as in the scapegoat ritual, then it meant transfer.27
M. C. Sansom seemed to accept this theory as his initial understanding of the gesture, but
he also allowed for the possible meaning of the victim’s being the property of a particular
individual and that it is presented in his behalf. Consequently, the ritual gesture signified
“attestation (as much to the priest as to God) that the victim comes from this particular
individual or group, that it is offered in his or their name, and that the fruit shall be his.”28
In order to encompass all these nuances of meanings, Sansom stated that the gesture
signified that the sacrifice has a representative nature.29
The advocates of the consecration/dedication/presentation theory claim that the
laying on of hands on the sacrificial animal signified the act of separation or setting apart
from the larger group for a special purpose. By placing the hands on the animal’s head,
the offerer was dedicating the sacrifice to God and making it his/her own representative
and substitute.30
Advocates of the appropriation/ownership/designation theory hold that placing
hand/s upon the sacrificial animal was a demonstration of the offerer’s ownership over

René Péter, “L'imposition des mains dans l'Ancien Testament,” VT 27 (1977): 52. Péter holds
that identification occurs only when the ritual is performed with one hand. J. A. MacCulloch, “Laying on of
Hands,” ERE 6:493–94; I. H. Marshal, “Laying on of Hands,” NBD (1962), 724; I. H. Marshal, “Laying on
of Hands,” IBD 2:889; D. W. Wead, “Hands, Laying on of,” ISBE 2:611; Henry Barclay Swete, “Laying on
of Hands,” DBDL 3:85; R. D. Parkins, “סמך,” TWOT 2:628; RBD s.v. “Laying on of Hands”; Porter,
Leviticus, 19. Even though Martin Noth used a term that would point to the transfer, he essentially thought
of identification: “The ’laying’ of the hand on the animal brought to the holy place for sacrifice is hard to
explain. It may have its origin in special sacrificial rites, as in Lev 16:31, in the sense of the transference of
the offerer’s own person to the animal thus making the latter his substitute.” Martin Noth, Leviticus: A
Commentary, OTL (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965), 22.
27

M. C. Sansom, “Laying on of Hands in the Old Testament,” ET 94 (1983): 325.

28

Sansom, “Laying on of Hands in the Old Testament,” 325.

29

DDB s.v. “Laying on of Hands”; Frank Thielman, “Laying on of Hands,” BTDB 473; NWDB,
s.v. “Laying on of Hands.”
30
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the animal which he/she offers to God. In addition, the gesture meant that the benefit of
that sacrifice belongs to the offerer.31 However, some proponents of this theory also see
transfer of guilt as a meaning of the ritual gestures in some cases where the gestures
occur, mainly in the case of the scapegoat.32 Roy Gane proposed a hybrid theory that
encompasses the meanings of several theories.33 Basically, the ritual gesture expresses
ownership of the offerer over the animal. Gane accepts Péter’s distinction between the
form of the gesture, one-hand and two-hand, but for him both forms “have a common
denominator: each signifies a (different) kind of identification that is involved in
transfer.”34 Transfer is accomplished through other required actions. Thus, the use of one
hand signifies the transfer of the animal from the offerer to God, while the use of two
hands, as in the case of scapegoat (with simultaneous confession), transfers moral sins to
the goat.35 Gane’s understanding of the ritual gesture seems to be identical to the position
of Bähr.36 However, Gane’s application of OT offerings to the sacrifice of Jesus Christ in

31
Porter, Leviticus, 20; Wright, “The Gesture of Hand Placement,” 437–39; Fox, The Five Books
of Moses, 511. Followed by Tipei, The Laying on of Hands in the New Testament, 28–9.
32

Norman H. Snaith, Leviticus and Numbers, CB 3 (London: Nelson, 1967), 30; Clyde M. Woods
and Justin Rogers, Leviticus-Numbers, CPNCOTS (Joplin, MO: College Press, 2006), 42–43; Gane, Cult
and Character, 245; Adrianus van den Born and Louis Hartman, “Imposition of Hands,” EncDB 1044–45.
“When hand-leaning is performed, it identifies the offerer/owner of the victim, to whom the
benefits of the sacrifice accrue, within the context of transferring the offering material from the offerer to
the deity.” Gane, Cult and Character, 64.
33

34

Gane, Cult and Character, 245.

35

Gane, Cult and Character, 245.
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Page 4 in this study. Also, Rolf P. Knierim, Text and Concept in Leviticus 1:1–9: A Case in
Exegetical Method, FAT 2 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1992), 37–40.
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the NT reveals that he goes beyond Bähr’s position by including the idea of transfer of
sin and substitution.37
Supporters of the manumission theory propose that the laying on of hand/s on the
animal’s head meant “renunciation of personal possession” of the offerer. The emphasis
in this theory is not on the fact that the animal is owned by the offerer, but rather, the
offerer’s willingness to give up his property. Most proponents of this theory do not deny
the idea of substitution, but also do not hold it as the dominant one.38
Contrary to the proponents of other theories who include the idea of
transfer/substitution, there are some who totally deny it. Some advocates of
consecration/dedication/presentation claim that the ritual gestures “[meant] nothing more
than a setting apart of the victim in consecration to its sacred purpose.”39 For others, the
ownership theory is an important component of the consecration/dedication/presentation
theory since the presentation of the animal, marked by the laying on of hands, signifies
transfer of ownership from the offerer to God.40
At least two proponents of the identification theory do not see any transfer in the
gesture of laying on of hands. They claim that the gesture signifies only identification.41
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Roy E. Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, NIVAC 3 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2004), 68–9.

38
Walther Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, trans. J. A. Baker, 2 vols. (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1967), 2:165; E. Kautzsch, “Religion of Israel,” DBDL Extra:720; Theodore C.
Vriezen, An Outline of Old Testament Theology, 2nd ed., rev. and enl. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1970), 263.

M. H. Shepherd Jr., “Laying on of Hands,” IDB 3:521; R. K. Harrison, “Hands, Impositions of
(Laying on of),” ZPEB 3:29; Philip J. Budd, Leviticus: Based on the New Revised Standard Version, NCBC
(London: M. Pickering, 1996), 47.
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Beverly Roberts Gaventa and David L. Petersen (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2010), 59–60.
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Most proponents of the appropriation/ownership/designation theory do not see
any idea of transfer/substitution in this ritual gesture. Some hold that transfer is the
correct meaning in the scapegoat ritual, but the scapegoat is not a sacrifice and therefore,
the offerer’s ownership of the animal remains the only correct meaning of the gestures in
sacrificial contexts.42
At least one proponent of the manumission theory rejects the idea of
transfer/substitution. His arguments are as follows: (1) transfer of sin/guilt would make
sacrificial animals unclean and unsuitable to be brought to the altar, and (2) transfer is
certain only in the case of the scapegoat which is not a sacrifice.43
Even though the initial and final goal of the present study was to identify the
meaning/function of laying on of hands, it became clear in the course of the research of
this topic and even in this short literature review that the meaning of this ritual gesture
greatly depends on the understanding of the two other concepts, that is sin and atonement.

Statement of the Problem
Although the ritual gesture of laying on of hands has generated significant interest
and extensive scholarly research from the beginning of the 19th century until the present,
which underscores its importance in OT studies, no unified position has been reached.

Wright, “The Gesture of Hand Placement,” 437–38; David P. Wright, “Hands, Laying of,” ABD
3:47; Jacob Milgrom and David P. Wright, “סמך,” TDOT 10:282–84. Wright holds that attributive
identification, which assumes ownership, is the meaning when the ritual is performed with one hand. When
the ritual is performed with two hands, then its meaning is designation. See also Wright, “The Gesture of
Hand Placement,” 436–38; Born and Hartman, “Imposition of Hands,” 1044–45; Joseph Coppens,
“Handauflegung,” BHH 2:632; Samuel E. Balentine, Leviticus, IBCTP (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press,
2002), 23; Lloyd R. Bailey, Leviticus-Numbers, SHBC 3 (Macon, GA: Smyth & Helwys, 2005), 48; Cecilia
Wassen, “Laying on of Hands,” NIDB 3:615; Frank H. Gorman, Leviticus, HCBC (San Francisco: Harper,
2000), 148.
42

Merwe, “The Laying on of Hands in the Old Testament,” 39–40.
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The fact that no biblical texts explicitly state the meaning of this ritual gesture further
complicates identifying its meaning. Due to the absence of any explicit statement
regarding the meaning of this gesture, a crucial factor that made the identifying its
meaning even more difficult is the lack of a proper hermeneutical interpretative
framework. The lack of clarity regarding the meaning/function of this ritual and the lack
of a proper hermeneutical interpretative framework that includes a comprehensive
exegetical analysis of relevant Pentateuchal passages and a broader interpretative
framework suggests that further research is needed.

Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this dissertation is to form a hermeneutical interpretative
framework based on the biblical texts, mainly those from the Pentateuch, in order to
facilitate clarifying the theological meaning/function of the ritual gesture of laying on of
hand/s. This hermeneutical interpretative framework includes an exegetical, contextual,
and conceptual analysis of the key Pentateuchal texts in cultic44 contexts. The analysis
includes passages where this ritual gesture is not found, even though it seems that it
should be present. Inasmuch as they are foundational for the present study, and due to
their interrelatedness, the concepts of sin and atonement in the OT are thoroughly
researched and, as a result, redefined. Research on sin and atonement can provide a
hermeneutical interpretative framework that facilitates identifying the meaning/

44

Cultic text or contexts in the present study refer to biblical texts and contexts related to the cult.
“Cult describes the entirety of religious actions and must be seen against the backdrop of the world view of
a specific group.” Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap, 11. It “… consists of a specific number of rituals
comprising subrites and distinct symbols.” Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap, 8.
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function of this ritual gesture. These two concepts, sin and atonement, form the
immediate literary and conceptual context of laying on of hands. From the exegetical,
contextual, and conceptual findings, the proposed theories regarding laying on of hand/s
is evaluated and a meaning of the ritual gestures is suggested.

Justification of the Research
Throughout the last two centuries, no unified position has been reached on the
meaning of laying on of hands in cultic contexts of the Pentateuch. The reason for this
lies partly in the presuppositions accepted by scholars who studied this ritual gesture.
Some scholars have been significantly influenced in their interpretations by the NT
understanding of atonement. Others have reacted against this methodology and have
wanted to propose explanations free of NT influences. In the process of identifying the
meaning of this ritual, major scholars have skipped or performed limited study of the
concept of sin and at the same time understood the concept of atonement based on the
ANE texts and the Bible.45 Ultimately, many scholars used phenomenological, textual,
cultural-anthropological, socio-cultural, or comparative studies perspectives for
understanding this ritual gesture. The conceptual import from the ANE texts is most
frequent among biblical scholars who deal with ritual texts.46

45

These unsound hermeneutical tendencies are exposed throughout the present dissertation.

46

I will use as an example two prominent Pentateuchal scholars, David P. Wright and Bruce Wells
as they propose meaning to two different ritual texts/concepts in the Pentateuch. Examining laying on of
hands, Wright stated: “We now turn our attention to examples of a hand gesture from ancient Anatolia
which has a meaning almost identical to that of sacrificial hand placement in the Bible. The Hittite literary
corpus contains numerous examples of this gesture. But despite this fact, to my knowledge, very little has
been written about it, either by itself or as it might relate to the biblical rite. Because of this lack of
treatment and so that we will be able to perceive fully the similarity of the meaning of the Hittite gesture to
that in the Bible, we need to enter a somewhat detailed discussion regarding the form and meaning of the
Hittite gesture.” Wright, “The Gesture of Hand Placement,” 439–40. This detailed discussion takes place in
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Although the meaning of the laying on of hands in cultic Pentateuchal contexts
has been the subject of significant interest and intensive study over the last two centuries,
no comprehensive exegetical analysis of the passages or dissertation research dealing
directly with this topic has yet been undertaken. The present dissertation attempts to
provide a hermeneutical interpretative framework for laying on of hands. It first
undertakes exploring the concepts of sin and atonement inasmuch as they are the key
elements of the immediate literary and conceptual context within which laying on of
hands is found. It also includes exegeting the key passages where this ritual gesture is
found in the Pentateuch with the insights acquired through the study of sin and
atonement. The ultimate goal is to form a system that rests on the data found in the
Pentateuchal texts, but without imposing any system or interpretation based on extrabiblical sources. ANE texts will be sporadically consulted as a secondary tool, never as
the primary.

Scope and Delimitations of the Study
This study will be exegetical, contextual, terminological, and conceptual in its

6.5 pages of an essay without any mention of method how to compare two texts originating from two
significantly different historical eras and geographical locations. Wright himself stated that these two sets
of texts are not necessarily coming from the same historical era. This study suggests that such a brief study
is insufficient to establish the connection and the impact between these two sets of texts. In addition, the
ANE texts corpus is unstable in the sense that it continues to grow, while the biblical corpus is completed.
Attempting to give meaning to Lev 5:1 Wells suggested: “There are a number of Neo-Babylonian texts,
however, that do not derive from law codes but that shed light on the use of this expression. These are
records from trials and other legal contexts and prove helpful in understanding the function of the
expression in Lev 5:1.” Bruce Wells, The Law of Testimony in the Pentateuchal Codes (Wiesbaden:
Harrassowitz, 2004), 72.
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scope and does not intend to extend into the areas of systematic theology, ritual studies,47
or ethics. The exegetical process will consist of a close reading of the biblical text on the
following levels: historical context, grammar, semantics, syntax, historical and cultural
background, genre, biblical context, text, structure, and theology.48 Texts in which the
laying on of hands is found (Exod 29; Lev 1, 3, 4, 8, 16, 24; and Num 8) and where it is
not found, but expected (Lev 1:10–11, 5, 6, 12, 14, 15 and 9, 16, 23; Num 6, 15, 28–29)
will be exegeted in order to bring out as much data as possible from the texts themselves
that will help to determine the biblical meaning/function of this ritual gesture. The
exegesis of these texts is not exhaustive, but rather, focuses on the aspects of the analysis
that will inform the meaning/function of the ritual gesture. Exegesis is not needed in
cases of the multiple tables that are supplied in the present work, especially tables dealing

47

For ritual theories based upon these disciplines see Wesley J. Bergen, Reading Ritual: Leviticus
in Postmodern Culture, JSOTSupp 417 (London: T & T Clark International, 2005), 1–12; David P. Wright,
“Ritual Theory, Ritual Texts, and the Priestly-Holiness Writings of the Pentateuch,” in Social Theory and
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Society of Biblical Literature, 2012), 195–216; Ithamar Gruenwald, Rituals and Ritual Theory in Ancient
Israel (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 1–39; Bryan C. Babcock, Sacred Ritual: A Study of the West Semitic Ritual
Calendars in Leviticus 23 and the Akkadian Text Emar 446, BBRS 9 (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns,
2014), 1–78; Gane, Cult and Character; William K. Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible: Meaning
and Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); Jonathan Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and
the Temple: Symbolism and Supersessionism in the Study of Ancient Judaism (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006); and Jay Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement: The Priestly Conceptions, HBM 2
(Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2005). These sources contain references to the previous generation of
ritual scholars.
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Biblical Exegesis for Preaching and Teaching (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1981), 24–36; Grant
R. Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical Interpretation (Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 35–344; John H. Hayes and Carl R. Holladay, Biblical Exegesis: A
Beginner's Handbook (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 35–212; Otto Kaiser and Werner
Georg Kümmel, Exegetical Method: A Student's Handbook (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 1–41;
Gordon D. Fee and Douglas K. Stuart, How to Read the Bible for All Its Worth (Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan, 2003), 5–32; John Barton, Reading the Old Testament: Method in Biblical Study (Louisville,
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with sin classifications. The reasoning behind these classifications is not stated since the
questions pursued in them are very simple and in the majority of cases does not require
extensive study.
The gesture of laying on of hands is embedded in the sacrificial offering process
when the latter includes offering of an animal. Sin and/or general human sinfulness
(GHS) stand in the background of multiple reasons that initiate offering of a sacrifice,
such as acceptance, forgiveness, sanctification, and sin removal. The focus of the present
research is not the sacrificial process itself, with its multiple reference points for potential
research, even though attention is given to various elements in the analysis of certain
ritual texts. Rather, it seeks to establish a broader hermeneutical interpretative framework
to understand the meaning/function of the laying on of hand/s by studying the concept of
sin in the Pentateuch, as one of its major triggers, along with the GHS, and atonement as
a key sub-process of a broader process resulting from sacrificial offering. The present
study follows mainstream OT atonement scholars who claim that, based on Lev 16:16, it
is possible for the sin, both ritual impurity and moral, to be accumulated in the
sanctuary.49 The two phase atonement is also accepted in this dissertation as a biblically
sound concept.50
Besides basic theological concepts that connect the books of Exodus and
Leviticus, the organic unity of the Pentateuch will play an important role throughout the
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Gane, Cult and Character, 158, 161, 178, 231, 279, 314, 352, 380; Maccoby, Ritual and
Morality, 186; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 260; Johann C. K. von Hofmann, Der Schriftbeweis, 2nd ed.
(Nördlingen: C. H. Beck, 1859), 2/1:257–58; J. H. Kurtz, Sacrificial Worship of the Old Testament (trans.
James Martin; 1863; repr., Minneapolis, MA: Klock & Klock, 1980), 142.
See the scholarly sources for this theory and details about it in the subheading: Gane’s Theory of
Atonement and Understanding of  ִּמןin the present study.
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exegesis of the selected passages in order to determine the meaning of laying on of
hand/s. This means that the Pentateuch is considered as an account of a continuous
history and a literary whole written by a single author, Moses, in great part.51 The final
form of the OT text is accepted as primary material for deriving conclusions in the
present dissertation. The MT will be accepted as a basic source for the texts cited above
and others used in the process.

Methodology
The introductory chapter includes a survey of the literature relevant to the
meaning/function of the laying on of hands and classification of the main theories
proposed by biblical scholars. Due to its scope, delimitations, and goal, the present study
is divided into 3 major sections. The research in the first section is distributed in the
second and third chapters and focuses on the concept of sin in the OT, specifically in the
Pentateuch. The second chapter specifically deals with OT hamartiology, establishing a
proper method to study sin in the OT and specifically, moral sin in the Pentateuch. The
third chapter defines terminology that is used to express the nature of sin and the insights
from the Modern Legal System (MLS) and biblical law (BL). Special attention was given
to Lev 4–6.
The second section is spread over the fourth and fifth chapters and includes a reexamination of atonement in the Pentateuch. The study of  כִּ ֶּפרand other ways of
atonement is studied in chapter four, which includes an in-depth analysis of Lev 17:11
and 10:17. Chapter five analyzes the automatic defilement hypothesis (ADH) that is

Charles Elliott, “The Unity of the Pentateuch,” HSt 2 (1883): 305, 308.
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embedded in the concept of sin and atonement by the majority of biblical scholars of the
Ancient Israel cult.
The third section is covered in chapter six which presents the ritual theory
adopted in this study52 and evaluates arguments biblical scholars have proposed against
the transfer/substitution theory as the meaning of laying on of hands. Most of the
attention is given to the transfer/substitution and ownership theories since these two are
most debated in present scholarly dialogue. The present study proposes the
meaning/function of the laying on of hand/s based on the understanding of the concepts
of sin and atonement as its interpretative framework and evaluation of the arguments
proposed against it.
The seventh chapter will provide a conclusion of the entire study. It presents the
findings of the study in a coherent system where the details support the main goal of the
study: the meaning/function of the laying on of hands in cultic contexts.

52

This study does not apply any pre-formed ritual theories.
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CHAPTER 2

OT HAMARTIOLOGY

The first part of the first section covered in this chapter is divided into two major
parts. In the first part, I identify certain elements embedded in the study of sin in the OT,
such as obstacles, weaknesses, and various approaches that biblical scholars utilized to
define sin. I also review developments of the understanding of this concept in the OT.
Finally, having reviewed the major approaches and their weaknesses, I develop my own
approach to counter the weaknesses detected in previous approaches, and ultimately,
suggest a more solid and comprehensive understanding of sin.
With the knowledge acquired in the first part of this chapter, I undertake a more
focused study of the terms פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןin the second part of this chapter. These
terms play a key role in the overall understanding of atonement in the Pentateuch since
they are used in crucial passages such as Lev 4 and 16. The study of these terms reflects a
rigorous application of the approach developed in the first part of this chapter. The goal is
to define the sins that these terms refer to and establish whether they are intentional or
unintentional and expiable or inexpiable.1

1
Two basic components in defining sin are sin’s expiability and the sinner’s intent. In terms of
sin’s expiability, intentional sin refers to both non-brazen and brazen sin which differ by the fact that the
former is expiable and the latter is not expiable through the cult. In terms of the sinner’s intent, the term
intentional sin refers to the sin that is done with the sinner’s full awareness and intent to perform activity
and with the knowledge of the fact that that activity conflicts with God’s revealed regulations.
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OT Hamartiology: Obstacles, Weaknesses and Approaches
This chapter deals with certain elements of OT hamartiology such as major
obstacles, key approaches, insights from previous and research presented in the present
study, and a terminological study of the three most relevant Hebrew terms for sin ,פֶּשַׁ ע

חָ טָ א, and עָֹון. Scholars have recognized for a long time that in the history of Western
theological research, sin is one of the central, yet most complex concepts2 in the OT.3

Obstacles to OT Hamartiology
There is at least one literary (metaphorically) and two linguistically informed
reasons for the difficulty related to the study of sin.
First, the concept of sin has been expressed through several sets of different
In terms of sin’s expiability, unintentional sin refers to the sin that is expiable if God’s regulations
to handle it are followed. In terms of the sinner’s intent, the term unintentional sin refers to the sin that is
done with the sinner’s full awareness to perform activity that accidently or unknowingly turned into
committing a sin. The intent to act was not to perform sin, but the act accidentally or unknowingly turned to
be sin.
The use of terminology intentional/unintentional and expiable/inexpiable, along with their
meaning in this study are fully defined and explained in the subheading “Intentional and Unintentional Sins
in the Old Testament” on pp. 354–58 of the present study.
2
In the present study, the term concept refers to units of thought without a firm position on their
ontological status, that is, whether they are mental representations, abstract objects, or both. Joseph Ching
Po Lam, “The Metaphorical Patterning of the Sin-Concept in Biblical Hebrew” (PhD diss., University of
Chicago, 2012), 5. As will become obvious from the data derived from OT texts, the concept of sin is
variously portrayed—sometimes as a mental representation, sometimes as an abstract object, and
sometimes as both. However, since the core of this study does not examine the ontology of concepts, this
will not be explored here. For a more elaborate study on the ontology of concepts, see Eric Margolis and
Stephen Laurence, “The Ontology of Concepts-Abstract Objects or Mental Representations?,” NOÛS 41
(2007): 561–93.
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(1969): 112; Robin C. Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:31–40; Edward J. Young, The Study of Old Testament
Theology Today (Westwood, NJ: F. H. Revell, 1959), 18, 20, 44, 70, 74, 82.
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metaphors in the OT.4 Some of the most frequent ones used to portray sin against God are
rebellion (Ezek 2:3), forsaking and despising God (Isa 1:4), breaking the covenant (Deut
31:16), and so on.5 Based on the basic or literal meaning of the root חָ טָ א, Ryder Smith
noted that sin is metaphorically expressed as missing the target (Judg 20:16), losing the
path (Prov 19:2), and bearing the burden (Lev 20:20).6 The metaphors which focus on the
effect of the sin on the people convey that sin: it defiles the people along with the land
(Ezek 14:11; Lev 18:24–27), ensnares and rules over the people (Ps 119:133), causes the
people to stumble (Ezek 7:19), separates the people from God (Isa 59:2), and causes the
people to rot (Ezek 24:23).7
Second, the plethora of Hebrew terms was used to express this concept.8 The
statistics of the terms employed vary from at least 10,9 28,10 and 3111 to over 50.12 A high

Jay Sklar, “Sin,” OEBT 2:298; Charles Ryder Smith, The Bible Doctrine of Sin and of the Ways of
God with Sinners (London: Epworth Press, 1953), 16–22; Phillip P. Jenson, “Sin,” DOTHB 901. It has to
be recognized that Smith’s use of metaphors is usually closely related to the etymology of the Hebrew
terms for sin.
4

Sklar, “Sin,” 2:298–99.

5
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Smith, The Bible Doctrine of Sin and of the Ways of God with Sinners, 19.
Sklar, “Sin,” 2:298–99.
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Mark J. Boda, A Severe Mercy: Sin and Its Remedy in the Old Testament (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns,
2009), 6n6; Quell, “ἁμαρτάνω, ἁμάρτημα, ἁμαρτία,” TDNT 1:267–68; Alex Luc, “חטא,” NIDOTTE 2:87;
Ronald Youngblood, “A New Look at Three Old Testament Roots for ‘Sin,’” in Biblical and Near Eastern
Studies: Essays in Honor of William Sanford LaSor, ed. Gary E. Tuttle (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
1978), 201; Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, trans. D. M. G. Stalker (Louisville: Westminster
John Knox Press, 2001), 1:263.
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number of terms with a variety of contexts in which they are used and nuances they
emphasize are the primary reason why some purely terminological studies are not
rewarding in their treatment of the subject. In addition, some terms are used very
infrequently, which reduces the data base upon which one can establish the potential
meaning of that particular term.
Third, in observing the irregularity and inconsistency of the LXX’s use of Greek
terms to translate the Hebrew terminology employed for the concept of sin, Gottfried
Quell pointed to another issue related to the concept of sin:
The reasons for these defects in translation are not to be sought only in the methods of
the translators, but also in the peculiar difficulty of the Hebrew usage. It is obvious
that among the many words to be considered, none was exclusively devoted to
religious and theological use and therefore, none constitutes an exact equivalent to the
English “sin.” All the Heb. words in question had a secular, as well as a religious
sense, and, disparate though the relation often is, the very fact of this twofold usage
constitutes a warning not to overestimate the purely religious content of the term. On
closer inspection, all seem to be more or clearly the results of rational reflection
which is religious in content. They are theologoumena rather than original terms of
spontaneous experience, and the meaning falls into different groups.13
These are some of the difficulties which contributed to the complexity of studying
and understanding sin. In Quell’s understanding, the terminology in the first place was
not strictly related to the specific activities, but rather was to convey the occurrence of a
concept. He observed that six Greek terms were used to translate about 26 Hebrew
expressions for sin,14 which further confirms his claim that the terms for sin refer to the

Quell, “ἁμαρτάνω, ἁμάρτημα, ἁμαρτία,” TDNT, 1:269.
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the resolution of the problem as laid out in the introduction.
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concepts, rather than to the specific activities, the understanding that was also transferred
into the Greek-speaking world.15
This conceptual understanding of sin was also endorsed by other scholars. Ghana
Robinson noted that “the Old Testament writers were not interested in a theoretical or
philosophical discussion of sin.”16 Rather, as S. J. de Vries has pointed out, they only
“strove to reflect in their rich and vivid terminology the profundity and the widespread
effects of sin as they experienced it.”17

Major Weakness of the OT Hamartiology
To arrive at the conceptual understanding of sin, the above-mentioned scholars
analyzed all or most of the OT texts. The method they used to arrive at this conclusion is
based on the etymology of certain verbal and nominal terms for sin which, itself, has
weaknesses.18 This approach of over-relying on the basic meaning of certain terms was
correctly criticized by James Barr in his seminal work Semantic of Biblical Language.19
The essence of his critique is found in the following quotation:
Nevertheless there is a normative strain in the thought of many people about
language, and they feel that in some sense the “original,” the “etymological
meaning,” should be a guide to the usage of words, that the words are used ‘properly’
when they coincide in sense with the sense of the earliest known form from which
their derivation can be traced; and that when a word becomes in some way difficult or
Rolf P. Knierim, “חטא,” TLOT 1:411; Quell, “ἁμαρτάνω, ἁμάρτημα, ἁμαρτία,” TDNT, 1:268f.
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ambiguous an appeal to the etymology will lead to a “proper meaning” from which at
any rate to begin.20
Based on the previous quotation, etymology is not a reliable guide in determining
the meaning of words in all the contexts they are found in due to the fact that, as Barr
continued, “the etymology of a word is not a statement about its meaning but about its
history; it is only as a historical statement that it can be responsibly asserted, and it is
quite wrong to suppose that the etymology of a word is necessarily a guide either to its
‘proper’ meaning in a later period or to its actual meaning in that period.”21 While
etymology is helpful in shedding light on the usages of a given word, context22 seems to
be a substantially more reliable guide than the historical meaning that was once
associated with that particular word. Especially relevant for the Hebrew terms is the
concept Barr labelled as “root fallacy:”
It seems to be commonly believed that in Hebrew there is a “root meaning” which is
effective throughout all the variations given to the root by affixes and formative
elements, and that therefore the “root meaning” can confidently be taken to be part of
the actual semantic value of any word or form which can be assigned to an
identifiable root; and likewise that any word may be taken to give some kind of
suggestion of other words formed from the same root. This belief I shall for the sake
of brevity call “the root fallacy.”23
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The weakness of the root fallacy is that it does not notice the potential semantic
shift of given lexical items derived from a common root. In other words, the meaning of
various root derivatives and roots themselves expand/change over time. Thus, once more,
context is crucial to determining the most appropriate meaning in a given usage.

Key Approaches to the OT Hamartiology and Their Weaknesses
There are 3 basic types of analyses that scholars used in researching this
concept,24 but nonetheless, it has to be stated here that these types of approaches are not
mutually exclusive as the reading of the works that utilize them shows. Even more, a
slight or a greater overlap of two or even all three of them can be detected as one reviews
the studies on hamartiology mentioned below. Thus, the taxonomy of the approaches
rather indicates the emphasis each author placed on their analysis, rather than the totally
unique and independent approach.

Terminological Approach
The first analysis is labelled terminological, in which the emphasis is placed on
the meanings of certain, or a majority, or even all of the verbal or nominal derivatives of
the Hebrew roots that are associated with sin. Most of the analysis of this type includes
an examination of  חָ טָ א שַׁ ע,פֶּשַׁ ע, and עָֹון, and sometimes  ֶרשַׁ ע.25 Some of the key
representatives of this approach are R. C. Cover,26 R. Y. Youngblood,27 S. Lyonnet and
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L. Sabourin,28 Štefan Porúbcan,29 and Rolf Knierim.30 The findings of some of these
studies are considered later in the study and thus will not be presented here but it has to
be noted that scholars of this approach noticed them.
Undeniably, this type of analysis is inescapable since it provides a basic step to
gain understanding about a concept. However, the review of the studies in which this
approach was utilized reveals some serious weaknesses. First, by dealing with so many
terms that are associated with sin in the OT in its entirety, one is forced to be superficial
in his/her analysis and insensitive to all the linguistic possibilities and literary particulars
in regards to the terms in question due to the comprehensiveness of the scope of his/her
study.31 Second, the context in which the term is used and all usages of a term have to be
taken into consideration in order to gain a complete understanding.32 Finally, what lacks
in some studies that were limited in scope to  חָ טָ א,פֶּשַׁ ע, and  עָֹוןis the absence of or
limited ability of a researcher to observe linguistic patterns that were utilized in regards to
the uses of all the terms.33
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Biblical-Theological Approach
The second analysis is identified as biblical-theological and actually refers to the
pool of approaches which emphasize broader, over-arching ideas and themes which come
out of the historical-literal reading of the biblical texts. This approach assumes a solid
philological interpretation which, in part, overlaps with the previous, terminological
approach. As already mentioned above, a degree of emphasis and the organization of
biblical texts are two points of difference between this and the previous approach.
This approach inclines toward merging the biblical material into an allencompassing view of a topic or a historical development of a concept during the biblical
period. Works utilizing this approach do not offer fresh lexicographical or philological
aspects of terms under question and the concept is described in relation to other biblical
notions.34 The interrelatedness or organic relationship between some biblical concepts, in
the opinion of the proponent of this approach, is so important that examining them in
isolation “would destroy the organic texture of the texts and distort the results.”35
Representative scholars who employed this approach in their research on the
concept of sin include Yehezkel Kaufmann,36 Walter Eichrodt,37 Gerhard von Rad,38
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Brevard Childs,39 C. Ryder Smith,40 Jože Krašovec,41 and Mark Boda.42 Scholars
following this approach usually linked the concept of sin to the topics of forgiveness,
retribution/punishment, reward, confession, mercy, atonement, and so on.43 The intention
in these studies was to integrate various insights about the concept of sin found
throughout the entire canon into a general definition of it.
Thus, Eichrodt defined sin as “Verletzung des Gebots,” or “die Sünde als
Verletzung des Gebots.”44 Von Rad, limiting material he examined to P and Ezekiel,
suggested the conceptual understanding of sin as “any grave breach of this divine law
which Israel knew both in the shape of the series of cultic commandments and in the
shape of general ‘unwritten’ laws,”45 which, based on the terminological study which he
also included, also includes its penalty.46 Kauffmann defined sin as rebelliousness: “The
idea of man’s rebelliousness, by which Genesis explains the origins of the human
condition, is a fundamental idea of biblical literature and of Israelite religion in general.
One might call the Bible a chronicle of human rebellion.”47
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The change that Childs contributed to this approach was his introduction of the
canonical-theological element in which he claimed “that the object theological reflection
is the canonical writing of the Old Testament, that is, the Hebrew scriptures which are the
received traditions of Israel.”48 He defined sin as “the offence against the God of the
covenant.”49 Applying Child’s extensions to the biblical-theological approach, Boda
came up with the already seen definition of sin as “as a violation of God’s command.”50
However, Boda’s conclusions on his findings on sin of each of the three parts of the OT
are descriptive, rather than conceptual ranging from 2 to even 7 pages. His example, as
well as those of the previous scholars associated with this approach, present the main
weakness of this approach as verbalized by Lam:
Perhaps this is one of the weaknesses of the “canonical-thematic” approach: while it
encourages the construction of theology based on exegesis of the individual literary
portions of the Hebrew Bible, it encounters a greater obstacle at the level of synthesis,
for there is no theoretical basis for synthesis beyond the historical principle of canon
itself, which is by definition imposed on the material from the outside.51
The final results of this approach are always partially accurate with embedded
incompleteness of their assessment of the concept of sin along with descriptiveness,
rather than a precise definition of it. In addition to Lam’s criticism, Barr noticed that
“canonical criticism as it now stands, far from being the genuinely theological approach,
lies in an uneasy balance between the historical, the literary and the theological, unable to

48

Childs, Old Testament Theology, 6.

49

Childs, Old Testament Theology, 87.

50

Boda, A Severe Mercy, 517.
Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 92.

51

30

accept any one of them completely and unwilling to cut loose completely from any of
them either.”52

Metaphorical Approach
The third analysis is metaphorical in its scope. Scholars using this approach
attempted to explore specific themes relevant to sin, rather than endeavoring to describe
sin in its entirety. The review of studies that utilized this approach shows that the concept
of sin is mainly related to retribution, suffering, and impurity.53 A basic review of the
association of sin with retribution and suffering is presented below. The relation of sin
and impurity is not presented for multiple reasons, some of which follow.
First, impurity is just another term used by some key scholars, to which Lam
referred under the subheading “Studies on Sin and Impurity” in his dissertation to denote
sin in the OT. A review of some studies that use the term impurity undeniably refer to sin
which is a concept rather than a metaphor. Lam himself recognized that.54 Second, a
scholar’s treatment of impurity as a metaphor is essentially minimal. One type of
impurity, ritual impurity, is perceived by all scholars as a literal entity, while they are
divided on the use of moral impurity. Third, none of the scholars who used the noun
metaphor or more often, the adjective metaphorical proposed a valid explanation as to
where to draw a line between the majority of literal uses and the few metaphorical uses of
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impurity in the OT.55 Also, by rule, the definition of the metaphor is missing in those
studies. Lam himself noticed that the studies on sin in the OT were closely related to the
etymologies of certain terms for sin.56 Some totally or almost always avoided metaphor in
their studies.57 The concept of metaphor was important for Neusner,58 but Lam also
noticed significant weaknesses of his use of metaphor.59 Milgrom and Wright used the
terms metaphorical and metaphor, but in an inconsistent way.60 Klawans rejected
metaphor as an option for expressing sin and proposed that sin/impurity, both ritual and
moral, are real.61 Lam omitted reference to some significant scholars who tried to utilize
metaphor in their studies on sin, but none of them offered what metaphor or metaphorical
represented in their studies.62 Fourth, all these scholars were interested in delineating the
nature of sin that is expressed in the OT texts, which is an attempt in the present study,
rather than finding metaphors associated with sin. These are just some, but not all, of the
significant reasons why considering impurity as a metaphor for sin seems to be an
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unjustifiable endeavor. One should, rather, look at it as the term some scholars used to
refer to the concept of sin.
Among those scholars who studied sin in relation to retribution is Klaus Koch in
his extensive article “Gibt es ein Vergeltungsdogma im Alten Testament?”63 His response
to the question is that retribution is misleading when applied to biblical texts. Instead,
Koch claimed that there is a link between a deed and its consequence. The latter is a fated
result (good or bad) bound up with a deed in nascent form, the way a seed produces a
plant.64 The change Koch brought to the discussion on the relationship between sin and
retribution was a major alternative to the juridical view of divine retribution in the OT.
This view generated a lot of criticism, even though it was accepted by many other
scholars.65
As regards the question of the relationship between sin and suffering, scholars
traditionally claimed that it is either literal-causal (sin causes suffering, either by the
imposition of God or by some intrinsic effect of sin) or metaphorical (i.e., sin is being
portrayed as physical suffering or sickness). Still, the predominant response is the former
one and it is based on attempts to synthesize insights from biblical material.66 The views
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of Klaus Seybold,67 Michael Brown,68 Frederick Lindström,69 Karel van der Toorn,70 and
Günter Röhser are some of the key studies in this regard. However, due to in-depth
analysis devoted to these studies, along with critiques presented in Lam’s work, it will
not be replicated here.71

Terminological/Contextual/Intertextual Approach
Review of the findings of all these approaches makes it obvious that there is a
tendency, or even necessity to portray sin as a concept. The terminology for sin is
immense. Terms are associated with a variety of settings and contexts. All these facts
related to sin add so many facets to it that treating it as a concept, as the research on the
topic shows, seems to be a necessity and the correct way to approach the term. Thus, the
conceptual understanding of sin is accepted in the present study. The present study seeks
to explore the concept of sin in two steps.
The first step will be to derive the data about sin from texts. The focus of this step
is to gather elements of the concept of sin from Pentateuchal texts and establish the
meaning of the concept. This step consists in presenting and evaluating previous research
on the concept and evaluating of the understandings of the key representatives of various
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schools of interpretations against the texts of the Pentateuch. This step will finally
propose an understanding of the concept of sin based on the findings gained during the
process.
The second step is reviewing the terminology used for sin. In order to avoid the
fallacy of “defaulting” to the etymology, the present study will establish certain pattern
that will consider certain elements of the literary context. This pattern will provide a
more complete understanding of sin where context plays a key role in the process of
determining the meaning of terms and the concept itself. The higher awareness of the
literary and linguistic specifics found in the texts where terms are used is provided by
limitations to the texts of the Pentateuch and to the terms פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and עָֹון. In addition,
this will prevent this terminological study from the inadequacies noted in the previous
terminological studies. This linguistic limitation to the terms פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןis
particularly relevant for the present study since its overall goal is linked to the removal of
sin from the sanctuary and consequently, from the people on the Day of Atonement. The
terms  פֶּשַׁ עand  חָ טָ אalong with  טָ מֵ אare used in Lev 16:16 to articulate the sins
accumulated in the sanctuary while the list is modified in Lev 16:21 where פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א,
and  עָֹוןare used to denote sins that were taken away from the camp by the scapegoat.
Notable scholars in the area of atonement and ritual studies in the OT have suggested that
these three terms refer to very specific and particular types of sins.72 This step will
examine whether the uses of these terms in the Pentateuch texts confirm such a claim.
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Remarks on Sin and Impurity: Insights from the Previous Research
A survey of scholarly attempts to define the concept of impurity in the OT shows
that there are two major schools. One school recognizes that there are two distinct types
of impurity,73 while the other school studies impurity as an organic whole.74 In regards to
the former proposal, one type is referred to as ritual and the other as moral impurity. Two
questions permeated scholarly dialogue on the topic of impurity: (1) Is the division of
impurity to ritual and moral plausible or it should be considered as a whole? and (2) What
is the relationship between the two types of impurity? The goal of this section is based on
the up-to-date scholarly findings and additional research provided in the present study
and to suggest proposals on both of these questions.
The existence of one or two types of impurity and the relationship between
possibly two types was considerably debated in the last century,75 and delineating the
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types of this concept and their potential interrelatedness is a complex task.76 It seems that
there are multiple reference points of the research on this concept in the OT which
heavily influence the final outcome.77 The chronological development of this debate will
be presented below, along with the arguments of the key representatives. The topic is still
unsettled in scholarly debates regardless of massive attempts by biblical scholars to
resolve it.78 This disagreement is more related to the question of the relationship of the
two natures than to the number of natures.

Impurity in the OT in Modern Studies
David Hoffmann
The earliest attempt to define the relationship between two natures of impurity in
the OT in modern times is that of David Hoffmann.79 In his significant commentary on
Leviticus he divided impurities into two groups following a division accepted in various
traditional Jewish sources. The first type of impurity, the ritual one, stands in opposition
to purity, while the second type, the moral one, stands in opposition to holiness.80
The bipartite division to ritual and moral impurity was not an innovation
developed by Hoffmann himself. Terminologically and conceptually, this division
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originated from Talmudic and medieval rabbinic literature down to Philo and the early
rabbinic sages (the Tannaim) wherein this distinction of ritual bodily impurity and
impurity resulting from sinful behavior was also debated.81
Hoffman categorized the sources of ritual defilement into three groups: (1)
impurity contracted from a dead human (Num 19) or dead animal (Lev 11:24–40;
22:5);(2), impurity obtained from natural or unnatural genital discharges (Lev 15),
childbirth (Lev 12), and leprosy (Lev 14); and (3) impurity attained via contact through
ritual objects that rendered one impure like a scapegoat (Lev 16:26), a burnt sin offering
(Lev 16:27–28), and the ashes for the water of cleansing (Num 19:7–10). These sources
of impurity are discussed basically in Lev 11–15 and Num 19.82 Ritual defilement,
contrary to moral defilement, is symbolic and symbolizes sin.83 Hoffmann noted that
ritual impurity can be transferred to other humans and objects, but its effect is temporary
and can be altered through a purification ritual.84
The second type of impurity originates from sinful behavior including eating
forbidden foods, performing idolatrous acts, and various sexual sins.85 There is no means
of purification for this type of impurity except for the sacrificial ritual on the Day of
Atonement (Lev 16).86 Based on Lev 18:24–25, Hoffmann concluded that this impurity

81

Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 6.

82

Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 1:303.

83

Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 1:315, 340; D. Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus (Berlin:
Poppelauer, 1906), 2:59.
Haber, “They Shall Purify Themselves,” 10–11.

84
85

Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 1:303; Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 2:22.

86

Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 1:315.

38

defiled the land and caused the exile of its inhabitants.87 In addition, based on Leviticus
11:43 and 19:31, this impurity affected the sinner’s well-being.88 For this reason,
Hoffmann also referred to this defilement as defilement pertaining to the soul.89 Although
emphasizing that this defilement affected the soul of the sinner, he believed that it also
defiled their body.90 However, the defilement by sin which was the concern of Lev 18
was of a different kind than the ritual defilement which was delineated in Lev 15. The
latter one was temporal and could be removed by ablution, while the former one affected
both body and soul and could not be removed by ablution.91 Commenting on the
commandment against necromancy in Lev 19:31, Hoffmann concluded that this
defilement, being moral in nature, affected both sinner’s body and soul and, as a result,
the sinner was rejected by God.92 In his understanding, this defilement was concrete
rather than symbolic.93
Hoffmann’s division portrays two basic natures of the concept of impurity/sin.
Sklar has correctly noted that this division does not differentiate defilement that
originates from intentional and unintentional sins. In addition, symbolic correspondence
between the three sources of ritual impurity and three different types of sin is
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unconvincing due to the lack of objective criteria to support it.94 Susan Haber added more
substantial criticism of Hoffmann’s work by noting that his division of impurity to ritual
and moral was driven by his dualistic view of humans to body and soul. The first was
affected by ritual and the latter was affected by moral impurity. However, texts of the OT
do not give support for the concept of human dualism.95

Alfred Büchler
Alfred Büchler followed Hoffmann in adopting a bipartite division of impurity,
but used different terms for each impurity. However, Klawans noted that Büchler never
settled on a fixed terminology regarding these two defilements which, beside other issues
related to his work,96 seems to confuse the readers.97 However, instead of Hoffmann’s
ritual defilement, Büchler frequently used the term levitical defilement to refer to the
defilement that originates in certain natural conditions.98 These defilements are outlined
in the regulations found in Leviticus 11–15 and Numbers 19. He claimed that this
defilement was impermanent contagion.99 For acts resulting from sinful behavior, he used
multiple terms such as moral, spiritual, and religious, instead of Hoffmann’s term moral
defilement.100 Sklar noted that Büchler established four points of difference between these
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two defilements.101 First, moral defilements are the result of some moral lapse.102 Second,
moral defilements are cleansed via punishment, while levitical are cleansed by prescribed
rituals.103 Third, moral defilements are not contagious, while levitical ones can be.104
Fourth, the biblical use of defilement language to discuss moral defilements is symbolic
or figurative, while that is not the case with levitical defilements.105 Sklar’s criticism of
Hoffmann’s work also applies to Büchler’s. That is, Büchler does not differentiate
between defilement that originates from intentional and unintentional sinful behavior.106
Both the works of Hoffmann and Büchler were neglected by subsequent scholars
on purity/impurity due to their weaknesses and the style in which they were written.
Klawans pointed out that Büchler’s work is outdated in terms of methodology and the
discovery of Qumran corpus.107 Sklar noted that neither of these two authors made a
difference between the defilement that arises from unintentional and intentional sins and
they did not discuss the difference between minor and major ritual/levitical
defilements.108
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Gedalyahu Alon
Just two years before Büchler’s death, Gedalyahu Alon published his first essay
wherein he pioneered the thesis that the major impurity debate among ancient Jews
concerned geographical boundaries of the realm of purity.109 Alon claimed that in the
Second Temple period, two conflicting trends established themselves among Jews. One
insisted on restrictions and limiting the laws of purity to the sphere of the Temple and
priests, and the other one insisted on enlargement and extending these laws to be
applicable to all of Israel.110 Based on this model, the Pharisees were maximalists,
expanding the realm of purity beyond the temple limits, while the Sadducees were
minimalists, restricting the realm of purity to the temple confines only.111 Alon’s thesis
was criticized in details by Sanders112 and proven to be problematic in terms of method
and the interpretation of the evidence;113 nevertheless, along with Jacob Neusner’s,
Alon’s works became the most influential treatments of the topic.114 Klawans correctly
criticized Alon’s proposal on the fact that the defiling force of impurity cannot be
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exclusively in spatial/geographic terms only.115

Jacob Neusner
Jacob Neusner is an important scholar who evidently eliminated the distinction
between ritual and moral impurity. That is especially obvious in his monumental work
The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism.116 He suggested that “the notion of ‘an ethical
offense, a sin’ evolved from the general class of ‘acts that make you unfit for the holy
community.’”117 Neusner’s work covers various corpuses such as (1) Hebrew Bible, (2)
Qumran texts, (3) Second Temple Literature, and (4) Rabbinic literature. In regard to the
Hebrew Bible, he stated that “the biblical corpus of ideas about purity may be divided
into two distinct parts, the interpretation of purity and impurity as a metaphor of morality,
on the one hand, and the specific laws about purity and impurity in connection with the
Temple cult, on the other.”118
This statement is virtually identical to his conclusion on the purity/impurity in
ancient Israel as the following quotation shows: “Two important ideas about purity and
impurity come down from ancient Israel: first, purity and impurity are cultic matters;
second, they may serve as metaphors for moral and religious behavior, primarily in
regard to matters of sex, idolatry, and unethical action.”119
Neusner understood that purity/impurity is a single-nature concept but it can be
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interpreted in two different ways. In his opinion, the texts in the so called Priestly Law
Code which are related to the cult120 are to be understood literally. On the other hand,
texts from the rest of the Hebrew Bible are to be understood metaphorically121 and are
related to moral behavior.122 These behaviors involve idolatry, illicit sexual relationships,
which includes marital fidelity, and they all defile the land.123
However, Neusner was not able to uphold this distinction to the literal and
metaphorical interpretation of the purity/impurity in his own work. Neusner equated his
two distinct ways of interpreting purity/impurity laws by equating defilement of the
people and the land through the land’s connection to the cult in texts such as Lev 18:24–
25, Lev 20:25–26, and Num 35:34.124 In doing that, Neusner related both of his
interpretations of impurity to the temple, and this association of impurity and the temple
became fundamental to his understanding of impurity.125 The following quotation
demonstrates that:
The Temple supplied to purity its importance in the religious life. As the Temple
signified divine favour, and as the cult supplied the nexus between Israel and God, so
purity, associated so closely with both, could readily serve as an image either of
divine favor or of man’s loyalty to god. From that fact followed the assignment of
impurity to all that stood against the Temple, the cult, and God: idolatry above all.
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Neusner abandoned this dichotomy between literal and metaphorical
understanding of purity/impurity as he studied this concept in two corpuses of literature,
Qumran texts, and Rabbinic literature. In regards to Qumran texts, he stated: “One cannot
distinguish between cultic and moral impurity. In themselves and in their consequences,
they are identical.”126 In regard to Rabbinic literature, Neusner noted that
the variety and character of the rabbis’ list of social evils yielding leprosy-gossiping,
selfishness, and the rest-are routine and unexceptional. Such commonplace social
vices will characterize any sort of society. What is striking is not the catalogue of
sins, therefore, but the imputation of leprosy as the result of those sins. This extreme
interpretation begins with nothing more than the biblical use of impurity as a
metaphor for sin. The metaphor is, however, shattered. Instead of maintaining
impurity is like gossip of fornication, or gossip or fornication is like impurity, the
rabbis held gossip or fornication produces impurity.127
The critique of Neusner’s position on impurity/purity written by Mary Douglas is
found in the appendix of his The Idea of Purity in the Ancient Judaism. The main thrust
of her critique was directed towards Neusner’s dichotomy between literal and
metaphorical understanding of purity laws concerning the temple. In the Priestly texts,
these laws are understood literally, while in the rest of the Bible, they are interpreted
metaphorically suggested: “Since it is clear that the temple rules and sex rules and food
rules are a single system of analogies, they do not converge on any one point but sustain
the whole moral and physical universe simultaneously in their systematic
interrelatedness.”128
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Klawans took a further step in critiquing Neusner’s work directly, and Douglas’s
critique indirectly, by stating that neither Neusner’s nor Douglas’s positions adequately
make sense of the biblical impurity system. The question left unanswered is whether the
defiling force of sin is merely a metaphor and whether the adulterer is considered to be
ritually impure. Neusner would say “yes” to the first question, contrary to Douglas, while
Douglas would say “yes” to the second question, contrary to Neusner.129

Mary Douglas
Some consider Mary Douglas as a proponent of one nature of impurity,130 but this
is a too simplified portrayal of how she understood this concept. Douglas’ Purity and
Danger, published in 1966, has been recognized to advance the theoretical foundation for
all subsequent works on ritual impurity in the OT. Some of her ideas were refuted and
shown to be mistaken,131 but the basic claims of her work are still widely accepted. For
the purpose of the present study, four of them will be summarized here.132
First, Douglas proposed that defilement is not a primitive concept. She challenged
a conceptual barrier common for anthropologists and scholars of religion that the notions
of defilement were totally absent from the categorization known to contemporary man.
As a result, many scholars today recognize that all people in all times have concepts of
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dirt and pollution which are structurally similar and can be compared in spite of their
significant differences.133
Douglas’s second suggestion is the claim that the conception of defilement is
systematic in its nature in any given culture. Referring to pollution by analogy, she said
that “where there is a dirt there is a system.” Dirt, in any given system, is “matter out of
place.”134 Douglas claimed that defilement is a structure and as such, all its components
should be studied in the context of the system rather than as separate entities.135 For
instance, the menstrual taboo cannot be properly understood by collecting examples from
various cultures that shun this substance and then comparing the results. Rather, the
systems of defilement should be studied, such as the way defilement is conveyed, the
totalities of things that pollute, and so on. Her definition of pollution as “matter out of
place” has not convinced all,136 but seeing systems of defilement still remains essentially
unchallenged until the present.137
Third, building on the concept of purity/defilement as systematic was Douglas’s
next step in claiming that this system is symbolic. She saw a symbolic system at work in
the fact that some animals are shunned, some body fluids are to be avoided, and so on. To
Douglas, body symbolism was central in understanding the defilement system. Since the
body symbolizes society, there is a correspondence between the attitudes toward societal
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and bodily boundaries.138 As a result, she also set forth a symbolic interpretation of the
Israelite dietary laws. Here, symbolism is not found in the correspondence between the
body and society, but between diet and the categories of creation. However, her symbolic
interpretations of Leviticus 11 in light of Genesis 1139 are not universally recognized.140
Some notable theorists still believe that the ancient Israelite impurity system is
arbitrary.141
Fourth, Douglas also claimed that symbolic systems have social functions; they
influence and control human behavior and interaction. They influence all social classes
and control undesired social and sexual behavior.142 It is ironic, as Douglas noted, that
such systems are likely to flourish in the absence of desired effective forms of social
control rather than when the society has them. Note Douglas’s statement:
When male dominance is accepted as a central principle of social organization and
applied without inhibition and with full rights of physical coercion, beliefs in sex
pollution are not likely to be highly developed. On the other hand, when the principle
of male dominance is applied to the ordering of social life but is contradicted by other
principles such as that of female independence, or the inherent right of women as the
weaker sex to be more protected from violence than men, then sex pollution is likely
to flourish.143
Keeping in mind these key claims of what Douglas’ system consists of and of
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remarks she wrote particularly in the chapter “Internal Lines of her Purity and Danger,” it
can be inferred that her understanding of impurity is complex and cautious. There are
statements that lead a person to conclude undoubtedly that Douglas saw defilement and
sin as a single category, having one nature like the following one: “Pollution has indeed
much to do with morals.”144 On the other hand, there are statements which point to the
fact that she saw two natures of this concept, such as the following: “Pollution rule only
highlights a small aspect of morally disapproved behavior.”145 Therefore, Klawans seems
to be right in stating that Douglas’s understanding on this phenomenon was rather more
nuanced than that of scholars who made such claims based on her work.146

Hyam Maccoby
Hyam Maccoby believed that there is a basic distinction between ritual and moral
in the OT, as well as in rabbinic literature. Ritual impurity originates from various actions
and physical conditions, many of which are not sinful. Being ritually impure was never a
sin and was limited to Israelites only. He claimed that “ritual purity forms part of the
code of holiness, by which the Israelites were set apart as a ‘kingdom of priests.’ Other
parts of this holiness code are the rules about permitted and forbidden foods, the rules
about the Sabbath and the festivals, the rules about the performance of sacrifice in the
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Temple. All these rules are laid down for Israelites alone.”147
On the other hand, “the laws of morality, which Israelites share with the rest of
humanity, take precedence over them. In every case where there is a conflict between
ritual and morality, ritual gives way to morality.”148
Maccoby denied that morality stands behind ritual laws and claimed that they are
rather dedicatory in their nature and function. He followed the proposal of previous
scholars149 in accepting that the cycle of birth and death is the rationale behind ritual laws
in the OT.150 Observing that ritual impurity results from physical states and conditions
related to birth (genital fluxes, childbirth) and death (corpses, scale-disease), he
concluded that the ritual purity laws guarded the Temple/tabernacle not just from death,
but from the entire cycle of mortality. In Maccoby’s view, there is a significant gap
between moral and ritual laws. For him, ritual laws are related to the Temple/tabernacle,
while moral laws are applicable to both Jews and non-Jews. Even though Maccoby’s
work encountered dispute and critique on some points, especially the metaphorical use of
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impurity terminology in Lev 18 and 20 and insistence on the total separation between
moral and ritual laws,151 his fresh emphasis on mortality as a rationale for the ritual laws,
along with the division of moral and ritual impurity, were welcomed among scholars.

Jacob Milgrom
The understanding of impurity in the works of Jacob Milgrom152 is informed by
his application of critical approaches of redaction criticism153 and source criticism to the
OT texts.154 He believed that Leviticus comprises two sources—the so-called P
source/tradition, which is mostly found in Lev 1–16, and the H source, which is found in
Lev 17–27. However, P source is also found in H texts and vice versa, but in a rather
small number of texts.155 In Milgrom’s system, impurities in these two sources in
Leviticus differ greatly. In P,  טָ מֵ אstrictly means ritual impurity, referring to three sources
of impurity: (1) corpse, (2) scale disease, and (3) genital discharges. In H, to the contrary,
it is used metaphorically in non-ritualistic contexts such as the law against adultery (Lev
18:20) and other sexual violations (Lev 18:24), and Israel’s land (Lev 18:25–28).156
Klawans noted that three of the four claims of Douglas’s ritual theory mentioned above
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greatly impacted Milgrom’s understanding of ritual impurity. First, avoidance behaviors
are not inherently or distinctively primitive. Second, avoidance rules in any culture as a
system form a coherent definition of things which are permitted or forbidden, and things
that are sacred and defiled. Third, a system as such is symbolic in its nature. As a result
of adopting these claims, Milgrom treated ritual impurity as a system wherein rules for
certain ritual impurities apply to other impurities similar to them, even though they are
not stated in the latter, but only the former texts.157
He also endorsed the fact that the entire system of ritual impurities has death as a
common denominator, admitting that this rationale was suggested by many other
scholars158 first by A. Dillmann and V. Ryssel in 1897,159 and later by Feldman,160 and
Füglister in 1977.161
Klawans traced the first-time occurrence of this suggestion even earlier, namely to
the work of Edersheim162 in 1874.163 This systematic and symbolic understanding of
ritual impurity is thoroughly developed in the first volume of Milgrom’s Anchor Bible
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Commentary, Leviticus 1–16 which was published in 1990.164
Besides ritual impurity, Milgrom endorsed the existence of moral impurity, which
works very differently than ritual impurity. Milgrom has done this by studying the
defiling force of these two impurities. Agreeing with previous scholars who adopted two
natures of impurity, Milgrom noted that contrary to ritual impurity defilement that
originates from various sources of defilement and refers to the state, moral impurity
originates from sinful actions165 and does not defile the sinner in any distinct way.166 The
defining power of moral impurity is directed towards the sanctuary, not the sinner, and, in
Milgrom’s view, cleansing of the sanctuary from this impurity is achieved via a sin, or as
he renamed it, a purification offering.167 Being informed by Milgrom’s theory of the
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The first attempts to establish purification offering translation for  חַ טָּ אתsacrifice appeared in
the first half of the twentieth century. James Barr and A. R. S. Kennedy, “Sacrifice and Offering,” DB 874.
However, Milgrom was the most influential proponent of this translation in modern times. He claimed that
the translation “sin offering” for “ חַ טָּ אתis inaccurate on all grounds: contextually, morphologically, and
etymologically” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 253. This is an overstatement, and it is more accurate to say that
this translation is partially inaccurate. All the arguments he cited to support this claim are informed by the
notion that  כִּ פֶּרrefers to cleansing in cultic ritual texts. First, in order to prove that this translation was not
contextually supported, he cited Lev 8; Exod 29:36–37; Lev 12, and Num 6 and concluded that “the ḥaṭṭāʾt
is prescribed for persons and objects who cannot have sinned.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 253. It is
impossible to suppose that the persons involved in the events these texts record would not sin during
periods of different lengths after which they were required to offer a sin offering (Lev 12, Num 8) or were
offering sin offerings on a daily basis (Lev 8; Exod 29:36–37). For instance, a new mother is prohibited
from coming to the sanctuary and subsequently offering any kind of sacrifice forty or eighty days,
depending on the child’s gender. Failing to include in his atonement theory GHS as a constant disadvantage
of human beings before God and the necessity that actual sin could have been committed by the participant
of the events described in these texts, caused him not to see that חַ טָּ את, the sacrifice involved in mending
those experiences, actually deals with sin or GHS. Consequently, the texts Milgrom selected to support his
contextual argument do not support it if GHS and actual sin are considered. Second, Milgrom’s
morphological argument was anticipated by James Barr already in 1963. Barr and Kennedy, “Sacrifice and
Offering,” 874.That is, morphologically,  חַ טָּ אתappears to be piel rather than qal derivative, and so it refers
to cleansing or decontaminating. Milgrom added that “water of  ”חַ טָּ אתserves exclusively for purifying
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sacrifice in Lev 4–5, some scholars concluded that passages like Lev 18:24–31, Lev
20:1–3, and Num 35:33–34, which are associated with moral impurity and use purity
terminology, represent a metaphorical use of purity language. However, a number of
others, to the contrary, concluded that these texts use purity language literally as the ritual
texts do. The land is defiled in some way by the grave sins listed in these texts.168 The
same line of interpretation was suggested by Hoffmann and Büchler almost a century
ago, as shown above, and it was taken up by some modern scholars as well,169 whose
systems will be presented below.
Thus, the works on moral defilement by other scholars in the 90s170 were
most cases,  חַ טָּ אתatones individuals/groups because of their sin or GHS based on ransom as established in
the present study. Lev 4 is a prime example. Richard E. Averbeck, “חַ טָּ את,” NIDOTTE 2:95. Third,
Milgrom’s etymological argument is unconvincing since the sources he cited—LXX, Philo (Laws 1. 226),
Josephus (Ant. 3.230), and Rabbi Eliezer (m. Zebaḥ. 1:1)—all follow sin offering translation. Milgrom did
cite two other rabbinic references (b. Šebu. 8a; Ker. 26a) which are insufficient to prove that  חַ טָּ אתis
unrelated to sin, as he stated. Milgrom concluded his about 590 word-long study on the change of חַ טָּ את
translation from sin offering to purification offering with the following statement: “The advantage of
freeing the ḥaṭṭāʾt from the theologically foreign notion of sin and restoring to it its pristine meaning of
purification is that now it is possible to see this sacrifice in its true ancient Near Eastern setting. Israel was
part of a cultic continuum which abounded in purifications both of persons and of buildings, especially
sanctuaries. The ḥaṭṭāʾt, I aver, is the key that opens the door to this world (for details see Milgrom
1971a).” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 254. Based on the study of hamartiology and atonement presented in the
current study, Milgrom’s freeing  חַ טָּ אתfrom its relations to sin by suggesting its name of purification
offering instead of sin offering is not advantageous in discovering its correct meaning/function, but rather a
disregard of explicit statements in biblical texts, as well as an overall biblical portrayal of human nature and
the complexity of divine-human interaction due to human nature. Removing sin or, in Milgrom’s words
“cleansing,” is a very limited function of  חַ טָּ אתwhile atonement of human beings because of their sin or
GHS is much more frequent. Therefore, sin offering remains better, even though not the best translation, of
חַ טָּ את. It is certainly significantly more accurate than purification offering.
168
The three main impurities outlined in these texts are sexual immorality, idolatry, and murder,
respectively. Other texts, outside of the Pentateuch, also speak about these three sins: Jer 2:4–7; Ezek 22:1–
4; Ps 106:34–42.
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informed by Milgrom’s two claims: (1) a systematic look at ritual defilement which
paved the way for also considering moral defilement as a set of regulations that operates
in a coherent fashion and (2) like ritual impurity, moral impurity is also symbolic and
forms a background of his understanding of the sacrifice outlined in Lev 4–5. However,
Klawans noted that Milgrom’s own work on moral impurity in the second volume of his
Anchor Bible Commentary, Leviticus 17–22, published in 2000,171 was not systematic.
While Milgrom included multiple excursuses or digressions in Leviticus 1–16 to develop
his systematic approach to ritual impurity, such an approach on moral impurity is absent
from the subsequent volume on Leviticus 17–22. He uses other terms such as
metaphorical impurity172 and non-ritual impurity173 to refer to moral impurity. Klawans
claimed that “in these cases [referring to the references from Milgrom’s Leviticus 17–22],
the adjectives are not the additional ones qualifying a description of moral impurity;
rather these adjectives are used instead of the referent ‘moral.’”174 Milgrom was also
inconsistent in using the term “impure” because, in a number of instances, he used it
metaphorically,175 while in a number of other instances, he used it literally.176 The lack of
a terminological consistency along with the absence of tables to map out moral impurity,
which are noticeable in great numbers in Leviticus 1–16 in relation to ritual impurity,
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shows a deficiency of a developed system of moral impurity in Milgrom’s work.177
Milgrom’s approach to all 3 main sources of moral impurity is different. He
claimed that the act of murder defiles the land (Num 35:33–34) as an age-old notion
based on texts such as Gen 4:10–12 and Deut 21:1–9.178 He affirmed that the defilement
in this case is literal.179
However, Milgrom claimed that the sexual prohibitions of Lev 18 and their
defiling effect on the land involve a metaphorization of the earlier idea that murder
defiles the land in a literal way. This metaphorization takes place at two levels: (1) In Lev
18,  טָ מֵ אis used metaphorically, contrary to its literal use in ritual impurity texts, so-called
P,180 and (2) Lev 18 developed and applied to sex the earlier ideas applicable to murder
only.181 The latter level is based on the following quotation: “Thus whereas homicide
literally pollutes the area where the blood is spilled, in H, sexual violations
metaphorically pollute the entire land.”182
Milgrom’s treatment of the defiling force of idolatry is the most complex one. His
treatment of idolatry is actually limited to Molech worship (Lev 20:1–3), and he claimed
that its defiling force is limited to the sanctuary only.183 This mode of sanctuary
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defilement is based on Milgrom’s proposal postulated in his article “Israel’s Sanctuary:
The Priestly ‘Picture of Dorian Gray’” wherein he proposed that the impurity defiles the
sanctuary without any threat to the land.184
In order to maintain this claim, Milgrom had to propose two additional claims.
First, idolatry is not morally defiling in H.185 He did so by stating that the defiling force
of idolatry is evident in H, but it is limited to Molech worship.186 In general, idolatry is
not defiling.187 Encountering the fact that the defiling force of idolatry is evident and well
established among seventh-century prophets, Milgrom claimed that based on the defiling
effect of Molech worship, they adopted the view that all forms of idolatry are defiling.188
Second, since Molech worship is mentioned in Lev 18:21, Milgrom had to
address this text, since in this text, Molech worship, like other sins enumerated in this
chapter, defiles not just the sanctuary, as stated Lev 20:1–3, but based on Lev 18:24–30,
also defiles the land. His comments on Lev 18:21 seem to assume that the prohibition
against Molech worship essentially does not belong with the sexual sins of Lev 18 at all.
It was placed there because child sacrifice destroys human seed and thus interferes with
procreation, even though the defiling effects of Molech worship, which defiles the
sanctuary only, is different from the defiling force of sexual sins, which defile the land.189
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However, Milgrom showed inconsistency regarding this claim when he discussed
the Holiness topic in one of his Leviticus 17–22 excursuses where he stated that Molech
worship does defile both sanctuary and the land.190 Regardless of the inconsistency of his
view on the defiling force of Molech worship, Milgrom generally believed that this
activity defiles the sanctuary only. Klawans correctly countered Milgrom’s position on
two grounds.191 First, the act of Molech worship itself includes the act of bloodshed
associated with murder, which would undeniably defile the land (Num 35:33–34).
Milgrom did endorse the defiling force of bloodshed and murder.192
Second, it is well established in the prophetic books and writings that idolatry,
along with sexual and murderous sins, was morally defiling in Ancient Israel.193 For these
two reasons, the claim that sexual sins and murder defile the land and that only one form
of idolatry, worship to Molech, defiles the sanctuary but not the land, is highly
questionable.194
Idolatry, presented in the Pentateuch and the rest of the OT, is combined with
both sexual sins and murder and, as such, it does morally defile all: the participants of
such activity, the sanctuary and the land. It would be possible to imagine idolatry that
would not include any sexual sins or murder and, as such, could have been non-defiling
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in its nature, but that is not the sort of idolatry that the Pentateuch and the rest of the OT
portray. 195
Milgrom’s distinction between sanctuary defilement and land defilement is also
problematic because in some places he maintained this concept,196 while in other places,
he mitigated it.197 The distinction between sanctuary defilement and land defilement
seems to be indefensible based on the texts from the Pentateuch and prophetic books
listed above. These texts show that Molech worship defiles both the sanctuary and the
land, which leads to the conclusion that the separation Milgrom suggested is rather nonexistent in the OT. Klawans suggested that defiling the land would automatically render
the sanctuary defiled since it is situated on that land.198 Thus, after reviewing Milgrom’s
view on impurity, it can be said that he saw two natures of impurity, ritual and moral, but
his approaches to them were different and, at times, conflicting.199

Tikva Frymer-Kensky
The article by Tikva Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification, and Purgation in
Biblical Israel” in The Word of the Lord Shall Go Forth: Essays in Honor of David Noel
Freedman in Celebration of His Sixtieth Birthday, presents one of the most systematic
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approaches to impurity in the OT.200 She opened up her exposition on the topic by
confronting two forms of impurity and their effects:
Pollution, the lack of purity, could affect individuals, the temple, the collectivity of
Israel, and the land of Israel itself. Some forms of pollution could be eradicated by
rituals; the performance of these purifications and expiations was a major function of
the priesthood. The pollution caused by the performance of certain deeds, however,
could not be eradicated by rituals; Israel believed that the person intentionally
committing these acts would suffer catastrophic retribution. Wrongful acts could
cause the pollution of the nation and of the land of Israel, which could also not be
“cured” by ritual. There was therefore an ultimate expectation of catastrophic results
for the whole people, the “purging” of the land by destruction and exile.201
All essential characteristics of Frymer-Kensky’s understanding of impurity are
contained in the quotation above. First, impurity can defile individuals, the temple, and
the entire land of Israel. Second, similarly to what Büchler and Hoffmann claimed,
Frymer-Kensky noted that there are two types of impurities that defile in different ways.
Third, the way these impurities were to be handled also differs. Ritual impurity is handled
through various rituals, while wrongful acts, which pollute the land, are handled through
catastrophic retribution, that is, exile.
Later in her article, she called the first type of impurity “simple impurity,” the
impure state of the Levitical202 or priestly laws. She also mentioned that these impurities
are called pollution beliefs,203 but also frequently used the term ritual impurity. The other
impurity, she termed dangerous beliefs.204
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Frymer-Kensky found that ritual impurities are comprised of major and minor
ones. Concerning major impurities, she found (1) that death-related pollution, originating
from the human corpse is the most contagious pollution (Num 19:11, 14, 16),205 (2) the
disease of leprosy (Lev 13–14), and (3) impurities deriving from the human body, such
and childbirth (Lev 12) and menstruation and genital discharges (Lev 15).206 As minor
impurities, Frymer-Kensky listed (1) contact with impure things, such as carcass of
impure animal, (2) contact with something that has become impure through contact with
someone under a major impurity, (3) contact with someone who is under major
pollution.207
The first feature Frymer-Kensky endorsed is that these impurities are contagious.
Individuals who contract them can defile others, making them defiled for the duration of
one day. They can also defile an entity, which in turn can defile other persons for a
day.208
Second, the profound observation is that even though these impurities are
contagious they are only potentially dangerous. There is no harm to an impure person
except that he/she needs to be isolated from other people and holy things. Association
between the impure and the holy is fatal for the impure party. In addition, since they are
contagious, the contagion can spread, separating the entire community from God. There
is no guilt associated with the impure condition of an individual. Even more, some of
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these impurities originate from God’s explicit command, such as the one to procreate.
Furthermore, contact with the human corpse is unavoidable during the burial of a family
member.209
The only potential connection between an instance of an impure state and some
kind of harm is the case of leprosy. There are some instances of leprosy being imposed
on individuals as punishment for moral impurity. However, it was the impure state that
was imposed on the individual as a sort of punishment for moral impurity210 and thus,
ritual impurity does not originate from any form of moral wrongdoing.
Frymer-Kensky’s moral impurity refers to the performance of forbidden activities.
These activities bring about divine punishment.211 She focused on the kārēt punishment
as the main mechanism to prevent intermingling of sacred and profane. Another
punishment that is also frequently found in the Pentateuch for moral impurity is that “he
shall bear his penalty.” Frymer-Kensky saw the separation between sacred and profane as
fundamental aspect of Israelite cosmology. God is holy and the people must be holy (Lev
11:44, 45; 19:2; 20:7, 26) and must not defile the camp, the temple, or the land. Violation
of this distinction would disrupt the entire system.212 She listed many examples of direct
contamination of the sacred by the impure from the Pentateuch to prove this claim.213
She generally held that pollution of the sanctuary takes place via direct contact,
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that is, an impure person coming to the sanctuary, but she also accepted Milgrom’s
hypothesis that the sanctuary can be defiled aerially. In regard to defilement of the land
and the people, Frymer-Kensky listed a number of moral impurities that defile the land
and the people, such as idolatry, Molech worship, necromancy (Lev 20:1–5), improper
sexual acts (Lev 18), and murder (Num 35:33–34). All of these, because they assault the
very basis of Israel—its relationship with God—pollute both the land and the people. The
whole community is encouraged to stand actively against these moral impurities by
punishing doers, and thus exterminate evil among them.214 The progressing pollution
finally brings catastrophic punishment in the form of exile.215
Frymer-Kensky’s understanding of impurity is conceptually very clear and is
heavily based on a careful study of the Pentateuch and general in its scope. For these
reasons, it did not receive much critique. However, it is not clear whether Frymer-Kensky
understood that ritual impurity has any defiling impact on the land or that only moral
impurity can defile the land. The terminological search conducted later in the present
study proved that the land was always and only defiled by moral impurity.

David P. Wright
Wright’s work on the topic is a seminal one. He also divides impurity into two
major types and uses fresh terminology to label them. Wright labeled the first type, which
is referred to as ritual, or cultic, or levitical impurity in the previous research,216 with the
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adjective tolerated. This defilement is discussed in Lev 11–16 and Num 19.217 Wright
sorted them out into four classes, listing the potential sources of defilement with biblical
references for each class: (1) death-related impurities (human and animal carcasses), (2)
sexual impurities (menstrual blood, a lochial discharge after birth, an abnormal genital
discharge in a male, or an irregular blood flow in a female), (3) disease related impurities
(leprosy as diagnosed or suspected in a person, cloth, leather, or house), and (4) cultic
impurities ( חַ טָּ אֹותsacrifice carcasses and blood, the scapegoat, the Red Cow, its ashes,
the water of purification of leprosy purification made from ashes, and possibly the birds
and blood used in purification of leprosy impurity).218 In addition to these which are
considered major or fathers of impurities, Wright listed another 6 impurities: (1) a corpsecontaminated person, (2) a person suffering a menstrual, lochial, or abnormal sexual
discharge, (3) a person who has had intercourse with one of these sexually impure
persons, (4) an object on which any of these sexually impure people (including one who
has had intercourse with the severely impure) have sat or lain, (5) a person or object
suspected or diagnosed as having ṣāraʿat, and (6) a person in her/his seven-day period of
purification from ṣāraʿat. All these impurities are contagious. They can defile other
objects and persons.219
Wright’s analysis was led by three criteria when he graded these impurities. First,
the means required for cleansing them are different. Sacrifice is not needed for lesser
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grades, while it is for higher grades. Second, the extent of pollutions varies. A higher
grade of these impurities defiles the sanctuary, while a lesser grade does not. Third, the
communicability of these pollutions is different. Some were communicable to the profane
sphere and were prohibited from both the sanctuary and, in some instances, the camp,
while some were non-communicable to the profane sphere and thus allowed within the
camp, but not the sanctuary.220
Wright himself acknowledged that the label tolerated is an oxymoron due to the
fact that an impurity is a negative quality and a threat to what is holy. However, these
impurities are “tolerated” due to necessity. Many of these impurities are unavoidable
natural conditions or particulars of Israelites religion such as menstruation, contraction of
diseases, or death. Some of them, such as childbirth and seminal emissions, cannot be
prohibited since they are an essential part of Israelite religion.221 These impurities are
thus allowed, but not encouraged in Wright’s opinion. Even more, he claimed that this
kind of impurity should be generated as infrequently as possible.222 No sinful notion is
related to these impurities in Wright’s analysis.223
Wright labeled the other category, called “moral” or “religious” by previous
scholars,224 by the adjective prohibited impurities which arise from sinful situations225
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and he identified two types of this impurity: (1) intentional and (2) unintentional.
Following Milgrom’s ADH of the sanctuary, Wright claimed that unintentional sins
defile the sanctuary. Lev 5:2–3 states that one’s inadvertent delay to perform purification
from tolerated impurity defiles the sanctuary. The parts of the sanctuary that are defiled
are the outer altar and the shrine, depending on the sinner’s social status.226 The same
principle of sanctuary defilement is also found in Num 6:9, 10–12 which discusses
defilement of the Nazirite, and Lev 4:1–5 and Num 15:22–29 which explain the
procedure when one errs unintentionally.227
The effects of intentional sins, most likely considered high-handed since the
punishment for them was capital, on both the sanctuary and the sinner are more severe.
That is, the most holy place is defiled by these sins and the sinner suffers kārēt,
premature death of the sinner, and no personal sacrifice is allowed for these sins. The
sanctuary is cleansed from these sins on the Day of Atonement. Some of these sins are
(1) intentional delay or refusal of purification, Num 19:13, 20,228 (2) sacrifice to Molech,
Lev 20:1–5, (3) intentionally defiling holy things, Lev 7:19–21; 12:4; 22:3–7, Num
18:11, 13, (4) sexual sins, Lev 18:6–23,229 and (5) other general intentional sins, Num
15:30–31.230 Wright produced the following (Table 1) to present these two impurities.231
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Table 1. Two impurities
Tolerated232
(no distinction between
unintentional and intentional)
No sacrifice
Individual ad hoc
sacrifice
Pollution of
person

Pollution of
sanctuary [outer
altar] and person

Noncommunicable to
profane; hence,
restriction only
from sanctuary as
sacred

Communicable to
profane; hence,
restriction from
the sanctuary and
other sacred
matters and
restriction from or
within the
[profane]
habitation

Prohibited
Unintentional
Intentional
Individual, sometimes
communal, ad hoc
sacrifice
Pollution of sanctuary
[outer altar or shrine];
ritual personal
pollution if deriving
from tolerated
impurity

Potential removal
from life; restriction
from sanctuary and
sacred, and sometimes
from habitation [if
communicable to
profane] if the sin
derives from a
tolerated impurity

Day of Atonement
sacrifice233
Pollution of
sanctuary [adytum,
shrine, outer altar],
sometimes land;
‘moral’ pollution of
persons’; ‘ritual’
personal pollution if
from tolerated
impurity
Removal from life;
kārēt or capital
penalty; in some
cases, exile;
restriction from
sanctuary and
sacred, and
sometimes
habitation if sin
derives from a
permitted impurity
(unlike the penalty
takes effect)
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Wright affirmed Milgrom’s “Dorian Gray” hypothesis that states that
unintentional prohibited impurities defile the outer altar and the shrine of the sanctuary
and require offering a sacrifice, while intentional prohibited impurities defile the most
holy place and the sinner’s life is forfeited. The sanctuary is cleansed from these
impurities through the sacrifice of the Day of Atonement.234 He also noted that these two
impurities are not connected just by the metaphorical use of language originally used for
tolerated impurity, which is also used related to prohibited impurity, but also by the
object of pollution (the sanctuary) and similar ways of removing the pollution (mainly
ḥaṭāʾṯ sacrifice).235 Based on these three points, Wright deduced that the two types of
impurity with their two subdivisions are of the same conceptual family and system so
instead of looking at them as two separate types of impurity, he preferred looking at
impurity as a single phenomenon, a spectrum of impurity.236 He placed the prohibitions
against eating and touching certain animals in Lev 11:4–8, 10–12, 13–20, 41–45; 22:8
among the tolerated impurities.237
The fundamental difference between the two kinds of impurity is the issue of
intention. Emphasizing more numerous points of connectedness led Wright to view the
entire spectrum of impurity as a symbolic system with a moral foundation.238 Klawans
eloquently and correctly countered all of the points that led Wright to his conclusion.
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First, the similarities singled out by Wright are overdrawn. In terms of terminological
use, the term  טָ מֵ אis used in both ritual and moral contexts, but the verb  חָ נֵףand the noun

 תֹּועֵבָ הare used exclusively in moral contexts. Second, the loci of defilement are
different. That is, certain moral impurities can defile the land, while no ritual impurity
does so. In addition, ritual impurities, in Wright’s system, defile the sanctuary via
contact, while the prohibited ones defile it from a distance. Third, in terms of methods of
removal, the  חַ טָּ אתsacrifice is the point of similarity between the two impurities.
However, ablution does not remove moral impurity. In fact, there is no method for
removing of the defilement of land by sin.239 Fourth, restrictions and exclusions also
differ. For instance, those involved in moral impurity are not declared ritually impure and
are not excluded from the sanctuary. Each of these differences demonstrates that the
points of difference are more numerous than the points of similarity when the defiling
force of these two impurities are compared.240 These obvious differences lead to the
conclusion that it is better to emphasize and recognize the distinctive nature of the
defiling effects of the two impurities regardless of the minor overlaps between them.
Wright’s innovation in comparison to the previous research on impurity is that
prohibited, or in traditional language, moral impurity can be unintentional and
intentional. Previous research did recognize that there are two basic types of impurity—
ritual and moral. Wright expanded the classification of ritual impurity by stating that
among tolerated impurities, there are those that do not require sacrifice, do pollute the
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person, but are not communicable to the profane, contrasted with those that do require a
sacrifice, do pollute both the sanctuary and the person, and are communicable to profane.
Frymer-Kensky documented the fact that ritual impurity may be divided into minor and
major. Wright elaborated more on moral impurity, observing that among prohibited
impurities, there are those that are unintentional and require sacrifice, pollute the
sanctuary, and require more severe punishments (potential capital punishment and
others), contrasted with the intentional that require communal sacrifice; pollute the
person, sanctuary, and land; and require the most severe punishments (capital punishment
and others).241

Jonathan Klawans
The most recent and also thorough study on impurity was carried out by Jonathan
Klawans in several of his works.242 He followed the division into ritual and moral
impurity that was well established by previous research.243 Ritual impurity results from
direct or indirect contact with multiple natural sources/events such as childbirth (Lev
12:1–8), scale disease (Lev 13:1–14:32), genital discharges (Lev 15:1–33), the carcasses
of certain impure animals (Lev 11:11–47), and human corpses (Num 19:10–22) or is a
consequence of particular purifications (Lev 16:28; Num 19:8). There are three basic
characteristics of this impurity. The first characteristic points to the fact that they arise
from generally natural and more or less unavoidable sources including birth, death, sex,
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disease, and discharges.244 This kind of defilement is transmitted through various direct
or indirect contacts with any of a number of natural processes.245 The only exception to
this characteristic is the impurity that happens when priests perform the purification ritual
(Lev 16; Num 19). Klawans also considered this impurity to be natural since he saw the
temple, along with the cult and all cultic procedures which involved all natural things like
animals, blood, and death, as an essential part of ancient Israel’s life.246 In addition to
this, it may be claimed that the Day of Atonement ritual was an unavoidable event of
Israelite religion.
Ritual impurity is both avoidable (not touching impure animals, not having sex
with a menstruant) and unavoidable (discharges, disease, death). Even more, some
impurities were obligatory (burial), except for priests who were allowed to touch a corpse
only in certain circumstances (Lev 21:1–4). However, even priests, including the high
priest, were obliged to defile themselves by being involved in reproduction (Gen 1:28;
9:7) or to perform cultic rituals that rendered them impure (Lev 16; Num 19).247
A second characteristic of ritual impurity is that contracting a ritual impurity is
not sin. Milgrom, Frymer-Kensky, Sanders, and Wright have already noted that it would
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be impossible to consider natural processes as something to be prohibited.248 Conversely,
Sanders and Wright claimed that some or all of these defilements were discouraged.249
However, there is no indication that permitted sex, physical contact between an Israelite
father and the mother of his newborn child, or contact with the dead was discouraged at
all. Many of these events were proper and even obligatory. The texts do not have any
warning against contact with ritual impurity in general. Priests had to limit their contact
with corpse impurity (Lev 21:1–4), but were allowed to contact other impurities (Lev 4–
7). The key concern necessary for priests was to maintain a separation between ritual
impurity and purity (Lev 10:10). They were also prohibited from eating sacred food or
entering the holy precincts in a ritually impure state (Lev 7:20–21; 22). They were
technically not prohibited from touching any ritual impurity, but had to be aware of it.
Thus, both the priests and the Israelites were to be aware of their impure state so that they
did not accidentally contact the sacred in their impure state (Lev 7:20–21; cf. 15:31,
etc.).250 Regardless of the fact that ritual impurity is not sinful, there are several OT
narratives that view one form of ritual impurity as punishment for moral wrongs (Num
12; 2 Kings 5; 2 Chr 26). Again, both Frymer-Kensky and Wright have noted that the
legal texts provided no basis to view the one stricken with scale disease as being a
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transgressor.251 The leper is ritually impure, but is not guilty.252
Nevertheless, ritual impurity can lead to sin in two ways. First, Num 19:13, 20
state that the refusal to purify ritual impurity resulting from contact with a corpse is
punishable by kārēt which could further result in defilement of the sanctuary.253 The
nature of the punishment points to the nature of the impurity. It is not ritual, but moral,
that is, disobedience to following divinely prescribed laws of purification. Second, every
Israelite was warned not to enter the sanctuary or come into direct contact with holy
foods in the state of impurity (Lev 7:20–21; 15:31; 22:30–7). Disobeying these laws
could result in defilement of the sanctuary and was sinful since the sinner was subject to
kārēt. Association of these prohibitions to ritual impurity did not mean that being ritually
impure was sinful. As long as the prohibitions were observed, the impure Israelite was
not morally impure.254
The third characteristic of ritual impurities is that they convey impermanent
contagion to persons. The Israelites who came in contact with a menstruant or someone
afflicted with an irregular flux contracted a defilement which lasted until sunset (Lev
15:5, 21). Contact with a more severe impurity such as corpse impurity prolonged the
impure status to a week (Num 19). The state of defilement after giving birth lasted,
depending on the sex, up to 33 days for a son or 66 days for a daughter (Lev 12). Genital
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flows, scale disease, and house funguses lasted for an unspecified time, but not
permanently.255 None of the ritual impurities was permanent. Some lasted for a short
period of time and some lasted longer, but they were all impermanent.
Klawans’s definition of moral impurity is as follows: “Moral impurity results
from what are believed to be immoral acts.”256 The sins that belong to this impurity
include (1) sexual sins (Lev 18:24–30), idolatry (Lev 19:31; 20:1–3), and bloodshed
(Num 35:33–34). They defiled the sinner (Lev 18:24), the land (Lev 18:25) and the
sanctuary (Lev 20:3) morally rather than ritually, and the final result was exile (Lev
18:28).257
Klawans’s comparison of these two impurities results in five points of difference
between them:258
(1) Whereas ritual impurity is generally not sinful, moral impurity is a direct
consequence of grave sin.259 (2) Whereas ritual impurity often results in a contagious
defilement, there is no contact-contagion associated with moral impurity. One need
not bathe subsequent to direct or indirect contact with an idolater, a murderer, or an
individual who committed a sexual sin.260 (3) Whereas ritual impurity results in an
impermanent defilement, moral impurity leads to a long-lasting, if not permanent,
degradation of the sinner and, eventually, of the land of Israel.261 (4) Whereas ritual
impurity can be ameliorated by rites of purification, that is not the case for moral
impurity;262 moral purity is achieved by punishment, atonement, or, at best, by
255
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refraining from committing morally impure acts in the first place. (5) In addition to
these phenomenological differences, there are also terminological distinctions used in
the texts themselves. Although the term impure ( )טָ מֵ אis used in both contexts, the
term abominations ( )תועבהand pollute ( )חנףare used with regard to the sources of
moral impurity, but not with regard to the sources of ritual impurity.263
Klawans noted these differences in Table 2:

Table 2. Differences in impurity types
Impurity type
Ritual
Moral

Source
Bodily flows,
corpses, etc.
Sins: idolatry,
incest, murder

Effect
Temporary, contagious
impurity
Defilement of sinners,
land and sanctuary

Resolution
Bathing, waiting
Atonement or punishment,
and ultimately, exile

Klawans explored the texts that confirm that idolatry, incest, and murder morally
defiled the sinner, the land, and the sanctuary. The most explicit text that speaks about
moral defilement through sexual sins is Lev 18:24–30. The sexual sins enumerated in this
text defiled both the sinner and the land. However, the exact way this defilement took
place is unknown. It is crucial here that the impurity contracted through these deeds was
conveyed to the land. Ritual impurity was never conveyed to or contracted from the
land.264 The defilement of the land in this passage does not threaten the ritual status of
those who are on it. Rather, the threat to all those living on the earth is exile.265
The morally defiling effect of sexual sins is also detailed in Num 5:11–31, the law
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of the suspected adulteress. The impurity referred to in this law seems to be moral and
not ritual because the ritual ceremony referred to in this chapter could never take place at
the sanctuary.266 All sexual sins defile ritually, at least for a short time (Lev 15:18), so it
would be unnecessary to determine that status.267 Rather, the concern is to determine
whether the woman has been defiled morally by committing adultery.268
The defiling effect of idolatry is articulated in Lev 19:31 where it is stated that
necromancy defiles. In addition, the act of sacrificing children to Molech is portrayed as
defiling in Lev 20:1–3. Klawans adduced a number of OT texts to support his claim that
idolatry defiled the sinner and the land (Ps 106; Deut 18:9–12; 2 King 16:3; Jer 7:9–15;
16:18; Ezek 20:30–31; 22:4; 36:18; 37:23) and the sanctuary (Jer 7:30; 32:34; Ezek 5:11;
8:10; 2 Chr 29:5, 16). However, there is no indication that idolatry defiled ritually. It
defiled morally, but contact-contagion was not included.269 Klawans’s claim is in
agreement with the conclusion reached by Büchler270 and Wright.271
The defiling force of bloodshed is described in Num 35:33–34. Klawans followed
Büchler’s claim that the verb ḥānēp̱ is a technical term that articulated the defiling force
of moral impurity.272 This term is also synonymous with the term ṭāmēʾ, but only when it
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is used in moral contexts, since ḥānēp̱ is never used in ritual contexts.273 In the same way
as moral impurity originating from idolatry is articulated in many OT texts, so is the case
with moral impurity resulting from bloodshed (Deut 21:23; 1 Chr 22:8; Ezek 9:7, 9;
22:1–4; 33:25). Thus, the impurity associated with murder, sexual sins, and idolatry is
moral in nature and defiles the sinner, the sanctuary, and the land morally, not ritually. To
further support this claim, Klawans cited the narratives about Dinah (Gen 34:5ff) and the
legislation regarding the suspected adulteress (Num 5:13ff). Since moral impurity does
not include ritual defilement of the sinner he or she is not excluded from the sanctuary.
The case of the suspected adulteress, as well as of the murderers who sought safety of the
sanctuary confirms this (Exo 21:14). Klawans accepted Milgrom’s ADH of the sanctuary
from afar, which is moral in nature.274 Klawans also applied his claim of moral
defilement to the land. The land is never ritually defiled, nor is it ever the source of or a
means of transmitting ritual defilement. The land thus suffers noncontagious degradation
with the exile of its inhabitants as the ultimate punishment. The effect of moral impurity
upon the sinner and the land is degradation in status. The sanctuary, by contrast, is
cleansed from moral impurity once a year on the Day of Atonement.275 Klawans provided
the definition of moral impurity as follows: “Moral impurity is best understood as a
potent force unleashed by certain sinful human actions. The force unleashed defiles the
sinner, the sanctuary, and the land even though the sinner is not ritually impure and does
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not ritually defile… As a result of this defilement, the sinner and the land experience a
degradation in status.”276
Impurity that the morally impure person suffers is moral in its nature and not
ritual.277 In sum, Klawans’s understanding of impurity is twofold. First, he kept a sharp
distinction between ritual and moral impurity. Second, a similarity between these two
impurities is that they are both real.278 Before expanding on these two points, it is useful
to notice that Sklar accurately criticized Klawans’s table of impurity for not providing
more elaborate differences within the realms of these two impurities. That is, Klawans
listed only three activities as moral sins which are intentional, grave sins, refusing to
acknowledge unintentional sins which also defile the sanctuary and were discussed at
length in the Pentateuch (Lev 4:1–5:13)279 and also in Num 15:22–29. Reasoning from
the assumption that major ritual impurities require sacrifice/s just like unintentional moral
impurities, Sklar criticized Klawans for not including this similarity and connection
between the two impurities in his table.280 However, Sklar’s criticism on this point is not
substantial since the way impurities are resolved does not seem to affect their ontological
nature. Regardless of the similarity in the way they are resolved, ritual impurity remains
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ritual in its nature and moral impurity also remains moral in its nature.
The first point Klawans put forward regarding the understanding of moral
impurity is that scholars usually understand the concept of moral impurity either as
metaphorical or figurative. Even Milgrom and Wright, who recognized the defiling effect
of moral impurity, also referred to it as metaphorical.281 Klawans claimed that the
dichotomy between literal and metaphorical is not helpful when one wants to understand
the differences between these two impurities. None of the scholars mentioned offered the
precise meaning of “metaphorical” or “figurative.” This might be due to the fact that
these terms are very difficult to define and the phenomena to which they refer are
difficult to isolate282 and the philosophical debate on this continues. For this reason,
Klawans suggested that they should be dropped from the discussion on this topic. In
addition, this debate has not yet had a significant effect in biblical and ancient Jewish
writings.283
When scholars characterized moral impurity as metaphorical or figurative, they
used these terms in a traditional way which means that metaphorical language is not to be
taken literally. In addition, the terms in question are transferable, meaning the term or
phrase with literal meaning in one context can be transferred into another context in
which it is not literal. Thus, metaphorical language is secondary and nonliteral, and its
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usage is informed by the literal meaning of the particular language.284
Klawans responded to both of these claims. First, applied to the purity language
of the OT, this implies that the metaphorical use of the purity language does not mean
that the defilement is happening at all. For instance, this is the case with Lev 18:24–25
that speaks of the land defilement for which many commentators think that it is
metaphorical.285 If one claims that this passage is metaphorical, it would mean that
defilement is not literal and the use of the purity language is secondary. However, it is
explicitly and implicitly stated in the OT that the land of Israel is holy due to God’s
presence in the midst of it (Num 35:34). If the land can be holy, then it can be defiled.
Almost a century ago, Hoffmann understood that impurity in the context of grave sins is
to be understood as an idea opposite to holiness.286
Defilement of the land in the context of Lev 18:24–30 is not ritual, but rather,
moral; these impurities defile the land on which they are committed, and the sinner
literally and, as a result, the land, is permanently degraded in status.287 The ultimate result
is exile of the people.288 Both types of impurity’s perceived effects result from actual
physical processes and as such are real. A ritual impurity is perceived as impermanent
contagion coming out of real, physical processes which affect people and certain objects
within their reach. A moral impurity is perceived as permanent contagion coming out of
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real, physical processes that affect people, the land, and the sanctuary. A ritual impurity is
conveyed by direct and indirect physical contact, while a moral impurity is transmitted to
the land by the sins that take place on it. All three sins that defile the land morally include
direct contact with the land.289
Second, it is implied by scholars that moral impurity involves secondary use of
purity terminology. Levine termed it, “applied concepts of purity,” Schwartz referred to a
“transformation,” and Wright spoke of “metaphorization.”290 However, no detailed
analysis has been provided to establish precisely the nature of the secondary use of purity
terminology in regard to moral impurity.291 It was commonly assumed that moral
impurity is a secondary use of purity terminology, but yet, this secondary usage occurs in
prophetic and so-called Deuteronomistic texts which are considered, in the perspectives
of these scholars,292 to be chronologically earlier traditions than Priestly sources. As such,
they should use the primary use of impurity terminology, but yet, they do not. This
means, then, that it is uncertain which usage came first, and as a result, it cannot be
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assumed that purity terminology was used metaphorically in Lev 18.293 This is not to say
that metaphorical and figurative use of purity terminology is nonexistent in the OT, but is
just an observation that in Lev 18:24–30, purity language was used in a literal way, not
metaphorically or figuratively. When ritual impurity terminology is used metaphorically
or figuratively to express the sinfulness of the Israelites or to illustrate righteousness or
atonement, there is always an explicit or implied comparison between ritual impurity or
purity on the one hand, and sinfulness and righteousness on the other.294
Establishing a distinction between the two kinds of impurities leads to the
question of their inter-relatedness. In other words, is there a single system that
encompasses both or does each impurity form its own system? Mary Douglas, as an
anthropologist, claimed that there is a unifying system that encompasses both
impurities.295 Building on Douglas’s work, Wright suggested that all defilement-creating
conditions in the priestly legislation have the same conceptual family, and as such, the
whole purity system, ritual and moral, in his words tolerated and prohibited, has a moral
basis and rationale.296 Klawans’s critique of Wright’s claim is substantial and well taken.
To get to the point of claiming that these two impurities belong to the same conceptual
family with the same morally informed foundation, Wright argued that (1)
purity/impurity terminology is interchangeable between the two impurities, (2) they share
the loci of pollution (the sanctuary), (3) there are similar ways of removing that pollution
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(usually via  חַ טָּ אתsacrifice), and (4) the restriction and exclusion are similar.297
Klawans also noted that a search for the single symbolic system is not called for
by the text itself. He explained that various rituals have the task of reminding Israelites of
some greater purpose. Certain activities related to the Sabbath remind Israelites either of
the Exodus from Egypt (Deut 5:14–15) or the creation of the world (Exod 20:10–11). The
tassels on their garments served to remind the people to obey God’s commandments
(Num 15:37–41). The Pentateuch had a way to communicate that certain rituals served to
remind them of some greater purpose, but the texts do not have any indication that
impurity laws were to serve as behavioral reminders of morally defiling effects of sin.298
In addition, Klawans also noted that Wright emphasized that the use of impurity
language associated with sin, moral impurity, involves metaphorization which is a
secondary application of language originally used in the context of ritual defilement.299
Subsequently, Wright argued that morality is the foundation of the whole system, and
that ritual impurity symbolizes sin. This means, then, that ritual defilement serves to
symbolize its own metaphorization. The circularity present in this proposal is selfcontradictory.300
The sharp distinction Klawans proposed does not mean that these two impurities
are totally separate. They are distinct, but yet analogous, conceptions of contagion. They
overlap, but they do that with other systems in the OT such as the sacrificial system, the
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legal system of law and justice, cultic laws, and the calendar. If one were to look for a
unifying system for all other systems, it might be the entire religion of Israel. Thus, due
to the fact that the differences between two impurities outweigh the similarities, it is fair
to take the two impurities on their own terms.301
When it comes to the terminology, Klawans agreed with Wright that the use of
adjectives, “ritual” and “moral,” attached to the word “impurity” in order to differentiate
these two impurities, is problematic. They do not appear in OT texts, nor in post-biblical
Jewish literature.302 Some scholars simply refused to use any additional terminology than
just impurity.303 The danger of using ritual and moral is that whatever is associated with
the latter will always be considered with more attention than with the former. However,
since the OT uses the same terminology to describe two distinct impurities, researchers
need to supply descriptive terminology in order to lessen the confusion related to this
concept.304 Adopting a terminology not used by the biblical authors to explain biblical
concepts is necessary and unavoidable in regards to many concepts.305
The terminology that defines these two kinds of impurities does not imply that
these two types of impurity are opposing or mutually exclusive. Rather, the intention is to
highlight the fact that there are two distinct impurities, one of which is more associated
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with sin (in terms of moral faults) than the other. A ritually impure person is excluded
from particular rituals and prevented from entering sacred precincts.306 A ritually impure
person regains his or her ritual purity in part ritually, by the means of sacrifice,
sprinkling, washings, and bathing, but in some cases, rituals are not sufficient. One may
remain ritually impure until evening after ritual purification (Lev 15:5). Thus, the
completion of the process of regaining ritual purity in part is conditioned by the passage
of time. However, ritual is a useful description, much more so than cultic307 and
levitical,308 since ritual frequently plays an important role in this process.309 Ritual is also
an integral part of achieving moral purity, as well as also making this term imperfect for
reflecting this type of impurity. However, Klawans suggested the use of the adjectives
“ritual” and “moral” to describe impurity in the best way possible, but not in perfect
terms. These adjectives attached to the noun “impurity” express both the inter-relatedness
of the two impurities and also their differences. They refer to the same concept of
impurity, which consists of two types,310 with two distinctive natures.
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Thomas Kazen
Thomas Kazen is a representative of the school that equates ritual and moral
impurity.311 He noted that “purity is a ritual concept but the purity language is used in the
OT with reference to sinful behavior.”312 For this and reasons that will be presented
below, Kazen initially claimed that the unifying factor of ritual and moral impurity is the
notion of disgust as stated in the following quotation: “All three phenomena for which
impurity language is used in Leviticus—dietary laws, contact-contagion, and certain
types of immorality—share common traits that can be related to the primary emotion of
human disgust at objectionable substances, being applied secondarily to these phenomena
alike.”313 Kazen arrived at this conclusion by applying a bio-psychological approach to
the moral and ritual texts. This approach in Kazen’s work, as in all other approaches of
cognitive science of religion, refers to human cognition. However, he placed the
emphasis on the emotional aspect of cognition, rather than on rational mental activities.314
Kazen took Antonio Damasio’s work as a foundation in this process. Contrary to the
traditional Western paradigm based on Descartes’ famous saying, Cogito, ergo sum,
which assumed that mind is separate from matter and rationality is opposite to emotion,
Damasio claimed that bodily sensations and emotions are an integral part of the human
mind. In conducting neurobiological research, he found that the mind is in constant
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interaction with the rest of the organism. He concluded, “It does not seem sensible to
leave emotions and feelings out of any overall concept of mind.”315 He also said that the
“mind derives from the entire organism.”316 Therefore, emotions are crucial in human
reasoning, judgment, and behavior.317 Focusing on the emotions and avoiding the
division between morality and ritual, Kazen’s latter work shows that he added two more
major emotions to the emotion of disgust, namely fear and the sense of justice, which
underlie the concept of impurity.318 Thus, these three emotions form the background for
all impurities, rituals, and morals.
Kazen noted that purity language is used in three different groups of laws—clean
and unclean animals, bodily transferable contact-contagion, and serious immorality.319 In
scholarly works, clean and unclean animals are placed into either ritual or moral laws.320
Noting the overlap between these three groups of laws and not acknowledging the
separation between the last two allowed Kazen to integrate the first and most problematic
group of texts into a single-nature understanding of impurity in the OT.321 The fact that
these three groups of laws overlap in the OT and that, in Kazen’s understanding, they
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have a common origin enforced Kazen’s claim of a single-nature of impurity.322
Kazen also excluded the metaphorical interpretation of impurity on two grounds:
the use of the metaphor in the scholarly works is inconsistent323 and human language
itself is very prone to be metaphorized.
The distinction [between literal and metaphorical] often becomes artificial. Although
“metaphorical” generally refers to the use of language in a secondary or transferred
sense, while “literal” refers to a primary use, literal expressions can be metaphorized
and metaphorical language at times literalized. At a deep level, human language and
thought are metaphorical throughout, including our moral imagination.324
Kazen’s reasons for eliminating metaphor from the discussion on impurity are not
sound. First, the inconsistent metaphorical and literal use of purity/impurity language by
scholars does not mean that the distinction between ritual and moral impurity does not
exit. Rather, the solution can simply be found in defining these two terms than in
eliminating the possibility of separation between ritual and moral impurity.325 Second,
Kazen’s understanding of metaphor is based on the works of George Lakoff and Mark
Johnson,326 whose totalizing claims on metaphor are to be taken with caution.327 Lam’s
evaluation of Lakoff’s and Johnson’s understanding of metaphor seems to be on point:
Lakoff and Johnson claim that metaphorical patterning has a deeper cognitive basis—
that “metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there are
Kazen, “Dirt and Disgust,” 47–49. It has to be stressed that the common origin argument is
heavily dependent on the ANE texts rather than on biblical texts.
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metaphors in a person’s conceptual system.” Thus they posit the existence of
“metaphorical concepts”--cognitive structures of the form [TARGET DOMAIN] IS
[SOURCE DOMAIN] that are thought to give rise to linguistic instantiations of the
metaphor. The assumption is that, since these patterns are so apparent and pervasive
in language, it must be the pattern that is primary, not the linguistic expressions that
give evidence of it.328
It seems very arbitrary to single out just one aspect of the human being—the
emotional,329—and disregard all others, such as the rational and the social, which
contribute greatly in conceptualizing an idea as complex as morality.330 It also has to be
emphasized that Kazen’s model is limited in terms of its theoretical foundation to Charles
Darwin’s evolutionary theory.

Summary of Scholarly Research on Impurity
The review of the history of interpretation shows certain tendencies and
developments in the studies of impurity in the OT. The pioneers of this study in modern
times, David Hoffmann and Adolf Büchler, followed, conceptually and terminologically,
the classical, bipartite division of impurity to ritual and moral which was already
articulated in Jewish sources, spanning from Talmudic and medieval rabbinic literature,
Philo, and the early rabbinic sages.
Hoffmann recognized that moral impurity originates from sinful behavior such as
eating forbidden foods, idolatry, and various sexual sins for which atonement is not
available except on the Day of Atonement. This impurity defiles the sinner’s body and is
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not symbolic, but real, implying God's rejection of the one who commits it. Based on Lev
18:24–30, this defilement also defiles the land and causes the exile of the people. Ritual
impurity is temporal and can be removed by ablutions. As Lev 11–15 and Num 19
convey, it originates from human corpses, certain animal carcasses, bodily flows, and
leprosy. Hofmann perceived this impurity as a symbolic one, symbolizing sin.
Büchler assigned different terminology to the same two natures of impurity by
using levitical instead of ritual, and religious or spiritual instead of moral impurity. He
noted that ritual impurity is impermanent contagion. Except for the different terminology
he used for these two impurities and the fact that moral impurity is not contagious, his
work is similar to Hofmann's work. Both Hoffmann’s and Büchler’s works missed
drawing a distinction between the defilement that arises from unintentional and
intentional moral impurity and they do not discuss the difference between minor and
major ritual/levitical defilements.
Gedalyahu Alon added a new component to the purity studies, namely, the role of
geographical boundaries to which purity laws were applied. “Minimalists” restricted
these laws to the sphere of the Temple and priests, while the “maximalists” claimed that
they are applicable to all of Israel. However, isolating only the geographical element
related to the purity/impurity laws is insufficient to understand them properly.
Jacob Neusner proposed the evolutionary development of moral impurity out of
one’s unfitness in the holy community. Under the influence of Alon, he suggested that
purity/impurity itself is a single nature concept and can be interpreted in two ways: as a
metaphor of morality elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible and in the Priestly texts through
which specific laws are related to the Temple. However, Neusner's interpretation of
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biblical texts shows that he was not able to preserve these two descriptions on the
purity/impurity laws. In addition, Douglas correctly noted the inconsistency of taking
some parts of a single system and ascribing to them different meanings in different
contexts. Neusner's work has received a lot of substantial criticism.
The contribution of Mary Douglas to the study of ritual and impurity from a
theoretical and anthropological standpoint is well known and substantial, but she was not
concerned about making a clear distinction between ritual and moral impurity; because of
that, some scholars claimed that she also assumed the single nature of impurity. This is
strengthened with the statements found throughout her works that would lead one to
deduce that she understood impurity as a single nature phenomenon, but there are also
statements in her works which point to the fact that she understood impurity to be a twonature phenomenon. Klawans’s remark that she was much more nuanced than scholars
who make such claims based on her works regarding impurity seems to be correct.
Hyam Maccoby recognized a basic distinction between ritual and moral impurity
with ritual purity having limited validity for Israelites only, and moral purity having
universal validity for all of humanity. In addition, he believed that moral purity has
precedence over ritual purity in case they conflict. He emphasized the fact that mortality
through the birth and death cycle, which is related to all ritual impurity, stands as the
background of ritual laws and that they guard the temple from the entire cycle of
mortality.
Jacob Milgrom’s treatment of impurity is not clear as might have been expected.
Essentially, he endorsed ritual and moral impurity distinction. However, his treatment of
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ritual impurity is more consistent and systematic than treatment of moral impurity which
he, at times, interpreted as metaphorical.
Tikva Frymer-Kensky produced one of the most systematic and complete
treatments of impurity in modern times. Building from the classical division to ritual and
moral impurity which both defile individuals, temple, and land, she added subdivisions to
both of them. She divided ritual impurities into major and minor ones. Major impurities
are caused by death, leprosy, bodily discharges, and childbirth, while minor impurities
result in contact with impure things, things that are defiled by the persons having a major
impurity, and persons themselves under major impurity. This impurity is contagious in its
nature, not sinful or dangerous by default, but it can lead to sin and danger. Moral
impurity is related to forbidden activities which provoke God’s punishment of kārēt or
the punishment expressed by “he shall bear his penalty.” She understood that a distinction
to the sacred and profane is foundational for Israelite cosmology. First, God is holy and
his presence made the temple, camp, and land holy, and the latter three must maintain
their holiness. Frymer-Kensky believed that pollution takes place via direct contact, but
also aerially. At times, Frymer-Kensky used different terminology to refer to these
impurities, for example, “pollution beliefs” and “dangerous beliefs,” rather than classical
terms, but she more frequently used the classic terms ritual and moral impurity.
Building on the work of the previous scholars mentioned above, in great part
Frymer-Kensky, David P. Wright accepted the fact that some impurity comes out of
natural conditions and some results out of sinful situations. In addition, he endorsed two
classes of ritual impurities, major and minor. He also assigned to them a defiling force
and approved the fact that this impurity is not sinful. Wright’s systematization is based on

92

the (1) means of cleansing, (2) extent of pollution, and (3) communicability of pollution.
His division is more detailed and consists of four classes of major and six classes of
minor impurity. Wright divided impurity that is caused by sinful activities into (1)
intentional and (2) unintentional. The unintentional impurity defiles the outer altar and
holy place depending on social status, while intentional sins defile the most holy place
aerially. The unintentional are expiable via sacrifice, while the intentional are not
expiable but punishable by kārēt. The idea Wright introduced in comparison to FrymerKensky’s was totally new terminology to refer to these two impurities, tolerated and
prohibited, but he himself acknowledged that these terms are also problematic. Wright
can also be credited for being much more detailed in his systematization of impurity.
Basing his research on the works of the previous scholars mentioned above who
had already advanced systematization and understanding of impurity, especially in the
works of Hoffmann and Frymer-Kensky, Jonathan Klawans produced the most elaborate
and systematic, up-to-date research on impurity. He is currently the most ardent
proponent of the traditional division of impurity into ritual and moral. Along with the
previous scholarly research, Klawans agreed that ritual impurity (1) arises from natural
and unavoidable conditions, (2) is not sin, and (3) conveys impermanent contagion via
direct contact. Moral impurity on the other hand, (1) arises from grave sin, (2) does not
defile by direct contact, (3) leads to long-lasting, if not permanent, contagion, and (4)
unlike ritual impurity which can be addressed and remedied via purification ritual, is
rectified by atonement, punishment, or by refraining from committing it.
Klawans noticed that purity/impurity terminology also confirms traditional
division to ritual and moral impurity since  טָ מֵ אis used for both impurities, but  תֹּועֵבָ הand

93

 חָ נֵףare used exclusively for moral impurity. Moral impurity defiles the one who
performs it, the sanctuary, and the land. Ritual impurity never defiles the land, nor is
derived from the land, but defiles the sanctuary and humans. The idea that Klawans
brought to the discussion on impurity is that both impurities, ritual and moral, are real. In
addition, he endorsed the metaphorical use of purity/impurity language in biblical texts,
but not to the extent scholars usually assume. In addition, the use of a metaphorical or
figurative interpretation of certain texts brings more confusion than clarity to the
discussion due to various theories on metaphor itself.
Klawans also stated that besides the fact that these impurities are distinct, they are
an analogous conception of contagion as a part of the entire system of Israelite religion.
These two impurities are not mutually exclusive, but rather, the emphasis is on the fact
that impurity consists of two natures, each of which has unique characteristics and
features. Aware of the deficiencies of all terminology suggested in the previous research,
Klawans chose ritual and moral impurity, not as perfect terms to denote these two
impurities, but as what are the least confusing and misleading.
Thomas Kazen was a firm proponent of a single nature of impurity. Driven by the
methods of bio-psychology, he suggested that the notions/emotions of disgust, fear, and
sense of justice stand in the background of both ritual and moral impurity. Informed by
research in the area of bio-phycology which proposes the equal role of emotions along
with reason in the decision-making process, Kazen concluded that these three emotions
underline the concept of impurity as a single nature phenomenon.
After review of the development of scholarly opinions on impurity in the OT and
before proceeding to study moral impurity specifically, the present study seeks to
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emphasize some more specific points mentioned in the scholarly dialog on the topic,
namely, the following subheading examined and expanded some crucial scholarly claims
regarding impurity.

Remarks on Sin and Impurity: Insights
from the Present Research
Some scholars have arrived at profound insights that impact the understanding of
impurity in the Pentateuch. These statements are cited below and, when needed, refined.
Following the works of Kurtz,331 Rendtorff,332 and Milgrom,333 Gane brought to attention
an accurate and helpful point that further strengthens the standpoint of modern
scholarship on the existence of two distinct impurities: “A  חטאתsacrifice providing כפר
for physical ritual impurity results in physical ritual purity ()טהר. Forgiveness ( )סלחis
not needed, because contacting a bodily impurity does not, by itself, constitute a moral
fault.”334 The following subheadings, “סלח,” and “טהר,” test the correctness of this
claim.

סָ לַח
The verb סָ לַח, “to forgive”335 occurs twenty times in the Pentateuch and was
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never required for contracting ritual impurity. As a search for this verb, provided in the
following table, proves,336 contracting ritual impurity status does not create moral
impurity. This point is further strengthened by the way ritual impurity comes into
existence. That is, ritual impurity is undesirable, but it remains a part of the current
human nature and the created world since the Fall into sin (Gen 3). In most cases, it is
unavoidable and cannot be prevented.
The first two columns of Table 3 provide the biblical reference where  סָ לַחis used
in the context with the terms for sin. The middle two columns show the additional noun/s
and verb/s that convey the concept of sin found in the same pericope. The last two
columns demonstrate the nature and expiability of the impurity under consideration.
In addition to סָ לַח, the verb טָ הֵ ר, “to be pure, cleansed, to purify,”337 frequently
occurs in impurity contexts to convey the elimination of the effects of impurity on
humans.338 The verbal forms of  טָ הֵ רoccur fifty-four times in the Pentateuch.339
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Table 3. The verb  סָ לַחin the Pentateuch
Word Type
Biblical
Reference
Ex 34:9

Sin Terms

 חטאתv. 14
חטאת

Lev 4:26

Lev 4:35

חטאת
חטאת
חטאת

Lev 5:10

Lev 5:13
Lev 5:16
Lev 5:18

Lev 5:26/6:7
Lev 19:22
Num 14:19
Num 14:20
Num 15:25
Num 15:26

חטאת
וְ ֵ֣את אֲשֶׁ ֩ר חָ ָ֨ ָטא
שׁגגה
ַל־אַחַ֛ת ִמ ֹ֥ ֹכּל
ַ
ע
א ֶ ֲֶֽשׁר־ ַיע ֶ ֲֶ֖שׂה
 חטאתx2
עון
 שׁגגהx2
שׁגגה

Deut 29:19

חטאת, Lev 5:6
חטאת, Lev 5:6
חטאת, Lev 5:6
סרה,

שׁגה, עשׂה,  אשׁםv. 13
 חטאv. 14
חטא, עשׂה,  אשׁםv. 22
חטא, v. 23

 שׁגגהv. 22
 חטאתv. 23
 חטאתv. 26
 חטאתv. 28x2 חטא, עשׂה,  אשׁםv. 27
חטא, v. 28x2
 חטאv. 35
 חטאתv. 6x2  חטאv. 5
 חטאתv. 10
 חטאv. 7
 חטאv. 10
 חטאv. 11
 חטאv. 13
 מעלv. 14
מעל,  חטאv. 14
 חטאv. 16
חטא, עשׂה,  אשׁםv. 17
 שׁגגv. 18
 מעלv. 1
מעל,  חטאv. 1
אַשׁמָ ה
ְ v. 7
 חטאv. 3
חטא,  אשׁםv. 4
 חטאv. 4x2
 מרדv. 9
נסה,  שׁמעv. 22
 שׁגגהv. 24
 שׁגגהv. 27
 שׁגגהv. 29

Num 15:28
Num 30:6
Num 30:9
Num 30:13

Additional Verb/s

פֶּשַׁ ע
חטאת

Lev 4:20

Lev 4:31

Additional
Noun/s

שׁגה, עשׂה,  עשׂהv. 22
 שׁגהv. 22
 חטאv. 27
שׁגג,  חטאv. 28
 עשׂהv. 29
 חטאLev 5:5
 חטאLev 5:5
 חטאLev 5:5
Negation + סָ לַח

Deut 13:5
 ָרע, Deut 13:5;
17:5, 7
ּתֹועבָ ה, Deut
13:14; 17:4

Nature of
Impurity
Ritual

Moral

Yes

X

x

X

x

X

x

X

x

X

x

X

x

X

x

X

x

X

x

X

x

X

x

X
X
X

x
x
x

X

x

X
X
X

x
x
x

X
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Expiability
No

x

טָ הֵ ר
However, contrary to  סָ לַחwhich is exclusively used in moral impurity contexts,
the use of  טָ הֵ רis not as consistent as the use of סָ לַח. In the Pentateuch, the verb is used in
the context of both ritual and moral impurity. The following table (Table 4) lists all the
texts where the verbal form of  טָ הֵ רrefers to the state of the person or object when purity
is achieved in the Pentateuch. The first column contains the references and the second,
the number of uses in each of those references. The next two columns in the middle
divide the references in regard to the impurity they refer to. The last two columns show
whether an object of the verb is a human being, the sanctuary, or other objects.
Results of the search on these two verbs shows that the purity/impurity
terminology that conveys the elimination of the effects of impurity from humans is
consistent, but still has certain exceptions. That is, the use of  סָ לַחdecisively shows that
forgiveness was never needed for ritual impurity, and a ritually impure person never
received it in the Pentateuch or the rest of the OT. Accordingly, the uses of the verb סָ לַח
in the Pentateuch and the rest of the OT clearly emphasize a difference between the two
impurities, moral and ritual.
The use of  טָ הֵ רis not as consistent as that of סָ לַח. That is,  טָ הֵ רrefers to the purity
that is the result of ritual and/or moral impurity being eliminated from humans and
inanimate objects in the Pentateuch. Statistics show that  טָ הֵ רdeals with ritual impurity
more frequently. Speaking in numbers,  טָ הֵ רrefers to the purity from the effects of ritual
impurity in twenty-one out of twenty-five of contexts when it appears with the terms of
impurity in the Pentateuch. However, three out of four of the remaining four contexts are
98

Table 4. The verbal forms of  טָ הֵ רin the Pentateuch

Verb
X

Ritual
X

X

X

Nature of Impurity
Moral
Sinfulness

1
2

Reference
Gen 35:2
Lev 11:32

3
4

Lev 12:7
Lev 12:8

X

5
6
7
8

Lev 14:7
Lev 14:8
Lev 14:9
Lev 14:20

2x
2x
X

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Lev 14:48
Lev 14:53
Lev 15:13
Lev 15:28
Lev 16:19
Lev 16:30
Lev 17:15
Lev 22:4
Lev 22:7
Num 8:6
Num 8:7
Num 8:15
Num 8:21
Num 19:12
Num 19:19
Num 31:23

X
X
2x
2x
X
X
X
X
X
X
2x
X
X
2x
X

x+healing
x+healing
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
x342
X
X

X

X

25

Num 31:24

X

X

x
(potentially)

X

X
X

Direct/Indirect Object
Human
Inanimate
x
physical
objects
x
x

X

x
x
x
x

X
X
X
x
(potentially)

X

house
house
x
x
x340
x341

altar

X

x
x
x
x
x
x
X
X
X
X
physical
objects
pieces of
cloth

340

Gane, Cult and Character, 230.

341

Gane, Cult and Character, 39.

Based on the use of the hithpael form of the verb חָ טָ א, Milgrom noted that cleansing conveyed
by this verb and form undeniably refers to the cleansing from ritual impurity. Milgrom, Numbers, 65 and
see excursus 48.
342
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debatable. In Lev 12:7–8 and 14:20, the moral aspect of purity is just potentially present.
It is not mentioned in the text. In Lev 16:19, ritual and moral impurity are removed from
the sacrificial altar, which cannot have moral responsibility, but can just be clean or
unclean. Lev 16:30 remains the only true exception since  טָ הֵ רrefers to the moral purity
of the Israelites.343
In the rest of the OT, the use of  טָ הֵ רis more frequently found in contexts where it
refers to the cleansing of both ritual and moral impurity. That is, forty verbal forms refer
to both ritual and moral purity which, contrary to the uses in the Pentateuch, have the
greater number of occurrences related to moral impurity. There are thirty-two derivatives
of the root  טָ הֵ רthat are divided into two nonverbal forms, adjectives and nouns. Nouns
occur five times and in four occurrences, they refer to ritual purity (Ezek 44:26; Neh
12:45; 1 Chr 23:28; 2 Chr 30:19) while one of them does not belong to purity language
(Ps 89:44, translated as “splendor”). Adjectives occur twenty-seven times and refer to
ritual (1 Sam 20:26; Isa 66:20; Ezek 22:26; 36:25; 44:23; Mal 1:11; Job 14:4; 17:9;
28:19; Eccl 9:2; Ezra 6:20; 2 Chr 30:17) and moral impurity (Hab 1:13; Psa 12:6; Ps
19:9; 51:10; Job 14:4; 17:9; 28:19; Prov 15:26; Prov 22:11; 30:12). In addition, some
adjectives refer to ritual purity (Zech 3:5; Job 28:19; 1 Chr 28:17; 2 Chr 3:4; 2 Chr 9:17;
13:11). These statistics show that the use of the root  טָ הֵ רis more complex in the rest of
the OT than in Pentateuch. The meanings that are attached to this term and the conditions
they refer to are much broader. However, the rationale for this broader meaning of the
verb in the rest of the OT exceeds the scope of this study and will not be explained here.

343

Gane, Cult and Character, 39.
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It seems that the verb that refers to removal of the negative effects of impurity
from humans points to the existence of two kinds of impurities.  סָ לַחis used exclusively
to convey the removal effects of moral impurity from humans, while  טָ הֵ רeffects removal
in the contexts where ritual impurity affected humans or inanimate objects and once
where both impurities are involved (Lev 16:30).

 חָ נֵףand טָ מֵ א
In the following quotation, Klawans highlighted two terminological points that
also stress the difference between ritual and moral impurity: “Although the term impure
( )טָ מאis used in both contexts, the terms abomination ( )תועבהand pollute ( )חנףare used
with regard to the source of moral impurity, but not with regard to the sources of ritual
impurity.”344
First, in surveying the terminology mentioned in this quotation, Klawans noticed
that when  טָ מאor  חָ נףhave the land as their direct object, they always convey defilement
by moral impurity. The land never acquires defilement by ritual impurity. The following
displays the texts where the verb  טָ מאconveys moral defilement of the land (Table 5).
The verb  חָ נֵףis used only once in the Pentateuch to convey the defilement of the
land (Num 35:33). The nature of this defilement is moral.
Thus, 2 out of 3 verbs, טָ מֵ א, חָ נֵף, and חָ לַל, used in the OT to convey defilement
are employed to express defilement in the Pentateuch. The use of these verbs shows that

344

Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 26; Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple,

55–56.
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Table 5. The verb  טָ מֵ אin relation to the land in the Pentateuch

Reference
Lev 18:25
Lev 18:27
Lev 18:28
Num 35:34
Deut 21:23

Word Type
Terminology Various Verb
x
x
x
x
x

Nature of Impurity
Ritual
Moral
X
X
X
X
X

the land never received ritual, but always moral defilement. The reason why Klawans did
not examine what kind of defilement is conveyed by the third verb that conveys
defilement, the verb חָ לַל, is because it never has land as a direct object in the Pentateuch.
The only time  חָ לַלconveys defilement of the land is in the prophetic text of Jer 16:18,
where the verb conveys defilement of the land by moral impurity.
Neither did Klawans discuss what kind of defilement  טָ מֵ אand  חָ נֵףpoint to when
they involve humans or the sanctuary. Those statistics are provided in Table 6. The first
column indicates references where  טָ מֵ אis used in the Pentateuch. The second column
follows the use of the verbs. The third and fourth columns are both divided into two to
present the nature and direct object of impurity.
The verb  טָ מֵ אcan apply to either of the impurities, as can be observed in Table 6.
The majority of direct objects affected by the defilement communicated by  טָ מֵ אare
humans rather than the sanctuary. Out of ninety-three uses, humans were affected eightynine times, while the sanctuary was affected three times. Once the entire camp was
affected.
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Table 6. The verb  טָ מֵ אin relation to humans and sanctuary

Reference
Gen 34:5
Gen 34:13
Gen 34:27
Lev 5:3
Lev 11:24
Lev 11:25
Lev 11:26
Lev 11:27
Lev 11:28
Lev 11:31
Lev 11:39
Lev 11:40
Lev 11:43
Lev 11:44
Lev 12:2
Lev 12:5
Lev 13:3
Lev 13:8
Lev 13:11
Lev 13:14
Lev 13:20
Lev 13:22
Lev 13:25
Lev 13:27
Lev 13:30
Lev 13:44
Lev 13:46
Lev 13:59
Lev 14:46
Lev 15:5
Lev 15:6
Lev 15:7
Lev 15:8
Lev 15:10
Lev 15:11
Lev 15:16
Lev 15:18
Lev 15:19
Lev 15:21
Lev 15:22
Lev 15:23
Lev 15:24
Lev 15:27
Lev 15:31

Terminology

2x

2x
2x
2x

2x

2x

2x
2x

Nature of Impurity
Ritual
Moral
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

103

Object of Impurity
Human
Sanctuary
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Table 6—Continued.
Lev 15:32
Lev 17:15
Lev 18:20
Lev 18:23
Lev 18:24
Lev 18:30
Lev 19:31
Lev 20:3
Lev 21:1
Lev 21:3
Lev 21:4
Lev 21:11
Lev 22:5
Lev 22:6
Lev 22:8
Num 5:3
Num 5:13
Num 5:14
Num 5:20
Num 5:27
Num 5:28
Num 5:29
Num 6:7
Num 6:9
Num 6:12
Num 19:7
Num 19:8
Num 19:10
Num 19:11
Num 19:13
Num 19:14
Num 19:16
Num 19:20
Num 19:21
Num 19:22
Deut 24:4

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

2x

2x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
camp

2x
2x

2x
2x

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

x

X
X
X

By contrast to טָ מֵ א, the verb  חָ נֵףis never used in the Pentateuch for defilement
that affected either humans or the sanctuary. However, the verb  חָ לַלis used in nine texts
in the Pentateuch to denote defilement as the following table displays.
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חָ לַל
While the verb  טָ מֵ אremains the key verb to convey the process of defilement in
the Pentateuch,  חָ לַלis also used, less frequently, to refer to defilement. Milgrom
explained this semantic domain overlap in terms of confusion in the H texts that use טָ מֵ א
and  חָ לַלinterchangeably.345 However, the present study understands this semantic
overlap as a common phenomenon in BH. The following table regarding the defilement
of the land communicated through חָ לַל, should be understood thus: the first column of the
table shows references where  חָ לַלis used in the Pentateuch. The second column lists the
use of the verbs. The third and fourth columns are both divided into two to present the
nature and direct objects of impurity (Table 7).

Table 7. The verb  חָ לַלin relation to humans and sanctuary

Reference
Lev 19:29
Lev 21:4
Lev 21:9
Lev 21:12
Lev 21:15
Lev 21:23
Lev 22:9
Lev 22:15
Num 18:32

Terminology

2x

Nature of Impurity
Ritual
Moral
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

345

Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 37–38, 229–30.
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Human
X
X
X
X
X

Sanctuary

X
X
X
holy gifts
holy gifts

As can be observed,  חָ לַלis very similar to  טָ מֵ אin its preference for transferring
both ritual and moral defilement to humans and sanctuary.
Therefore, keeping in mind the results of the search for the verbs טָ מֵ א, חָ נֵף, and

 חָ לַלpresented above, Klawans’s claim that the land never contracts ritual defilement is
correct. The only defilement that the land can be affected with is moral defilement.
However, the use of these verbs when their direct objects are humans or the sanctuary
shows that they can refer to either type of defilement. In addition, the search showed that
humans are more frequently affected with both kinds of defilement than the sanctuary is.

תֹּועֵבָ ה
The second claim from Klawans’s quotation is that  תֹּועֵבָ הnever refers to ritual
impurity. The following shows that Klawans’s claim that  טָ מֵ אis used in both contexts,
ritual and moral impurity, is correct (Table 8). The noun  תֹּועֵבָ הand the verb  חָ נֵףare used
exclusively for moral impurity.
It has to be emphasized here that  תֹּועֵבָ הin Gen 43:32, 46:34 and Exod 8:22[26]
conveys meaning/s that were part of the Egyptian cultural, religious, moral, and social
context and order, rather than Israelite’s ideological context. Scholars are not certain of
the exact meaning of  תֹּועֵבָ הin these texts. Most of them claim that the issue was
essentially related to both ritual and moral contexts.346 However, the most thorough study

346

Thomas B. Dozeman, Exodus, ECC (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 228; Kenneth A.
Mathews, Genesis 11:27–50:26, NAC 1B (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2005), 791–92; Michael A.
Grisanti, “ּתָ עַב,” NIDOTTE 4:314–15; Carl Friedrich Keil and Franz Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, BCOT
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1952), 1:361–62.
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Table 8. The noun  תֹּועֵבָ הin the Pentateuch

Reference
Gen 43:32
Gen 46:34
Ex 8:22 [26]
Lev 18:22, 26–27, 29–30
Lev 20:13
Deut 7:25–26
Deut 12:31
Deut 13:15
Deut 14:3
Deut 17:1
Deut 17: 4
Deut 18:9, 12
Deut 20:18
Deut 22:5
Deut 23:18
Deut 24:4
Deut 25:16
Deut 27:15
Deut 32:16

Terminology

illicit sex, sodomy
homosexuality
idolatry
child sacrifice
illicit worship
unclean animals
unfit sacrifice
Idolatry
Necromancy
sins of the nations
sexes mixing clothes
prostitution money
in temple
remarrying a woman
dishonest scales
idolatry
idolatry

Word Type
Noun Verb

Nature of Impurity
Ritual
Moral
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

on the meaning and origin of  תֹּועֵבָ הhas been done by A. S. Yahuda, who noted that the
word is mainly related to sinful and criminal contexts that are in sharp opposition to
Egyptian gods.347
The following statement by Milgrom is partially correct but misleading: “The
distinction between moral and physical impurity is indicated not only by the terms for the
causes of the sanctuary’s pollution (ṭumʾā versus ḥēṭʾ) but by the consistent use of the

347

A. S. Yahuda, The Language of the Pentateuch in Its Relation to Egyptian (London: Oxford
University Press, 1933), xxxii, 4, 75, 95. It is also documented that the Egyptian influence on the biblical
texts is very low. Bernd U. Schipper, “Egyptian Influences on the Biblical Text,” Bible Odyssey, released 8
Nov 2017, http://www.bibleodyssey.org/places/related-articles/egyptian-influences-on-the-biblical-text.
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two different verbs that describe the effect of the purgation: physical impurity is purified
(ṭāhēr); moral impurity is forgiven (nislaḥ).”348
Based on this statement, one is led to believe that there is a consistent
terminological usage of two sets of terms for ritual or moral impurity. That is correct for
the second pair of terms  טָ הֵ רand  סָ לַחas it was demonstrated above,349 with Lev 16:30
being the only exception. However, consistency of uses cannot be claimed for the first
pair of terms,  טֻמאָהand חֵ טא. Even though the majority of uses of  טֻמאָהin the
Pentateuch, nineteen out of twenty,350 refers to ritual impurity,  טֻמאָהin Num 5:19 refers
to moral impurity. In addition, the nominal derivative of  חָ טָ אand its derivative  חֵ טאis not
the only term for moral impurity. Besides חֵ טא, there are four more nominal derivatives
from the same root (חַ טָּ את, חַ טָּ אָה, חֲטָ אָה, and  )חֶּ טאָהthat all refer to moral impurity. To
this, one could add other terms that convey moral impurity, such as פֶּשַׁ ע, and עָֹון, to
which the present study is limited. However, the number of terms, including their verbal
and nominal derivatives, that refer to moral impurity is even higher, which makes
Milgrom’s claim highly questionable.

Conclusion
After having analyzed the findings of scholarly research on impurity compared
with Pentateuchal texts that deal with impurity and the additional terminological search

348

Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 857.

349

See Table 3 on page 97 of the present study.

350

Lev 5:3; 7:20–21; 14:19; 15:3, 25–26, 30–31; 16:16, 19; 18:19; 22:3, 5; Num 19:13.
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presented here, the present study arrived at the following conclusions. The position of the
majority of scholars on the topic in regard to the first question that permeates the
discussion, that is, whether there are one or two types of impurity, seems to be correct.
The research presented in the present study, comprised of a variety of insights derived
from Pentateuchal texts and a terminological/contextual/intertextual analysis of the
passages where certain terms for sin are used, showed that there is a substantial
difference between two types of impurity, ritual and moral. The key features of these two
impurities which emphasize the differences between them were recently formulated by
Klawans. Building his own system on the works of Hoffmann, Büchler, and FrymerKensky, he substantially expanded the understanding of the concept and strengthened the
weak points of their research to frame the most comprehensive and detailed
understanding of impurity to the present time.
However, Klawans’ system also lends room for some modification. Two points in
which it can be modified were noted in the present study. First, there is no division into
intentional and unintentional in moral sins in Klawans’s system, but rather, he recognized
that moral sins are only murder, idolatry, and illicit sex, and they are always intentional.
The second point coming from this oversight is that by not dividing moral sins into
intentional and unintentional, he understood that moral impurity is a direct consequence
of these grave sins, which is in sharp contrast with texts like Lev 4:1–5 and Num 15:22–
29 that speak about unintentional sins which are also moral in nature.
The second question regarding the relationship between these two types of
impurity generated a considerable amount of research, but unfortunately did not produce
a unified position. At this point, I suggest the following descriptions to reflect the
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relationship between ritual and moral impurity as an attempt to bring more clarity and
precision to this lengthy discussion.
(1) Origin of impurity: Both kinds of impurity are sinful because they originate
from the Fall into sin portrayed as the disobedience of the first couple in Eden (Gen 3).
This Fall resulting from disobedience that made humanity susceptible to specific
condition of GHS which is discussed on pp. 399–407 of the present study. This condition
of humanity is foundational to both ritual and moral impurity. Ritual impurity essentially
represents the effects of the Fall on the natural world, including humans, while moral
impurity represents its effect on the human mind (as being a set of cognitive faculties
including consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, language and memory, and
also including the spiritual aspect of it), thus paving the way for potential intentional and
unintentional activity by humans against God’s laws. Ritual impurity finds its expressions
in the physical domain of human existence—reproduction, various physical diseases,
contact with the dead—while moral impurity is exclusively related to the human mind—
performing activities that oppose God’s laws. Kiuchi, following Wenham,351 has
postulated an understanding of ritual impurity accepted in the present work that it
symbolizes an “aura of death.”352
(2) Nature of impurity: (a) Both of these impurities are real. They are perceived
effects coming out of actual physical processes. Both impurities, as a result of certain
activities or events, defile humans, physical entities, and the land. There are perceived

Gordon J. Wenham, “Why Does Sexual Intercourse Defile (Lev 15:18)?,” ZAW 95 (1983): 434.

351

Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 63. Wenham modified Douglas’s theory of normality and
wholeness as a norm of holiness. Douglas, Purity and Danger, 63–71.
352
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effects of a defilement by both impurities, mostly impermanent defilement caused by
ritual impurities, and more severe defilement caused by moral impurity. Defiled
individuals, in the case of ritual impurity, must refrain from contacting holy things or, in
the case of moral defilement, are subject to punishment. Thus, both impurities bring
effects of legal and social consequences. “Real” is not the same as “physical,” but both of
these impurities are ontologically abstract realities. Ritual impurity is often represented as
physical and results from natural sources or events like child birth and human corpses.
Numerous texts warn against direct contact between the ritually impure and the pure or
especially the holy (Lev 7:20–21; 15:31; 22:3–7; 21:1–4; 22:3–7), an indication that the
primary goal of these texts was to maintain and bring awareness of a required separation
to be kept between ritual impurity and the holy. On the one hand, violating any of God’s
laws, which were given to prevent direct contact between the impure and the holy,
constitutes moral rather than ritual impurity. On the other hand, being in or contracting a
state of ritual impurity never generates moral impurity. Moral impurity is more serious in
its consequences than ritual impurity since it results from the violation of God’s laws,
some of which include breaking the laws that are related to ritual impurity, and the rest
represent guidelines for social and religious relationships within ancient Israel.
(3) Modes of defilement: Both kinds of impurities are contagious. Ritual impurity
defiles humans and physical entities including the sanctuary via direct or indirect contact,
but contracting ritual impurity by humans does not constitute moral impurity or sin as
long as the divinely prescribed procedures for cleansing various types of ritual impurity
are followed. Moral impurity defiles humans, the sanctuary, and the land in its entirety,
but not certain physical entities as ritual impurity does. Humans are defiled by moral

111

impurity by breaking God’s laws. Defilement of the sanctuary by moral impurity takes
place through the sacrificial blood offered by the sinner that is brought into the sanctuary.
The land is defiled by moral impurity performed in/on it by covenantal people.
(4) Effects of impurity: Ritual impurity results in mostly impermanent defilement
with no punishment. However, if ritual impurity was not dealt with or was brought in
contact with the holy, it could trigger terminal punishment since that activity represents
ignoring God-given guidelines regarding ritual impurity, and thus constitutes moral
impurity or violating God’s laws. Moral impurity brings more severe conditions and
punishment of and upon the sinner which sometimes includes degradation of status. By
breaking God’s laws, the sinner is considered guilty, liable for punishment, and in need
of forgiveness. Some moral impurities make a sinner irrevocably liable to kārēt353 or in
some instances, he or she is allowed to live, but at a lower status. The remedy for both
defilements was given by God so that individuals affected by any type of impurity could
get rid of it, and in most of cases, experience no status degradation. If the remedy is not
utilized in regards to some ritual and all moral impurity then one faces permanent
degradation which, in other words, is death or exile if the land is affected.
(5) Remedy for impurity: Ritual impurity can be lessened by lapse of time and/or
rites of purification. The remedy for some ritual impurity also requires a sin offering, but
never forgiveness. Moral impurity always required a sin offering/atonement, prerequisite
to forgiveness, but in some cases it resulted in the terminal punishment of kārēt.
Cleansing, which involved a sin offering, took place on the Day of Atonement. The most

The concept of kārēt is explored in chapter four of the present study.

353
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severe remedy was exile and took place in case the land was defiled. In order to maintain
their moral purity, humans could refrain from committing morally impure acts in the first
place and follow God’s procedures for private and annual cleansing of the sanctuary.
Cleansing of the land was uniquely achieved by the shedding of the intentional killer’s
blood onto it.
(6) Terminological details: In addition to the previous characteristics derived from
Pentateuchal texts in totality, the terminology used in purity/impurity contexts confirms
the existence of two types of impurity. The crucial and most important difference is that
removal of the effects of ritual impurity never requires סָ לַח, forgiveness, but is always
used in contexts that involve the effects of moral impurity. This consistent use of סָ לַח
points to the fact that being ritually impure does not constitute the moral defilement of an
individual. Another verb used to express removal of the effects of impurity is  ;טָ הֵ רit is
always used in ritual impurity context. The only exception is its use in Lev 16:19. 30
which seems to be reasonable in that particular context. The term that always refers to
moral impurity is the noun תֹּועֵבָ ה. The verb  טָ מֵ אis used as a general term for defilement
of humans, sanctuary, and physical entities by impurity in both ritual and moral contexts.
However,  טָ מֵ אnever conveys ritual impurity to the land; it only conveys moral impurity.
Of the other two verbs used to express defilement,  חָ נֵףand חָ לַל,  חָ נֵףnever conveys ritual,
but always moral defilement of the land; it is never found in the contexts of defilement of
humans, sanctuary, or other physical entities. The verb חָ לַל, on the contrary, conveys
both ritual and moral defilement of humans, sanctuary, or other physical entities, but
never defilement of the land. Thus, the terminology that conveys removal of impurity is
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consistent where  סָ לַחis used in moral and  טָ הֵ רin ritual contexts with the exception of
Lev 16:30. The terminology that conveys defilement is not consistent since  טָ מֵ אconveys
both ritual and moral impurity, חָ נֵף, only moral impurity to the land, and חָ ַלל, like טָ מֵ א,
conveys ritual and moral defilement, but unlike טָ מֵ א, never conveys defilement of the
land.
People who are in a covenantal relationship with God should not take part in
moral impurity and should follow God’s guidelines to deal with ritual impurity. However,
since both ritual and moral impurities were impossible to avoid in the state of human
affairs in ancient times, God prescribed regulations and remedies so the people could
retain a relationship with him even though they found themselves affected by one, or the
other, or both types of impurity.

Moral Impurity/Sin in the Pentateuch
This subheading opens the second part of chapter 2 which focuses on moral
impurity. With a broad, yet foundational understanding of impurity in the OT, I focus on
the three specific terms for sin in the Pentateuch in the second part of this chapter. A brief
introduction of these terms and understanding in the scholarly debates precedes their full
analysis. These three terms occur in the most relevant passages in the Pentateuch that
deal exclusively with moral impurity. The importance of these terms is also seen in the
fact that they are found in crucial texts that scholars refer to as they form their
understanding of atonement.

Relevant Terms for Moral Impurity in the OT
Most scholars consider that ַעפֶּשׁ, חָ טָ א,and  עָֹוןare the three key terms for moral
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impurity in the OT due to the frequency these terms are used in comparison to others.
Some consider them to be generic terms for sin.354 Some also consider the root

שָׁ גַג/355 שָׁ גָהand  ָרעָהand  ָרשַׁ עwith their derivatives are important terms for sin.356
However, the current study is limited to the terms ַע ֶפּשׁ, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןfor two reasons.
First, these three terms were never used to refer to ritual impurity expressed
through the root טָ מֵ א. They were used in certain contexts where derivatives of the root

 טָ מֵ אwere used (Lev 5:1–13; Num 5:5–31; Num 6, 19; Deut 21:22–23), but they never
refer to ritual impurity. No pericope of all these provides grounds for claiming that , חָ טָ א

ַעפֶּשׁ, and  עָֹוןrefer to ritual impurity. ַע ֶפּשׁ, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןexclusively refer to moral
impurity.
The terms reserved for moral impurity, עָֹון, and חָ טָ א, appear in the same context
with טָ מֵ א,but the act of touching objects that would result in uncleanness in Lev 5:2–3
was not problematic, but postponing/forgetting the cleansing ritual was. The sin was not
acquiring defilement, but disregarding the prescribed procedures to deal with it was.

Knierim, “חטא,” TLOT 1:410.
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355

356
Sklar, “Sin,” 2:298; Youngblood, “A New Look,” 202; Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:32;
Lyonnet and Sabourin, Sin, Redemption, and Sacrifice, 12–13; Quell, “ἁμαρτάνω, ἁμάρτημα, ἁμαρτία,”
TDNT, 1:270–71; Robinson, “Terminological Study,” 112. For additional list of works see Lam,
“Metaphorical Patterning,” 65n1; Alex Luc, “עָֹון,” NIDOTTE 3:351.

115

Thus, this sin was moral and not ritual in its nature.357
Sin in Num 5:5–31, potential adultery, is referred to by  עָֹוןin v. 15.358 Though
Gane presented arguments that this sin could include both ritual and moral defilement by
the woman,359 he ultimately concluded that “in any case, adultery involves both physical
ritual impurity that is forbidden and is therefore morally wrong, because it was incurred
with the wrong party (cf. Lev 18:20 of man defiling himself with his neighbor’s wife).”360
The emphasis in this case is on moral impurity since the sin in the first place was in
breaking one of the commandments from the Decalogue.
Accidental annulment of the Nazirite’s vow in Num 6 is the most challenging
case. That is, the circumstance that annuls the Nazirite’s vow is introduced in 6:9. The
Nazirite obtains defilement by corpse contact of a person who suddenly dies in his
surroundings. Verse 10 uses the verb  חָ טָ אto refer to the incident, מֵ אֲשֶּׁ ר חָ טָ א עַל־הַ ָנּפֶּשׁ.
Thus, it seems that the act of incurring ritual impurity constitutes moral sin. The verb

חָ טָ א, along with nominals  פֶּשַׁ עand עָֹון, are used to refer exclusively to moral impurity.
However, Gane was correct when he said that this incident has to be treated as
unintentional moral sin because it represented the violation of God’s commandment
regarding the Nazirite status: “Here sin is objective: Corpse impurity has simply occurred
through adverse circumstances, thereby violating the divine prohibition, without any
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38–39.
359

Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 522–23.

360

Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 523.

116

failure of intention, carelessness, vigilance, or memory on the part of the Nazirite (cf. Lev
5:2–4).”361 The fact that the person under Nazirite vow was involved in the incident and
was not in any case responsible for the violation of God’s commandment regarding his
Nazirite status makes this sin a moral one.362
The sin in Num 19:13, 20 is moral in nature since it resembles the sin in Lev 5:2–
3. Numbers 19 supplements Lev 5:2–3 by the addition of the sinner’s attitude of not
wanting to submit himself or herself to the prescribed purification procedure. The sin is
not referred to as acquiring ritual defilement, but as the neglect of purification
procedures. It differs from the sin in Lev 5:2–3 because it represents intentional
disobedience rather than an inadvertent or forgetful act.363
The sin in Deut 21:22–23 is moral defilement of the land, not ritual. The removal
of the corpse might also be initiated in order to prevent the community or the land from
accruing the curse applied to the criminal.364
Second, פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןare found in crucial contexts for the formation of the
atonement doctrine. All of them are used in Lev 16:21 to describe the sins that were
cleansed from the most holy place by the blood of the bull for the priests and the Lord’s
goat, and confessed by the high priest over the head of the scapegoat, thus “loading” it
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with the sins from the sanctuary, and that goat subsequently takes them away from the
Israelites’ camp. This part of the ritual of the Day of Atonement is considered the second
and final phase of the cleansing of Israel’s sins, removing them from the sanctuary and
the camp itself (Lev 16:21–22).365 The use of פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןin this context demands
research as to their meaning. However, the meaning of פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and עָֹון, Lev 16:21, is
excluded from separate searches on these terms that follow, but is suggested in the
subheading “Interpretation of Leviticus 16:21” because it depends on separate findings
on these terms.

 חָ טָ אitself is used in Lev 4:3, 14, 23, 26, 28x2, 35, and 16:30, 34.  עָֹוןis used in
Exod 28:38,366 Lev 5:1, 17, 10:17 and 16:22. Besides the statistics that demonstrate that
these three terms are the most frequent terms for sin in the Pentateuch, the fact that they
are found in crucial atonement contexts separates them from others.
The aim of this subheading “Relevant Terms for Moral Impurity in the OT” is to
show that Pentateuchal texts do not provide support for the claim that each of the three
terms for sin, פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and עָֹון, refers to specific categories of sins, whether
intentional/unintentional or expiable/inexpiable (forgivable/unforgivable) sins.367 Based
on the analysis presented in this study, all three terms refer to intentional/unintentional
and expiable/inexpiable or forgivable/unforgivable sins.
In order to demonstrate this, I am going to examine two characteristics concerning
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פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and עָֹון. First, are the sins expressed by a given term intentional or
unintentional? In other words, by what extent do biblical texts reveal the mental state of
the sinner who commits פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and  ?עָֹוןSecond, is  כִּ פֶּרavailable for the sinner who
commits a sin articulated by these terms? In other words, are פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןexpiable
or inexpiable?
In order to answer to these two questions, I will study פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןby
applying the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach. This approach extracts the
data about each sin from its immediate and wider literary context. This approach refers to
the study of the terms within the context in which a sin was committed. The presence or
absence of some sort of capital or other punishments368 contributes to the final answers.
This approach includes the contexts in which respective terms for sins are syntactically or
conceptually related to verbs/phrases that describe punishment for them.
The first step of the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach includes a
basic analysis of the phrase חָ טָ א,369 נָשָׂ א עָֹון. These phrases are associated with three
contexts and they differ according to the subject of the verb נָשָׁ א.370 In the first context,
the sinner is the subject of נָשָׁ א. In other words, the sinner  נָשָׁ אtheir own sins. In the
second context, God is the subject of  ;נָשָׁ אthat is, God  נָשָׁ אthe sinners’ עָֹון. In the third
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context, a third party, neither the sinner nor the one wronged, is the subject of the verb.371
The analysis of the phrases חָ טָ א/פֶּשַׁ ע/ נָשָׂ א עָֹוןbelongs to the first step of the
terminological/contextual/intertextual approach since their meaning affects the meaning
of these terms. This especially applies to the term עָֹון, because  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןis the most
frequent form of the phrase when the verb  נָשָׂ אtakes פֶּשַׁ ע, עָֹון, or  חָ טָ אas direct object.
The first step will include occurrences of the phrase within the Pentateuch.
The second step of the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach is the
study of פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןin contexts of capital punishment. Within the context of cult,
capital punishment372 points to inexpiable and unforgivable sin373 and is expressed
through a number of verbs and phrases. The verbs that serve as an umbrella for the
various modes of execution of capital punishment are 374 מוּתand הָ ַרג.375
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There are several modes of execution of capital punishment. The first mode is
stoning and is expressed via verbs ( ָרגַםLev 20:2, 27; 24:14, 16, 23; Num 15:35–36; Deut
21:21) and ( סָ קַ לExo 19:13; Deut 13:11 [10]; 17:5; 22:21, 24). The second one is
burning, expressed via the verb ( שָׂ ַרףGen 38:24; Ex 10:6; Lev 20:14; 21:9). The third
mode is execution by the sword (Exod 22:24; 32:27–29; Deut 13:15). The verb  ָנכָהalso
refers to the act of killing as a form of capital punishment (Lev 26:21, 24).376 Finally, the
verb  י ָָרהis used once to denote divine destruction in war in Exod 15:4. Even though the
verb is not mentioned, it is most likely that this sort of capital punishment operates in
Num 25:7–8. Exodus 15:4 uniquely used  י ָָרהmost likely as a synonym of דָּ קַ ר, which is
the technical verb for killing by piercing with a spear or sword.377 Sin punished by י ָָרה
was never referred to by the terms פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and עָֹון. Sometimes the mode of execution
is not articulated (Lev 20:9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 15; 24:17, 21).378 However, the use of the
verb  מוּתindicates some form of capital punishment for the cases where it is not
specified.
In the third step of the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach, פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א,
and  עָֹוןare associated with the nominal derivative from the verb כ ַָרת, kārēt. Due to

The verb  ָנכָהis included in this search due to the fact that it is conceptually, like its synonym,
linked with the verb  שָׁ פְַךthat refers to the act of killing. For further explanation see Slaviša Janković, “The
Rationale behind the Homicide Law in Numbers 35:30–34,” in Searching the Scripture: Andrews
University Seminary Emerging Scholars Pay Tribute to Their Professors, ed. Slaviša Janković (Berrien
Springs, MI: Andrews University, Theological Seminary, Old Testament Department, 2017), 84.
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various understandings of the kārēt punishment, the following subheading presents the
arguments for the understanding adopted in the present work.
The fourth step of the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach traces the
syntactical and conceptual connection between the verb  אָשַׁ םand sin expressed by ,פֶּשַׁ ע

חָ טָ א, and עָֹון.379  אָשַׁ םdescribes the sinners’ condition after they commit sin. Most of its
51 occurrences within the Pentateuch are found in the book of Leviticus, especially
chapters 4 and 5 which discuss atonement for intentional and unintentional sins.
There are four proposals for the meaning of the term nd they are a 380אָשַׁ ם
analyzed on pages 288–313 in the present study. At this point, this study accepts that “to
suffer guilt’s consequences” is the least problematic meaning of  אָשַׁ םin the crucial
context of Leviticus 4 and 5.
Cut Off (Kārēt) Punishment381
This punishment was frequently prescribed for various sins in the OT.382
Milgrom383 and Hobson384 offer a list of sins punishable by kārēt, but both of them either

 אָשַׁ םis also considered as a punishment for the sin. Leviticus 1–16, 33; Gane, Leviticus,
Numbers, 119; Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 13.
379
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omit,385 or fail to differentiate between, certain sins.386 Therefore, in the following list,
which is based on the list suggested by these two scholars, I have made adjustments
accordingly:
1. Failure to be circumcised: Gen 17:14.
2. Eating leavened bread during Passover: Exod 12:15, 19.
3. Unauthorized production of sacred incense: Exod 30:33.
4. Unauthorized production of sacred anointing oil: Exod 30:38.
5. Profaning the Sabbath: Exod 31:14.
6. Eating sacrificial meat in a state of uncleanness: Lev 7:20–21.
7. Eating blood: Lev 7:27; 17:10; 17:14.
8. Eating sacrificial fat: Lev 7:25.
9. Slaughtering an animal outside of the authorized sanctuary and as a sacrifice
to God: Lev 17:4.
10. Sacrificing an animal outside of the authorized sanctuary and as a sacrifice to
God: Lev 17:9.
11. Committing “any of these abominations” listed in Lev 18 (according to v. 29),
including incest, sacrifice to Molech, sex during menstruation, homosexual intercourse,
and bestiality.
12. Eating sacrificial meat that has been left over until the third day: Lev 19:8.

385
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13. Offering children to Molech: Lev 20:3–5.
14. Patronizing mediums and wizards: Lev 20:6.
15. Brother-sister incest: Lev 20:17.
16. Sex during menstruation: Lev 20:18.
17. Approaching sacred gifts that have been dedicated to YHWH, while one is in
a state of uncleanness: Lev 22:3.
18. Failure to afflict oneself during Yom Kippur: Lev 23:29.
19. Failure to keep the Passover without an adequate excuse: Num 9:13.
20. Sinning “with a high hand,” that is, deliberately “despising the word of
YHWH”: Num 15:30–31.
21. Failure to cleanse oneself with holy water after defilement due to contact with
a dead person: Num 19:13, 20.
Sklar has summed up the debate on the meaning of kārēt by asking two main
questions: (1) Of what does the penalty consist?, and (2) Who executes the penalty?387
These two questions are discussed below, respectively.
Of What Does Kārēt Consist?
In response to the first question, biblical scholars have proposed at least four
meanings of kārēt: (1) excommunication from the covenantal community,388
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1993), 119; John I. Durham, Exodus, WBC 3 (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1987), 406; Hobson, “Cut off
(One's) People,” 1.

124

(2) premature death,389 (3) extinction of lineage,390 and (4) punishment in the afterlife.391
The first proposal, excommunication from the covenantal community, is mainly
supported by the fact that the person deserving kārēt is said to be “cut off from his/her
people,” which is interpreted as excommunication from the covenantal community.
Pentateuchal texts seem to lend the most substantial support for the second
proposal, premature death. There are at least five arguments of support for the second
proposal:
(a) This is supported by some texts that seem to equate kārēt with premature death
(Exod 31:14;392 Num 4:18–20393). These texts suggest that kārēt and premature death are
synonymous.394 I found that Exod 31:15 and 35:2 in relation to Exod 31:14 also point to
the fact that kārēt and premature death are synonymous.
In addition to Exod 31:14 and Num 4:18–20 that Sklar quoted, the following
textual pairs further confirm that kārēt refers to the premature death of the sinner: Gen
17:14=Exod 4:24; Lev 17:4=Exod 32:27, Deut 13:5, 9, 10, 17:5–6; Lev 20:3, 5=20:2, 4;
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Lev 20:6=Exod 22:18, Lev 20:27; Num 19:13=Lev 15:31. The sins in these texts are the
same, but the punishment is either kārēt or premature death, which suggests that either
kārēt refers to premature death or refers to premature death with potential further
punishment.
(b) This is supported by three contexts where human beings are the direct object
of the verb  כ ַָרתwhich refers to premature death (Gen 41:36,395 Deut 12:29,396 19:1).
These texts are not legal texts, but they reflect a specific semantic preference in the Bible.
The same semantic choice can be detected also when animals are the direct object (Gen
9:11; Exod 8:9; Lev 26:22).
(c) Through the use of other verbs that regularly refer to premature death of
human beings, the context of some laws points to kārēt as premature death (Lev 23:29,
Num 19:13). Therefore, Lev 23:30 helps explain the prohibition in v. 29.397 Thus, based
on the present study’s research, the public or private nature of sin is insignificant in
determining the mode of punishment; however, a sinner’s attitude can be
determinative.398 This is particularly applicable in this case. Furthermore, Lev 7:20; 10:1–
2; 12:4; 15:31 shed light on the meaning of kārēt in Num 19:13.That is, those who
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intentionally bring impurity in contact with God’s holy sanctuary experience premature
death.
(d)  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןis used as kārēt’s equivalent in some contexts (Lev 20:17, Num 9:13;
15:31).  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןis a punishment that is understood to mean premature death. The
arguments for such an interpretation are presented below. Consequently, based on this
semantic equivalence, kārēt may refer to premature death of the sinner.
(e) The phrase “אֲנִּי אֶּ תֵּ ן אֶּ ת־ ָפנַי, to set my face,” is used in Lev 17:10; 20:3, 6;
26:17 along with kārēt and suggests the type of punishment implied. According to the
interpretation suggested in the present study regarding Lev 20:3, namely that it is a
subcase of the case introduced in v. 2, this text points to premature death as a punishment
for the idolater. Such a conclusion is possible since the same kind of punishment is
explicitly stated in v. 2 for the same sin. Moreover, the death penalty and kārēt are
equivalent in this case. However, Lev 20:6 provides more certainty that kārēt actually
refers to premature death. Specifically, based on Exod 22:18 and Lev 20:27, the sin of
necromancy is punishable by premature death. Leviticus 26:17 also points in the same
direction. It describes Israel’s defeat at the hands of its enemies, which is understood as a
reversal of v. 7 and describes Israel’s victory over its enemies. The defeat in both verses
includes (1) killing Israel’s enemies “by the sword” in v. 7 and killing Israelites in v. 27,
and (2) God as executioner.399 Based on the intertextual evidence, in three out of four of
these texts that contain double punishment, the phrase “to set my face,” and kārēt are
equivalent. The implied punishment seems to be premature death.
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The third proposal can be taken as complementary to the second and finds support
in Num 4:18–20, which states that Kohathites are cut off from the tribe of Levi. This
means that this particular lineage of the tribe of Levi would be terminated. The same
principle seems to be operating in Lev 20:20–21, where the sinner’s lineage is terminated
because of sin. Even though kārēt is not mentioned as a punishment for illicit sexual
deeds in these texts, the parallel laws in Lev 18:14, 16 that deal with the same sins are
understood in Lev 18:29 as punishable by kārēt.400
The fourth proposal finds textual support in Lev 20:2–3, which requires the
double punishment of stoning and being cut off. Wenham noticed that death in the OT is
referred to as “sleeping with one’s fathers” (1 Kgs 1:21) and “being buried with the
fathers” (1 Kgs 14: 31), which could imply an afterlife judgment. In that case, being cut
off would mean the eternal annihilation of the sinner.401 Milgrom argued that another
phrase, “to be gathered to one’s kin/fathers,” is an opposite idiom of kārēt and suggests a
reunion of the deceased after earthly life.402
Thus, based on the above points, the intertextual connections suggested in the
present study and the points noted by Sklar, it can be concluded that kārēt primarily
refers to the premature death of the sinner and possibly includes two additional more
severe components, termination of their lineage and eternal death. However, since
Donald Wold addresses the last two additional punishments in his research on the nature
of kārēt, his method and interpretation will be evaluated below.
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Donald Wold on the Kārēt Punishment
Wold suggested that kārēt refers to one’s extirpation and/or the extirpation of
his/her line of descendants, which may occur simultaneously along with or subsequent to
the premature death that was carried out either by God or the covenantal community.
Thus, the biblical kārēt resembles curse formulae found throughout ANE literature, and is
“a conditional divine curse of extinction.”403 This view has been adopted by many
modern scholars of biblical cult, such as Milgrom,404 Wright,405 and Gane.406
The present study argues against Wold’s conclusions which are problematic due
to the shortcomings of his methodology. As stated in his introduction, his work heavily
relies on extra-biblical sources conceptually, ideologically, and linguistically. Although
such information may be profitable for understanding biblical texts, it may also obstruct
the biblical presentation of topics and concepts, especially if such sources are given
preference over biblical texts. The present work finds that Wold allowed the extrabiblical material to guide and greatly influence his understanding of biblical topics on the
afterlife, which consequently influenced his understanding of kārēt punishment.
Wold stated that his methodology would include two steps: (1) an analysis of
expressions paradigmatically and syntagmatically associated with the verb  כ ַָרתin various
kārēt formulae in order to form a stable matrix whose dimensions can construct an
exegetical model and (2) this matrix would be rooted in the conceptual field of ideas
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derived from the P source of the OT and extra-biblical sources.407 The three expressions
Wold identified in his first step are (1) ע ִַּמּים, (2)  ִּאישׁ,  ֶּנפֶּשׁ, and (3) כ ַָרת.408

ע ִַּמּים. In regard to the first element, Wold defined  ע ִַּמּיםas “the sphere of the
individual’s existence. It designates the social entity from which one is cut off, whether
from the nation Israel, the cultic community ()עדה, one’s own family, etc.”409 Wold
stated that the P source deliberately chose  ע ִַּמּיםbecause it is “comprehensive and
equivocal.”410 This semantic broadness led Wold to extend the meaning of this word to
connote the afterlife. However, the initial step towards this understanding of  ַע ִּמּיםcame
from G. Driver’s and John Miles’ observation in regard to the Nabataean uses of  עַםas
ancestors.411 Wold also relied on the opinions of scholars of his time who held that the
phrases “to sleep with one’s fathers,” “buried with his fathers,” and “to be gathered to
one’s kin” refer to a place called “community of souls” whose existence is in the
afterlife.412 This claim suffers from at least two problems.
First, the dissertation research of Eriks Galenieks demonstrated that the beliefs of
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Wold’s time, which are currently accepted,413 are not biblically supported, but rather, rest
on evidence found in extra-biblical sources. All sixty-six passages in which  שׁאֹולis
mentioned in the OT are “poetic synonyms of the grave,” which denies the possibility of
human conscious existence after death.414 Galenieks further stated:
Sheol means no more than the place of the dead or simply the grave in general, where
the dead bodies or corpses return to become the dust of the earth (Gen 2:7; 3:19). On
the other hand, the fact that not even one of the sixty-six references to the term Sheol
contains any indication that Yahweh would somehow try to communicate with the
dead is strikingly clear and does not need to be commented on.”415
Second, the fact that the OT evinces little interest in the topics of death and
afterlife is one argument against Wold’s conclusions regarding kārēt. This is not to say
that the OT does not speak about death in connection with the afterlife, but rather, it
defines it in a very limited way (see e.g., Gen 5:24; Num 16:33; 1 Sam 2:6; 28:8–19; 2
Kgs 2:11; Isa 26:19; Ezek 37:1–14; Prov 12:28).416 The OT’s focus is on the present life,
so it emphasizes the covenant relationship between God and human beings.417 In his
dissertation research, Jan Sigvartsen stated: “The overall impression from a study of the
TaNaKh passages relating to the afterlife is that death was not considered the start of the
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next life, but the end of the present.”418 He also added that “the lack of obvious religious
burial rites in the Hebrew Bible may further suggest a lack of interest in the afterlife
among religious leaders.”419 Finally, Sigvartsen found that “the Hebrew Scriptures do not
present a fully developed, or rather, a complete, comprehensive, and detailed description
of the afterlife.”420
In the light of Sigvartsen’s and Galenieks’ research, especially of the latter’s
exegesis of the pertinent biblical texts (which is also the method used throughout this
work) Wold’s inclusion of extra-biblical notions of the afterlife cannot be accepted.
Subsequently, the impact such a notion has on the noun  ע ִַּמּיםand ultimately the term
kārēt invalidates Wold’s conclusions.

 ִּאישׁ,  ֶּנפֶּשׁ. In regard to the second element, building on the definition of Daniel
Lys, Wold concluded that  ֶּנפֶּשׁrepresents “the whole person but surely this was not an
abstraction for the ancient Hebrew. Of significance to the kārēt formulae is the fact that
the Israelite’s identity and existence was linked to his name and to his children.”421 While
this is true throughout the OT, it is also true that every individual is responsible for
his/her sin and for his/her own existence. Even more, Deut 24:16 states that “fathers shall
not be put to death for their sons, nor shall sons be put to death for their fathers; everyone
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shall be put to death for his own sin.”422 Thus, the claim that kārēt formulae refer to one
and exclude the other semantic domain of the word  ֶּנפֶּשׁis certainly a possible use in
certain contexts, but further research is needed. Such research is lacking in Wold’s work.
He rooted his transition from the former limited understanding of  ֶּנפֶּשׁto the one he
upheld throughout his study in the quote of Josef Schrabert, who stated that “wie  נפשׁim
hebräischen Text, so kann auch ψυχή di ganze person meinen, etwa in der
Ausrottungsformel ἐξολεθρευθήσεται ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκείνη ἐκ τοῦ γένους αὐτῆς.…”423 Based
on this assumed definition of  ֶּנפֶּשׁ, Wold concluded that the kārēt formulae affects the
person and his/her progeny. The present research does not find the method used to arrive
at such an understanding of  ֶּנפֶּשׁas sound.

כ ַָרת. In regard to the third element, to which Wold devoted most attention and
space in his study, he studied the verb  כ ַָרתin the context of its Akkadian and WestSemitic background. He stated:
In this section we hope to establish a Gattung for the kareth formula by means of
comparative linguistic analysis. Etymologically, karath is cognate to Akkadian
karātu, “to cut off, cut down.” To date, our search of the Akkadian sources had turned
up no examples of karātu with either napištum or awilum as its object so as to provide
an exact parallel to the biblical kareth formula with the verb karātu. However, we do
find a counterpart to karat nefesh with the verb nakāsu, a synonym of karātu, in the
expression napištam nakāsu. By studying the paradigmatic semantic field of this
idiom in the Akkadian literature and by comparing the usage of a network of West422
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Semitic terms which mean “to cut off” it is possible to establish a Gattung for the
biblical kareth penalty.424
Based on linguistic and conceptual similarities between kārēt formulae in the OT
and in Akkadian and West-Semitic texts, Wold concluded that kārēt punishment is
“conditional divine curse formulae.”425 The initial step Wold utilized in his quest for the
meaning of kārēt punishment was deriving its meaning from comparative Semitic
examples.426 Wold then analyzed the crux interpretum texts in the OT, namely the texts
that contain double punishment, kārēt, and premature death. These texts are Exod 31:14,
Lev 18:18, 15, 17, 21, 23, 22; 20:3, 5, 6; Num 15:30.427 Leaving aside the potential
irregularities of Wold’s linking of comparative insights to biblical texts, the present study
focuses on the reasons he offered against the understanding that kārēt formulae always
predominantly refer to premature death, regardless of the fact that premature death is
stated along with it. He proposed three reasons.
First, “stylistically, the Priestly Source is noted for its terseness in the legal
portions so that a circumlocution like the ambiguous kareth formula for the death penalty
at the very last comes as a surprise.”428 This claim is only partially correct, that is,
terseness is a general feature of biblical literature as a whole and applies to certain but
definitely not to all texts. It has been demonstrated throughout the present work that
terseness was not the primary guide that led biblical author/s to generate the biblical text
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as it stands. In many instances a phrase or a word is repeated for rhetorical purposes in
order to emphasize certain topic/s, maintain legal precision, or follow structure. To this
can be added that many laws themselves were repeated with modifications along with
exact verbatim repetitions. Repetitions are specifically present in the legal texts that
speak about curses.429 For the same reason, kārēt formulae were repeated after a
premature death penalty in order to emphasize the seriousness of the consequences for
certain sins. In addition to the specific weaknesses against Wold’s second and third
reason against single punishment kārēt formulae, the arguments against terseness
presented here are also applicable to those arguments.
Second, “logically, since the meaning of  מות יומתis clear, the addition of the
kareth formula in the aforementioned cases is tautologous and leads to confusion rather
than clarification.”430 This claim is refuted by numerous instances of repetition of the
same or equivalent/synonymous expressions in legal as well as narrative texts of the OT.
For instance, Num 15:31 abounds with synonyms that are not needed. Lev 1–7 is filled
with unnecessary repetition.
Third, “exegetically, to accept the synonymy of the expressions for death and the
kareth formula runs the risk of losing the exegetical process to subjectivity.”431 Even
though this risk is possible, the repetition of the same concepts through different words is
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well recognized and accepted.432 Removing the risk of losing exegetical objectivity in the
texts that include such phenomena is achieved by a careful analysis of the definitions in
context.
Thus, terseness, style, and logic should not be made a decisive factor for
interpretation. Rather, one should take into consideration the entire context of the
Pentateuch/OT.
In addition to those points of critique to Wold’s double punishment of texts that
contain premature death and kārēt punishment, the following arguments can be
mentioned:
1. kārēt never appears after any case of expected kārēt punishment (see Num
16,433 35:32–26,434 Lev 10,435 24436), but premature death does.
2. The syntactical position of kārēt is not static in the texts causing chronological
confusion. Sometimes it precedes other punishments (Lev 20:17; 23:29; Num 4:18; 9:13;
19:13), sometimes it follows them (Exod 31:14, Lev 17:10; 20:3, 5, 6), and sometimes it
appears in triple punishment texts where it is repeated twice (Num 15:31).
3. Wold’s methodological shortcomings may suffer from uncontrollably
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applying insights from the ANE context onto biblical texts without establishing sound
methods and control of the correspondence between the two literary, conceptually, and
ideologically similar, but yet totally differently worldviews, which has continued
unabated since the 1960s.437 Establishing a defensible method is still a demanding and
difficult task. Although current scholarship finds some overlaps between ANE and OT
exist, few scholars are able to find a proper method of comparison and analysis.438
4. A valid question to ask is this: What is the difference between death and kārēt
in reference to the afterlife? The sins deserving of premature death as a punishment are
intentional and brazen sins, where the sinner shows an attitude of defiance against God.
The death penalty assumes that a sinner deserving of this punishment automatically loses
the benefits of the afterlife based on his/her own choice.
5. Death is the primary punishment in kārēt cases outside of legal texts (Deut
12:29; 19:1).
In conclusion, Wold’s study is inordinately influenced by an Akkadian and WestSemitic worldview and suffers from a limited analysis of certain linguistic similarities.
That kārēt punishment in the OT refers to punishment in the afterlife is based on an ANE
construct that is more fully developed in ANE literature than in the OT. Therefore, in not
denying the existence of vague understanding of the afterlife concept in the OT, Wold’s
proposal cannot be accepted by this study since it is not supported by the biblical
evidence and suffers from methodological unsoundness.
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Who Administers the Kārēt Penalty?
In an attempt to provide an answer to the second question, key scholars of biblical
cult have suggested that kārēt is carried out by God himself,439 and they have identified
three points in support of this conclusion. First, there are texts which explicitly state that
God executes kārēt punishment such as Lev 17:10; 20:3, 5, 6.440 Second, as Wenham
noticed, many of the sins punishable by kārēt are secret sins, and only God could know
them (Lev 7:20).441 Third, in regards to Wold’s classification of sins punishable by kārēt
into six categories, specifically sacred time, substance, failure to perform purification
ritual, illicit worship, illicit sex, and blasphemy,442 Milgrom noted that “all fall within the
category of religious law not civil law; that is, they are deliberate sins against God not
against man.”443 He further reasoned that “as the cardinal postulate of the Priestly
legislation is that sins against God are punishable by God and not by man (Milgrom
1970a: 5–8), it follows that the punishment of kārēt is executed solely by the deity.”444
The first two points support the fact that at least in some instances God executes
kārēt. The third point may require some adjustments. First, Milgrom’s claim that all sins
punishable by kārēt are sins against God may benefit from more analysis. It does not
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provide the grounds for the argument that God executes the punishment in the event of
such sins. As stated in the present study, under the subheading Legal System of Ancient
Israel in chapter three, God is the originator, source, and giver of BL. This means that
violation of any of those laws makes the violator liable to God. Even if a person suffers
due to the sin of another person, the sin committed is ultimately against God. Thus,
Milgrom’s constructing a false dichotomy between religious and civil laws445 does not
remove foundational and underlying responsibility of the law breaker to God himself.
Second, some sins deserving of kārēt, according to Milgrom’s and Wold’s lists,
are punished by a human party, as explicitly stated in Exod 31:14.446 Milgrom assumes
that two punishments are implied here, as in Lev 20:2–3. The first punishment is death at
the hand of the covenant community, followed by kārēt at the hand of God.447 While
Sklar accepted the possibility that a double punishment may be possible but not necessary
in Lev 20:2–3,448 he claimed that that is not the case here because the role of the Hebrew
particle  כִּ יplaced in between ( מחַ ללֶּיהָ מֹות יוּמָ תeveryone who profanes it shall surely be
put to death) and ָ( כָל־הָ עֹ שֶּׂ ה בָ הּ מלָאכָה ונִּכרתָ ה הַ ֶּנּפֶּשׁ הַ הִּ וא ִּמקֶּּ ֶּרב עַמֶּּ יהfor whoever does
any work on it, that person shall be cut off from among his people) suggests that one
clause interprets the other: kārēt is carried out by the act of capital punishment.449
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Sklar also pointed to another passage that consists of similar lexical and
conceptual elements, Num 15. Numbers 15:27–31 discusses forgivable and unforgivable
sins, of which the latter is punishable by kārēt. This passage is immediately followed by
the episode of a man who was found collecting sticks on the Sabbath (v. 32). The
covenant community inquired of the Lord and asked how they should treat the violator.
God affirmed kārēt punishment, which was carried out by the covenant community and
consisted of stoning the Sabbath-breaker outside the camp (v. 35). In the passage
beginning in Num 15:31, immediately following the passages that prescribed kārēt for
high-handed sin, v. 35 illustrates what kārēt looks like. It states that it is premature death
carried out by a human party.450 In addition to these two texts, the following texts on
idolatry laws in Lev 20:1–5, 6; Deut 13, and 17 prescribe that idolater/s are punished by
premature death (stoning) by a human party. Finally, a  ביָד ָרמָ הsin, which is not limited
to any type of sin, but rather, is defined by the sinner’s attitude (see Num 35:32–36;
Sabbath breaking), is also punishable by premature death at the hand of the covenant
community. Thus, the claim that God is the only one who administers punishment for
sins punishable by kārēt is not confirmed by the biblical texts.
In conclusion, based on these biblical texts, it can be inferred that the kārēt
punishment is carried out by both God and the covenantal community and not solely by
God. Due to the nature of the sins in question, it is possible that God implemented this
punishment more frequently than the covenantal community.
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Summary and Conclusions
Kārēt punishment predominantly refers to the premature death of the sinner. The
sins that invoked the punishment of premature death themselves represent sins that are
motivated by a desire to defy and reject God. As such, premature death as punishment
affects the sinner’s status in the afterlife and prevents him/her from receiving the
advantages of afterlife that are presented in a limited manner in comparison to the ANE
texts and the NT. Wold’s study, which argues that kārēt punishment refers to the sinner’s
status in the afterlife, is heavily informed by an Akkadian and West-Semitic worldview
and based on a limited analysis of linguistic similarities. His proposal that kārēt
punishment in the OT refers to the punishment in the afterlife is based on an ANE
construct that is developed more fully in ANE literature than in the OT texts. Therefore,
in not denying the existence of a limited presentation of the concept of afterlife in the OT,
Wold’s proposal is not supported by the biblical texts. In addition, his conclusions also
suffer from methodological unsoundness. Finally, according to the biblical texts and in
contradistinction to Milgrom’s conclusions, God and the covenant community administer
kārēt punishments. However, due to the secret nature of these sins, it is reasonable to
suggest that God administers this punishment more than humans. The current study first
presents the key points of the previous scholarly research on each term that precedes this
study within the limits of the Pentateuch.

חָ טָ א/פֶּשַׁ ע/נָשָׂ א עָֹון: The Meaning
The analysis of the terms ַע ֶפּשׁ, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןaccompanied with the verb נָשָׁ א,
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generated a considerable amount of research.451 Most scholars have studied these phrases
under the assumption that ַע ֶפּשׁ, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןare synonyms.452 The terms חָ טָ א/פֶּשַׁ ע/עָֹון

 נָשָׂ אare found in two contexts: (1) forgiveness for sin or (2) consequences for sin:
punishment. Studies have maintained these two functions of the phrase for a long time,
but this dichotomy was challenged by Baruch J. Schwartz in recent times.453
Schwartz’s Interpretation of נָשָׂ א עָֹון
Schwartz noted that there are two key reasons that have led scholars to arrive at
the dual understanding, forgiveness for sin or punishment, of the phrase: (1) in the
metonymic use of the terms for sin in the Hebrew Bible, they refer to both the act itself
and its consequence and (2) the verb  נָשָׁ אhas two different figurative meanings, “to
forgive” and “to suffer, endure.” This resulted in two contrasting translations of the verb
depending on the context, “to forgive sin” or “to suffer punishment.” Other ANE
languages seem to affirm this point further.454
Schwartz proposed that the phrase does not have two different meanings, but
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rather, one literal meaning. The verb  נָשָׁ אmeans “to bear, carry,” while  עָֹוןand  פֶּשַׁ עrefer
to sin, so the phrase means “to bear, carry sin or carry off, take away, remove.” As being
a figure of speech that refers to the wrongdoing as an object rather than an event or an
action, the phrase was used in two distinct ways. Schwartz understood the phrase as a
figure of speech that conceives sin as an object, a load rather than an event or action.
First, it was used to convey the sinner’s carrying of sin as a burden which might end in
suffering the consequences if there are any. Thus, if a sinner bears sin, he or she may
suffer the consequences if there are any related to it. In this usage, the phrase is a
metaphor for the sinner’s unrelieved guilt and should be translated as “to bear, carry sin.”
In other words, it is an indirect way of saying that the sinner deserves punishment and
never represents punishment itself.455
If somebody else bears the load, then the sinner is relieved of it and its
consequences if there are any. In this usage, the phrase is a metaphor for the sinner’s
relief from guilt and should be translated as “to carry off, take away, remove sin.” Thus,
the phrase has only one meaning, but two uses.456 The former use of the phrase (just עָֹון

 נָשָׂ אand  )נָשָׂ א חָ טָ אis restricted to P and H source/tradition only, whereas the latter one
(חָ טָ א, פֶּשַׁ ע,  )נָשָׂ א עָֹוןis found throughout the Pentateuch.457 Schwartz’s main argument
for establishing the two uses of the same phrase is in changing the subject and the

Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 8–9, 10.

455

Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 8–9, 10.

456

Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 9.

457

143

execution of some sort of punishment or release from it.458
The use of the phrase in one or another context is characterized by changing
subject. If the sinner is the subject then the phrase refers to his or her liability, whereas if
someone else other than the sinner is the subject, it refers to relief from the liability.459 In
the latter usage, the sin, as a weight, is not transferred to another party so that the
individual would bear the sin instead of the sinner, but rather, it does not weigh upon
anyone. Schwartz stated: “It has disappeared.”460
Schwartz ardently upheld the fact that the verb  נָשָׁ אhas only one basic meaning—
“to bear, carry”—and the choice of the subject of the phrase would point to one of the
two possible uses. In his opinion, the meaning of “to forgive (sin)” or “to suffer
punishment” is not a semantic domain of the verb נָשָׁ א. He did not support his proposition
with research on the semantic domains of נָשָׁ א. Yet, based on the various studies of נָשָׁ א,
gathered together by Olaffson,461 the consensus was reached that the basic meaning for
the verb  נָשָׁ אis “to lift,” “to carry,” or “to take.” The meaning “to forgive” was not
considered as a semantic domain of נָשָׁ א.
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In addition to the basic meaning, the studies of  נָשָׁ אshowed that this meaning is
expressed in two ways, literal or metaphorical.462 The emphasis is placed on the former
one, whereas the latter was almost totally ignored. Finally, these studies showed a lack of
importance and the meaning of the idiomatic uses of particular phrases encompassing the
verb נָשָׁ א. The outcome of the approaches noted in those studies was that “no one has
suggested the existence of a homonymous root for the concept of forgiveness, even
though they seem to suggest that the concept of forgiveness is more or less ‘appended’ to
the root rather than being an integral part of it.”463 These studies are uniform in
understanding the concept of forgiveness as “removal of sin, guilt, transgressions, or
wrongdoing.”464 Knierim, Stolz, Zimmerli, Freedman, and Willoughby pointed to the
substitutionary aspect of forgiveness.465 Knierim, Holladay, Freedman, and Willoughby
indicated the aspect of forgiveness in personal relationships.466 Knierim, Freedman, and
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Willoughby gave limited evidence for the “to care,” “to support” aspect of the verb

נָשָׁ א.467
Two characteristics of Schwartz’s work that become obvious in the following part
of the present research: (1) no analysis of  נָשָׁ אsemantic domains and (2) source-driven
division of the Pentateuch. The first caused him to go with the basic lexical meaning of
the verb and not notice the nuances of meaning contained in the semantic domains of the
verb. The second characteristic caused him not to conduct a source-driven understanding
of atonement, thus eliminating the insights on the topic that can be gained outside of P.
He isolated 22 occurrences (21 texts) of the phrase/s and one additional text in the
Priestly tradition that captured the consequential meaning of the phrase  עָֹוןor  חָ טָ אand he
derived 5 arguments that confirm this meaning of the phrase (see Table 9).468
As the table above shows, Schwartz joined Lev 7:18 and Lev 19:8 in one text due
to the close similarity of the two texts. The phrase  נָשָׂ א פֶּשַׁ עdoes not appear in those 21
texts since they all belong to P, but it does appear in other texts of the Pentateuch. I will
first analyze Schwartz’s research on  עָֹוןor  חָ טָ אin priestly texts and then analyze other
texts that also include נָשָׂ א פֶּשַׁ ע.
First, these 22 texts are comprised of 3 types of cases of which (1) some do not
state any punishment, (2) some include capital punishment prescribed by human or divine
agency, and (3) some involve kārēt punishment, explicitly or implicitly prescribed.
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Table 9.  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןtexts based on Schwartz’s research469
1. Exod 28:43 – Aaron and his sons when
they fail to wear the proper undergarments as
they approach the altar.
2. Lev 5:1 – A potential witness in a trial who
refuses to testify.
3. Lev 5:17 – A person who has unknowingly
sinned and possibly violated “the holy things
of Yhwh” (qodšê yhwh).
4. Lev 7:18 – A person who eats from the
šĕlāmîm -offering on the third day (first day =
day of offering)
5. Lev 17:16 – A person who eats from an
animal that either died on its own or was
killed by other animals and who does not then
properly cleanse himself.
6. Lev 19:17 – A person who does not reprove
his neighbor and thereby “lifts (nāśā’) onto
him (the neighbor) sin (ḥēṭ’).”
7. Lev 20:17 – A man who “takes” his sister
or half-sister and, presumably, has sexual
relations with her.
8. Lev 20:19 – A man who has sexual
relations with his maternal or paternal aunt.
9. Lev 20:20 – A man who has sexual
relations with his uncle’s wife.
10. Lev 22:9 – Priests who do not obey the
instructions about keeping themselves ritually
clean.
11. Lev 22:16 – “Nonpriests who
inadvertently eat of the sacred gifts, having
thus been caused to ‘bear sin’ through the
negligence of the priests.” v. 15

12. Lev 24:15 – A person who curses his god.
13. Num 5:31 – A wife whose husband
suspects her of adultery and who undergoes
the prescribed ritual under the supervision of
the priest.
14. Num 9:13 – A person who does not make
the paschal offering without a good reason.
15. Num 14:34 – The generation of adults
who were too fearful to enter Canaan after
hearing the report of the scouts.
16. Num 18:1 – Aaron, his sons, and his
ancestral house with respect to sins against the
sanctuary (miqdāš); only Aaron and his sons
with respect to sins connected to the
priesthood (kĕhunnâ).
17. Num 18:22 – Israelites who draw near to
the Tent of Meeting.
18. Num 18:23 – The Levites for any offenses
connected with the service of the Tent of
Meeting.
19. Num 18:32 – The Levites when they fail
to take the best of the donations (tithes) that
they receive to pass on to the priests.
20. Num 30:16 – A husband who, after
hearing about his wife’s vows and obligations,
later nullifies them.
21. Num 15:30–31 – Any person who acts
defiantly, deliberately transgressing any
commandment, thus spurning God

Based on the fact that some cases do not include potential punishment and some
warrant it, Schwartz concluded that the phrase is a metaphor for the commonality related
to all these texts, that is, being guilty.470
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Second, if sin bearing and punishment were coextensive, it would be expected
that either one or the other, but not both, would be mentioned in one single context. This
not being the case signals that the punishment and the bearing of sin are two distinct
phenomena, that is, sin bearing is culpability, liability, and guilt, whereas punishment
may or may not follow.471
Third, in some cases, bearing sin can be remedied ([2]472 Lev 5:1; [3] Lev 5:17;
[11] Lev 22:9 and possibly [6] Lev 19:17, and perhaps [20] Num 30:16), thus pointing to
it as only being the state of culpability and not the punishment itself.473
Fourth, Schwartz found additional confirmation for his position in the fact that the
terms for sin in this phrase,  חָ טָ אand עָֹון, refer to the deed itself and never to the
punishment since in 19/21 cases, they are sins of commission, deeds. However, he did
notice that eight cases ([1] Exod 28:43; [2] Lev 5:1; [5] Lev 17:16; [6] Lev 19:17; [10]
Lev 22:9; [14] Num 9:13; [18] Num 18:23, and [20] Num 30:16) appear to be omissions,
“but in every one of them, the negligence involved is tantamount to the commission of an
offence.”474 He listed Num 9:13 as the only exception to this point since it is a
performative command in P which includes kārēt punishment.475
Fifth, Schwartz found that in four cases ([2] Lev 5:1; [4] a) Lev 7:18; [5] Lev
17:16, and [10] Lev 22:9), bearing sin is the precise equivalent for being impure in the
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immediate and proximate cases. He stated: “This analogy too confirms that the sin that is
borne is a metaphor for a condition, not the penalty that is its outcome.”476 He noticed
that a bearing metaphor is reinforced when one realizes that impurity and sin are
associated with the same prepositions as they relate to human beings. Consequently,
impurity is occasionally “upon” the sinner (Lev 7:20, 22:3, Num 19:13) as is bloodguilt
“upon” sinners ([7] Lev 20:17; [8] Lev 20:19; [9] Lev 20:20). As individuals are “in their
impurity” (Lev 15:31; 18:19), they can also be “in their sin” (Lev 26:39; Num 27:3; Ezek
3:18; 33:6). In case (13), Num 5:31, bearing sin is opposite to being cleansed of sin. In
case (20), Num 30:16, the text states that the wife’s sin is borne just as her vow/oath is
upon her.477
Sixth, he noticed that in two cases ([2] Lev 5:1 and [3] Lev 5:17), the offender’s
bearing of his sin is a counterpart of realizing his or her guilt ()אָשַׁ ם. Sin-bearing, like

אָשַׁ ם, may also have a psychological component to it.478
Critique of Schwartz’s Interpretation of עָֹון
Milgrom produced the most extensive critique of this view. The starting point of
his argument was that behavioral terms extend the consequential meaning so that the
phrase can be translated as punishment or God lifts his punishment. Milgrom found that
this phenomenon is found in the Akkadian phrases ḥiṭam našû, arnam našû, šertam našû
(CAD N 11/2:103, 104, 108). Thus, he rejected Schwartz’s first consequential meaning
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and provided more arguments for Schwartz’s second meaning of “carry” or “removing
sin.”479
For Milgrom, all the occurrences of the phrase עָֹון אשָׂ ָנ/ חֵ טְ אin P means “to bear,
suffer punishment,”480 while in H, it means “to carry off, remove sin or forgive.”481 It
does not mean to carry a sin as if it were a weight, but refers to its consequences.
Milgrom first focused on proving that in all the cases ([2] Lev 5:1; [3] Lev 5:17;
[6] Lev 19:17) that Schwartz classified as having no punishment, the phrase actually does
refer to punishment. First, in regards to case (2) Lev 5:1, Schwartz believed that נָשָׂ א עָֹון
from v. 1 is parallel to  ואָשֵׁ םin vv. 2, 3, and 4. This interpretation has a long history482
and was noticed as early as in the Qumran texts (CD 9.10–12).483 Milgrom claimed that
this inference is incorrect because  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןis a part of the apodosis, a conditional part of
the law introduced in v. 1, while  ואָשֵׁ םbelongs to the protasis of the subcases of this law
detailed in vv. 2, 3, and 4.484 In most instances in Biblical Hebrew (hereafter BH), the
protasis of these conditional statements begin with either  כִּ יor  ִּאם, and then the apodosis
follows.485 Subcases of the protasis are emphatically introduced by  אֹוat the beginning of
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each law in vv. 2, 3, and 4,486 emphasizing their dependence on the protasis in v. 1. The
apodosis actually begins in 5b.487
In addition to this syntactical point,  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןand  ואָשֵׁ םcould refer to the two
mutually inclusive parts of the same process, namely the sinner’s realization that he has
sinned and is guilty—the psychological and judicial consequence of one’s sin.  ָנשָׂ א עָֹוןis
mentioned in the protasis and would apply to all following cases in vv. 2, 3, and 4,
whereas  ואָשֵׁ םis added in the apodosis to add the subjective aspect of the same process
for v. 1.  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןrefers to the objective aspect of one’s consequences for sin or
punishment since v. 1 represents a criminal case.488 The phrase  ואָשֵׁ םin vv. 4b and 5a
could refer to the sinner’s subjective realization of his or her condition of guilt. It also
refers to all cases, vv. 1–4.489 Nobuyoshi Kiuchi proposed that נָשָׂ א עָֹון, even though
mentioned only in v. 1, applies to all the following cases in vv. 2, 3, and 4. The culprit in
v. 1 faces two penalties, one for not testifying about the truth, and other for withholding
testimony.490
Second, regarding the case in (3) Lev 5:17, Milgrom rightfully pointed to the fact
that the law explicitly states that the sin was expiated with a reparation offering, but an
expensive ram as a fine is a stark penalty rather than a remedy. He listed Lev 5:6, 19,
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25a; and Num 5:7 to prove that  אָשַׁ םcarries the meaning of reparation, penalty.491 Other
scholars also recognized that  אָשַׁ םwas a penalty paid to God in the form of a sacrificial
offering in this pericope.492
Third, regarding case (6), Lev 19:17, Milgrom agreed that punishment is not
explicitly mentioned in this case, but that does not mean that it is not implied. He went on
to say that none of the cases ([4a] Lev 7:18; [4b] Lev 19:8; [8] Lev 20:19; [12] Lev
24:15; [13] Num 5:31; [16] Num 18:1; [18] Num 18:23, and [20] Num 30:16) mention
punishment, but the punishment is implied in all these texts.493 Schwartz himself agreed
that punishment is also implicit in (4a) Lev 7:18 and (8) Lev 20:19, as well as in others
([5] Lev 17:16 and [7] Lev 20:17). Thus, Lev 7:18 rules that those who do not uphold
regulations for eating sacrificial meat נָשָׂ א עָֹון, but the parallel law in Lev 19:8 specifies
the kārēt punishment for this sin. Milgrom stated: “H (Lev 19:8) explains the נָשָׂ א עָֹון, in
7:18 (P) means kareth.”494 Not agreeing that this is the characteristic of the two sources,
other scholars also noticed that these two texts illuminate each other, thus suggesting that
7:18 does indeed imply the kārēt punishment.495
It has been noted that the change in person and style in Lev 20:19a and 19b could
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suggest that this law is an appendix.496 Milgrom agreed with Michael Hildenbrand that
the change of person is rather an attempt to distinguish this prohibition from all the others
within its literary context by its content, style, and vocabulary.497 Hildenbrand noted that
this prohibition is the only one in the pericope, consisting of vv. 17–21, that does not
include a penalty except for  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןand does not begin with ו ִּאישׁ אֲשֶּׁ ר.498
The use of  ועֶּרוַת אֲחֹותinstead of  ו ִּאישׁ אֲשֶּׁ רpoints back to the parallel prohibition
in Lev 18:12–13 where this phrase begins eleven laws (vv. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
16, 17). Another signal that Lev 20:19 builds on Lev 18:12–12 is the noun שׁאָר,
translated as blood relative.  שׁאָרis used 4 times in Lev 18 (vv. 6, 12, 13, 17) and only
used in v. 19 of Lev 20. Milgrom believed, in this regard, that H edited the list in Lev 20
using the list in Lev 18.499 Hildenbrand saw it as a combination of Lev 18:12–13 with the
addition of עָֹון נָשָׂ א.500 While the composition of this law is not the question that is
pursued in the current study, it is evident that Lev 20:19 heavily relies on the parallel law
in Lev 18:12–13 which, in contrast to Lev 20:19, does legislate the punishment of kārēt
via Lev 18:24–30 that serves a concluding epilogue of the chapter codifying the kārēt
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punishment for committing the sins listed in the preceding verses.501 Therefore, Lev
20:19 does imply severe punishment as do sins in Lev 18 and in the preceding and
following verses of Lev 20:19. Schwartz himself agreed that the death penalty must be
inferred for the laws of the entire pericope of Lev 20:17–21 because it is mentioned in vv.
9–16.502
Milgrom rightfully noted that case (12) Lev 24:15 is followed by a death penalty
emphatically expressed by  מֹות יוּמָ תin v. 16 which clearly means that the penalty for
such a sin is death.503 Even though this law seems clear in terms of punishment for this
sin, Wells suggested a scenario in which the phrase  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןwould refer to the
unspecified punishment for cursing one’s god other than the God of Israel. Wells stated
that it is difficult to argue that there is an additional liability in this law, but he saw a
possibility that this law may be referring to a god other than the God of Israel. Thus, the
law could be applied in two different contexts and could imply distinct liabilities. In case
the context includes cursing the God of Israel, the punishment would be death, but in case
the context includes cursing some other deity, then the liability would be unspecified,
which would make the punishment in this law similar to the punishment in Lev 5:1, 17;
17:16; Num 5:31; and 30:15, some sort of wait-and-see unknown punishment.504 The
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present study rejects this proposal based on the fact that Leviticus used the phrase  אֱֹלהָ יו8
times in 7 texts (Lev 4:22; 21:7; 12:8, 17, 21–22; 24:15) and the addition to the
pronominal suffix 3 MSS never changed the referent of the phrase, that is, it is always the
God of Israel.505 It would also be unlikely that BL would be concerned with protecting
other gods than the God of Israel. This would contradict the entire thrust of the biblical
monotheistic faith and put emphasis only on the God of Israel. Biblical legislation shows
unfriendliness towards other gods including death penalties for serving or enticing others
to serve them (Exod 23:13, 24; Lev 20:1–5; Deut 13; 17:1–7).506 In addition, the
punishments in 5:1, 17; 17:16; Num 5:31; and 30:15 are not wait-and-see, but are rather
specified. That is, if no punishment is specified,  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןrefers to the death penalty.
Case (13) Num 5:31 also contains the punishment. That is, convicted women are
condemned to childlessness (vv. 22, 27). Milgrom stated: “Her punishment is equivalent
to ʿărîrî.”507 This punishment is also found in Lev 20:20–21. Milgrom proved from the
biblical texts (Gen 20:9; 26:10; 39:9b) that in the Bible, as well as in ANE,508 adultery
was considered a crime against the husband, but also against deities. As such, it was
treated by religious and civil laws.509
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Milgrom proposed two reasons why a suspected adulteress was not judged by a
human court. First, she was not apprehended by man, and thus there were no witnesses to
the woman’s sin. There are four indicators in v. 13 to show this: (1) “unbeknown to her
husband,” (2) “she keeps secret,” (3) “without being apprehended,” and (4) “and there is
no witness against her.” This further means that an unapprehended criminal is not subject
to the jurisdiction of the human court. These kinds of crimes are punishable by God only
with no need for human mediation.510
Second, the technical term for adultery, naaf, found in Decalogue 20:13, Lev
20:10[4x], Deut 5:17, is absent in a suspected adulteress pericope even though the text
describes her infidelity in four ways. The author of this pericope perhaps intentionally
refrained from relating a legal term naaf to suspected adultery because he wanted to
disconnect this woman’s fate from the death penalty imposed for adultery by a human
court. The intention was to emphasize the fact that punishment in this case comes from
God himself, and was not a human jurisdiction.511
The punishment itself reflects what is known in the OT as a measure-for-measure
principle and refers to a more precise retribution that would fit the crime one commits.
Thus, a human court could not do any more than put the apprehended adulteress to death,
but God sentenced an unapprehended adulteress to a more suitable punishment. That is,
since she agreed to receive forbidden seed, she was doomed to sterility for the rest of her
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life.512 She was not put to death and could live out her life, but was doomed by God to
childlessness.513 The final punishment in case the woman was proven to be guilty is also
debatable. Gane’s observation that the text is silent in regard to the punishment if the
women confessed her sin discredits Milgrom’s claim that the ritual’s purpose was to
encourage the woman’s confession.514
Perhaps her confession can protect her from the public humiliation of being
involved in the ritual itself, punished by a prolapsed uterus, and eventually being
punished by the death penalty. Milgrom believed that her full punishment could be
sterility,515 perhaps a prolapsed uterus,516 and a childless life517 which was perceived in
the OT as curse from God.518 In addition, if she had been proven guilty, her husband
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would have had the right to divorce her.519
The hint that the death penalty might be involved if she was proven to be liable in
this case is found in the inclusion of the  ע ֲִּר ִּיריelement of this punishment. Milgrom
recognized that the punishment of the woman in Num 5:31 is equivalent to ע ֲִּר ִּירי,520
punishment legislated in Lev 20:20, she would not be able to have children.
Commenting on Lev 20:20, Kiuchi noted that  ָימֻתוּrelated to  ע ֲִּר ִּיריis more
particular than it might seem. That is,  ָימֻתוּdoes not refer to a natural death, but rather,
describes the consequences of violating God’s laws or ordinances. Leviticus uses the qal
stem of the verb  מוּתto refer to the death punishment when humans carry it out (8:35;
10:2, 6–7, 9; 15:31; 16:1–2, 13).521 Some texts are excluded from this claim for valid
reasons. The death of an animal in Lev 11:39 is excluded due to the non-human subject.
However, it is unknown why Kiuchi did not include Lev 22:9 in the list since the text
uses the qal stem of  מוּתand refers to the death of the human being due to punishment for
violating God’s regulations regarding the sanctity of the sanctuary. Leviticus 21:11 is a
true exception to this since it uses the qal of the verb  מוּתand refers to a human who has
died for unknown reasons.522 However, with Lev 21:11 most likely being the only
exception, Kiuchi’s claim that death is viewed as punishment for violating God’s laws in
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the book of Leviticus potentially emphasizes the presence of death as the punishment
along with the punishment of  ע ֲִּר ִּיריin Lev 20:20. Since  ע ֲִּר ִּיריis the same punishment in
Num 5:22, 27 and in agreement with death as the punishment for adultery elsewhere in
the OT (Lev 18:20, 28; 19:20; 20:10–21; Deut 22:22–27),523 one could argue that נָשָׂ א עָֹון
could include the death penalty in the course of time if the suspected adulteress were
proved liable for the adultery.
Olaffson pointed that it is not clear if the phrase “to die childless” in Lev 20:20–
21 refers to the inability to have children or if their efforts to have children together
would be unsuccessful because they will both die. In the context of the pericope and the
punishments presented for illicit sexual behaviors the latter alternative is more suitable.524
Regardless of the fact that the nature of punishment is still a matter of debate, it is
nonetheless certain that punishment is envisioned in Num 5:31.
The two additional cases (16) Num 18:1 and (18) Num 18:23 are similar, and
none of them contains any explicit penalty. However, Num 18 deals with two dominant
concerns that were anticipated in prior legislation: (1) laws concerning the purity of the
sanctuary, its interior space and contents, including the priesthood, and (2) laws for the
support/compensation for the priests and Levites and their families. The law of (16) Num
18:1 belongs to the first concern and is specifically related to Exod 29:1–37; Lev 8–10;
Num 3–4, and 8:5–26, while the law of (18) Num 18:23 is embedded in the second
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concern. The specific issue of these laws in Num 18 covers the duties of the priests and
Levites.525
The former are responsible for preserving the purity of the sanctuary and its
contents by not allowing encroachment, which could have been done by priests’ entering
it in the state of impurity (Lev 22:3)526 or by allowing a disqualified priest—blemished
(Lev 21:23), inebriated (Lev 10:9), unwashed (Exod 30:20), improperly dressed (Exod
28:43)—to officiate at the altar or enter the sanctuary. Priests are the only ones who could
prevent some among them from entering the Most Holy place (Num 18:7) or if the high
priest entered it without proper safeguards (Lev 16:2).527 The priest had access to the
outer area of the Sanctuary and was punished by death if he encroached on the Sanctuary
or allowed a non-Levite to commit such an offense (Num 18:3).528 In the light of the
greater responsibility of the priesthood to guard the Sanctuary, the Most Holy, and the
altar and the fact that the Levites who guarded the outside of the sanctuary would receive
the death penalty if they failed, it is very difficult to claim that the punishment for priests
would not be death, as well.529 In addition to this, the fact that previous legislation
associated with potential violations envisioned in Num 18:1 stipulates kārēt (Lev 22:3;
Lev 21:23– )חָ לַלor the death penalty (Lev 10:9; Exo 30:20; Exo 28:43; Lev 16:2, and Lev
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cf. v. 7) for the culprit also emphasizes the responsibility of the priests and Levites in
relation to preventing its defilement. Case (18) Num 18:23 portrays the same
phenomenon of implied punishment. That is, the punishment for an encroaching Israelite
is death (Num 18:22), whereas the punishment for the Levite who failed to prevent this is
not specified.530 Well’s suggestion that  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןin these two texts has the role of
designating who bears liability531 would be redundant in the light of the beginning of the
verse, where Aaron was introduced and addressed.
Case (20) Num 30:16 is a law that regulates the annulment of a woman’s vows
and oaths. The law states that if a husband does not annul his wife’s vow or oath within
the next 24 hours of hearing it,532 but annuls it afterwards, he will  נָשָׁ אher  עָֹוןif the
vow/oath is not honored. Milgrom deduced from Num 30:6 that not fulfilling a vow or
oath causes punishment for the culprit. That is, the unfulfilled vows or oaths are punished
by God533 or in this case, forgiven by him. Wells admitted again that it is difficult to
argue for any additional liability, as he did in relation to Lev 24:15, and the clarity of the
text prevented him from proposing any possibility in favor of  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןhaving additional
liability over punishment. He is right thought that the nature of punishment is not
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specified;534 it is unknown and God implements it.535
The phrase  והִּ ִּשּׂיאוּ אֹותָ ם עֲֹון אַשׁמָ הin case (11) Lev 22:16 would be rendered sin
of guilt/reparation, which makes no sense. Rather,  עָֹוןin this context, refers to
punishment of guilt/reparation.536
In addition, Milgrom found Schwartz’s proposal that bearing sin is a counterpart
of being impure incorrect.537 The preposition bet is the bet of means, thus changing the
translation of the texts which Schwartz translated from “in the sin” into “by means of
(sin)” (Lev 26:39; Num 27:3; Ezek 4:17; 18:17, 19; 20; 33:6, and so on).538 Others also
recognized that the bet of means or cause539 is a more accurate use/meaning of the
preposition in these texts.540
Finally, Schwartz argued that  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןin cases (7) Lev 20:17, (8) Lev 20:19, and
(9) Lev 20:20 is analogous to ( דּמֵ יהֶּ ם בָ םLev 20:11, 12, 13).541 Milgrom added v. 16
since this law also contains דּמֵ יהֶּ ם בָ ם.542 However,  דּמֵ יהֶּ ם בָ םis not a statement of
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condition in Lev 20:11, 12, 13 and 16, but rather, provides the reason why the culprits are
punished by the death penalty. Therefore, Milgrom stated, it cannot be analogous with

 נָשָׂ א עָֹוןin cases (7) Lev 20:17, (8) Lev 20:19, and (9) Lev 20:20 since the phrase נָשָׂ א ָעֹון
has a role of a declaratory formula in these texts.543 Its role is to express that the culprits
will be punished.
Hartley, on the other hand, believed that  דּמֵ יהֶּ ם בָ םand  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןboth represent the
declaratory formula in these laws. Their function is to underscore the certainty that the
punishment will be executed. The death penalty qualified by the declaratory formula

 דּמֵ יהֶּ ם בָ םconveys two points: (1) the guilty are deserving of death, and (2) the executors
of the penalty are not responsible for shedding blood.544
It is also possible that the structure of the law in case (7) Lev 20:17 points to the
meaning of the phrase נָשָׂ א עָֹון. That is, the phrase “ עֶּרוַ ַ֧ת אֲחֹ ֛תֹו גִּּ לָּ ָ֖הhe has uncovered his
sister’s nakedness” is redundant at the end of this law. The phrase ו ָראָ֨ה אֶּ ת־עֶּרוָתָָ֜ הּ ו ִּ ִֽהיא־

“ ִּתר ֶּ ֶ֤אה אֶּ ת־עֶּרוָתֹוhe sees her nakedness and she sees his nakedness” conveyed this
already at the beginning of the law. However, the redundant phrase “ עֶּרוַ ַ֧ת אֲחֹ ֛תֹו גִּּ לָּ ָ֖הhe
has uncovered his sister’s nakedness” is followed by נָשָׂ א עָֹון. I suggest (1) that the first
clause of this redundant part, “ עֶּרוַ ַ֧ת אֲחֹ ֛תֹו גִּּ לָּ ָ֖הhe has uncovered his sister’s nakedness”
summarizes the entire law without punishment, and (2) that the second clause, the phrase
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נָשָׂ א עָֹון, emphasizes the punishment, the fact that the man will be punished.545
Thus, the subsequent law in v. 18, does not contain נָשָׂ א עָֹון, but does include
kārēt punishment; v. 19 does not state the exact penalty, but does have  ;נָשָׂ א עָֹוןv. 20
contains both the penalty and  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןin reverse order ( נָשָׂ א עָֹוןfirst, penalty second); and
v. 21 contains just the penalty. It seems that the author was not concerned about
establishing a consistent pattern. Hildenbrand and Hartley presented a detailed study on
the laws contained in Lev 20:17–21546 and agreed on two points: (1) the inconsistency in
these laws has a role of a rhetorical force, and (2)  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןrefers to the penalty.547
Based on the well supported proposal that some sort of death penalty is implied in
all the laws in 20:17–21 and the structure of the law in v. 17, it might be that the author of
the laws defined  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןin v. 17 as another way of expressing but not specifying a
serious penalty that applies to all the laws in this pericope. Thus, wherever the penalty is
not stated, (v. 19)  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןappears to ensure that the penalty is implied and will be

The fact that only the man נָשָׂ א עָֹון, while both of them are cut off, is puzzling in this law. There
are valid explanations for this. First, Gane’s quotation sheds light on the process of law administration in
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misconduct, which could lead to capital punishment (cf. 22:13–21).” Second, Milgrom pointed out that
LXX and Peshita read the plural “they” to refer to the punished ones as v. 19 reads plural. Milgrom,
Leviticus 17–22, 1754. Both of them would be punished by the same punishment as it is stated in v. 19 for a
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executed. In the cases where it shows up along with the penalty (v. 20), it emphasizes that
the penalty will be executed.
In the light of the three proposals, it seems clear that  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןbasically refers to
the punishment. It has two roles: sometimes it ensures that the punishment will be
executed, and sometimes it refers to the implied punishment.
Schwartz also supported his claim that  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןrefers to the bearing of the sin as a
load by quoting Ezek 16:58 and 23:35.548 However, Milgrom noted that taking תֹּועֵבָ ה/זִּמָּ ה
as the object of  נָשָׁ אmakes no sense unless the punishment for these sins is implied.549 In
reference to Ezek 16:58, Keil and Delitzsch noted that “the perfect אתים
ִּ ָ נשׂindicates that
the certainty of the punishment is just as great as if it had already commenced.”550 They
held that the same idea of punishment is projected in 23:35.551 A recognized Ezekiel
scholar, Walther Zimmerli, saw a carrying of תֹּועֵבָ ה/ זִּמָּ הin both texts as equivalent to the
punishment for these sins.552 The claim that the punishment is implied in these texts is
strengthened even more by the historical and literary context of Ezek 16:53–63 which
presupposes the destruction of Jerusalem.553

Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 14n46.

548
549

Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1490.

550

Carl Friedrich Keil and Franz Delitzsch, Biblical Commentary on the Prophecies of Ezekiel,
BCOT 23 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1952), 1:230.
551

Keil and Delitzsch, Biblical Commentary on the Prophecies of Ezekiel, 1:332.

552

Zimmerli, Ezekiel 1, 1:352, 491.

553

William H. Brownlee, Ezekiel 1–19, WBC 28 (Waco, TX: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 244; Leslie
C. Allen, Ezekiel 20–48, WBC 29 (Waco, TX: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 50; Moshe Greenberg, Ezekiel 1–20,
AB 22 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1983), 294; Moshe Greenberg, Ezekiel 21–37, AB 22A (New York:
Doubleday, 1997), 490.

165

Milgrom’s definitions of  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןseem to state accurately the meaning presented
in Lev 20, but is overstated when studied in the context of the entire Pentateuch:554
nāśāʾ ʿāwôn is a nonexpiable, irremediable divine sentence. In all cases where the
punishment is not stated, it is forthcoming—irrevocably. In the theological terms,
perhaps one might say the punishment (usually mwt or kārēt, see above) expiates for
the sin (explicitly, m. Yoma 8:8), but the punishment itself is unavoidable.555
Gane pointed to a critical weakness of Schwartz’s proposal on the second use of

 נָשָׂ א עָֹוןwhen somebody other than a sinner is the subject of the phrase. Schwartz
proposed that the liability disappears when transferred to someone else.556 Following
Claus Koch, Gane rightly pointed to the fact that there has to be a transfer of the
liability/punishment from the sinner to the other party who receives the sinner’s
liability/punishment, making the sinner free of liability, forgiven. The Pentateuchal texts
state that the priests, as God’s representatives, temporarily  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןand eventually, the
high priest confesses עָֹון, transferring it over to the scapegoat.557
In conclusion, even though Schwartz's proposal that the term חָ טָ א/פֶּשַׁ ע/נָשָׂ א עָֹון
refers to the state of guilt, thus representing consequential bearing of sin, is an eloquent
attempt to suggest fresh meaning to the phrase. However, the weaknesses it contains
make it indefensible so the traditional understanding of the phrase consisting of two
meanings: “to forgive” and “punishment,” still remains a better option. That the
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behavioral terms extend a consequential meaning so that the phrase can be translated as
“punishment” or “God lifts his punishment” is well attested to in the Pentateuch/OT.
Schwartz’s first point that some texts do not include punishment is not correct as
was suggested above. Punishment is implied, explicitly or implicitly, in all the texts as it
has been shown above.
Second, the texts of the Pentateuch prove that the terms for sin, especially  ָעֹון,
refer to all three elements a sinful situation causes: an act, guilt, and punishment. Thus,
one, two, or even all three elements are coextensive in the texts. Schwartz himself
admitted that in 17 out of 22 occurrences, the phrase assumes punishment, either
explicitly or implicitly; thus,  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןand punishment are coextensive in Pentateuch.558
Third, punishment is included in all texts, but it is not capital in every text.
Fourth, the terms for sin combined with the verb  נָשָׁ אrefer to the sin as an act, but
also to punishment. They do that in the texts that speak of the sin of commission and
omission. Schwartz himself realized that there are texts that deal with the sins of
commission, and yet, are punished by capital punishment. Taking  עָֹוןas a term for sin
only and always does not make sense because punishment is an obvious meaning in a
number of texts.
Fifth,  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןis not a counterpart of being ritually impure because the same
preposition, ב, has different meanings in Pentateuchal, as well as in other OT texts.
Sixth,  אָשַׁ םand  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןare not parallel in Lev 5:1–4 because  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןis not a
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protasis, but an apodosis and thus  אָשַׁ םand  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןdo not refer to the psychological
component of the process. Sins in vv. 1 and 4 and 2–3 are radically different.
The proximity of the phrase with punishment in the majority of cases in Priestly
tradition (17/22 times is based on Schwartz’s interpretation, but in reality, in all cases as
suggested above) also confirms that  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןis another, emphatic way of saying that the
sinner is being punished. It has to be emphasized that the punishment is not necessarily
capital. The reason why some texts contain both explicit punishment and  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןis a
matter of rhetorical effect.
The remaining 14 non-priestly texts (Gen 4:13 ( ;)נָשָׂ א עָֹון50:17 ( נָשָׂ א פֶּשַׁ עand

 חָ טָ א נָשָׂ אx2); Exod 10:17 ( ;)נָשָׂ א חָ טָ א23:21 ( ;)נָשָׂ א פֶּשַׁ ע28:38 ( ;)נָשָׂ א עָֹון32:32 (חָ טָ א
 ;)נָשָׂ א34:7 (פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןx3); Lev 10:17 ( ;)נָשָׂ א עָֹון16:22 ( ;)נָשָׂ א עָֹוןand Num
14:18 ( נָשָׂ א עָֹוןand  נָשָׂ א ֶּפשַׁ עx2) that employ the same and modified phrases are
discussed in the first part of this subheading. Two meanings of the phrase that are
employed in those texts are the same, “to punish” if the sinner is the subject of the phrase
or “to forgive” in case other than the sinner is the subject of it.
Insights from Olaffson’s Work on נָשָׂ א עָֹון
These aspects of the verb  נָשָׁ אthat went unnoticed by the previous lexical listings
prior to Olaffson’s research are fully recognized in the lexicons published subsequent to
Olaffson’s dissertation defense in 1993. In particular, DCH, in addition to recognizing the
main points Olaffson discovered, also clearly lists that “to suffer punishment for,” or “to
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forgive,” “to pardon,”559 “to be forgiven of”560 are semantic domain of the verb נָשָׁ א.
HALOT and NIDOTTE listed both of these meanings as a semantic domains of the verb

נָשָׁ א.561 In addition, all these lexicons provide ANE background for the meanings they
suggested.
I am referring to Olaffson’s work here to provide rationale for the claim that the
meanings “to forgive” and “to suffer punishment” are included in the semantic domains
of the verb נָשָׁ א. His work seems to be the most detailed work on discerning the semantic
domains of נָשָׁ א. In addition, I also follow Olaffson’s approach since the contextual
seems to be the most complete way to find out the meaning of the word/verb within the
biblical literature. Examining the distribution of  נָשָׁ אin the Pentateuch, Olaffson noticed
that
All the morphological, syntactical, and contextual evidence seems to point to a single,
very flexible and neutral root which is fairly evenly distributed throughout of all the
OT, without any significant difference noted between individual books and sections.
… No noticeable development was detected in the OT writings relating to time,
authorship, or sources.562
The diversity of  נָשָׁ אuses in the Pentateuch itself is demonstrated by use in two
basic groups of passages, cultic and non-cultic. As it is used in the rest of the OT, the
Pentateuch also uses  נָשָׁ אin a literal (45 times or 27.2%) and metaphorical (124 times or
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72.8%) sense. These two shades of meaning, along with the others, are not discernable by
a characteristic pattern, but are rather solely dependent on the context.563
Olaffson delineated 5 categories of  נָשָׁ אuses in the Pentateuch. The two most
common aspects of  נָשָׁ אare (1) transport and (2) support. However, idiomatic
expressions indicating (3) utilization of tools or parts of the human body and (4)
interpersonal relations are quite frequent. Finally, there is (5) dealing with sin and
wrongdoings.564 The last one is of special interest to this study, along with the 4th one
since it occasionally represents the context for the 5th one.
When  נָשָׁ אis used with the terms for sin, the key concern is the consequences
which depend on who the subject of  נָשָׁ אwas. The subject may either be (1) the sinner
himself/herself or (2) someone else who bears the sinner’s sin.565 In regard to the fact that
the context suggests different meanings depending on who the subject of the phrase was,
Knierim asked a valid question:
Liegen hier zwei verschiedene Vorgänge zugrunde, so dass die Konformität der
Bezeichnung rein zufallig und darum unsere herkommlich verschiedene Ubersetzung
der vorgange sachlich richting ist? Oder Druckt die Wendung beidemal vor allen den
gleichen Grundvorgang der Wendung, sondern nur asu dem Zusammenhang
erschlossen werde kann?566
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Sinner Is the Subject of נָשָׂ א עָֹון
There are 19 texts in which the sinner  נָשָׁ אhis or her own sin. They demonstrate
that the sinner who commits sin/wrongdoing either knowingly or inadvertently has to
bear it (see Table 10).

Table 10.  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןtext based on Olaffson’s research567
 נָשָׂ א עָֹוןwith own wrongdoings
1. Wrongdoing
Sin General

2. Cultic
Eating

3. Cultic
Clothing

4. Sexual
Relations

1. Lev 5:1
“Now if a person
sins after he
hears a public
adjuration to
testify when he is
a witness,
whether he has
seen or otherwise
known, if he
does not tell it,
then he will bear
his guilt.”

1. Lev 7:18
2. Lev 19:8
3. Lev 22:16
4. Lev 22:9
5. Num 18:32
6. Lev 17:16

1. Exod 28:43

1. Lev 20:17
2. Lev 20:19
3. Lev 20:20
4. Num 5:31

2. Lev 5:17
“Now if a person
sins and does
any of the things
which the LORD
has commanded
not to be done,
though he was
unaware, still he
is guilty and
shall bear his
punishment.”
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5. Attitudes and
Actions
Towards God
and Holy
Things
1. Lev 24:15
2. Num 14:34
3. Num 18:22
4. Num 9:13

6. Attitudes
and
Actions
Towards
Others
1. Lev 19:17
2. Gen 4:13

The ultimate consequence of such bearing is death.568 Olaffson’s research showed
that the difference between the deed and its consequences is not clear, thus confirming
that the findings of the previous scholars on the topic such as Knierim and others569 seem
to be correct.570 His conclusion was that in these contexts,  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןrefers to a twofold
picture which includes that the one who commits sin acted against God and as a
consequence, has to bear the effects of his or her actions. This bearing involves
“Eingeständnis eigener Schuld und Einsicht in die Strafe—acknowledgement of one’s
guilt and insight into punishment.”571 The phrase indicates (1) the sinner’s responsibility
for his or her sin and (2) the impending punishment that the sin assumes. In 3 out of 19
contexts, the punishment is not capital, even though it might become that (Lev 5:1, 17;
19:17), while in 16 out 19 contexts, the punishment is capital whether explicitly stated
(11 times) or implicitly indicated or based on intertextuality (5 times).572 “nāśāʿāwon, can
state the consequences for a number of different wrongdoings. When it does, it often
takes the place of a specific punishment. That is, the expression can be used to mean that
a person will be punished without specifying the exact nature of the punishment.”573
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Another Party Is the Subject of נָשָׂ א עָֹון
There are 16 texts in which the subject of  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןis someone other than the
sinner. In 11 of them, a human being is subject of the verb, whereas God was the subject
in 4 of them and in 1 of them, an animal is the subject.574 Table 11 contains all the texts.
The texts will be commented on as grouped in Table 11. Thus, the texts in which
the subject of  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןis human will be commented on first, followed by the texts where
an animal is the subject of the phrase, and finally, the texts wherein God or divine beings
are the subject.

 נָשָׂ א עָֹוןwith Human Subject. A study of these texts reveals several activities
related to the verb נָשָׁ א. First, the priests and Levites were appointed to bear, within the
confines of the sanctuary, the wrongdoings of the people and priesthood against the
sanctuary’s sanctity. There are a number of interpretations of what, exactly, the “ אֶּ ת־עֲֹוֹ֣ ן

 ”הַ ִּמּק ָ ָ֑דּשׁor “ ”אֶּ ת־עֲֹוֹ֥ ן כ ֻהנַּת ֶּ ִֽכםin Num 18:1, 23 are. Knierim believed that the phrases
point to every conscious or unconscious act done by the people against the sanctuary or
the priesthood.575 This means that if a non-Levite tried to enter the sanctuary, divine
anger would break out against both the Levites and non-Levites who attempted to enter
the sanctuary, violating its sanctity. God would hold the priests responsible for preventing

574
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every aspect of priestly ministry. Budd, Numbers, 205.
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Table 11. Someone else but the sinner is the subject of נָשָׂ א עָֹון/bears sin576

General Functions of the
Priests
1. Num 18:1 x2
So, the LORD said to
Aaron, “You and your sons
and your father’s household
with you shall bear the guilt
in connection with the
sanctuary, and you and your
sons with you shall bear the
guilt in connection with
your priesthood.”

Someone Else Other Than the Sinner Bears Sin
Human Being
Transport by Eating Canceled Vow
General Wrongdoings
1. Lev 10:17

1. Num 30:15

1. Gen 50:17 x2

Why did you not eat
the sin offering at
the holy place? For
it is most holy, and
He gave it to you to
bear away the guilt
of the congregation,
to make atonement
for them before the
LORD.

But if he indeed
annuls them after
he has heard them,
then he shall bear
her guilt.”

Thus, you shall say to
Joseph, “Please forgive, I
beg you, the transgression
of your brothers and their
sin, for they did you
wrong. And now, please
forgive the transgression of
the servants of the God of
your father.” And Joseph
wept when they spoke to
him.

2. Num 18:23
Only the Levites shall
perform the service of the
tent of meeting, and they
shall bear their iniquity; it
shall be a perpetual statute
throughout your
generations, and among the
sons of Israel they shall
have no inheritance.

2. Exod 10:17
Now therefore, please
forgive my sin only this
once, and make
supplication to the LORD
your God, that He would
only remove this death
from me.
3. Num 14:33
Your sons shall be
shepherds for forty years in
the wilderness, and they
will suffer for your
unfaithfulness, until your
corpses lie in the
wilderness.

3. Exod 28:12
You shall put the two stones
on the shoulder pieces of the
ephod, as stones of
memorial for the sons of
Israel, and Aaron shall bear
their names before the
LORD on his two shoulders
for a memorial.
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Table 11—Continued.
4. Exod 28:29
Aaron shall carry the names
of the sons of Israel in the
breastpiece of judgment
over his heart when he
enters the holy place, for a
memorial before the LORD
continually.
5. Exod 28:30
You shall put in the
breastpiece of judgment the
Urim and the Thummim,
and they shall be over
Aaron’s heart when he goes
in before the LORD; and
Aaron shall carry the
judgment of the sons of
Israel over his heart before
the LORD continually.
6. Exod 28:38
It shall be on Aaron’s
forehead, and Aaron shall
take away the iniquity of the
holy things which the sons
of Israel consecrate, with
regard to all their holy gifts;
and it shall always be on his
forehead, that they may be
accepted before the LORD.

Animal

1. Lev 16:22
The goat shall
bear on itself
all their
iniquities to a
solitary land;
and he shall
release the
goat in the
wilderness.

God and Heavenly Beings
Confession of Faith
Intercessory
A Warning
Plea
1. Exod 34:7–8
1. Exod 32:31–
1. Exod 23:21
Then the LORD
32
Be on your
passed by in front
Then Moses
guard before
of him and
returned to the
him and obey
proclaimed, “The
LORD, and
his voice; do
LORD, the LORD
said, “Alas, this not be
God,
people has
rebellious
compassionate and committed a
toward him,
gracious, slow to
great sin, and
for he will not
anger, and
they have made
pardon your
abounding in
a god of gold
transgression,
lovingkindness and for
since My
truth;7 who keeps
themselves.32
name is in
lovingkindness for
But now, if You him.
thousands, who
will, forgive
forgives iniquity,
their sin — and
transgression and
if not, please
sin; yet He will by
blot me out
no means leave the from Your book
guilty unpunished,
which You have
visiting the iniquity written!”
of fathers on the
children and on the
grandchildren to
the third and fourth
generations.”

an attempt of a non-priest or Levite to encroach on a priestly prerogative.577 In the
context of the rebellion in Num 17, the regulations in Num 18:1, 23 are the assurance to
the rest of the people that they would be released from the consequences for the violation
of the sanctuary’s sanctity. The culprit would be punished, but the rest of the people
would be released from the punishment. Keil and Delitzsch emphasized the nuance of
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this interpretation, that the Levites and priests were to take upon themselves and remove
the guilt brought upon the sanctuary by the sins of the people and their holy gifts (Exod
28:38), “contaminated” by the giver’s sinfulness.578
The next group of texts from Exod 28 that discuss the various parts of the priestly
garments and their function in the sanctuary services seems to support this point. There is
in v. 12 a description of two stones engraved with the names of the sons of Israel that
were fastened to Aaron’s shoulders. Verse 29 mentions the breastplate and the stones, but
this time, each tribe had its name engraved on a stone. The high priest would “bear their
names” on his shoulders and heart as he entered God’s presence as their representative579
and substitute.580
The entire chapter of Exod 28 in general, and especially v. 30, which talks about
the Urim and Thummim in the breastplate and v. 38 that speaks about the golden plate on
Aaron’s forehead, point to the fact that the carrying process is related to the people’s
wrongdoings. The function of the former one is for Aaron “to bear the judgments” of the
people over his heart, and of the latter, that he may “bear their iniquity” before the Lord.
In light of the inseparable connection between sin and its punishment in Ancient
Israel, these two phrases are almost synonymous. Judgment related to the Urim and
Thummim is the result of the people’s wrongdoings, whereas the iniquities associated
with the golden plate caused that judgment. By bearing these articles, Aaron identified
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himself with the people’s wrongdoings as he entered God’s presence on the people’s
behalf. He symbolically carried the people’s wrongdoings on his body before the Lord.
These articles signified the mediating aspect of the high priestly office, along with a
substitutionary character.581
Olaffson found confirmation for this interpretation of the articles from Exod 28 in
Lev 10:17. That is, the priest was to eat the sin offering (Lev 6:19 [26]), but Eleazar and
Ithamar failed to do that, and Moses rebuked them for not performing their priestly duties
properly. Eating had a symbolic meaning of acceptance and/or relationship, and even
identification with someone.582 Thus, when the priest ate the sacrifice, he symbolically
made it part of himself, taking upon himself its function to  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןof the people into the
sanctuary to make atonement on behalf of the congregation. He became a substitute for
the sinners and literally carried their wrongdoing in his body.583 Thus,  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןseems to
be a significant element of the  כִּ פֶּרprocess without necessarily being synonymous with
it.584
Numbers 30:15 is the only text in the Pentateuch that explicitly spells out the
alternative of a person  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןof another person, thus providing forgiveness to the latter.
This law treats the sanctity of vows and seems to be indirectly related to the cult. The key
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standard portrayed in the law is that regardless of the gender of the one who makes the
vow, it has to be honored (v. 2). The husband of a married woman can annul or confirm
her vow (v. 13). In case he decides the former, he has to do it within a certain time limit,
and the Lord would forgive ( )סָ לַחthe wife (v. 12). If he did that outside of the time
constraints, then he would  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןhis wife.585
The similar point is found in the following 2 passages (Gen 50:17 x2, Exo 10:17)
in the Pentateuch which are not related to the cult. All 3 times the wrongdoer/s plead with
the wronged party to  נָשָׁ אtheir  עָֹוןso that the former can avoid the consequences of his or
her actions. In Gen 50:17, Joseph’s brothers asked him to bear the wrongdoing they had
done to him from their relationship so that there would not be any obstacle or threat to
their relationship. It was evident that neither the wrong nor its effects could be revoked,
but regardless, Joseph responded in a way that showed that he would  נָשָׁ אtheir ( עָֹוןv.
21). He comforted them, spoke kindly to them, and obliged himself to provide for their
needs. Thus, the integral concern of  נָשָׁ אin this instance is the care for the party that had
committed the wrong.586
The context of Exod 10:17 is the eighth plague due to Pharaoh’s opposition to
God’s instructions. After his command in v. 16, Moses and Aaron were summoned
before Pharaoh. He admitted his sin and pleaded for forgiveness. He asked Moses to נָשָׂ א

 חַ טָּ אתso that the consequences of his sin, the eighth plague, could be removed from
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Egypt. Subsequently, Moses prayed to God and God removed ( )נָשָׁ אthe locusts.587
The inference from both of these texts is that the entire process of removing the
effects of the wrongdoing is based entirely on the goodwill of the wronged party towards
the wrongdoer. The final outcome is that the guilty party is freed from the consequences
of his or her actions while the wronged party or the substitute takes on the burden of
wrong.
Finally, no removal or carrying of the wrongs of others on their behalf is involved
in the last passage, Num 14:33, but rather the emphasis is on the communal sharing of the
consequences of wrong actions. The context of Num 14 is the reaction of the people of
Israel on the report the spies brought about the Promised Land. The people grumbled
against Moses (v. 2–3) and the whole congregation called for the stoning of Joshua and
Caleb as they suggested that the people should follow God’s leadership (v. 10). This
attitude translates into rejection of a covenantal relationship (Deut 31:20) and rejection of
God’s leadership (v. 4). Even though they were forgiven (v. 20), they were not allowed to
enter the Promised Land.588 They received a mitigated punishment.
In particular, out of the 5 groups589 involved in the incident, all of them were
affected differently. In the sense of bearing the consequences of their actions, special
emphasis was placed on 3 groups of people: (1) the 10 spies who caused grumbling;
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(2) the grumbling crowd; (3) the faithful spies, Joshua and Caleb; (4) the descendants of
the grumblers, and (5) the priests and Levites. The first two groups cut themselves from
the covenant by their own free choice. The 10 spies, as the initiators of the grumbling,
died shortly after the incident (14:36–37). The grumblers lost their inheritance suffering,
just a less severe punishment. Even though not having negative effects in the incident, but
still being a part of the corporate body of Israel, the third group also suffered
consequences. That is, their entrance into the Promised Land was delayed; ultimately,
they received fulfillment of the promise. They had to bear the consequences by remaining
with the wrongdoers in the wilderness until the whole generation died. The younger
generation did not become co-guilty with the older one, nor was the older generation
released from their guilt, but rather, the younger generation became co-sharers of the
consequences.

 נָשָׂ א עָֹוןwith Animal as the Subject. Out of 5 texts wherein the subject of  נָשָׁ אis
an animal,590 only 1 is directly related to the removal of sins in the sanctuary, Lev 16:22.
The meaning and function of “the goat for Azazel” is hotly debated in scholarly
research591 with no consensus in sight. Wenham seemed to propose inclusive and general
evaluation on the question: “Whatever we understand by Azazel, there is a little doubt
about the total meaning of the ceremony … it all comes back to the same idea: that sin is
exterminated from Israel.”592
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The main concern of the current research is which sins are dealt with in this ritual.
Does the goat for Azazel bear away unconfessed sins593 or the totality of the confessed
sins of the Israelites?594 Rodríguez argued for the latter alternative, which seems to be
supported by the straightforward reading of Lev 16.595 I addressed this question below in
greater detail on page 376–79 of the present study.
Lev 16 explicitly states that the high priest confesses the accumulated sins from
the sanctuary and potentially the ones that the priest himself bears over the head of the
goat for Azazel, thus transferring them to it so that the goat could bear them away from
the camp into the wilderness. In this way, the sins of the people were removed from the
sanctuary (v. 20) and the camp.596 Olaffson further claimed three points regarding the
Azazel goat ritual: (1) forgiveness is nowhere mentioned in connection with the Day of
Atonement ritual, (2) the goat for Azazel was not killed, nor was its death a part of
sanctuary symbolism, and (3) the goat was not a sacrifice prepared for Azazel. Its only
role in the ritual was the one of a vehicle of transport for the sins of Israel from a
populated area to a place they cannot threaten Israelites.597 Thus, Olaffson saw the עָֹון

 נָשָׂ אof the goat for Azazel as purely removal with no traces of the concept of forgiveness.
This conclusion is heavily influenced by the interpretation of the ritual itself and will be
discussed at multiple occasions of the present study.
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 נָשָׂ א עָֹוןwith God or Divine Beings as Subject. There are 4 texts in this
category. Two of them are liturgical declarations or possibly confessions of faith598 and
are focused on God’s character (Exod 34:6–7; Num 14:18). One is part of an intercessory
prayer (Exod 32:31–32) and one is a form of a warning (Exod 23:31).599
Scholars usually refer to Exod 34:6–7 as a “Sinaitic theophany”600 which appears
to be the basis for other liturgical confessions frequently used in the OT.601 This text is
propositional in its nature. It is not concerned with God’s acts, but rather, with his
character.602 The key part of this passage is “נֹ שֵׂ א עָֹון ָופֶּשַׁ ע וחַ טָּ ה.”603 As already shown
above, scholars considered the three key terms for sin in the OT to convey universality or
totality of sin and not just a specific nuance that each of these terms could refer to.604 In
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other words, this triad refers to all sins. The whole phrase literally refers “to the one who
carries/removes sin.”605
The use of a participle of  נָשָׁ אis noteworthy since it “as a verbal adjective the
participle tends to describe a state of affairs rather than to present a bare event” or “a
continuing state of affairs.”606 Accordingly, God is presented as constantly bearing the sin
of his people, subjecting himself to its consequences. As a result of this, the people
continue to live and enjoy God’s guidance and protection.607 On the other hand, God’s
bearing of people’s sin does not include annulment of the consequence nor declaration of
people’s innocence. This is confirmed in the account of the spies.608 Although, Moses
pleaded that God would  סָ לַחthe people’s sin just as he had  נָשָׁ אthem from Egypt
onward609 and God did not forgive them, they had to suffer the consequences of their sin.
On the other hand, God’s bearing of the people’s sin involves the participation
and support of the one who bears sin in the sinner’s suffering.610 God’s direct speech in v.
11 reveals the attitude of the people that caused them to reject him. It reads: “The LORD
said to Moses, ‘How long will this people spurn Me? And how long will they not believe
in Me, despite all the signs which I have performed in their midst?’” All the piel uses of
the verb ( נָאַץnāʾaṣ) in the OT “refer without exception to the despising and spurning of
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God or something sacred to him. The contexts suggest that the action is regarded as
tantamount to rejection of the whole covenant relationship.”611
Thus, God’s pronouncement of judgment over the people did not happen as a
result of an arbitrary unleashing of his temper, but rather, it was an expression of an
unavoidable outcome of the people’s decision to reject him. Moses interceded not
because injustice was done toward people by God or that God acted arbitrarily in his
judgment, but exclusively on the basis of his nature, especially חֶּ סֶּ ד. Based on חֶּ סֶּ ד, God
is able to preserve a relationship that he has already created. The passage does not
indicate that forgetting or removing the consequences is a part of the concept of
forgiveness. It seems to be a more relational experience in which the forgiving party
removes the barrier that hinders the relationship with the forgiven party in order to restore
or maintain it. Sakenfeld seemed to be on point when she commented on forgiveness in
this context:
[Forgiveness] has to do with the preservation of the fundamental covenantal
relationship rather than simply with eliminating some particular act of punishment (e.
g. Jer 5:1, 7; 31:34; 50:20) … Forgiveness is understood basically as preservation of
the community, and this preservation need not be precluded or even cheapened by the
punishment of the community while the relationship is being continued.612
The last text where God is the subject of  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןis a warning to the people about
the danger of rebelling against God’s angel which God promised to send to guard them as
they wandered in the desert. The identity of the angel mentioned in this narrative is
closely associated to God himself. This narrative contains God’s announcement that his
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name would be in this angel (v. 21). Douglas Stuart noticed multiple references which
provide the ground for the inference that a name can mean presence or identity (Exod
20:24; Num 6:27; Deut 18:19–20; 2 Sam 7:13; I Kgs 8:16; 2 Kgs 21:7; Jer 7:10–12.) In
addition, the phrases “what he says,” referring to the angel’s words, and “all that I say,”
(v. 22) referring to God’s words, are treated syntactically as synonymous.613 In the same
venue, Gerhard von Rad suggested that the angel was “the personification of Yahweh’s
assistance to Israel” and it is frequently impossible to make a difference between God
himself and the angel of the Lord.614 Rebellion against this angel is paralleled with the
rebellion against God himself and will not be forgiven, נָשָׁ א. This is the only passage in
the Pentateuch where  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןis not provided regardless of the fact that in all the previous
3 passages, God agreed to  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןof the people.615
There is another passage in Deut 29:20 where  סָ לַחis used and forgiveness is not
granted. Here a law regulates the punishment for an idolater who exhibits a rebellious
attitude toward the God of Israel that leads to worshipping other gods.616 The reason why
God cannot  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןsuch individuals is simply because they rejected him. They turned to
other gods and disregarded him.617 These individuals chose to  נָשָׁ אtheir own  עָֹוןand
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die.618 Thus, open, conscious, and intentional rebellion also belongs to the group of sins
that are punishable by various sorts of capital punishment for which forgiveness is not
available.
Olaffson’s research on the meaning of חָ טָ א/פֶּשַׁ ע/ נָשָׂ א עָֹוןshowed that “to forgive”
is the semantic domain of the phrase. He did not see the forgiveness element in Lev
16:22, but as it was pointed out at the beginning of the previous subheading, this ritual
activity sealed the forgiveness process that had begun in the sinner’s private and daily
sacrifices.
It is noteworthy to mention that neither Schwartz nor Olaffson emphasized any
difference if the  נָשָׁ אwas used with different terms for sin, but they both took these to
refer to be sin in general.619
Conclusion on the Study of נָשָׂ א עָֹון
Thus, based on the study of  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןjust presented, it becomes obvious that a
human being, animal/s, or God can be the subject of the verb  נָשָׁ אwhen it is associated
with sins of others. The key principle that proceeds from this study is that whoever
commits sin/does not live in accordance with God’s revealed standards is guilty and must
bear,  נָשָׁ אconsequences for it, which includes punishment. Ultimately, that person suffers
death. The punishment is fixed in most cases where sinners  נָשָׁ אtheir own sin.
However, because God is presented as a loving God in the OT, some incidents
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that involve sin are repairable. Thus, priests and Levites are appointed and are able to

 נָשָׂ א עָֹוןof the people, thus releasing them from the consequences that would result in
their death. When a priest officiated a sin offering on behalf of someone else, he ate the
meat of the offering, thus making it part of himself, whereas in other cases, he would
function as a substitute for the people by wearing stones in his vestments along with the
golden plate on his forehead. In this way, he carried the sins of the people and provided
for their acceptance before God.
A unique ritual on the Day of Atonement included sending the goat for Azazel,
into the wilderness, loaded with the forgiven sins of the people that were accumulated in
the sanctuary. This activity on a yearly basis sealed the forgiveness process that began on
a daily basis in the experience of the sinner.
A husband could provide forgiveness for the obligation of the vow made by
dependents of his home by taking the responsibility of the vow on himself. The wronged
party could decide to  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןof the wronged party and remove it from the relationship.
Individuals could  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןof the others without being held guilty or releasing the
wronged party from his or her punishment. Finally, individuals could be instrumental in
removing the consequence of the others’ sin by taking them to God in prayer who is the
ultimate sin bearer. Conclusively, these tests show that forgiveness is one of the semantic
domains of the verb נָשָׁ א.

The Root  חָ טָ אas a Key Term for Sin in the OT
Based on the major lexicons and dictionaries, with slightly different outcomes, the
root  חטאwith its derivatives is most frequently associated with the concept of sin in the
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OT. The term occurs 591,620 593,621 595,622 or even 605623 times in the OT. This statistic
makes  חטאstand out from all other terms that refer to sin and indicate that it is the most
important term for the concept of sin in the OT.624
The basic, literal meaning of the verb  חָ טָ אis “to miss (a mark),” but, apart from a
few exceptions, the root is only used figuratively in religious contexts. The term marks
particular acts such as crimes or errors, and for that reason, is considered a general or
comprehensive term for sin.625 It conveys a sin or error of a person against another person
or a person against God.626 Quell has pointed out that this word is preferred to other
words because “this root conveyed a clear, objective picture to the mind, with no
reference to motive, or to the inner quality of the sinful behavior.”627
This characteristic of the term results from the fact that the verbal form is
frequently utilized in various formulaic usages that refer to various sort of errors. Thus,
the verb is found 30 times in the context of individual sins with the characteristic phrase,
“I have sinned,” in confessions after (sacral or profane) legal sentencing (Josh 7:20; 1
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Sam 15:24; 2 Sam 19:21; 24:10; Ps 41:5; 51:6) or in the affirmation of innocence
following an indictment (Judg 11:27; 1 Sam 24:12). It is also found 24 times in the
context of communal confessions with the reoccurring phrase, “We have sinned,” in rites
of penance or prayers of repentance and the communal laments (Num 14:40; 21:7; Judg
10:10, 15; 1 Sam 7:6; 12:10; Jer 3:25; 8:14; 14:7, 20; Dan 9:5ff; Neh 1:6). It is also used
in the cases of the indictment or verdict formulae within both profane and sacral
procedures, as well as in dictions to disclose an error or justify the sentence (Exod 32:30;
Num 23:23; Deut 9:16, 18; Jer 40:3; Hos 10:9).628
There are about 15 nominal forms of the root which refer to various settings and
all sorts of errors including legal, cultic, and social ones (2 Sam 12:13; Jer 16:10; Hos
8:13; Gen 41:9; Lev 16:16; Mic 3:8; Ps 59:4; 32:5; Lam 4:22; Ps 51:4; Jer 36:3; Ps 85:3;
Isa 44:22). Some significant usages are related to two other roots,  נָשָׁ אand מוּת.629 When
paired with the verb  נָשָׁ אthe term, depending on the context, refers to either forgiveness
or punishment. In the case of forgiveness, the representative bears the ( חֵ טאExod 34:7
and Gen 50:17; Exod 32:32; 1 Sam 15:25), while in the case of punishment, it is the
sinners themselves who bear it (Lev 19:17; 22:9; 20:20).630 When paired with the verb

מוּת, the term refers to the sins that are punishable by death (Deut 21:22; 22:26; 24:16; 2
Kgs 14:6; Ezek 18:4, 20; Amos 9:10).631
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Based on the variety of contexts and usages of the term, Knierim more
specifically suggested that the term refers to the act of sinning per se as the following
quotation shows: “For the rejection of a behavior as ‘error,’ it is basically inconsequential
whether a deed occurs consciously or unconsciously. In a great many passages, such a
distinction plays no role whatsoever. Neither the motive nor the attitude is characterized,
but the fact as such.”632
Knierim also suggested that the error expressed by  חָ טָ אis not directed towards
some specific commandment, but rather, affects the relationship of a man toward another
man or God. He claimed this based on the fact that the term is used to express sins or
crimes against the ban (1 Sam 14:33ff.), adultery (2 Sam 12:13) or another sexual offense
(Lev 20:20), theft (Gen 31:36), crimes against innocent blood (2 Kgs 21:17), against
Yahweh’s anointed (1 Sam 24:12), idolatry (Deut 12:29f.), social misdeeds (Mic 3:8;
6:6–8, etc.). The term was frequently used in so-called profane-legal spheres as in
Hezekiah’s confession of rebellion (2 Kgs 18:14), in reference to the failure to perform
professional duties by Pharaoh’s baker and butler (Gen 40:1), and other instances (Gen
42:22; 43:9). Knierim thus concluded: “Beside the known impossibility of strictly
distinguishing between the profane and the sacral realms, these usages of the term
indicate that the discussion of “sin” applies to all areas of life and was in no way limited
only to the religious sector.”633
Based on the meanings appropriate for certain texts in the OT where  חָ טָ אwas
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translated with English “sin” or in some legal contexts with the English words “crime,
negligence,” Gnana Robinson also noted that the term “indicated both intentional and
unintentional sins.”634 Along the same lines, while observing that the term refers to
unwitting sin in some instances, Ryder noted a frequent use of the term to convey both
intentional and unintentional sins, as the following quotation shows: “While the word is
overwhelmingly used of conscious and voluntary sins, there are a few instances in the
ritual code where it seems to refer to ‘unwitting sin,’ and is rendered ‘sin-offering’ (e.g.
in Lev 4:5).”635 Based on the entire OT, Ryder also noted the following regarding the
moral versus rare, literal uses of חָ טָ א: “The hundreds of examples of the word’s moral
use require that the wicked man ‘misses the right mark because he chooses to aim at a
wrong one’, —that is, there is no question of an innocent mistake or of the merely
negative idea of ‘failure’.”636 Martens also noted that this term denotes both intentional
and unintentional sins.637 Milgrom did the same thing.638
Thus, based on the variety of uses of this term in the OT, Rolf Knierim suggested
the following overall meaning of the root  חטאin the OT: “The theological character of
the understanding of ‘error’ is therefore not only grounded in the meaning of the word,
formally and psychologically only minimally developed, but in terms of whether and how
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Yahweh views a misdeed. In this sense ‘error’ has the same weight as all other types of
‘sin.’”639
The Nature of  חָ טָ אSins in Leviticus and the Rest of the Pentateuch
As was set out at the beginning of this chapter, by applying a
terminological/contextual/intertextual approach, I intend to address two questions in the
study of  חָ טָ אsins in Leviticus and the rest of the Pentateuch in the present study. The first
question is to find out whether  חָ טָ אrefers to an intentional or unintentional sin. The
second question is to explore whether  חָ טָ אsignifies expiable or inexpiable sin.

Intentionality and Expiability
Associated to  חָ טָ אSins
Out of 86 instances of nouns derived from the root  חטאin the book of Leviticus
the term refers 25 times to sin or error. Of those 25 uses,640 the term refers to both
intentional (4:3, 14, 23, 26, 28x2, 35, 5:6x2, 10, 13; 16:30, 34, 19:17, 22x2; 20:20; 22:9,
24:15; 26:18, 21, 24, 28) and unintentional (4:3, 14, 23, 26, 28x2, 35; 16:30, 34) sin or
error. The rest of the 61 uses of the nominal derivatives of  חָ טָ אrefer to the sin offering
(4:3, 8, 14, 20, 21, 24, 25, 29x2, 32, 33x2, 34; 5:6, 7, 8, 9x2, 11x2, 12; 6:10[17],
18[25]x2, 23[30]; 7:7, 37; 8:2, 14x2; 9:2, 3, 7, 8, 10, 15, 22; 10:16, 17, 19x2; 12:6, 8;
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14:13x2, 19, 22, 31; 15:15, 30; 16:3, 5, 6, 9, 11x2, 15, 25, 27x2; 23:19).641 The statistics
on the nominal uses of  חָ טָ אin Lev 16 reflect the understanding that two nominal uses of
this term in verses16, 21 refer to the sin offering, rather than to sin itself.642
The study of verbal uses of the term exhibit the same result as the use of the
nominal forms. Of 30 verbal forms in Leviticus, 25 refer to the activity of sinning; the
verb speaks of intentional sinning 21 times (4:2, 3x2, 14, 22, 23, 27, 28x2, 35, 5:1, 5, 6,
7, 10, 11, 13, [6:2] 21, [6:3] 22, [6:4] 23; 19:22), while it refers to unintentional sinning
14 times (4:2, 3x2, 14, 22, 23, 27, 28x2, 35; 5:15, 16, 17). In the remaining 5 usages (6:
[19] 26; 8:15; 9:15; 14:49, 52), the verb has different meanings.643
These statistics confirm that the root  חָ טָ אwas used in Leviticus to refer to both
intentional and unintentional sins. This claim is strengthened later when  חָ טָ אis studied by
applying the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach. That is, the sins expressed
by  חָ טָ אare both expiable and inexpiable. The intentionality of a given sin, but not
exclusively its intentionality, impacts whether it is expiable or inexpiable. The first step
of the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach established that the certain verbs
that point to a capital punishment of the sinner confirm that  חָ טָ אalso refers to inexpiable
sin.
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Capital Punishment644 and חָ טָ א
The first set of contexts relates to capital punishment expressed through six
Hebrew terms, מוּת, הָ ַרג,  ָרגַם, סָ קַ ל, שָׂ ַרף,  ָנכָה, and י ָָרה, for sins expressed by חָ טָ א. The
nominal derivatives of חָ טָ א, accompanied by the verbal and/or nominal derivatives of מוּת
are found in 8 texts in the Pentateuch (Exod 10:17 [death refers to punishment that does
not include biological death]); Lev 20:20; 22:9; Num 18:22, 32; 19:13 ([refers to human
carcass]); 27:3; Deut 21:22; 22:26; 24:16). These statistics shows that the verb מוּת, when
it refers to capital punishment, is related to the  חָ טָ אmore than any other verb that refers
to capital punishment. A syntactical connection between  חָ טָ אand  מוּתis found in all these
texts. The following presents the references (Table 12):
In the capital punishment contexts,  חָ טָ אalways refers to intentional sin. The fact
that capital punishment was associated with  חָ טָ אsin suggests that in these cases, such a
sin was considered as an inexpiable one.
The Pentateuch uses the verb  הָ ַרגto express punishment for various sins in eight
texts (Gen 20:4: adultery, kidnapping; Exod 4:23; 13:15: refusal to obey God; Exod
22:24: affliction of a widow or orphan; Exod 32:27: idolatry; Lev 20:16: sodomy; Num
25:5: idolatry; Deut 13:9: idolatry). The syntactical or conceptual connection between the

644
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W. Thompson, “Punishment and Restitution,” OEBL 2:433–46.

194

Table 12. The term  חָ טָ אin relation to the verb מוּת

1

Reference
Lev 20:20

Sin
Illicit sex

2

Lev 22:9

3

Num 18:22

4

Num 18:32

5

Num 27:3

Failure to guard
the sanctuary
Touching the
sanctuary
Profaning
offerings
unspecified

6

Deut 21:22

unspecified

7

Deut 22:26

rape

8

Deut 24:16

unspecified

Punishment
Death
Lev 20:20
Death
Lev 22:9
Death
Num 18:22
Death
Num 18:32
Death
Num 27:32
Death
Deut 21:22
Death
Deut 22:26
Death
Deut 24:16

Expiable

Inexpiable
X

Intention
x

X

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

verbs  הָ ַרגand  חָ טָ אexists in Abraham’s not presenting Sarah as his wife, thus causing
potential adultery or kidnapping (Gen 20:4) and in the Golden Calf incident (Exod
32:27).
In the first event, God used the verb  חָ טָ אto describe Abimelech’s potentially
taking Abraham’s wife Sarah for himself. The act could have resulted in adultery, as well
as in kidnapping (Gen 20:6).
The connection between  הָ ַרגand  חָ טָ אis more emphatic in the second event. The
verbal and nominal forms of  חָ טָ אare used multiple times to refer to the act of idolatry.
The verb is used in Exod 32:30, 31, 33 to express performing an idolatrous act while the
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noun is used in 32:21, 30x2, 31, 32, 34 for the same cause.645
The verb  ָרגַםis used in Lev 24:14 to refer to the punishment of the sin of cursing
the Lord; this is designated by  חָ טָ אin v. 15. Stoning expressed via  ָרגַםwas the
prescribed mode of capital punishment in Num 15:35–36 for breaking the Sabbath, but
the act itself was never designated by עָֹון, פֶּשַׁ ע, or חָ טָ א. In addition to  ָרגַם, two other
verbs were used to express punishment for this sin.  מוּתwas repeatedly used in Exod
31:14 and 35:2 to refer to the punishment for Sabbath breaking. Kārēt was also a mode of
capital punishment related to the breaking of the Sabbath (Exod 31:14).
Stoning expressed with  סָ קַ לfor sinning that is designated with  חָ טָ אis rare. That
is, Exod 19:13 (refusal to obey God’s instructions), Deut 13:10 (idolatry); 17:5 (idolatry),
and 22:21, 24 (sexual promiscuity) all use  סָ קַ לto express a mode of capital punishment
for various sins. However, it is only Deut 22:21, 24 that portrays that the sin of sexual
promiscuity could imply the  חָ טָ אterm, since sexual promiscuity sins are designated with

 חָ טָ אin Lev 19:20–22; 20:20; and Deut 22:26.
Burning646 as a capital punishment is expressed through the verb שָׂ ַרף. The
narratives in Gen 38:24 and Lev 10:6 and laws in Lev 20:14; 21:9; and Deut 22:21 all

Num 25:5 and Deut 13 use  הָ ַרגto express capital punishment for idolatry, but idolatry is not
specified as a  חָ טָ אsin in these two texts. An individual idolater was killed by a spear in Num 25:5, while
Deut 13:10 and the parallel law for idolatry in Deut 17:5 mention stoning as a mode of capital punishment.
The corporate idolatry act of the entire city is punished by sword: Deut 13:15. Idolatry is expressed by ָרעָה
and תֹּועֵבָ ה.
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state that burning was used to punish the sin of illicit fire for the altar in Lev 10:6, and
illicit sexual acts in the remaining texts. The verb  חָ טָ אdesignates the sins in all the texts
but Lev 10:6.
The verb  ָנכָהis syntactically connected to  חָ טָ אin one text, Lev 26:24, which is
illuminating regarding the nature of  חָ טָ אsin. In the contexts involving capital punishment
discussed in this subsection, the term  חָ טָ אrefers to intentional sin, unwillingness to obey
God. The imposition of capital punishment included in this text alludes that this sin is
inexpiable and unforgivable.647 The verb  י ָָרהis never used to express punishment for the
sin designated by חָ טָ א.

Kārēt and חָ טָ א
The second group of contexts examines the connection between kārēt and חָ טָ א.
The term  חָ טָ אwith its derivatives, accompanied by the verb כ ַָרת, is found 3 times in the
Pentateuch, namely in Num 9:13: neglect of the Passover; and 19:13, 20: not purifying
him/herself. Of these texts, the syntactical connection between kārēt and the nominal of

 חָ טָ אexists only in Num 9:13 (see Table 13).
The pattern found in חָ טָ א-capital punishment contexts is followed in חָ טָ א-kārēt
contexts. The term  חָ טָ אrefers to intentional sin. In addition, the nature of the punishment,
kārēt, suggests that this sin is an inexpiable one.

647
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Table 13. The term  חָ טָ אin relation to kārēt

1

Reference
Num 9:13

2
3

Num 19:13
Num 19:20

Sin
Avoiding
Passover
n/a
n/a

Punishment
kārēt
Num 9:13
n/a
n/a

Expiable

Inexpiable
x

Intention
x

 נָשָׂ אand חָ טָ א
The third context provided insight into the connection between  חָ טָ אand נָשָׁ א. The
nominal and verbal derivatives of  חָ טָ אaccompanied by the verb  נָשָׁ אare found in 18 texts
in the OT. The term is syntactically connected to the verb  נָשָׁ אin 11 texts. Table 14
displays all the occurrences.

Table 14. The term  חָ טָ אin relation to the verb נָשָׁ א
1

Reference
Gen 50:17

Sin
Kidnapping

2

Exod 10:17

Not obeying
God’s word

3

Exod 32:32

Idolatry

4
5
6

Exod 34:7
Lev 19:17
Lev 20:20

Unknown
Hatred
Illicit sex

7

Lev 22:9

8
9

Lev 24:15
Num 9:13

10

Num 18:22

11

Num 18:32

Charge over
sanctuary
Cursing God
Not
attending
Passover
Coming
close to the
tent
Profaning
holy gifts

Punishment
Death
Deut 24:7
Death
Num
15:30–31
Death
Deut
n/a

Expiable
forgive

Inexpiable
x

forgive

x

x

forgive

x

x

forgive n/a
punishment
punishment

n/a
x

n/a
x
x

punishment

x

x

כּ ַָרת

punishment
punishment

x
x

x
x

Death

punishment

x

x

Death

punishment

x

x

Death;
childless

Death
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Unintentional

n/a

Intention
x

Scholars have widely accepted that  נָשָׂ א חַ טָּ אתin Gen 50:17 to mean “to
forgive.”648 Schwartz’s proposal that the sin disappears if it is carried away by someone
else other than the sinner is problematic in P since the trajectory of sin from the sinner to
the sanctuary/priest is extensively elaborated in the cultic context. However, his proposal
seems to fit the texts outside of P, but only if the phrase  נָשָׂ א חָ טָ אis translated as
“forgive.” Jacob was dead and Joseph was in the position to get his revenge and punish
his brothers who had committed a horrific sin towards him. This context strongly
suggests that  חָ טָ א נָשָׂ אconveys the meaning, “forgive.” The patriarchal narratives (Gen
11:27–50:26)649 described the religion of the patriarchs in a very limited manner.650 Thus,
the contrast of priestly detailed treatment of sin and lack of it in the patriarchal narratives
makes the vanishing of sin, if forgiven, plausible. If not forgiven, sinners would still חָ טָ א

 נָשָׂ אthemselves. Most likely they would get punished for their sin.

648

Robert Alter, Genesis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), 305; Mathews, Genesis 11:27–50:26,
925–26; Claus Westermann, Genesis 37–50: A Commentary, trans. John J. Scullion (Minneapolis:
Augsburg, 1986), 204; Kenneth O. Gangel and Stephen J. Bramer, Genesis, HOTC 1 (Nashville: Broadman
& Holman, 2002), 375; Wenham, Genesis 16–50, 490; Victor P. Hamilton, Genesis 18–50, NICOT 1B
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1980), 703; Nahum M. Sarna, Genesis = [Be-reshit]: The Traditional
Hebrew Text with the New JPS Translation, JPSTC 1 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989),
350; Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 2:411–12.
649

William Sanford LaSor, David Allan Hubbard, and Frederic William Bush, Old Testament
Survey: The Message, Form, and Background of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1982),
15–18, 32–43; Tremper Longman and Raymond B. Dillard, An Introduction to the Old Testament, 2nd ed.
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2006), 53. For a different view on the division of the patriarchal narratives
in Gen 11:27–50:26 and the further references, see Longman and Dillard, An Introduction to the Old
Testament, 59–61; Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 256–64; Wenham, Genesis 16–50, 167–70, 343–45.
Gleason L. Archer, A Survey of Old Testament Introduction, Rev. and exp. ed. (Chicago: Moody Press,
2007), 155.
650
They prayed (Gen 25:21) and built altars and offered sacrifices (Gen 12:7; 22:9; 35:1), but there
is no special reference to the location of these rites, no official priesthood, nor established cult. The
distinctiveness of their religion can be seen in their conception of God and close personal relationship with
him. LaSor, Hubbard, and Bush, Old Testament Survey, 46.
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The 3 remaining texts state that God himself (Exod 10:17–18; 34:6–7) נָשָׂ א חָ טָ א
of various human beings or his angel does not  נָשָׂ א חָ טָ אof the people (Exod 21:23).
There is no indication in these texts about what happen with the sins in case God bears
them. Most likely, they vanish away as Schwartz proposed.
Texts 1–4 were all also commented above in the present study and were based on
the analysis provided on these pages. I adopted the view that the phrase  נָשָׂ א חָ טָ אin these
texts the subject of the sin is not the one who committed the sin, but rather, someone else
is “to forgive.”
The texts 5–11 were all commented above in the present study and based on the
investigation proposed on these pages, I agree with the idea that the phrase in these texts
refers to the explicit or implicit verb or noun “punish or punishment.”
The sins that  חָ טָ אrefers to in these texts, when they are syntactically connected to
the verb נָשָׁ א, belong to both groups, namely expiable and inexpiable ones which contrast
the connection that was established between  חָ טָ אand  כ ַָרתand  חָ טָ אand מוּת. Also, at least
one of the sins listed in the Table 14 is an unintentional one; the rest are intentional ones.
Thus,  חָ טָ אrefers to expiable and inexpiable as well as intentional and unintentional sins.

 חָ טָ אand 651אָשַׁ ם
The  אָשַׁ םcognates appear 103 times in the OT (2 nouns: אַשׁמָ ה, 19x and אָשָׁ ם,
46x, the adjective אָשֵׁ ם, -3x, and the verbal form אָשַׁ ם, 35x). The Pentateuch uses it 51

 אָשַׁ םis a stative verb. Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 134; Levine, Numbers 1–20, 188; Milgrom,
Leviticus 1–16, 243.
651

200

times, of which the books of Leviticus and Numbers use  אָשַׁ םand its derivatives fortynine times. The concentration of the term  אָשַׁ םalong with its derivatives suggests that the
meanings for these forms should be sought in these two books. The meaning of
reparation offering is attached to two nominal derivatives. Twenty-nine of thirty-three
occurrences of the nominal אָשָׁ ם652 refer to the offering as well as 2/4 occurrences of the
nominal אַשׁמָ ה.653
Of special interest for the present study is the verbal form of  אָשַׁ םsince it
expresses the outcome the sinners’ experience after committing a sin.654 The nominal
form of the same root refers to the guilt sacrifice that remedies the wrong, the wrong
itself, and the penalty for the wrong. Thus, both the nominal and verbal derivatives of

 אָשַׁ םrepresent a punishment for the wrong.655 However, the verbal form is analyzed here
because it represents the sinners’ initial condition or state after they have committed
sin;656 the approach set out in this study examines whether the punishment is applied for
both intentional and unintentional sins.

652

Lev 5:6–7, 15–16, 18–19; 6:6, 17; 7:1–2, 5, 7, 37; 14:12–14, 17, 21, 24–25, 28; 19:21–22; Num
6:12; 18:9. Different meanings are associated with the noun in the following texts: Gen 26:10: guilt; Num
5:7, 8x2: wrong. Scholars consider this nominal as a technical term for restitution/reparation offerings.
Hartley, Leviticus, 77; Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 104–12; Carpenter and Grisanti, “אָשַׁ ם,” NIDOTTE
1:547. Based on the statistics presented where the noun refers to the offering, 29/33 occurrences, that claim
seems to be justified.
653
Lev 4:3, 5:24 [6:5]. The other two occurrences in Lev 5:26 [6:7] and 22:16 are used adjectively
and mean “guilty.”
654

Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 24.
Averbeck, “אָשַׁ ם,” NIDOTTE 1:550–59; Carpenter and Grisanti, “אָשַׁ ם,” NIDOTTE 1:547.
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Carpenter and Grisanti, “אָשַׁ ם,” NIDOTTE 1:547.
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The verbal form of the term  אָשַׁ םis used thirteen times in the Pentateuch, eleven
times in Lev 4–5 (4:13, 22, 27; 5:2, 3, 4, 5, 17, 19x2, 23), and 2 in Num 5 (5:6, 7). There
are four proposals of what the verb means: (1) “to be/become guilty, to incur guilt, to
be/to become liable for guilt,” (2) “to feel guilt,” (3) “to realize guilt,” and (4) “to suffer
guilt’s consequences.”657 Arguments for each of these meanings are analyzed on pages
288–313 of the present study, but at this point, it is important to notice that the texts of
the Pentateuch make a syntactical connection between the verb  אָשַׁ םand the nominal חָ טָ א
in two passages, a set of pericopes in Lev 4–5 and Num 5. The verses with syntactical
interaction between these two terms in Lev 4 are vv. 13–21, 22–26, 27–28; 5: 5:2, 3, 4, 5,
17, 19x2, 5:23 [6:4], and Num 5:6, 7.
Since it is important to establish the nature of the sin for which one experiences

אָשַׁ ם, all these pericopes need to be addressed. It is important to state that Lev 4 deals
with both intentional and unintentional sins, as are the ones in the second and third
pericopes in Lev 5 (vv. 14–16, 17–19), while the ones listed in the first and the last
pericopes of Lev 5 (vv. 1–4, 20–26 [6:1–7]) are intentional.658
The unintentionality of the sins is indicated the fact that verbs that refer to the
activity/action of sinning are adverbially modified by the nominal prepositional phrase

בִּ שׁ ָגגָה.659 In Lev 4:2, 27, the  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהmodifies the verb  ;חָ טָ אin 4:22, it modifies the verb
עָשָׂ ה. In Lev 5:15, it modifies the verb חָ טָ א, while in 5:18, it modifies the verb שָׁ גַג. The

657

Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 25.

658

Wells, The Law of Testimony, 64.

659

Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 24.
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syntactical connection between  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהand the verbs חָ טָ א, שָׁ ַגג, and  עָשָׂ הsuggests two
points. First, the verbs that refer to the activity/action of sinning, חָ טָ א, שָׁ גַג, and עָשָׂ ה, are
interchangeable. This claim is reinforced below as I comment on the pericopes of Lev 4–
5 and Num 5. Second, the sins described in the pericopes where  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהis used are
unintentional. The topic of intentionality and unintentionality is examined in greater
detail on pages 271–313 of the present study, but at this point it is sufficient to state that
the sins in these pericopes are either intentional or unintentional.
Lev 4: The first pericope in ch. 4, vv. 3–12, is included here even though it does
not contain the verbal form of  אָשַׁ םbecause the nominal form of this term causes the
same effect on the people. That is, a sin of the high priest brings  אָשַׁ םon the people. The
verbal forms that refer to the activity/action of sinning in this pericope are  חָ טָ אin vv. 2,
3x2, and  עָשָׂ הin v. 2. In v. 2, the verbal form of  חָ טָ אis adverbially modified by בִּ שׁ ָגגָה
which is infinitival as is  לאַשׁמַ תin v. 3.660 The noun  חַ טָּ אתadditionally designates the act
of sin in v. 3.
There is a cluster of verbs in vv. 13–21 that express the activity of sinning, and a
single noun, חַ טָּ את, that refers to the act of sinning. In v. 13, the whole congregation
experiences  אָשַׁ םas a result of doing activity that is expressed by the verbal of שָׁ גָה.
However, in v. 14, the act of sinning expressed by the verb  שָׁ גָהin v. 13 is labeled as חָ טָ א

Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 231; Hannah S. An, “The Delayed Recognition of Sin in the Sacred
Precinct: A Reconsideration of  אָשֵׁ םand  יָדָ הin Leviticus 4–5 in the Light of the Hittite Instructions for
Priests and Temple Officials (CTH 264)” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2014), 31.
660
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in this verse, which leads to the conclusion that both the verb  שָׁ גָהand the noun חַ טָּ את
produce the  אָשַׁ םcondition of the sinner. It is worthy to note that v. 13 uses the verb עָשָׂ ה
to refer to the activity/action of sinning in this pericope because of which, the doer
experiences אָשַׁ ם. Thus, the activity/action of sinning is expressed by three verbs: שָׁ גָה
and  עָשָׂ הin v. 13 and  חָ טָ אin v. 14, while the act itself is indicated by the noun חַ טָּ את.
In the pericope of the leader in vv. 22–26 the verbal  אָשַׁ םis again related to the
nominal חָ טָ א. In v. 22, the verbal of  חָ טָ אand  עָשָׂ הplus the adverbial use of  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהthat
modifies  עָשָׂ הcause אָשַׁ ם. In vv. 23 and 26, the act itself is labeled with the nominal of

חָ טָ א. Thus, the same cluster of terms that defines the activity of sinning (the verbal of
 חָ טָ אand  עָשָׂ הplus the adverbial use of  )בִּ שׁ ָגגָהis the same in both pericopes. The act of
sinning is also defined with the nominal  חָ טָ אin both pericopes.
The pericope of the commoner in vv. 27–31 shows that same pattern that was
identified in the pericope that presents the sinning of the whole congregation (vv. 13–21)
and the leader (vv. 22–26). That is, in v. 27, the text uses the verbal of  חָ טָ אthat is
modified by the double adverbials  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהand the verbal  עָשָׂ הto describe the activity that
causes the doer to experience אָשַׁ ם. In v. 28, the verbal of  חָ טָ אis used two times to
express the activity of sinning while the nominal of the same term is used to describe the
act committed.
The pattern that emerges out of these four pericopes is that the activity/action of
sinning is expressed by the three verbs: חָ טָ א, עָשָׂ ה, and שָׁ גָה. The prepositional phrase

בִּ שׁ ָגגָה, functioning adverbially, is occasionally used to modify the meaning of the verbs
204

that refer to the activity/action of sinning, either  חָ טָ אin vv. 2, 27 or  עָשָׂ הin v. 22. The act
of the sin committed is always labeled with the nominal of ( חָ טָ אvv. 14, 23, 26, 28x2,
35). The outcome of the activity/action that are expressed by these verbs and the verbal
constructions cause the doer to experience אָשַׁ ם, mainly the verbal form of the term (vv. 2
[verbal use of nominal], 13, 22, 27).
Lev 5: There is a consensus among scholars regarding the pericopes division in
Lev 5661 and the element of intention and lack of it as regards the sins listed. Milgrom, for
instance, stated that Lev 5 consists of four pericopes and provided his own interpretation
of these sins. Thus, vv. 1–13 (graded sin offering) refer to intentional sin in v. 1 and sins
of forgetfulness in vv. 2–4; 14–16 (sacrilege against sancta) refer to unintentional,
inadvertent sin; 17–19 (suspected sacrilege against sancta) refer to unintentional,
inadvertent sin; and 20–26 (sacrilege against the oath) refer to intentional sin.662 The
verbal forms of  אָשַׁ םare found in vv. 2, 3, 4, 5, 17, 19x2; and 5:23 [6:4] which means
that it is a consequence of sin in all of these pericopes but 5:14–16.
The verbs used in the first pericope, vv. 1–13, only use the verbal of  חָ טָ אto
describe the activity/action of committing the sin (vv. 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13). The act of sin is
expressed through the nominal of ( חָ טָ אvv. 5, 6x2, 10, 13).
The second pericope, vv. 14–16, uses the verb  חָ טָ אin two verses, vv. 14 and 16,

The more detailed interpretation of Lev 5 is suggested under subheading “שָׁ גַג/שָׁ גָה/ ”שׁ ָגגָהand
“ יָדַ עand  ” ָעלַםof the present study.
661
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Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 292–93, 314, 319; Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 2:315; Kiuchi,
Purification Offering, 99–101, 112–15; Rooker, Leviticus, 116–26; Gane, Cult and Character, 117–23,
132–35; Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 24.
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to refer to the activity/action of sinning. The verbal form is modified by the adverbial use
of  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהin v. 15. This pericope is unique in Lev 4–5 for it does not use any noun to refer
to the act of sin, nor it uses the verb אָשַׁ ם. Based on the pattern from the previous
pericopes in Lev 4 and 5, it is reasonable to claim that the act of sin in this pericope is
also חָ טָ א, and that the doer also experiences אָשַׁ ם.
The verbal forms that refer to the activity/action of sinning in the next pericope,
vv. 17–19, are ( חָ טָ אv. 17), ( עָשָׂ הv. 17), and ( שָׁ גַגv. 18). The act of sin is designated
differently in this pericope. The nominal used in v. 18 is  שׁ ָגגָהinstead of the usual חָ טָ א.
The last pericope, v. 20–26 [6:1–7], uses the verb ( חָ טָ אvv. 20, 22 [6:21], 23
[6:6]) and ( עָשָׂ הv. 26) to denote the activity/action of sinning. The nominal form to
designate the act of sin is missing in this pericope.
Two of the pericopes in Lev 5, vv. 14–16 and 5:20–26 [6:1–7], use an additional
verbal form of the root  מָ עַלto designate further the activity/action of sinning and also use
the nominal derivative of the same root to describe the act of sin. These two pericopes are
unique because the sins that they deal with are directed toward God. In other words, this
sin constitutes a sacrilege.663 In the first case, it is directed toward God’s holy things. In
the second case, sacrilege consists of misusing God’s name in an oath.664
The pattern that surfaces out of the four pericopes in Lev 5 is very similar to the
one that was identified with the pericopes of Lev 4. That is, the activity/action of sinning

Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 319–32; Averbeck, “אָשַׁ ם,” NIDOTTE 1:553.

663
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Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 320, 345–56; Gane, Cult and Character, 132–35.
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is expressed by the three verbs חָ טָ א, עָשָׂ ה, and שָׁ גַג. The nominal derivative of the

שָׁ גַג/שָׁ גָה,  שׁ ָגגָהfunctioning as an adverb, supplements the meaning of the verb  חָ טָ אthat
refers to the activity/action of sinning in v. 15. The act of the sin committed is expressed
by the nominals of  חָ טָ אand  ;שׁ ָגגָהin the second and third pericopes, the nominals are
omitted (vv. 14–16, 20–26 [6:1–7]). The outcome of the activity/action that are expressed
by these verbs and verbal constructions cause the doer to experience אָשַׁ ם, a verbal form
of the term ( אָשַׁ םvv. 2, 3, 4, 5, 17, 19 x2, 23 [6:4]).
Num 5: Compared to the previous pericopes, Num 5:6–7 shows a limited use of
both verbal forms to refer to an activity/action of sinning. The only verbal form that is
used in this pericope derives from the root ( עָשָׂ הvv. 6, 7), whereas other pericopes
frequently used  חָ טָ אand שָׁ גַג/שָׁ גָה. When it refers to an act of sinning, this pericope
utilizes the usual nominal derivative of ( חָ טָ אv. 6, 7) in agreement with pericopes in Lev
4 and in contrast to the pericope in Lev 5, vv. 17–19, that used the nominal derivative of

שָׁ גַג/שָׁ גָה. Thus, besides the limited use of verbs, only the verbal of  עָשָׂ הis used. This
pericope follows the previous pericopes in Lev 4–5 in using the usual term, the nominal
of חָ טָ א, to refer to an act of sin.
The analysis of the contexts when  חָ טָ אdesignates sins that causes  אָשַׁ םto the
sinner demonstrates that  חָ טָ אrefers to intentional and unintentional sins. However, both
intentional and unintentional sins are expiable. These texts do not propose any sort of
capital or non-capital punishment that would imply that these sins would be inexpiable.
On the contrary, Lev 4–5 laid out the way for a sinner to receive expiation for their sins.
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Conclusion on the Study of חָ טָ א
Based on insights from the studies that have been done in the history of
interpretation on the term  חָ טָ אwhich were confirmed in the present study and the insights
presented here, it is accepted that  חָ טָ אdoes not focus on the motive or the inner quality of
a sinful act. In many instances, the term itself does not specify whether the sin is
intentional or unintentional, whereas some texts show that it can refer to both types of
sins. The focused analysis conducted in the present study demonstrated that sins
designated with the term  חָ טָ אalso signify intentional and inexpiable sins in the
Pentateuch. That has been verified by the syntactical or conceptual connection between
the term  חָ טָ אand various verbs that convey the capital penalty (מוּת, הָ ַרג,  ָרגַם, סָ קַ ל, שָׂ ַרף,

 ) ָנכָהand the punishment of kārēt.
The sins referred to by the phrase inexpiable and or are expiable

665

נָשָׂ א חָ טָ א

mainly intentional. The analysis of  חָ טָ אand  אָשַׁ םcontexts showed that the sins that cause
the sinner to be  אָשַׁ םare all expiable and are either intentional or unintentional. The
implication of the fact that  חָ טָ אrefers to expiable and inexpiable sins is that it describes
forgivable and unforgivable sins.
Finally, in expressing the concept of sin, this term is not limited to the particular
aspect or context of human life but rather is found in all of them: legal, cultic, and social.
Having provided the evidence that this term carries the same meaning/s in the book of

This phrase refers to the use of the verb  נָשָׂ אwith both nominal derivatives of the root חָ טָ א,
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 חַ טָּ אתand חֵ טא.
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Leviticus and in the Pentateuch, the present study agrees with the claim that  חָ טָ אrefers to
unintentional and expiable sins or errors, but based on pieces of evidence presented
above, it also suggests that  חָ טָ אalso refer to intentional and inexpiable sins in the book of
Leviticus and in the Pentateuch.
The Root  עָֹוןas a Key Term for Sin in the OT
By contrast with the term  חָ טָ אwhich is used in a variety of contexts,  עָֹוןis mostly
used in religious and ethical settings.666 Its plural form has been recognized as a
“summary word” that encompasses all sins against God.667 Based on the fact that the term
is used in the confession of the high priest in Lev 16:21 for sins that were removed from
the most holy and is the only term repeated in Lev 16:22, Milgrom claimed that  עָֹוןis the
key term used to convey “the totality of offences against the deity that the high priest then
transfers to the scapegoat.”668
It is still dispute whether  עָֹוןoriginates from the Hebrew root ʿwh ( )עוהor the
Semitic root attested in Arabic ʿawā.669 However, scholars mainly believe that the
Hebrew ʿwh is the root of עָֹון.670 Statistics on the occurrences of  עָֹוןcoincide with those

Luc, “עון,” NIDOTTE 3:349; Quell, “ἁμαρτάνω, ἁμάρτημα, ἁμαρτία,” TDNT, 1:271.
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Luc, “עון,” NIDOTTE 3:349; Carl Schultz, “ ָעוָה,” TWOT 2:650.
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Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 25, 1043.
Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:32; Rolf P. Knierim, “עָֹון,” TLOT 2:863.
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Knierim, “עָֹון,” TLOT 2:862; HALOT, s.vv. “עָֹון,  ָעוָה.”
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of  חָ טָ אin that that there are several proposals, ranging from 229,671 227672 to 231673
nominal occurrences in the OT. The metonymic uses of the term exemplify the affiliation
between “sin,” “guilt” and “punishment” in biblical thought,674 since  עָֹוןcan mean any or
all of these three meanings in a single verse.675 Knierim coined a phrase, “dynamistic
holistic thought,” pointing that  עָֹוןis a term of motion that basically conveys a process of
movement to emphasize the relatedness between the act and its consequence that is
embedded in the meaning of the term.676 Von Rad employed the phrase, “synthetic view
of life,” to refer to the same phenomenon.677

 עָֹוןcan refer to a conscious activity related to verbal forms, assuming that the verb
derives from ʿwh (( )עוה1 Kgs 8:47; Jer 3:21; 9:4; Ps 106:6; Job 33:27; Prov 12:8; Esth
1:16; Dan 9:5), as well as nominal forms (Gen 44:16; Num 14:19; Josh 22:20; 1 Sam
25:24; 2 Sam 3:8; Isa 22:14; Jer 11:10). Yet, multiple references also show that עָֹון
represent unconscious and unintended activity (Gen 15:16; 19:15; Lev 22:16; Num 18:1,
23; 1 Sam 14:41 LXX; 20:1; 2 Sam 14:32; 1 Kgs 17:18; Isa 6:7). In addition, some uses
emphasize the relationship between a deed and its consequence (Gen 4:13; Deut 19:15; 2

Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:32.
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Kgs 7:9; Isa 5:18; Ps 25:11; 31:11). Some texts emphasize the totality of sin without
interest in clarifying the type of sin (Deut 19:15; Amos 3:2; Ps 103:3). There are also
instances where  עָֹוןis used synonymously with חָ טָ א.678
Finally, since  עָֹוןrefers to both a deed and its consequence, then the
consequential-volitional element is not essential because the consequence often occurs
unknowingly or unintentionally. Knierim noted that “the emphasis on consciousness does
not characterize the term, then, but lies in the nature of the—always historically
conditioned—context that makes the issue of guilt comprehensible (Gen 3; Hos; Jer;
Ezek).”679 Thus, the general implication is that  עָֹוןcan express both intentional and
unintentional sins, and it is the context that clarifies whether the sin expressed by עָֹון
belongs to the former or latter category.680 After presenting the key points related to the
term  עָֹוןfrom scholarly discussions, the present study focuses on  עָֹוןin the Pentateuch.

The Nature of  עָֹוןSins in Leviticus and the Rest of the Pentateuch

 עָֹוןis used 42 times in the Pentateuch. The majority of occurrences of  עָֹוןis in the
books of Leviticus (18x) and Number (12x). The books of Genesis (4x), Exodus (6x), and

678

Knierim, Die Hauptbegriffe für Sünde im Alten Testament, 19–20, 50–54. followed by
Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 8n17. Gane noticed the following in the case of sin in Lev 5:1, 5–6: “A
witness who sins (verb  )חטאby failing to give required testimony bears his עון, ’culpability,’ unless/until
he confesses what he has sinned (verb  )חטאand bring a purification offering for the sin he has sinned
( )חַ טָּ אתֹו אֲשֶּׁ ר חָ טָ אand the priest effects purgation on his behalf from his sin (אתֹו
ִֽ ָ)מֵ חַ טּ. Compare 5:17,
where sinning (verb  )חטאalso results in bearing עון.” Gane, Cult and Character, 294.
Knierim, “עָֹון,” TLOT 2:864.
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Deuteronomy (2x) show low frequency of  עָֹוןusage.681 The general meaning/s suggested
by scholarly research that the term  עָֹוןcovers a sinful act and its consequence, along with
the guilt for the sin, seems to be operating in the book of Leviticus and the wider literary
context of the Pentateuch. The following tables list the  עָֹוןoccurrences, demonstrating
that the term in the Pentateuch refers to (1) sinful act, (2) punishment as a consequence
for a sinful act, and (3) guilt or liability for a sinful act. The application of the
terminological/contextual/intertextual approach with the questions set out at the
beginning of this chapter is also applied in the further analysis of עָֹון.

Intentionality and Expiability Associated to  עָֹוןSins
It is challenging to determine precisely the meaning of עָֹון. Sometimes, all three
components of sin are in view—an act, guilt, and punishment. It is very likely that it is a
matter of emphasis of one or the other. Thus, the following paragraphs are not intended to
suggest the firm meanings of עָֹון, but rather, to point to the emphasis on specific
meanings of the term in certain texts. In addition, I will seek to determine whether עָֹון
refers to intentional or unintentional sin and whether  עָֹוןis expiable or inexpiable sin.

 עָֹוןas Sinful Act
There are at least four contexts where  עָֹוןwas used six times to refer to intentional
and inexpiable sin. This suggestion points to the use of the term  עָֹוןwhen it refers to the
sinful act. The following table shows the references (see Table 15):

681

Accordance Bible.
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Table 15. The noun  עָֹוןas inexpiable sin, i.e. sinful act
1.
2.
3.
4.

Reference
Lev 26:39x2682
Lev 26:40x2683
Lev 26:41684
Lev 26:43685

Sin
Various sins
Various sins
Various sins
Various sins

Punishment
Death, exile
Death, exile
Death, exile
Death, exile

Expiable

Inexpiable
x
x
x
x

Intentional
x
x
x
x

Intentional
X
X
X
X

The occurrences in Table 15 demonstrate that  עָֹוןis perceived as an inexpiable
sin. All these  עָֹוןoccurrences have in common the fact that they refer to sins punished by
capital punishment and exile. It is worthy to note that these texts do not provide details
about the act of sin itself, but rather a general idea of sin is in view.
The severity of the punishment for these sins suggests that they are inexpiable. As
being a background of all the texts in the Table 15, exile represents God’s most severe
punishment for people’s sins. The intentionality of the sins portrayed in this chapter can
be suggested on the basis of verbs used to refer to Israel’s sins and thematic contrasts.
Milgrom noticed a lexical link between the phrase ִּתשׁמעָ֖ וּ … תַ ע ֲ֔שׂוּ ֵ ֹ֥את כָל־הַ ִּמּצֹוָ֖ ת
in Lev 26:14 and the phrase יתם אֹ ָ ִֽתם
ָ֖ ֶּ  ִּתּשׁמ ֔רוּ ַוע ֲִּשׂin v. 3. He suggested that this link via
use of the verb  שָׁ מַ עin v. 14, which is the equivalent of the verb  שָׁ מַ רused in v. 3, refers

The term  עָֹוןcan take on two potential meanings in this text. The one favored by Milgrom is
“iniquity.” Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2273, 2327. However, Milgrom referred to this iniquity as sins.
Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2327. This meaning is followed by many other scholars. Gane suggested
culpability as other meaning. Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 454.
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Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2273, 2330–31.
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Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2274. Gane understood the term  עָֹוןrefers to culpability in this text.
Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 455.
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to the negation of the heading of the previous “blessings” section. Both verbs used in vv.
3 and 14,  שָׁ מַ רand שָׁ מַ ע, need an additional verb, עָשָׂ ה, to communicate acting against or
breaking the commandments.  שָׁ מַ רand שָׁ מַ ע, meaning “to obey” or “to keep,” refer,
rather, to physical passivity, while  עָשָׂ הconveys the action of breaking the
commandments.686
In the context of God’s commandments expressed by the noun  ִּמצוָה,  עָשָׂ הwith a
human subject always refers to intentional and conscious activity (Ex 15:26; Lev 4:2, 13,
22, 27; 5:17; 22:31; 26:3, 14, 15; Num 15:22, 39, 40; Deut 5: 31; 6:1, 25; 7:11; 8:1;
11:22; 13:18; 15:5; 19:9; 27:10; 28:1, 13, 15; 30:8; 31:5).687 The same pattern is detected
when  עָשָׂ הis studied in the context of the nouns  חֹ קand  חֻקָּ הthat refer to God’s
commandments (Exod 15:26; 18:20; Lev 16:29, 34; 18:4, 5; 19:37; 20:8, 22–23; 25:18;
26:3; Num 9:3, 12, 14; Deut 4:1, 5, 6, 14; 5:1, 31; 6:1, 24; 7:11; 11:32–12:1; 16:12;
17:19; 26:16; 27:10).688 In some contexts,  חֻקָּ הis paired with  ִּמשׁפָטand in those contexts,

 עָשָׂ הalso refers to intentional activity (Lev 18:4–5, 26; 19:37; 20:22; 25:18; 26:15).
When God’s commandments are expressed through the noun תֹּורה
ָ ,  עָשָׂ הwith human
subject also refer to intentional and conscious activity (Exod 18:20; Num 5:30; 6:21;
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Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2304.
This principle also apply to the uses when God is subject of the verb ( עָשָׂ הExod 20:6; Deut
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5:10).
Several texts do not follow this pattern, but do not negate it. In Lev 6:22  עָשָׂ הmeans “to offer a
sacrifice.” In Lev 18:3, 26, 30; 23:21, 31; 26:15; Deut 28:15  עָשָׂ הis negated. In Lev 18:3, 26,  עָשָׂ הis also
negated and  ֻחקָּ הrefer to the statutes of Egyptian’s and Canaanite’s societies of which some were most
likely religious.
688
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15:29; Deut 17:11, 19; 27:26; 28:58; 29:29; 31:12; 32:46). In the context of the verb צָ וָה,
the verb  עָשָׂ הalways expressed intentional activity (Lev 8:4–5, 34, 36; 9:6–7; 16:34;
24:23; 25:21689).
On the same note, the phrase  בחֻקֹּ ַ ָ֖תי תֵּ לֵ ָ֑כוּin v. 3 is reversed in v. 15 ִּתּמאָ֔סוּ

בחֻקֹּ ַ ֹ֣תי.690 This reversal of verbs also points to the intentional change of people’s attitude
towards God’s commandments. The verb  מָ אַסis critical in this verse since it points to an
intentional, willful rejection or refusal in various contexts.691 God promised blessings for
people’s willingness to follow God’s commandments and curse/punishment if they
decide to refuse, reject, despise and not do them.
In addition, the use of  ִּמשׁפָטַ יin v. 15 along with  בחֻקֹּ תַ יin vv. 3 and  הַ ִּמּצֹותin v.
14, adds a legal notion of the sins associated with the activities elaborated in these texts.
The use of all 3 terms that refer to the totality of Israel’s legislative system692 further hints
at the totality of their sins or illegitimate status/condition.
Another hint concerning the nature of the sins implied in this chapter is found in
the phrase “יתי
ִֽ ִּ להַ פרכֶּ ָ֖ם אֶּ ת־ב ִּר,” and it reveals that the background of this entire chapter is
the Sinaitic covenant, including all of its stipulations.693 The stipulations of the Sinaitic

 עָשָׂ הdoes not have a human subject in this text.
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Roy E. Gane, “Leviticus,” in Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, vol. 1 of
ZIBBCOT, ed. John H. Walton, 5 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2009), 323; Milgrom, Leviticus 23–
27, 2305.
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covenant encompass cultic, legal, and moral laws.694 Consequently, it is to be expected
that the sins referred to by the term  עָֹוןinclude a variety of inexpiable sins in this context.
The sins implied here are unlikely to be unintentional sins since God would provide
atonement for those sins via the cult. These texts do not contain clues about nor describe
the act of sin. Biblical accounts of the exile of the kingdom of Judah testify that
individuals within covenant people retained their brazen rebellious and in doing so died
(Jer 52, Lamentations). The point from Lev 26:39–41, 43 and later texts about exile is
that  עָֹוןcan refer to intentional brazen inexpiable sin.

 עָֹוןas Punishment
The present study suggests that two texts with  עָֹוןemphasize the punishment (Lev
18:25; 22:16). Scholars are divided on the meaning of  עָֹוןin 18:25. Snaith and Milgrom
suggested that the  עָֹוןshould be translated by “sin” as becomes obvious from their
translation of Lev 18:25.695 The majority of scholars stressed punishment in the pericope
of v. 25, assuming punishment as the translation of עָֹון, based on the fact that 18:24–30,
as a conclusion of the law collection presented in ch. 18, would speak about punishments
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as a consequence of breaking the laws just presented.696 The literal translation of the
phrase  וָאֶּ פקֹֹ֥ ד עֲֹונָ ָ֖הּwould be “I have visited, punished its sin” as recognized and
verbalized by some scholars, but its meaning undeniably points to the punishment of the
people via punishment of the land. This literary tendency to emphasize punishment in the
case of disobedience at the conclusion of a group of laws was noticeable in the ANE texts
and followed in the OT.697
There is no such disagreement related to the meaning of Lev 22:16. That is, key
scholars agree that  עָֹוןshould be translated as punishment in this text.698
Like the texts that emphasize the act of sin, meaning of עָֹון, these texts do not
contain clues about nor describe the act of sin. Emphasis on the punishment component
of the term makes the nature of sin (intentional or unintentional) insignificant.

 עָֹוןas Sin/Guilt/Punishment
The term was used 8 times to express all three components of sin (Lev 5:1, 17;
7:18; 10:17; 17:16; 19:8; 20:17, 19). The precise or emphasized meaning/s is a matter of
interpretation, than based on solid, textual clues. Contrary to the uses of  עָֹוןwhen it refers

696
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Matthews, and Mark W. Chavalas, “Leviticus,” in IVPBBCOT (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press,
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to sin as an act or punishment, these texts do provide details about and describe the act of
sin. That is, the act for which one is guilty and punished is described in detail.
Schwartz suggested that in all of these texts, the phrase refers to the guilt or
consequential bearing.699 Bruce Wells approved of Schwartz’s findings, but furthered the
dialogue by limiting his work to the category of consequential sin-bearing, or as he
termed it, ‘āwōn-clause, in the OT.700 He proposed that the phrase “point[s] to a liability
that is in addition to the general liability for having committed an act that these texts
consider sinful.”701 The fact that discredits Well’s proposal is the inability to identify
what that additional liability would be in some texts.702
Schwartz and Wells both reduced the meaning of the phrase to the consequential
meaning only. The part of Schwartz’s list of the Leviticus texts with the consequential
meaning of the phrase differs from the list suggested here due to the fact that the list of
texts here includes only those that have נָשָׂ א עָֹון, contrary to Schwartz’s inclusion of the
other two terms for sin,  פֶּשַׁ עand the nominal derivatives of the root חָ טָ א. Additional texts
found in Schwartz’s list all have  חֵ טאpaired with  נָשָׁ אinstead of ( עָֹוןLev 19:17; 20:20;
22:9; 24:15).
Another difference is that Schwartz did not ascribe consequential meaning to נָשָׂ א

Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 12–13.
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 עָֹוןin Lev 10:17, but rather, a carrying, bearing away, or removing the sin from the
sanctuary, not from the sinner.703 Finally, Lev 18:25 does not have the verb  נָשָׁ אand thus,
it is not on Schwartz’s list. The meaning of the phrase חָ טָ א/פֶּשַׁ ע/ נָשָׂ א עָֹוןis revisited on
pages 139–85 above of the present study. However, at this point, it is important to note
that other scholars recognized that  עָֹוןin these Leviticus texts point to sin as an act and
guilt. In order for  עָֹוןto have consequential meaning, the subject of the phrase  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןis
always human.704
This group of texts contains sins of various kinds. It is evident that the majority of
them are intentional and inexpiable, but some of the intentional ones are expiable. In
addition, except for Lev 10:17, the texts provide clues that describe the sin in details.
Capital Punishment and עָֹון
The order of verbs that refer to capital punishment is the same as in the section of
the term חָ טָ א, namely (מוּת, הָ ַרג,  ָרגַם, סָ קַ ל, שָׂ ַרף,  ָנכָה, and )י ָָרה.  עָֹוןis syntactically related
to the verb  מוּתonce in the Pentateuch, in Exod 28:43. It is debatable what the actual
nature of the sin in this ordinance was,705 but it is inevitable that the
punishment/consequence was death.706  עָֹוןis never associated with the term of הָ ַרג. In
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two contexts, Gen 4:8 and Lev 20:16,  הָ ַרגis used to express a capital punishment for the
sin but they are not designated with עָֹון. The term  עָֹוןis never found in contexts where the
term  סָ קַ לor  ָרגַםare used to communicate punishment for sin.
The term may also be associated with  שָׂ ַרףin the contexts of various sexual
misconducts. Various texts use  שָׂ ַרףto designate the mode of punishment for sexual
misconducts that are defined by the term ( ָזנָהGen 38:24: adultery; Lev 21:9: illicit sex;
Num 25:1: illicit sex); and once ( זִּמָּ הLev 20:14: illicit sex). Illicit sexual misconducts are
also defined as  עָֹוןin Lev 20:17,707 19,708 and 20.709 The law in v. 17 deals with illicit
marriage and sex. The text in v. 19 refers to a potential double sexual misconduct. First, it
refers to an illicit sexual relationship with one’s mother’s or father’s sister. Second, it
potentially refers to adultery since the sister referred to in the law might have been
married. They are not married since the usual verb that refers to marriage  לָקַ חis missing,
but rather just have illicit sex. The law in v. 20 undoubtedly refers to adultery, illicit sex
with one’s uncle’s wife.710 The term  עָֹוןis used in a metonymic way in all these three
laws to refer to sin, guilt, and its punishment. Thus, certain sexual misconducts initiate
punishment by  שָׂ ַרףin the texts that do not define them as עָֹון, but rather,  ָזנָהand זִּמָּ ה.

Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1763; Wells, “Liability in the Priestly Texts,” 18–19.
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However, these sexual misconducts are defined by  עָֹוןin other texts of the Pentateuch. As
a result, it is plausible to state that  שָׂ ַרףis used as a mode of punishment for  עָֹוןsins.
The term  עָֹוןis never syntactically associated with the verb  ָנכָהin the Pentateuch.
There are only 2 out of 3 contexts where  עָֹוןand  ָנכָהare syntactically associated outside
of the Pentateuch (Isa 57:17; Jer 30:14). Neither is associated to the term  י ָָרהin the sense
of punishment.
Kārēt and עָֹון
The term  עָֹוןis syntactically related with the verb  כ ַָרתin 3 contexts in the
Pentateuch. The following table (Table 16) provides the references of those contexts:

Table 16. The verb kārat and עָֹון
1

Reference
Lev 19:8

2

Lev 20:17

3

Num 15:31

Sin
Illicit eating
of sacrifice
Illicit sex
Defiant sin,
despising
God’s word

Punishment
Death
Lev 19:8
Death
Lev 20:17
Death
Num 15:31

Expiable
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Inexpiable
x

Intentional
x

x

x

x

x

Unintentional

The nature of kārēt punishment for all three of these sins points to the fact that
they are inexpiable and unforgivable sins. The presence of the intention is unquestionably
explicit in Lev 20:17711 and Num 15:31.712 One could technically argue for negligence in
the case of Lev 19:8 since a person or the participants in the offerer’s feast could fail to
handle the sanctified offering meat properly. The full responsibility for handling the
peace offering is on the offerer and/or the participants in the offerer’s feast, not on the
priests.713 The offerer could have forgotten the day the sacrifice was offered and then eat
from it on the third day and serve it to his guests, or by not checking with the participants
of this feast, if they fulfill the prerequisites of ritual purity to participate in the feast (Lev
7:19–20), just to name some potential compromising situations. The full responsibility
lies on the offerer or his invitees.
In all three contexts where kārēt is related to the term עָֹון, a punishment seems to
be implied in the term. In other words, this connection points to the punishment to which
a person is liable because the term  עָֹוןimmediately defines these sins.714 Milgrom stated
that the term  עָֹוןand kārēt are equivalents here.715 The sins in these texts are intentional
and inexpiable.

The use of the verb לָקַ ח, which is frequently used to denote forming of a marital relationship in
the Pentateuch, suggests that the law discusses the situation of a person marrying his full sister which
includes illicit sexual intercourse. Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1763; Wells, “Liability in the Priestly Texts,”
18–19.
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 נָשָׂ אand עָֹון
The syntactical relationship between the term  עָֹוןand the verb  נָשָׁ אis found in
twenty contexts in the Pentateuch. Table 17 provides the list of references:
Based on the analysis presented above, under the subheading, חָ טָ א/פֶּשַׁ ע/נָשָׂ א עָֹון,
on pages 139–85 of the present study, the meanings associated with the phrase נָשָׂ א עָֹון
depend on the subject of the phrase. When the sinner is the subject of the phrase, that is,
the sinners  נָשָׁ אtheir own עָֹון, the phrase refers to two points: (1) the sinners’
responsibility for their sin, and (2) the impending punishment that the sin assumes. That
the act of sin has occurred is implied in this use. Accordingly, stating the consequences
for a number of different sins, the phrase takes the place of a specific punishment without
explicitly stating the exact nature of it.716
When another party is the subject of the phrase or  נָשָׁ אanother’s עָֹון, the phrase
ultimately implies forgiveness. Thus, in some of the texts from Table 17, the phrase

 עָֹון נָשָׂ אrefers to punishment (Gen 4:13; Exod 28:43; Lev 5:1, 17; 7:18; 10:17; 17:16;
19:8; 20:17, 19; 22:16; Num 5:31; 14:34), while in others, it implies forgiveness
(Exod 28:38; 34:7; Lev 16:22; Num 14:18–19; 18:1, 23; 30:15).717

See page 172 of the present study. Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 176; Wells,
The Law of Testimony, 161.
716

717
For a more detailed interpretation of the texts that convey punishment, see Olaffson, “The Use
of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 170–78. For a more detailed interpretation of the texts that convey forgiveness,
see Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 179–216.
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Table 17. The relationship of  עָֹוןand נָשָׁ א
1.

Reference
Gen 4:13718

Sin
Murder

2.
3.

Exod 28:38
Exod 28:43

4.
5.

Exod 34:7
Lev 5:1

6.

Lev 5:17

7.

Lev 7:18

Study this
Not
wearing
priestly
robe
Unknown
Failure to
testify
Disobeyin
g God’s
word
Illicit
eating of
sacrifice
Unknown

8.

Lev 10:17

Punishment
Death,
mitigated,
but not
death

Expiable
x

Death
Exod 28:43

Unknown
נָשָׂ א עָֹוןdeath
נָשָׂ א עָֹוןdeath

n/a
x

Inexpiable

Intentional
x

X

x

n/a

n/a
x

x

נָשָׂ א עָֹון-

Unintentional

n/a

x

X

x

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

x

x

x

x

x

death

נָשָׂ א עָֹוןdeath

9.

Lev 16:22

Unknown

10.

Lev 17:16

11.

Lev 19:8

12.
13.

Lev 20:17
Lev 20:19

Fail to
purify
Illicit
eating of
sacrifice
Illicit sex
Illicit sex

נָשָׂ א עָֹוןdeath

נָשָׂ א עָֹון
Cut off

Cut off

נָשָׂ א עָֹון, cut

x

x

off Lev
20:17

A brief history of the interpretation of the meaning of  עָֹוןin this text is provided in the Claus
Westermann’s Commentary with the most influential suggestions for it. Scholars were divided into two
groups, those who translate  עָֹוןas sin in this text, and those who translate it as punishment. Westermann’s
solution points to the fact that (1) Hebrew  עָֹוןdescribes an event which can include both sin and
punishment and (2) it is the context that places the stress on one or the other potential meaning. The
outcome of these two inferences is that none of these two groups is totally incorrect nor totally correct.
Westermann suggested that these two meanings for the Hebrew  עָֹוןare not mutually exclusive, but rather,
complimentary, and the context determines which of them is stressed in a given text. Along with von Rad
and Koch, Westermann believed that Gen 4:13 stressed the punishment meaning. Claus Westermann,
Genesis 1–11: A Commentary, trans. John J. Scullion (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1984), 309; Gerhard von
Rad, Genesis, rev. ed., OTL (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972), 107. This view is later affirmed by
subsequent scholars like Kenneth Mathews, Genesis 1–11:26, NAC 1A (Nashville: Broadman & Holman,
1996), 276; Schultz, “ ָעוָה,” TWOT 2:650–51.
718
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Table 17—Continued.
14.

Lev 22:16

15.

Num 5:31

16.
17.

Num 14:18
Num 14:34

18.
19.
20.

Num 18:1x2
Num 18:23
Num 30:15

Illicit
eating of
sacrifice
Potential
adultery
Unknown
(Bad
testimony)
multiple
sins
Unknown
Unknown
Annulling
wife’s
vow

נָשָׂ א עָֹון,
unknown
Death

x

x

Unknown
Staying in
the desert

n/a
x

n/a

n/a

n/a
x

Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
x

n/a
n/a

 אָשַׁ םand עָֹון
The connection between these two terms exists in two pericopes, Lev 5:1–13 and
5:17–19. The phrase  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןdesignates the sin and points to its punishment in v. 1. The

 אָשַׁ םis not mentioned in this verse, but it is in vv. 4b and 5 which, as a general protasis,
governs all four cases in vs. 1–4.719 As a result, one of the sins that produces  אָשַׁ םin the
sinner is עָֹון, and the sin referred to by this term is intentional and expiable.
In the same manner, the sin and its punishment are expressed by the phrase עָֹון

 נָשָׂ אin v. 17. That sin further causes the sinner to experience ( אָשַׁ םvv. 17, 19). The sin of
this pericope, like that in the previous one, is intentional and expiable.

719

Wells, The Law of Testimony, 66; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 314.
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Conclusion on the Study of עָֹון
The previous research showed that  עָֹוןoccurs mainly in religious and ethical
settings and refers to intentional and unintentional sin in the OT. The verbal form of  ָעוָה,
from the root, from which the noun  עָֹוןis apparently derived, refers to both a conscious
activity and unconscious or unintended activity in the OT. Some nominal uses emphasize
the relationship between a deed and its consequence.  עָֹוןcan be used synonymously with

חָ טָ א. The verbal form  ָעוָה, of which  עָֹוןis the nominal derivative, is never found in the
Pentateuch. The occurrences of the noun  עָֹוןin the Pentateuch demonstrate that the term
is used in a metonymic way to exemplify the affiliation between “sin,” “guilt,” and
“punishment,” as the previous scholarly research has shown.
The present research also agrees that it is difficult to determine whether the term
refers to any or all the elements of the sinful event, the act of sin, and/or guilt and/or
punishment, since in the majority of the texts, they overlap. A study of the texts where עָֹון
refers to an act of sin demonstrated that it refers to intentional and inexpiable sins. When

 עָֹוןemphasizes punishment, then inference on what kind of sins it refers to is
insignificant. The texts that convey metonymic use of this term encompass a variety of
intentions. In other words,  עָֹוןrefers to both intentional and unintentional sins. In
addition, some intentional sins, besides the unintentional ones, are expiable. It has also
been noticed that the texts that potentially imply only one meaning, sinful act or
punishment, do not provide the descriptions nor designation about the sinful act, but
emphasis is rather on the general idea of sin. To the contrary, when all three possible
meanings are implied, the text provides details about and designates that particular sin.
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When  עָֹוןis studied with the intent to establish whether the sin it refers to is
intentional or unintentional and expiable or inexpiable, the Pentateuchal texts provide
hints that עָֹון, aside from Lev 10:17; 16:21–22; and 22:16, always refer to intentional and
both expiable and inexpiable sin.  עָֹוןas inexpiable and intentional sin results in capital
punishment via its association with the verbs that convey this kind of punishment, such as

 מוּתand שָׂ ַרף, but is never used in the contexts where the punishment is conveyed via
הָ ַרג,  ָרגַם, סָ קַ ל,  ָנכָה, and י ָָרה. Another set of contexts where  עָֹוןrefers to inexpiable and
intentional sin is when it is associated with kārēt punishment. It has to be mentioned that
in Lev 19:8, one could argue for negligence, but the sin is still inexpiable. In נָשָׂ א עָֹון
contexts, the term refers to punishment or forgiveness. Sins that caused punishment are
both intentional and inexpiable. However, some intentional sins are expiable, in addition
to the unintentional sins which are mostly expiable. The punishment is not capital even
though in most cases, it is. In the contexts where  עָֹוןand  אָשַׁ םare associated  עָֹוןrefer to
intentional and expiable sin. The fact that  עָֹוןrefers to both expiable and inexpiable sin
implies that  עָֹוןsins are forgivable or unforgivable.
The term  עָֹוןrarely explicitly expresses unintentional sin in the book of Leviticus.
The only exceptions could be Lev 10:17; 16:21–22; and 22:16, where the contexts do not
indicate whether intentional or unintentional sins, or both, are in view. It is very likely
that  עָֹוןrefers to unintentional sin in these instances. An analysis of Lev 16:21 will be
provided below after all three terms for sin have been analyzed. Lev 10:17 seems to
imply the metonymic use of the term, referring to the three components of sin: act, guilt,
and punishment.
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This understanding of  עָֹוןalso does not coincide with Gane’s understanding that

 עָֹוןrefers to culpability in Leviticus 1–16.720 The research just presented suggests that it
refers to any sinful element, including sin, guilt, and punishment, and sometimes all of
them.
The Root  פֶּשַׁ עas a Main Term for Sin in the OT
The term is used 134 times in the OT including 41 verbal forms (40 times in qal
and 1 time in niphal) and 93 nominal forms. The commonly accepted meaning of the
term is “dispute, rebellion,” based on the understanding of Exod 22:8 suggested by L.
Köhler. Knierim found Köhler’s exegesis untenable based on the fact that the term refers
to various sins that cannot be classified as dispute or rebellion such as Gen 31:36: Jacob’s
potential theft of Laban’s gods; Gen 50:17: the act of Joseph’s kidnaping by his brothers;
1 Sam 24:10–14: David’s potential murder of Saul; Prov 28:24: the act of a son’s robbing
his parents; Amos 1:3, 6, 9, 11, 13; 2:1:various criminal acts, and other texts.721
Knierim, noting that the exegesis of Exod 22:8[9] does not support dispute or
rebellion, stated that the assumption of a dispute in this case “rests on inconsistent and
self-contradictory exegesis of the verse.”722 He suggested that translating the nominal
derivative of the term  פֶּשַׁ עby “property offence” or crime in this text presents fewest

720

Gane, Cult and Character, 294.
Rolf P. Knierim, “פֶּשַׁ ע,” TLOT 2:1034.

721

Knierim, “פֶּשַׁ ע,” TLOT 2:1034.
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difficulties. In addition, it is supported by Deut 22:1–3, which is considered to be the
oldest exegesis of Exod 22:8.723
He also suggested that the verbal form of this term should be translated with “to
break with,”724 rather than with “to rebel.” Knierim justifiably questioned whether the
verb in 2 Kgs 8:20, 22 “refers to a basic process of completed disengagement from a
social union or only to the process of rebellion, of protest against the union, whether
successful or not. Consequently, the definition of the term must involve a distinction
between (completed) separation and (attempted) rebellion.” The context of this text,
along with the phrase הוּדה
ָ֑ ָ ָשׁע אֱד֔ ֹום ִּמ ַ ָ֖תּחַ ת יַד־י
ֹ֣ ַ  ביָמָ יו פirrefutably demonstrates that the
separation was achieved, which further leads to the conclusion that this act was a type of
removal of property. Thus, he preferred “to break with,” over “to rebel.” The apparent
incongruity of the former translation is found when the term is accompanied by the
preposition ב. However,  בdoes not denote the direction of motion, but rather, an
association. The association of the term with the preposition  עַלis unique and may denote
secondary usage and, having in mind circumstances, may be translated with “to suffer
revolt.”725
Based on these remarks, Knierim suggested that nominal forms of  פֶּשַׁ עrefer to a
formal category that is comprised of various types of personal and material crimes
described by the verbs such as “to rob,” “to steal,” “to lay hand on,” and so on, whose

Knierim, “פֶּשַׁ ע,” TLOT 2:1035.

723

This translation is accepted by HALOT. HALOT, s.v. “פֶּשַׁ ע.”

724

Knierim, “פֶּשַׁ ע,” TLOT 2:1035.
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meaning is not included in the semantic range of פֶּשַׁ ע. As such,  פֶּשַׁ עshould be seen as “a
legal technical term for crimes that were subject to legal penalties.”726 The verbal forms,
implying some sort of loss, removal of a segment of a state structure, are to be translated
with “to break with,” “to break away from,” “to behave criminally,” or “to suffer loss,
crime, breach” depending on the literary contexts.727
Based on the meanings he derived from researching both nominal and verbal
forms of פֶּשַׁ ע, Knierim suggested the following theological meaning of פֶּשַׁ ע:
Whoever commits pešaʿ does not merely rebel or protest against Yahweh, but breaks
with him, takes away what is his, robs, embezzles, misappropriates it. Although it
always implies conscious behavior, the term per se does not describe the attitude, but
the criminal act that consists in removal of property or breach of relationship. As a
result, in the OT, the most serious aspect of the sin phenomenon is the offense as a
breach, but not “the revolt of the human will against the divine will.”728
Knierim, followed by Seebass,729 indicated a profound implication due to the fact
that the term was used in a variety of distinctive contexts: “Finally, then, pešaʿ does not
mean “sin.” For just as surely as the term has a theological dimension, the OT is in
general interested in speaking of ‘sin’ in such a way as to call deeds and procedures by
their proper names.”730
H. Seebass suggested a more neutral translation, “offence,”731 than Knierim’s

Knierim, “פֶּשַׁ ע,” TLOT 2:1035.
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Knierim, “פֶּשַׁ ע,” TLOT 2:1035–36.
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Emphasis mine. Knierim, “פֶּשַׁ ע,” TLOT 2:1037.
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H. Seebass, “פָשַׁ ע,” TDOT, 12:144–45.
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Knierim, “פֶּשַׁ ע,” TLOT 2:1037.
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Seebass, “פָשַׁ ע,” TDOT, 12:141.
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“crime.” Lexically, Seebass’s suggestion is more plausible and precise since “crime” is a
limiting word by associating it to criminal law only.732 However, it has to be indicated
that in Knierim’s treatment of this term, he did not limit it to criminal law only, but
rather, recognized various contexts in which it is found. Thus, the issue of the translation
might be related to Knierim’s unsuitable choice of the word, rather than
misunderstanding what the term/concept meant. In addition, Knierim’s procedure of
deriving the meaning from one text and attempting to prescribe it to all subsequent
contexts where the term is used shows insensitivity for the context and may lead into an
inaccurate representation of what the term refers to. However, his suggestion of
translating  פֶּשַׁ עas “crime” does not seem inaccurate in biblical uses of the term.
Seebass’s suggestion is more inclusive and also suits the context, but it is informed by his
analysis of all OT texts which, on the other hand, includes reading into Exod 22:8[9]
what is actually not there. Deciding which of these two suggestions is more accurate does
not affect the core of the questions dealt with in the present study and will be left open.
The essential difference between the crime and offence is found in the fact that
crime is always violation of the law and is punishable by it, while some offences are not
punishable by law.733 Carrol has recognized that  פֶּשַׁ עwas also used in parallelism with

 חָ טָ אand עָֹון.734
The part that is crucially important for the present study is the fact that there is a

Seebass, “פָשַׁ ע,” TDOT, 12:136.

732
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For a more in-depth analysis on crime, see pages 251–66 of the present study.
R. P. Carroll, “Rebellion and Dissent in Ancient Israelite Society,” ZAW 89 (1977): 181.
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solution regarding Exod 22:8 [9] which does not include any of the punishment that
would indicate that  פֶּשַׁ עis inexpiable and unforgivable sin in every case. Wells proposed
that this case is an example of lex talionis being applied to a false testimony735 which
does not include a terminal penalty, that would classify this sin as inexpiable. With the
review of the scholarly research on the term פֶּשַׁ ע, the analysis of this term within the
Pentateuch follows.
The Nature of  פֶּשַׁ עSins in Leviticus and the Rest of Pentateuch
In contrast to the terms  חָ טָ אand עָֹון, the term  פֶּשַׁ עis used infrequently in the
Pentateuch. The nominal form of the term is used 2 times in Leviticus and 7 more times
in the rest of the Pentateuch (Genesis, 2x; Exodus, 3x; and Numbers, 1x) to make a total
of 9 occurrences.736 The verbal form is not used in the Pentateuch, but occurs for the first
time in 1 Kgs 8:50.737
Applying the same terminological/contextual/intertextual approach to study פֶּשַׁ ע
that was used in the above study with  חָ טָ אand  עָֹוןdoes not give much insight into the
meaning of this term as it did with the previous two terms due to the fact that  פֶּשַׁ עis a far
less frequently used term in the Pentateuch.
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Wells, The Law of Testimony, 143–44.
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(Gen 31:36; 50:17; Ex 22:9; 23:21; 34:7; Num 14:18). Accordance Bible.
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Accordance Bible.
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Capital Punishment and פֶּשַׁ ע
A context in which  פֶּשַׁ עand capital punishment, expressed via the verb מוּת,
occur together is not detected in the Pentateuch. The syntactical connection can be
established in two out of six contexts where these two terms occur together outside of the
Pentateuch (2 Kgs 1:1; 3:5; Isa 53:12; 66:24; Ezek 18:28, 31). Both of them are found in
the book of Ezekiel. However, these texts will not be considered here because they do not
belong to the Pentateuch.  פֶּשַׁ עnever occurs in the context of other verbs that refer to
capital punishments such as הָ ַרג,  ָרגַם, סָ קַ ל, שָׂ ַרף,  ָנכָה, and י ָָרה.

Kārēt and פֶּשַׁ ע
The statistics on  פֶּשַׁ עand  כ ַָרתresemble the one established with capital
punishment and  פֶּשַׁ עcontexts. Out of the 3 contexts where  פֶּשַׁ עand  ָכ ַרתappear together
outside of the Pentateuch (1 Sam 24:12; Isa 50:1; Ps 37:38), the syntactical association
between them might be potentially established in Ps 37:38 based on the literary devices
used. That is, the line is written as a synonymous parallelism in which  פֹ שׁעִּ יםand רשָׁ עִּ ים
are a lexical pair. However, this text does not belong to the Pentateuch, so the potential
insights from it are not considered as the meaning of  פֶּשַׁ עexamined in this part of the
Hebrew Bible.

 נָשָׂ אand פֶּשַׁ ע
There are four contexts in the Pentateuch in which a syntactical relationship
between  פֶּשַׁ עand  נָשָׁ אcan be established. The following table follows the pattern
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established in this study where the term is analyzed against certain elements provided in a
given context such as the activity the term refers to, the sort of punishment it invokes, and
whether the sin is expiable/inexpiable and intentional/unintentional (Table 18).

Table 18. The relationship of  פֶּשַׁ עand נָשָׁ א
1

Reference
Gen 50:17x2

Sin
Kidnapping

Punishment
Death

2
3
4

Exod 23:21
Exod 34:7
Num 14:18

Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

Many
Unknown
Unknown

Expiable

x
x

Inexpiable
x

Intentional
x

Unintentional

x

n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a

Out of four contexts in which  פֶּשַׁ עand  נָשָׁ אoccur together in the Pentateuch, Gen
50:17 provides explicit insights for the points sought in the analysis pattern set in this
study for sin terminology. The action of Joseph’s brother towards him involves
accountability for several crimes such as kidnapping, breach of the kinship covenant, and
forced usurpation of the father’s privilege of selling a family member into slavery.738 The
context explicitly suggests that the sin of Joseph’s brothers was intentional, and later
legislative material found in the Pentateuch requires the death penalty for their most
obvious sin of kidnaping (Exod 21:16). It is an inexpiable and unforgivable sin. However,
all those sins were forgiven (Gen 50:19–20).
The other three texts are actually descriptions of God’s dealing with the sins of his
people. Two of those three contexts speak of God’s willingness to forgive the sins (Exod
34:7; Num 14:18), while in one, it is stated that God will not forgive them (Exod 23:21).

Seebass, “פָשַׁ ע,” TDOT, 12:137.
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It should be noted that the terminology does not give grounds for an undisputed definition
or nature of the sins represented by the term פֶּשַׁ ע.
That is, nominals forms פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןare used in these three texts. In Exod
23:21 where it states that God will not forgive the people’s sin, the term used is פֶּשַׁ ע,
which represents the activity of the verb  מָ ַררwhich, in piel, means “to make bitter” or in
Hiphil, “to cause bitterness, grief.”739 The contexts of the piel usage of  מָ ַררin the
Pentateuch point to a willful decision of someone to make someone else’s life bitter by
physically attacking/hurting or physically forcing him or her to perform various physical
activities (Gen 49:23; Exod 1:14).740 The context of the Hiphil use of  מָ ַררin Exod 23:21
can include various activities that make/cause God to feel/be bitter.
Is It  מָ ַררor ?מָ ָרה
Rolf Knierim’s suggestion that the verbal form in this text was probably derived
from another root, מָ ָרה, “to rebel”741 that points to a more intense intentionality of its
subject reflects the understanding commonly accepted by the English Bible translations742
that  פֶּשַׁ עrefers to rebellion perceived as unforgivable sin. Propp noticed that this textual

HALOT, s.v. “מרר.”
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Rolf P. Knierim, “מָ ַרר,” TLOT 2:687; Knierim, “פֶּשַׁ ע,” TLOT 2:1035. Also, Gary V. Smith,
“מרר,” NIDOTTE 2:1103–4; A. S. Van Der Woude, “שֵׁ ם,” TLOT 3:1363; Eugene Carpenter and Michael
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emendation of the MT’s  מָ ַררinto  מָ ָרהis possible under the assumption, favored by the
contexts of their uses, that these two roots are equivalents
While the meaning is in little doubt (however, see Rashbam, ibn Ezra), the
vocalization is uncertain. The MT Hiphʿil tammēr appears to be influenced by
Aramaic (GKC §67g, y) and assumes the root mrr, which ordinarily means “to be
bitter” (so Symmachus). However, Sam (tmry), LXX, Aquila, Tgs. and Syr read the
Hiphil of mry “rebel,” as the context dictates. So we should probably vocalize *temer
(GKC §67y) or *tāmēr (assuming a root mrr is equivalent to mry; cf. GKC §77e).743
However, the uses of  מָ ַררand  מָ ָרהdo not completely support the claim that the
sin of  פֶּשַׁ עexpressed by any of these two verbs is unforgivable. The majority of these
contexts testify that מָ ַרר/ מָ ָרהactivity assumes capital punishment, in which case, פֶּשַׁ ע
could refer to inexpiable/unforgivable sin. However, out of five  מָ ָרהcontexts in the
Pentateuch,744 Num 20:24 and 27:14 point to the complexity of such sins. That is, the act
of  מָ ָרהcan refer to the sin that requires punishment, in this case, a ban from entering the
Promised Land which also included premature death, and in this sense might be regarded
as implying inexpiable/unforgivable sin. However, at the same time, textual hints in Num
20:24, 27:14 and the treatment of Moses and Aaron in rest of OT suggest that the
treatment of their sin was exceptional and not considered inexpiable/unforgivable
regardless of the premature death of both of them.
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Propp, Exodus 19–40, 136.

First, Moses addressed the sons of Israel by using the participle of  מָ ָרהin Num 20:10. Second,
Moses’ and Aaron’s sin of not obeying God’s command at the water of Meribah was described as a  מָ ָרהact
in Num 20:24; 27:14. Third, Israel’s disobedience of God’s commands to go and occupy the Promised
Land in Deut 1:26; Deut 9:23 or not to go to occupy it in Deut 1:43 was described by the verb מָ ָרה. Fourth,
the rebellious attitude of the son of Israel in Deut 9:7, 24; 31:27 is expressed by מָ ָרה. Fifth, the rebellious
son is described by the participle of  מָ ָרהin Deut 21:18, 20.
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Closer Look at Num 20:10 and
Num 20:24; 27:14
Two contrasting contexts are Num 20:10 and Num 20:24; 27:14. In the first,
Moses addressed the sons of Israel as “rebels,” while God never addressed them in such a
way in this context, but rather, in the latter two texts, God defined Moses’ and Aarons’
behavior at the Meribah incident as being act of מָ ָרה.745 Moses’ and Aaron’s sin was not
considered rebellion in the sense of breaking with or separating from God, but rather,
expression of their GHS and weakness, since they were “honored in their deaths with all
the status and dignity afforded the great patriarchs of Israel.”746 However, it is clear that
capital punishment elsewhere implies that these sins were inexpiable/unforgivable in
other contexts.
The act of  מָ ָרהin the third set of contexts always implies capital punishment,
thereby indicating inexpiability/unforgiveness of these sins. It should be noted that the
main reason for their rebellion, recognized to be disobedience,747 was fear748 of the
Amorites and later, their arrogance749 (Deut 1:26, 43; 9:23).750 The emphatic presence of

Cole, Numbers, 327–38. For a potential background of Moses’ sin, see Milgrom, Numbers, 452.
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arrogance, but also a desire to recompense for their previous disobedience and disbelief by appeasing him
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fear also points to the fact that they did not necessarily wanted to break with or rebel
against God, but they allowed fear to inform their behavior and decisions, rather than the
mighty deeds of God on their behalf. Therefore, the nature of their rebellion is not desire
to break with God because of who he was, but rather, they disobeyed his orders because
they were afraid. This does not change the final result of their choice which was capital
punishment as stated in 14:29, 32, 35, but it does shed light on the nature of their
rebellion. In other words, it was instigated by fear, rather than a mere desire to separate
from God. The same can be said regarding Deut 9:7, 24; 31:27, which include many
incidents, such as at Taberah (Num 11:1–3), Massah (Exod 17:1–7), Kibroth-hattavah
(Num 11:31–35), Kadesh-barnea (Num 14–15; cf. Deut 1:19–40) and others. The fear for
their physical existence can be added to the background of their rebellion.751 Their
rebellion was not motivated by their desire to break with or separate from God because
they do not want him as a leader, but rather by fear originating from their disbelief in
what God can do.
These  מָ ָרהcontexts describe the attitude of the Israelites during their journey after
the Exodus from Egypt, and they included capital punishments, but the texts do not
provide much clarity as to who, exactly, was punished. They do show that not all the

in order to withdraw his punishment over them. The actual account of the event referred to in Deut 1:26 is
found in Num 13–14 and the activity of the sons of Israel is never described by the term  מָ ָרהin these two
chapters. Even more emphatic words used in chapter 14 to refer to their activity and character such as מָ ַרד
“to rebel, revolt” against the Lord (14:9); “ נָאַץto reject, disdain” me [the Lord] (14:11, 23); “ ָרעָהevil”
congregation who are gathered together or to grumble against Me (27, 35); “ עָבַ רto transgress” the
commandment of the Lord (14:41) should include the fact that the underlying factor of their behavior was
fear. It is explicitly stated two times in 14:9 that a driving force behind their rebellious disobedience to God
was fear. Having seen all the miraculous acts of God, the sons of Israel should not have developed such a
fearful attitude.
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participants of certain events were punished. Christensen captured this by stating that
“the long history of Israel’s perfidy underscores that they would not be standing in the
plains of Moab to renew their covenant but for the grace of God.”752 This provides
grounds for the claim that God punished those who deserved punishment and spared
those who did not.
The final context of Deut 21:18–21 could be used to claim that  מָ ָרהrefers to
rebellion in the sense of wanting to separate from God because of who he was, in contrast
to the previous two sets of contexts. This context contains references to a young man’s
continuous behavior against God’s commandments, particularly the fifth.753 The
rebellious attitude of his persistent breaking of God’s commandment, even though he was
warned not to do so (the negated form of the verb  שָׁ מַ עis repeated 2 times in v. 18 and 1
time in v. 20) shows that the son wanted to break with God.
These points of the  מָ ָרהcontexts demonstrate that there is no solid textual ground
for the claim that  מָ ָרהactivities, defined as  פֶּשַׁ עin Exod 23:21, should be considered as
inexpiable/unforgivable sin.
Moreover, it is probable that Exod 23:21 should be read with  מָ ַררand not מָ ָרה,
since this verb refers to the bitter, resentful attitude of the sons of Israel. In the following
quotation, John I. Durham emphasized the broader context of Exod 23:21 that confirms
that  מָ ַררfits this context better than מָ ָרה. He noticed that the context of Exod 23:21
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stresses the totality of Israel’s journey which, in turn, does not favor the rebellion sense
of the potentially emended verbal form תַּ מֵּ ר, in which case MT’s  מָ ַררwould need to be
changed to מָ ָרה. Rather, the verb reveals Israel’s wrong attitude towards God:
This is why the messenger’s guidance can be trusted: his guidance is Yahweh’s
guidance into the land “made ready,” the gift of which will fulfill the second half of
the covenant promise of progeny and land. Exodus begins with an account of the first
half of this promise, and ends, at least in its narrative sequence, with the anticipation
of the fulfillment of its second half. Paying close attention to the Presence of
Yahweh’s messenger and listening to his voice is equal to paying close attention to
Yahweh’s Presence and listening to Yahweh’s voice. They must not “resent” or “be
bitter against ( )מררthe “messenger’s” guidance and counsel, because to do so will
bring punishment authorized by Yahweh, whose “name” (“ = שׁמPresence”) is
“within him” ()בקרב.754
The use of  מָ ַררmakes more sense if the diachronic element of the text is taken
into consideration since at the point the warning in Exod 23:21 was stated, many events
of Israel’s rebellious acts were still in the future. Later, this attitude, in some cases of
their journey, would grow into מָ ָרה, rebellion, while in some cases, it remained just a
wrong, provoking attitude toward God.
A point that can be derived from  אָשַׁ םand  פֶּשַׁ עtexts below is that  פֶּשַׁ עpoints to
intentional and planned activities. It is noteworthy that the rebellious son in Deut 21:18–
21 is described with the participial form in v. 20, which conveys a definite decision of the
subject to continue with his attitude of rejection and rebellion. As such, these activities
have the potential of being considered as unforgivable sins. The doer actually does not
want forgiveness.
Continuing to describe the nature of God, Exod 34:7 includes the full triad of
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nouns עָֹון, פֶּשַׁ ע, and  חָ טָ אto convey the sins of God’s people that he is able and willing to
forgive his people. The semantic domain of  פֶּשַׁ עand the kinds of activities it covers is
uncertain from this text. It may refer to either intentional or unintentional sins. However,
the text does indicate that  פֶּשַׁ עsin is forgivable sin in the same way as  עָֹוןand  חָ טָ אare,
and since the term covers both intentional and unintentional sins in the Pentateuch, it
seems reasonable `to accept the proposal of Knierim and others755 that when this triad is
found, it points to the totality of sin without strictly assigning particular meaning to any
of them.756 In other words,  פֶּשַׁ עcan refer to both expiable and inexpiable sin, as well as
intentional and unintentional sin with the context determining which meaning is intended
depending on the context. The wider literary context of this text is idolatry recorded in
Exod 32, but the lexical link between idolatry and  פֶּשַׁ עdoes not exist in the Pentateuch.
In addition, the text portrays the forgiving trait of God’s character which includes
forgiving sin in its totality.
The nouns of  פֶּשַׁ עand  עָֹוןare paired in Num 14:18 to communicate again God’s
willingness to forgive his people’s sins. Even though the noun  חָ טָ אis omitted in this text,
it heavily relies on Exod 34:7 through multiple lexical and topical similarities.757
However, even though God forgave people’s sin of rebellion against him, they were

Stuart, Exodus, 717. The same idea is implied in Keil’s comment on Lev 16:21. Keil and
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punished with the mitigated penalty of not entering the Promised Land. As with the
previous text, the wider literary context of this text is rebellion recorded in the previous
verses, but the lexical link between rebellion and  פֶּשַׁ עdoes not exist in the Pentateuch. In
addition, the text depicts the forgiving characteristic of God’s character which involves
forgiving sin in its totality.

 אָשַׁ םand פֶּשַׁ ע
That sin expressed by the noun  פֶּשַׁ עcauses  אָשַׁ םis implied in the laws of false
testimony in Lev 5:20–26 [6:1–7]. False testimony is mentioned six times in the OT, two
times in the Decalogue (Exod 20:16; Deut 5:20), two times in the Covenant code (Exod
22:6–8 [7–9]; 23:1–3), once in Lev 5:20–26 [6:1–7]; and once in Deut 19:16–21.758 False
testimony seems to be a part of the law of deposit in Exod 22:6–8 [22:7–9]. Exodus 22:6–
8 [7–9] portrays a situation where one person deposits his or her belongings for
safekeeping with another person. When those belongings are missing, the law implies
two potential situations: (1) The belongings could have been stolen from the receiver and
the thief has been apprehended, or (2) no third party has been involved which further
implies two additional scenarios: (1) The receiver illegally appropriated some of the
belongings and perhaps falsely alleged that they were stolen, or (2) the receiver claims
the purported owner never deposited his/her belongings to the receiver or not in the
amount/s they claim. The guilty party in the first scenario is the receiver, whereas the
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purported owner is liable in the second.759 The law focuses on the first of the two
scenarios, namely that the receiver misappropriated the belongings of the owner.760 Verse
7 [8] states that in order to determine the receiver’s guilt or innocence, he/she must go to
Elohim for a decision. This part of the law could have been referring to the judicial oath
or divine oracle, and the punishment761 is spelled out at the conclusion of v. 9.762
However, there is an expansion of the list of possible belongings in v. 9 before the
penalty is stipulated to other kinds of property including cattle and clothing. It is obvious
that the punishment for this illicit treatment of other’s belongings does not include any
sort of capital punishment. Instead, the punishment in both scenarios, when a thief is
identified, or the receiver or depositor is found guilty, is double the worth of the
belonging/s.763 The term  אָשַׁ םdoes not appear in Exod 22:6–8 [7–9] along with פֶּשַׁ ע.
However, the hint that  פֶּשַׁ עcauses  אָשַׁ םis found at the beginning of v. 9 where the
designation for all these illicit activities is  פֶּשַׁ עand the same sin appears in Lev 5:20–26
[6:1–7] causing אָשַׁ ם. In other words, the fact that the same sin that is expressed by פֶּשַׁ ע
sin in Exod 22:6–8 [7–9] causes  אָשַׁ םin Lev 5:20–26 [6:1–7] lead to the conclusion that
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 פֶּשַׁ עcan refer to the activities that are not considered as inexpiable and unforgivable sins,
but are expiable and forgivable.
The specific issue in this law is that the defendant takes a false oath. The
following statement from Milgrom reflects his careful reading and accurate interpretation
of the function of the phrase, “and then he swears falsely,” in v. 22: “This clause does not
specify a discrete wrong. Rather, it applies to all of the preceding cases: not only has the
offender wronged his fellow but he has denied it under oath.”764 Commenting on the
possible misdeeds listed in v. 21–22, Wells identified 3 of them: “Lying about property of
another that was not lost and then discovered, but that was taken in some other way;
extorting property from another; and lying about the property of another that was lost.”765
That is, the defendant is accused of having in his possession an item that most likely
belongs to the person who claims it. The defendant denies the charge under oath, but later
decides to confess his misdeed and restore it to its owner. Of the first misdeeds, the first
one undoubtedly is dealt with in the law of deposit in Exod 22:6–8 [7–9]. Milgrom
recognized that “the bailee laws of Exod 22:6–12 are subsumed under piqqādôn and
represent no new category.”766 Thus, the same misdeed that are designated by  פֶּשַׁ עin
Exod 22:2–8 [7–9] are contained in Lev 5:20–26; in the case of the latter text, a new
element is the oath and the fact that they are treated as sins against God, but in both cases,

764

Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 337

765

Wells, The Law of Testimony, 139.

766

Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 367; Toorn, Sin and Sanction in Israel and Mesopotamia, 19.

244

they are expiable and forgivable. Accordingly,  פֶּשַׁ עdoes refer to expiable and forgivable
sins in the Pentateuch.
Conclusion on the Study of פֶּשַׁ ע
Based on the biblical texts, it seems that terms like property offence, crime, or
simply offence fit better what  פֶּשַׁ עrefers to in the OT than dispute or rebellion. The
verbal forms, implying some sort of loss, are to be translated with “to break with,” “to
break away from,” “to behave criminally,” or “to suffer loss, crime, breach,” depending
on the literary context. The nominal form refers to various acts that are described with the
verbs such as “to rob,” “to steal,” “to lay hands on,” and so on, whose meaning is not
included in the semantic range of פֶּשַׁ ע. The term is used in a variety of contexts such as
legal, social, and ethical. It is used in parallel with  חָ טָ אand עָֹון.
Within the limits of the Pentateuch,  פֶּשַׁ עis never found in the context of capital or
kārēt punishment. A study of  פֶּשַׁ עwhen it is associated with the verb  נָשָׁ אprovided some
insights into the nature of the sins it refers to. That is, in Gen 50:17,  פֶּשַׁ עrefers to
intentional sin that deserves the death penalty, but the sin was forgiven. Other texts
include Exod 34:7 and Num 14:18, where God stated that he would forgive  פֶּשַׁ עand
Exod 23:21, where God said that he would not forgive it. These texts, however, do not
give undisputed guidelines regarding the nature of the sins expressed by פֶּשַׁ ע.
Exodus 23:21 includes clues to state that God or his angel does not forgive sin
because the sinner does not ask for or want forgiveness. In Exod 34:7, God assures that
he will forgive פֶּשַׁ ע, along with  חָ טָ אand עָֹון.  פֶּשַׁ עseems to be treated by God in the same
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way as  חָ טָ אand עָֹון, which both represent intentional or unintentional and expiable or
inexpiable sin. Thus, it seems preferable to accept the proposal that the triad used here
refers to the totality of sin.767  פֶּשַׁ עis to be considered as expiable and inexpiable, as well
as intentional and unintentional sin. Determining which type of sin is in view depends on
the immediate and broader literary context.
Numbers 14:18 is an allusion to Exod 34:7 with the omission of חָ טָ א. God
declares that he will forgive פֶּשַׁ ע. However, even though the immediate context of  פֶּשַׁ עis
rebellion against God for which people experienced mitigated punishment, the term פֶּשַׁ ע
is never associated with the rebellion in Num 14. The most solid clue that  פֶּשַׁ עis
intentional, but yet expiable sin is found in the fact that a sinner experiences  אָשַׁ םin Lev
5:20–26 for the list of sins of which one is expressed by  פֶּשַׁ עdescribed in detail in Exod
22:8. This is also intentional, but yet expiable sin.
Conclusion on the Study of חָ טָ א,  פֶּשַׁ עand עָֹון
Based on the research conducted in the present study which included an
application of the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach on the three key terms
for sin in the Pentateuch, it has been demonstrated that ַע ֶפּשׁ, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןall have their
own distinct characteristics by which they refer to the concept of sin. However, at the
same time, they often semantically overlap. The present study suggests three implications
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about these terms regarding their (1) intentionality and (2) expiation/forgiveness of the
sins expressed by them.
(1) עשַׁ ֶפּ, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןrefer to intentional and unintentional sins.  פֶּשַׁ עmainly
refers to intentional sin (4/6 times) except in two accounts of theophany events in Exod
34:7 and Num 14:18, where it potentially covers unintentional sins because it is used in
the triad along with  חָ טָ אand  עָֹוןto communicate a totality of sin which includes both
intentional and unintentional sins. Outside of these special events, it always refers to
intentional sin.
(2)  חָ טָ אand  עָֹוןdesignate expiable/forgivable and inexpiable/unforgivable sin
whereas  פֶּשַׁ עgenerally refers to expiable sin with an exception in Exod 23:21, where

 פֶּשַׁ עexpresses an inexpiable/unforgivable sin.
(3) On the one hand, in some contexts, all of them refer to expiable/forgivable
sins, while on the other hand, in some contexts, they all designate
inexpiable/unforgivable sins.
With this in mind, Gerhard von Rad could not be more correct when he reflected
upon his own terminological study and stated, “As can be well understood, as far as
terminology went, Israel had very varied ways of expressing what she understood by sin,
for of course there were very many ways in which she met the phenomenon of sin. … But
such a statistical review, even if were prosecuted in much more details, would still come
far short of disclosing what is the heart of the matter for theology.”768
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Terminology that expresses ritual and moral impurity does not give grounds for
the claim that פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןare related to specific illicit activity. However, it does
give grounds for the claim that  טָ מֵ אcan express one of the two types of impurity,
whereas פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןexclusively express moral impurity.
The current study agrees with Lam, who defined sin in the OT as follows: “Sin
denotes personal wrongdoing, which in biblical terms has to do either with actions (moral
or cultic) that violate the will of God (i.e., sin as an act), or with the human condition
resulting from such behavior (i.e., sin as a state—encompassing the ideas of sinfulness
and guilt).”769 This definition basically conveys a conceptual understanding of sin. It is
comprehensive, but yet refers to the main components of which sin is composed: (1) it is
a wrongdoing, (2) it can come out of a state or activity, and (3) it can be moral or
cultic/ritual in its nature.

Ontology of Impurity
As was established in chapter two, ritual and moral impurity are conceptual
entities. As such, impurity is emptied of cognitive and motor skills characteristic of live
entities, such as motion, thinking, and instinct. Maccoby and Milgrom assigned some sort
of literal material nature to impurity, such as gas, miasma, radiation, or electricity.770
Gane, on the contrary, endorsed J. Porter’s, appealing but yet misleading, assertion on the
nature of moral impurity: “In the priestly theology, sin is an objective, quasi-physical
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thing-hence, even if committed inadvertently, its consequences cannot be avoided — and
so not sharply distinguished from defilement or uncleanness.”771
In Gane’s understanding, impurity is a conceptual, but yet quasi-physical entity
with the ability to behave like a living and, to some extent, an intelligent entity, namely,
to travel from one point to another. Gane stated that “because the defilement in question
is conceptual, it can have an effect through space in the sense that it causes a change of
state to occur at a distance.”772 He also stated that
words such as “miasma” or “ray” may be helpful as metaphors for explaining to the
modern mind a dynamic that that connects objects located at some distance from each
other, provided it is clear that in our ritual context they do not refer to literal physical
substances subject to physical constraints in the material world, such as the time it
takes for miasma or even radiation to spread.773
These quotations from Gane contain serious contradictions. First, the concept
does not possess a physical quasi-physical quality to it. It is a mental construct and, as
such, is purely abstract. It does not even look like a miasma or ray that could be
characterized as quasi-physical entity. Schwartz stated the following about ritual impurity
which at rare occasions can have physical characteristics “though invisible, it is believed
to be quite real; though amorphous it is substantive.”774 This can be applied with more
force to moral impurity. Second, biblical metaphors are rooted in well-known and
established realities that operate within physical limitations. For instance, the metaphor of
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load is used in the OT to represent sin. However, this metaphor of load that portrays that
sin produces a pressure on the sinner’s shoulders that is a well-known reality and
possesses physical limitations. A load referred to in this metaphor is a purely abstract
entity without any physical or quasi-physical component to it and cannot jump from one
sinner to another or travel to the sanctuary. The assumption that any sort of physical or
quasi-physical component is related to it would greatly diminish if not eliminate the
symbolism of the concept of impurity in the defilement of the sanctuary aspect of the
biblical sacrificial system.
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CHAPTER 3

INSIGHTS FROM MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS AND BIBLICAL
LAW ON INTENT AND EXPIABILITY/INEXPIABILITY
IN THE PENTATEUCH

The second part of the first section is covered in this chapter. A taxonomy of
crime is necessary in order to develop a basic conceptual framework and take part in a
more productive dialogue concerning the nature of sins. The purpose of this subheading
is twofold. First, it introduces fundamental concepts of modern legal systems which assist
in clarifying concepts used in scholarly dialogue on the topic and present study. Second,
it provides a rationale for using simple, yet biblically informed, legal terminology. The
subsequent part of the present study shows that these fundamental concepts were present,
but judging from the records, more implicit in the biblical legislative corpuses. The
following interrelated concepts are vital for a meaningful conversation on sin: (1) mens
rea and actus reus, (2) types of wrongs, (3) intent or mental state/s, (4) negligence, and
(5) ignorance.

Mens Rea and Actus Reus
The following quotation presents two basic elements of which a crime consists:
“A fundamental principle of Criminal Law is that a crime consists of both a mental and a
physical element. Mens rea, a person's awareness of the fact that his or her conduct is
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criminal, is the mental element, and actus reus, the act itself, is the physical element.”1
An act is not considered a crime if any of these two elements is missing.2
Mens rea is considered to be the internal side of the committed wrong.3 Mens rea
refers to the mental process of the offender associated with the wrong he/she committed.
It is also called intent or culpability.4 Mens rea or intent is sometimes equated with
motive, but motive is a slightly different concept5 and will be discussed below.

Types of Wrongs
Modern legal systems6 recognize two types of these wrongs which lead to harm:
(1) torts or civil wrong and (2) crimes.7 Some add one more type called moral wrongs,
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which may actually be objects of both civil and criminal proceedings, but not all moral
wrongs are classified as crimes or torts. This is due to the fact that criminal law does not
seek to punish thoughts or moral character, but just acts or omissions that cause social
harm.8 Therefore, the first two concepts will be presented below.
The definition of tort and crime suggested by biblical scholar Raymond
Westbrook resembles the definitions of the tort9 or crime10 found in modern legal
literature and sources. He defines the tort as follows: “A tort is conceived of purely as a
personal wrong against the victim. The initiative for proceeding against the tort-feasor
(guilty party) is solely in the hands of the victim, and the role of the court is to
compensate the victim for any harm caused him.”11 The following quotation compliments
Westbrook’s definition of tort: “A tort is a legal wrong committed against a person or
property independent of contract. A tort is either an intentional act that causes damage to
legally protected interest, or the breach of a legal duty that is the proximate cause of harm
to a legitimate interest of another.”12 The tort can be an intentional or unintentional act,
but is, by rule, a personal wrong towards another person. In addition, the initiation of a

8

Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice Professional (2009), 58.

ERLA, s.v. “Torts and Religious Organizations”; David Partlett, “Torts,” OEBL 2:407; “Tort,”
Wikipedia, released 17 July 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tort; Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts,
HSer (St. Paul, MN: West Group, 2000), 5; Westbrook and Wells, Everyday Law in Biblical Israel, 69;
Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, 77; Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice
Professional (2009), 56. The crime required the “taking from possession and carrying away of a thing with
the intent permanently to deprive the owner of his property.” Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, 79.
9

“Crime,” Wikipedia, released 17 July 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crime.

10

Westbrook, “Punishments and Crimes (OT and NT),” 5:548.

11

ERLA, s.v. “Torts and Religious Organizations”; Dobbs, The Law of Torts, 3.

12

253

legal procedure depends on the victim. Compensation to the victim is regulated by legal
institutions.
The nature of a crime is different, as Westbrook’s definition13 of it shows: “A
crime, by contrast, is conceived of as a wrong to society, in which the harm to the
particular victim is incidental—indeed, there may be no specific victim at all. The
initiative is in the hands of the state, which may proceed irrespective of the victim’s
wishes; and the purpose is to punish the offender.”14 Even though an individual can also
be harmed in the event of a crime and initiate retaliation, it is the state that is the primary
party which prosecutes and sanctions the offender.15
It has been recognized that certain acts can fall into both of these two basic
categories, crimes and torts, both in biblical and MLS.16
As was mentioned above, the two legal terms crucial for examining both types of
wrongs, torts and crimes, are intent and negligence. Modern legal systems recognize the
difference between intentional and negligent wrongs, but disagreement appears when it
comes to the definition or the implications of these two types of liability. It is also
assumed that intentionally committing a wrong is worse than committing it negligently

Westbrook’s definitions of crime, as his definition of tort, also resemble definitions of crime
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and bears higher responsibility. The key to separating these two ways of committing a
crime is the factor of knowledge, desire, commitment, or likelihood of execution.17 In
order to do so, legal systems have established four types of wrongs that are associated
with a certain level of responsibility.18 As will be noticed below, the level of
responsibility grows along with the level of consciousness/awareness or knowing the one
who does something wrong.
The process of establishing responsibility in the event of committed wrong starts
with the possibility of accident where the level of responsibility is the lowest and
progresses to negligence, intention, and bad motive, with a gradual increase of
responsibility with each new possibility.19 Accident has the lowest possible level of
responsibility of the actor. By rule, “accidents are possible only where there is a
conceptual gap between the action and the consequence. This is the case with regard to
homicide, battery, and arson but not true relative to rape, larceny, and burglary.”20 The
subsequent possibility is the negligent act where the level of responsibility is higher.
Negligence is closely related to accident and differs from it in the fact that the actor has
the ability to avoid harm by exercising due care—acting reasonably or nonnegligently.21
The concept of negligence is discussed below in more detail.
A major conceptual divide exists between accident and negligence on one hand,
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and intent and bad motives on the other. The matter of intent assumes the second highest
level of responsibility and can exist independently prior to actions, as well as in the
actions themselves. In other words, an actor comes to the point where he/she intends to
perform the criminal act which later translates into an actual criminal act. The intention
of performing the act is formed before the action confers upon it its particular quality as a
criminal act.22 The act of the bad motive represents the highest level of responsibility.
Motive refers to the emotions which prompt a person to perform an act.23 Motives form a
basis for distinguishing between various levels of bad intentional conducts. These levels
of bad intentions make a difference between various types of certain crimes, the most
notable being homicide and theft.24

Intent or Mental State/s in the MLS
Modern legal systems have various definitions of mens rea, but a consensus has
been reached on the following four types. In the past, legal systems used to employed
various phrases that consisted of the adjective plus the noun “intent” to refer to a specific
mental state or mens rea. The three most common are (1) special intent which refers to
the consequences which surpass the performing a criminal act itself, (2) a general intent
which refers to the actual act of a crime, and (3) transferred intent that holds an actor
liable even if he/she did not intend the consequences of the act.25 However, it has been
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noted that these phrases, along with the others26 used in the legal system are confusing
and complicated.27 Thus the following four phrases28 that describe the way an act has
been realized began to be used more frequently:
1. Acting with Purpose. This mental state consists of two subcategories. With
respect to the result of conduct, “the perpetrator’s voluntary will is to act in a certain way
or produce a certain result.”29 With respect to attendant circumstances, “the perpetrator is
aware of conditions that will make the intended crime possible.”30 In other words, the
perpetrator’s voluntary wish is to act in a certain way or construct a certain result.
2. Acting knowingly. This mental state consists of two subcategories. With
respect to the result of conduct, “the perpetrator commits an act aware that it is practically
certain that his or her conduct will cause a certain result.”31 With respect to attendant
circumstances, “the perpetrator commits an act aware that his or her actions are criminal
or that attendant circumstances made an otherwise legal act a criminal one.”32
Accordingly, the perpetrator acts knowing well that his/her behavior will cause a certain
result.
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3. Acting recklessly33 This mental state is explained in the following way: “The
perpetrator voluntarily ignores a substantial and unjustified risk that a certain
circumstance exists or will result from the reckless conduct.” 34 Emphasis in this state is
on the perpetrator’s ignorance of the fact that his/her reckless conduct will result in
certain circumstances.
4. Acting negligently35 This mental state is defined in the following way: “The
perpetrator should be aware that a substantial and unjustifiable risk exists or will result
from the negligent conduct.36 In other words, acting negligently refers to the perpetrator’s
failure to know that his/her negligent conduct results in certain circumstances.
Negligence37
A closely related term to the concept of intent is negligence. Black’s Law
Dictionary (BLD) defines it as follows: “The negligence is failure to exercise the standard
of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation; any
conduct that falls below the legal standard established to protect others against
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unreasonable risk of harm, except for conduct that is intentionally, wantonly, or willfully
disregardful of other’s rights.”38 As such, “negligence in law ranges from inadvertence
that is hardly more than accidental to the sinful disregard of the safety of others.”39
Kenneth Simons concluded the following concerning negligence:
The conscious choice of a reckless actor can be culpable even though the choosing
actor almost never is aware of, much less consciously chooses, all of the morally and
legally relevant features of his act. Thus, the actor need not be aware of the illegality,
or even the immorality, of his act, in order to deserve blame and punishment; nor
must he believe that the risk he is running is unjustifiable.40
As such, negligence refers to an unintentional activity, but at the same time it is
considered as culpable carelessness.41 Modern jurisprudence classifies thirty types of
negligence,42 some of which even blur the lines between negligence and intention. Types
such as wanton negligence, willful negligence, and the combined terms of willful and
wanton negligence all depend on awareness, consciousness, and/or the voluntary nature
of the activity. In other words, they depend on the intention of a doer.43 That is why
legislative theorists state that “negligence is indeed a surprisingly complex and pluralist
concept.”44
An example of negligence is found in the law which regulates safety in the event
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of building a new house. Deuteronomy 22:8 requires the construction of a parapet on the
roof of a new house to prevent someone falling down and potentially suffering death.
Having someone falling down from his roof and consequently dying is not the
homebuilder’s intention, but is a possible outcome. Not building the railing would be an
act of negligence. This is also similar to the law of goring ox45 when it went its ways and
gored someone to death, but the owner is not liable (Exod 21:28). However, if the owner
knew that the ox was a gorer and the individual was warned, then the owner is liable (Exo
21:29).

Inadvertence
A sub-category of negligence is inadvertence. Inadvertence is defined as “a fault
resulting from not paying attention; a mistake caused by an oversight.”46 Inadvertence
may result from the following four flaws: (1) motor control (e.g., clumsiness), (2)
cognition (e.g., stupidity or short attention span), (3) conation (e.g., weakness of will),
and (4) motivation (e.g., character flaws such as selfishness or indifference).47 The
concept of inadvertence as a sub-category of negligence emphasizes the fact that
negligence is intentional conduct,48 especially flaws (3) and (4).
Weakness of will is an especially important concept for the overall understanding
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of inadvertence. It refers to a conflict between practical thought and action.49 In other
words, an agent is intentionally doing something he/she knows is wrong. The concept has
a long tradition in the philosophical and lately, psychological conversation.50 The first
mention of this topic appeared in Plato’s Protagoras (352b–356c) and Aristotle’s
Nichomachean Ethics 7 (2–3) who both referred to Socrates who denied the existence of
akrasia51 or weakness of will.52 In Socrates’ understanding, “no one who either knows or
believes that there is another possible course of action better than the one he is following
will ever continue on his present course.”53
The history of interpretation of this concept portrays two major points that
permeate the dialogue. First, the concept of weakness of will has moved from being
deeply puzzling and denied in antiquity to being considered as a common component of
human experience in the present. Philosophers who, following Socrates, questioned this
concept understood that that free intentional act that opposes one’s better judgement is

Christine Tappolet, “Weakness of Will,” IEE 9:5412; HDE, s.v. “Weakness of Will.”

49

Jackson, “Weakness of Will,” 1; Byron Williston, review of Weakness of Will from Plato to the
Present, ed. Tobias Hoffmann, NDPR (2008, 3 September), https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/weakness-of-willfrom-plato-to-the-present/; Tappolet, “Weakness of Will,” 9:5412.
50

51

Akrasia is considered a moral state that refers to the lack of mastery. Generally, English uses the
noun “incontinence” to translate it. Tappolet, “Weakness of Will,” 9:5413. “A literal translation of the
Greek term ‘akrasia’ might be ‘powerlessness,’ signifying ‘being overcome by desire’ and a consequential
loss of self-control.” Richard Reilly, “Plato and Augustine on Human Weakness,” Cithara 18.2 (1979): 48;
Sarah Stroud, “Weakness of Will,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2014,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/weakness-will/
R. M. Hare, “Weakness of Will,” EncEth 3:1789; Gerard J. Hughes, “Weakness, Moral,” NDCE

52

655.
53

Protagoras 358b-c. For a more detailed work on classical conceptions of akrasia and their
relations to the present debates, see Christopher Bobonich and Pierre Destrée, Akrasia in Greek
Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus, PA 106 (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

261

feasible. This view is now widely accepted.54 Second, initially being a moral problem that
used to be discussed in moral philosophy, weakness of will is now understood as a failure
of practical rationality and has moved into the domain of moral psychology and more
generally, in the philosophy of action.55
Besides being an object of philosophical debates, weakness of will is widely
debated among Christian thinkers too. Along with Socrates who was the first among
philosophers to mention this concept, the apostle Paul expressed diametrically different
opinion on the weakness of will. He actually endorsed the theoretical possibility of it as
an inevitable reality for fallen humanity.56 Gerard J. Hughes conveniently summed up
Christian understanding as follows: “The shortest way with the problem of moral
weakness is to assert roundly that there is nothing here that requires explanation. It is
simply a fact about ourselves that we are able to act against our sincerely held moral
principles, with full knowledge and full deliberateness.”57 This view is widely accepted
today and is also well argumented in philosophical and psychological debates.58
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The most influential work on the weakness of will was done by Thomas
Aquinas.59 Denis J. M. Bradley noted that “whereas for Aristotle, agents do not choose to
act incontinently, for Thomas they do. However, they do not choose the action as such
but rather the passion that is its proximate cause or psychological support.”60
From this basic study of the weakness of will concept one thing becomes obvious:
weakness of will is an intentional and free act of an agent. The reasons why people
decide to act contrary to their judgment may be rooted in their passions, desires, and
bodily appetites,61 but they do not deny the fact that one acts intentionally and willfully.
Thus, intentionality for at least one reason, weakness of will, is embedded in the concept
of inadvertence.

Ignorance
Biblical scholars frequently used this concept in the process of defining sin in
important texts of the Pentateuch62 which requires that it, too, be defined. A Dictionary of
Modern Legal Usage defines ignorance as follows: “Ignorance implies a total want of
knowledge in reference to the subject matter.”63 Glanville Williams defined it as follows:
“Ignorance is lack of true knowledge, either (1) because the mind is a complete blank or
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(2) because it is filled with untrue (mistaken) knowledge on a particular subject. The first
variety, lack of knowledge without mistaken knowledge, may be called simple ignorance.
The second variety, lack of true knowledge coupled with mistaken knowledge, is
mistake.”64 It is a conscious and intentional act, but is opposed to the law because of the
doer’s misconceptions regarding the matter.65
It is evident, at least at the level of written records, that modern jurisprudence is
much more complex, comprehensive, and precise in understanding the concept of intent.
Terminology of the legal collections of the OT was not as extensive and precise as the
terminology utilized in modern legal systems.66 A look at the definitions of some legal
terms used in modern legislative systems would suffice to support this claim. For
instance, BLD has 31 different types of act entries:67 61 crime entries (crime
accompanied by other terms is not included in this number of types),68 19 of the intent
entries,69 19 intention entries,70 and 64 of the property entries.71 The legal terms such as
crime and/or criminal law do not exist in OT texts.72
Even though the term intention is not present in the legal corpus of the OT and is
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not as precisely defined as it is in modern legislative systems, some phrases irrefutably
point to the presence or absence of intention related to some forbidden activities. As
shown above, this claim is valid for the laws that cover various aspects of human life in
ancient Israel. Table 19 is a simple representation of the relationship between the basic
types of wrongs, their consequences, and the consciousness/awareness of the one doing
them:

Table 19. The assessment of the sinful act
Types of wrongs
Accident
Negligence
Intent
Bad Motive

Consciousness/
awareness
Act
act, consequencesby some extent
act, consequences
act, consequences

Unconsciousness/
Unawareness
Consequences
Consequence

Intentionality
no
yes, no
yes
yes

Conclusion
Like any other activity that breaks certain sets of laws, sin that in the Bible refers
to breaking the biblical legal corpus, including the Decalogue, consists of two elements:
(1) the internal/psychological, called mens rea or intent or mental state, and (2) the
outward/physical part, called actus reus or an act itself.
The biblical legal corpus resembles modern jurisprudence in recognizing two
basic types of offences, torts that refer to the wrong towards an individual and crimes that
refer to the wrong towards society when the individual may or may not be affected. It has
to be emphasized that the biblical legal corpus does not employ specific terms to refer to
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torts or crimes. However, the biblical legal corpus contains these two types of offences
conceptually.
Legal jurisprudence has recognized four ways in which an act can be committed.
First, a person can purposely act in a certain way to bring about a certain outcome.
Second, a person can knowingly act in certain way to bring about certain outcome. Third,
the perpetrator ignores the fact that his/her reckless conduct will produce certain
outcomes. Fourth, the perpetrator does not know that his/her conduct results in certain
circumstances.
Negligence is wrong based on the failure of one to exercise certain laws that
prevent harming other people. By definition, negligence is unintentional, unwilful
activity, but certain forms of negligence are undoubtedly intentional conducts and
sanctioned as such. The concept of inadvertence as a part of negligence points to the
presence of intention in negligent conduct. Intentionality stems from weakness of will.
Ignorance is a product of two elements of the mental state. First, ignorance takes
place a result of one not knowing the law, or second, having a wrong perception of it.
The review of these definitions from modern legal jurisprudence that biblical
scholars frequently use to discuss the concept of sin was needed in order to proceed into a
meaningful dialogue with secondary literature.

Legal System of Ancient Israel
In contrast to the modern legal system,73 the legal system of ancient Israel

“Modern legal systems generally classify wrongful acts as crimes and civil delicts (torts) and
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reflected the basic concepts and categories of her ANE neighbors’ tripartite division: (1)
offences against a hierarchical superior, especially a king or a god, that called for
disciplinary action; (2) morally grave offences against another individual that called for
revenge;74 and (3) offenses against the interests of an individual involving less moral
culpability, for which the remedy was compensation.75 However, this tripartite division is
an external scholarly assessment of the BL, rather than a division that comes out of the
law since BL does not make the distinction between the law collections.76 Even though
scholars of the BL have reached some sort of consensus on the similarities and
differences of ANE law collections and the legislative corpus between ancient Israel, this
is still a highly controversial topic.77
There are several similarities and differences that are widely accepted. First,
ANE law collections are older than BL. Second, ANE law collections come out of royal
jurisprudence and represented the voice of the establishment. They existed from ancient
times and have been innovated as new circumstances arose or through administrative
order issued by the ruler. BL collections do not reflect circles sympathetic to the king.
Third, in Israel, to the contrary, God was portrayed as the author of the legislative system.
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He was also considered as divine and the ideal king of justice. His role was to maintain
equity and protect the poor and oppressed.78 In this sense, God is also the ultimate
judge.79 Fourth, in accord with ANE law collections, BL was not legislation in the
modern sense since these texts present just a small fraction of the law and assumed the
knowledge of the rest.80
The third and the fourth points are especially relevant for the present study. In
regard to the fact that God is portrayed as a king in Israel who gives the laws, it is
important to know that his kingship over ancient Israel was based on the divinecovenant.81 The primary way of speaking about a special relationship between God and
ancient Israel is in the context of the covenant.82 The law was given in the context of an
established covenantal relationship (Exod 19–14) and therefore, in breaking the law, one
is liable and accountable to God.83 Moshe Greenberg profoundly stated: “In the biblical
view, the law is the command of God; hence violation of it is rebellion against God’s will
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– i.e. crime is sin.”84 Studying legal institutions in Ancient Israel, Michael LeFebvre said,
“Notwithstanding the resulting complexities, there is one consistent ideal behind these
institutions that helps explain them: the conviction that Yahweh was Israel’s true
lawgiver and judge.”85
The BL separated itself from ANE law collections by uniquely integrating various
law regulations into one legal collection. regarding the ANE legal corpuses, Shalom Paul
stated: “There is a complete separation of secular and religious law: dīnu (law), kibsu
(moral rules), and parṣu (religious orders) are never combined in a single corpus. Legal
rules, moreover, have no didactic purpose; they do not serve as a goal for pedagogic
instruction.”86 Basing her study on the analysis of Moshe Greenberg’s work on the
relationship between biblical and ANE law collections, Ruxandria Pădure stated: “In the
theory referring to the Biblical law, the idea of the transcendence of the law becomes
clearer. Here, God is not just the guardian or the judge, He is the very source of the law,
and the latter is the expression of His will.”87 As such, BL expresses the will of Yahweh.
Frank Crüsemann noted that “the basic notion that Israelite law is direct divine utterance
is not at all common in the ancient world.”88 This fact is foundational for the claim that
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“instruction” or “teaching,” rather than “law” in the majority of cases, reflects better the
sense of what tôrâ is.89
In addition, M. J. Selman stated that “many parallels exist between the laws of the
OT and those from the rest of the ancient Near East, though no laws have been found so
far that are identical in form in both Israel and Mesopotamia.”90 Biblical Law experts
resist claims that the laws found in the Pentateuch are identical to the laws of ANE law
collections, but rather speak of mutual similarity between the two collections.91 Selman
has noted two extreme views of the law that are not necessarily contradictory if put in the
right perspective.
Scholars have suggested two opposed views of the function of BL. First, working
out of the realization of the close connectedness between the commandments and
covenant and the fact that revelation of the commandments was a salvific event, Gerhard
von Rad viewed the law as a form of gospel. This implication is based on the fact that
covenant was completed at a time when Israel had had no chance to exhibit its obedience
to the law.92 Thus, the law had a salvific role. Complementary rather than contrary to this
is the inference of W. Zimmerli and H. D. Preuss. They noted that besides blessings,
covenant laws also contain curses. Zimmerli noted that the validity of divine law that
assumes threatening judgments is embedded in Israel’s election. Preuss discredited the
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law’s ability to save by emphasizing Israel’s inability to obey the laws.93 The law had a
legal, obligatory function.
Selman believed that von Rad’s, on the one hand, and Zimmerli’s and Preuss’s
view, on the other, can be seen as complementary if viewed in the context of God’s
covenant with Israel which implies that the law is not law per se, but rather, serves for
God’s larger purpose for Israel. The laws given to Israel as a nation redeemed from
slavery (Ex 20:1–2; Deut 5:6; cf. Deut 1:1–4:43) in order to preserve and shape their
newly won freedom and provide further opportunities to commune with him as they
journeyed from Egypt.94 Thus, both of these functions, salvific and legal, are obligatory
as valid elements of the covenant.
These distinctive features of the BL are crucial since the present study views BL
as a whole. Breaking any regulation of BL assumes the liability of the one doing it and
accountability to God himself.95 This further means that breaking any regulation requires
offering a sin and/or reparation sacrifice and making restitution when needed.
Regarding the claim that BL is different than modern legislative systems, Bernard
S. Jackson conveniently outlined the manner in which modern scholars have related
ancient biblical codes to modern legal systems. It is factual that both ancient and modern
legal codes, common and civil traditions, consist of the three principal parts of legal
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source, statute, precedent, and doctrine. Jackson concluded that
ancient phenomena corresponding to these modern institutions are certainly to be
found. But once discovered they are all too readily invested with the particular
attributes of their modern counterparts. Moreover, such identifications sometimes
suggest inappropriate lines for further investigation. Much effort has been misapplied
in seeking to determine such questions as whether ancient “codes” are restatements of
custom or reform (i.e. consolidating or reforming statutes); whether they are
comprehensive or merely collections of “difficult cases” (i.e. codes or miscellaneous
provisions acts); whether they are “official” or “private” (i.e. statute or doctrine).96
The similarities between biblical and modern law do exist since they share some
shared features when basic concepts and terminology of the two systems are compared.97
However, the differences are more numerous, which is a signal against applying a
conceptual understanding regarding similar laws from modern, legal understanding to
related or similar laws of the ancient legal corpus.98 Rather, they should be studied
separately first, and then similarities should be discussed/compared. This principle also
applies to the use of modern, legal terminology which, in the case of this study, is related
to the concept of intention in reference to some crimes. Instead of applying already
preconceived terminology of intent and related subconcepts such as inadvertence and
negligence, fresh terminology is needed that is defined by the study of the laws
themselves and to the extent the laws provide.

Bernard S. Jackson, “From Dharma to Law,” AMJCL 23 (1975): 491. For a more detailed
analysis of the influence of modern legal terminology on ancient legal systems and the inadequacy of
applying the concept of the former to the latter, see Hu, “Codes as Constitution,” 2–12.
96

97

Richard H. Hiers, Justice and Compassion in Biblical Law (New York: Continuum, 2009);
Jackson, “From Dharma to Law,” 491; Westbrook, “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law,” 1:1–2.
Gane agreed with Christine Hayes on the fact that “the relationship between OT law and modern
categories of law is complex.” Gane, Old Testament Law for Christians, 27; Christine Elizabeth Hayes,
What’s Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 3,
12, 14–53.
98

272

Intent or Mental State/s in Biblical Law
The term intent or mental state/s is never used in the OT and most likely was not
in use in Ancient Israel (Early Judaism and rabbinic texts).99 “On the contrary, all of them
frequently employed a rich selection of concepts and expressions to refer to state of mind
that a person had when he or she performed a given action.” 100 Another difficulty in
studying intent/mental states is spelled out in the following quotation by Brent A. Strawn:
“The notion of intention is controversial given the difficulty of determining internal
dispositions (solely) on the basis of external factors.”101 Strawn captured the core
difficulty in determining the nature of intent in legal cases. Intent, as such, takes place in
a very private domain, namely, the human mind, but its nature is established based on
external factors, physical activities. Yet, it is obvious that intent plays a crucial role in
BL, and some of these laws provide textual hints into the mental state of a potential
human agent.102
Greenberg recognized that BL provide bases for establishing both types of guilt,
objective and subjective:
The notion of objective guilt, which still operates in the realm of cult and taboo, has
but faint echoes in the penal laws of the Bible. As a rule, it is the subjective factor, the
mind of the doer, which is determinant in evaluating the nature of the offense. The
laws distinguish clearly between murder, on the one hand, and homicide through
negligence or accident, on the other. Bodily injuries inflicted deliberately and with
premeditation are treated differently from those inflicted in the sudden heat of
passion. The religion of Israel heightened both the awesome sanctity of all that
99
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touched upon God—an objective datum—and the importance of the individual’s
moral choice—a subjective datum; these laws illustrate the dilemma that may arise
out of the class of the two.103
Analyzing intention in the present study is limited to so-called “action” cases,104
that is, the cases in which the wrong is not limited to an inward offense, but is
accompanied by the physical act, as well. An individual may sin either by committing a
sinful action or by failing to perform an act that the law required. The criterion of
intention is equally important in criminal and cultic laws.105

Intent or Mental State/s in Criminal Law
The notion of intent is first mentioned in the Decalogue. Exodus 20:17 uses the
verb “ חָ מַ דto covet,” and Deut 5:21 used the verb  חָ מַ דalong with  אָוָהI “to desire.” It is
very probable that  חָ מַ דrefers to mental states only,106 whereas  אָוָהI is clearly restricted

Greenberg, “Crime and Punishment,” IDB 1:734.

103

Bernard S. Jackson started off his study on intention with the claim that “numerous texts in the
early history of law suggest that the ancients were concerned with the problem of liability for mere
intention, that is, the imposition of liability upon a person solely because of the intention he has formed in
his mind, and without reference to any external act by which such intention may be projected into practice.”
Thus, he introduced the conceptual division between action (criminal and cultic scenarios) and non-action
(coveting, devising evil) cases. The latter cases do not necessarily exclude the physical act and its
consequential impact, but rather, the emphasis is on the fact that biblical authors perceived the offense
consisting not just of the physical act, but also of inward trespass. Bernard S. Jackson, Essays in Jewish and
Comparative Legal History, SJLA 10 (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 202ff. Also, Botica, Concept of Intention, 6.
104

105

Botica, Concept of Intention, 51.

106
Some scholars related this text with Mic 2:1–2 in which the verb ḥāmad involves action besides
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just to the mental states.107 The key law is the one of homicide.108
Exod 21:12–14: The first mention of this law is in Exod 21:12–14, and the
offender’s intent candidly affects the gravity of the punishment. That is, the opening
clause of the law, the protasis, states that the punishment in case of a person’s hitting
another person which ends in the death of the latter is the death of the former.109 This
introductory statement is a generic case of intentional homicide.110 This would be typical
example of a well-attested concept in the OT, lex talionis or talionic retribution.
However, vv. 13 and 14 further provide immediate qualifications. If the murder was not
premeditated,111 but the event was “an act of God,” then it is classified as an
unintentional homicide, and the offender can flee to the appointed place for sanctuary
(Exod 21:13). If it was a premeditated,112 then the offender has no right for refuge (Exod
21:14). He suffers capital punishment. The issue associated with this law is the fact that
the law does not specify who performs the execution of the punishment. The place of
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refuge for unintentional manslayers is discussed later in Num 35:9–34 and Deut 4:41–43;
and 19:1–13.113 Premediating can be understood as “scheming” to fit the context of a
crime.114 Another term,  ע ַָרםI, is used in v. 14 to strengthen the intent idea behind this
crime and it refers to the attitude of deceit as a result of prior intention.115 The role of the
court and judges is also not specified in Exod 21:12–14, but is stipulated in Num 35:9–
28.116
The homicide law in Exod 21:12–14 contains clear pointers for the presence of
intent, and even more premeditation of a criminal act. All the pointers in this law come
close to the descriptions of similar crimes in the MLS.
Num 35:9–34: In contrast to Exod 21:13–14 where the details of the homicide are
lacking, Num 35:9–34 includes a series of specific circumstances under which the crime
happened, along with tools/means included in it. A basic division between two sets of
circumstance related to the crime is that the former points to an unintentional homicide,
while the latter points to an intentional one.117 The switch in content is followed by the
use of a literary pointer, the particle  ִּאם, that also separates the cases (vv. 16, 22).
Concerning intentional homicide, in the first set of texts, vv. 17–18, the manner of
committing the crime was striking and it was performed by the use of the objects (v. 16—
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iron object, v. 17—stone, and v. 18—wooden object). In the second set of texts, vv. 20–
21, the manner is conveyed by pushing, throwing at, or lying in wait, whereas the state of
mind is communicated by the use of hatred and enmity.118
Regarding unintentional homicide, vv. 22–23 state that the manner related to this
act was through “suddenness, not seeing,” while the mental state is expressed by “no
enmity nor personal enmity, no malice aforethought, no intent to hurt.”119
Thus, the terminology that is used to point to the intent of a murder such as
premeditation, plotting, lying in ambush or in wait and acting out of hatred or enmity is
negated in the parts of the law that emphasize unintentional acting.120
The phrase  מַ כֵה־ ֶּנפֶּשׁ בִּ שׁ ָגגָהused in Num 35:11, 15 describes accidental homicide
and Botica appropriately asked if it refers to the state of mind or only refers to the generic
case of accident. Numbers 35:11 does not contain indications to answer this question.
The terms used in the homicide contexts in the same fashion as שׁ ָגגָה, with the
preposition ב, ( זִּידacting presumptuously, Exod 21:14),121 ( אֵ יבָ הenmity, Num 35:21),

( ע ֲֵרמָ הcraftiness, Exod 21:14), ( צ ִּדיָּהmalice, lying in wait, Num 35:20),122 and ִּשׂנאָה
(hatred, Num 35:20) all possess a distinct mental/emotional connotation.123 Botica
correctly concluded: “Perhaps, one could apply here the legal distinction between
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intention to harm (on the spur of the moment but not to kill), intention to kill (not foreplanned, but on the spur of the moment) and premeditation (planning to kill in
advance).”124 These semantic properties are not covered by שׁ ָגגָה. Rather,  שׁ ָגגָהis used to
convey both accidental and unintentional activity. The context of Num 35 suggests that

 שׁ ָגגָהrefers to the unintentional and accidental nature of the act and is followed by the
phrase  בִּ בלִּ י־דַ עַתin order to emphasize the fact that it does not imply previous mental
planning of the act.125 In other words, it is an accident which itself presumes
unintentionality on the part of the human party involved.
The suggestion that the homicide law in Exod 21:12–14 contains clear pointers
for the presence of intent and premeditation is even more expanded in the case of Num
35:9–34, where the text contains terms based on which, one can determine various levels
of intent. In this regard, this law comes closer to the descriptions of similar crimes in the
MLS.
Deut 4:41–42: The main concern of the short law in Deut 4:41–42 is the
establishment of the cities of refuge, rather than particulars of homicide intentionality and
unintentionality. It actually deals only with the latter. In this regard, it resembles the law
in Josh 20. That is, this similarity in terms of content between the two texts is also
extended to the realm of terminology. The phrase that is used to refer to unintentionality
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in these two texts is ( בִּ בלִּ י־דַ עַתDeut 4:42, Josh 20:3, 5).126 No new details appear in this
text that are not covered in the previous two texts.
Deut 19:1–13: A general statement concerning the mental state involved in
unintentional homicide is found in v. 4 which states that the perpetrator did not have the
intention of committing the act, בִּ בלִּ י־דַ עַת, nor did he have a history of hatred toward his
fellowmen, לו
ֹ שׂנֵא
ֹ ל ֹא־. Verse 5 provides details of the circumstances of the accident and
object involved, slipping of a head from the axe handle as one swings to cut wood and
striking his fellowman as he cuts wood in the forest. Intentional homicide is more
precisely described in v. 11. The manner of committing the crime was conveyed by lying
in wait, attacking and striking, whereas the state of mind includes hatred.127
The analysis of the homicide laws in the Pentateuch demonstrates that the concept
of intention is present in these laws even though the texts do not use the term
intent/intention or mental states. The level of intention in homicide laws range from the
law that has no specifications (Exod 21:12–14), but just states that the person who kills
another person is to be executed, to the ones where there is a distinction between the
intention to kill and premeditated intentionality to kill (Num 35:9–34). The laws of
homicide require the death penalty for the intentional murderer.128 In the case of
accidental, unintentional homicide, the laws of homicide do not require the death of the

This phrase is also used in Deut 19:4. Joshua 20 also used the verb שָׁ גַג/ שָׁ גָהto emphasize the
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killer, but protect him/her by making sure that he/she has valid legal investigation and
protection if it is proven that he/she did not act intentionally. Not negating these insights
of levels of intent, Botica plausibly stated: “Nevertheless, the understanding of intention
in biblical criminal law is still basic. The observable/physical dimension is
paramount.”129
However, even though determining the mental state was not an easy task due to
the lack of a fuller list of explicit verbal indicators and their definitions, the legal corpus
contains certain hints which indicate the existence of certain and specific verbal
pointers.130
Other laws where intent plays an important role in determining the magnitude of
punishment are related to various aspects of life in Ancient Israel. Some of these laws are
the goring ox found in Exod 21:28–32, the thief breaking in found in Exod 22:2–3, injury
of a pregnant women in a quarrel found in Exod 21:23–25, bodily injuries found in Lev
24:19–20, the malicious witness found in Exod 20:16; 23:1–3; Deut 5:20; 19:15–21, and
sex between a man and a betrothed woman in Deut 22:23–27.131 The present study limits
itself to the homicide law because intention is developed in these laws in the most
comprehensive way.

Intent or Mental State/s in Cultic Law
The difficulty of determining intention in legal texts also appears in cultic texts.
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The two key texts are Lev 4–5 and Num 15.132 Determining the nature of intent in Lev 4–
5 and Num 15 requires understanding the semantics of nominal and verbal forms of the
terms חָ טָ א, שָׁ גַג/שָׁ גָה, אָשַׁ ם,  יָדַ עand  ָעלַם. Insight into the nature of intent consequentially
provides understanding of the nature of sins mentioned in these texts. In both passages,
the noun  שׁ ָגגָהor the verb שָׁ גַג/ שָׁ גָהindicate sins for which expiation is available (Lev
4:2, 13, 22, 27; 5:15, 18; Num 15:22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29) while  ביָד ָרמָ הpoints to the
intentional sin which excludes the chance for expiation (Num 15:30–31), and this sin is
denoted by עָֹון. Scholars have understood that former terms refer to inadvertence,133
while the latter is associated with sins committed out of brazen opposition to God.134
The study of intent or mental state/s in criminal law demonstrated that the context
of Num 35 suggests that the phrase  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהconveys accidental and thus, the unintentional
nature of the act and is followed by the phrase  בִּ בלִּ י־דַ עַתin order to emphasize that it
does not imply previous mental planning of the act.

Jacob Milgrom on Leviticus 4–5 and Numbers 15
Milgrom’s work and understanding of the nature of sin, and consequently, intent,
outlined in Lev 4–5 and Num 15 is foundational and has immensely influenced most of
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recent scholarship135 and encompasses all the crucial terms listed above. For that reason,
it is analyzed in this section. He proposed that  אָשַׁ םhas a consequential meaning like
other verbs that deal with sin, such as  עָֹוןand חָ טָ א, and express both sin and its
punishment.136 He summarized the meaning of nominal and verbal derivatives of the root

 אָשַׁ םin cultic contexts as follows:
The cultic usages of the root ʾšm are as follows: the noun ʾāšām is the restitution for
desecration by either composition or sacrifice and should be rendered “reparation”
and “reparation offering,” respectively. The verb ʾāšam is a stative. When it is
followed by the preposition l and a personal object it means “to incur liability to”
someone for reparation; without an object, it refers to the inner experience of this
liability, meaning “to feel guilt.”137
In Milgrom’s understanding, the meaning of the intransitive אָשַׁ ם, “to feel guilty,”
is supported by the technical noun which Milgrom held to mean
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“inadvertence.”139 Before continuing further into the analysis of Milgrom’s position on
the nature of intent and sins in these chapters, I need to address the concept of
inadvertence which was discussed on pages 258–61 above.
For Milgrom, inadvertence is an overarching criterion in all expiatory sacrifices.
This is how he expressed it:
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Strawn, “Intention,” 1:440–41; Gane, Cult and Character, 202; Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice,
Atonement, 24; Wells, The Law of Testimony. However, Milgrom’s view was also heavily criticized and
rejected by others. Hartley, Leviticus, 55, 58–59, 76–77; Kiuchi, Purification Offering; Knierim, “”שׁגג
TLOT 3:1303.
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Inadvertent wrongdoing may result from two causes: negligence or ignorance. Either
the offender knows the law but involuntarily violates it or he acts knowingly but is
unaware he did wrong. The former situation underlies the examples of accidental
homicide—Num 35:16–18, 22–23; Deut 19:5–6—and the latter is presumed by 1 Sam
14:32–34; Ezek 45:20; and such nonritual texts as 1 Sam 26:21; Prov 5:23; Job 6:24;
19:4. These two types of inadvertence have also been termed “error” and “accident”
(Daube 1949). In either case, as the citations illustrate, unconsciousness of the sin and
consciousness of the act are always presumed (contra Kiuchi 1987: 25–31), as
recognized by the rabbis: “Scripture says bišĕgāgâ implying the existence of
consciousness” (b. B. Qam. 26b). By contrast, an unconscious wrong, when the
offender is unaware of both his act and his sin, when he only suspects that he has
done wrong, is expiated by a different sacrifice, the ʾāšām (see the NOTES on
5:17–19).140
This quotation requires close analysis. First, based on the review of the legal
concepts it is negligence that encompasses wrongs done inadvertently or ignorantly, and
not inadvertence that encompasses wrongs done negligently or ignorantly. Negligence is
a more complex and neutral concept in terms of intent involvement. It includes both—
inadvertence, a wrong that can be done intentionally and unintentionally, and accident,
where wrong is exclusively unintentional. Negligence assumes knowledge of the law as
does inadvertence, but inadvertence, as a subcategory of negligence is a narrower concept
related to the nature of the intent of a wrong act,141 while negligence includes other
elements such the circumstance, level of damage, consequences… Milgrom seems to
bypass the meaning of these concepts as they are defined by MLS and loaded them with
the meanings based on his interpretation of Lev 4–5 and his understanding of sin.
Loading precisely defined terms in MLS with incorrect meaning added even more
confusion to the understanding of which sin/s is/are in question in Lev 4–5. He claimed
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that inadvertence precisely meets the condition of being conscious of the act, but not its
sinfulness.142 One of the ways inadvertence takes place is by the weakness of will which
is intentional activity and includes consciousness of its wrongness. I revisit this below in
greater detail.
Second, Milgrom understood negligence when the offender knows the law, but
involuntarily violates it. This is a very unlikely scenario since knowing the law and
involuntarily breaking it is a contradictory scenario in itself. Knowledge of the law and
still breaking it must include either intention of breaking it, regardless of knowing it or
knowing the law and accidentally break it. I later suggest an additional way of how one
can know the law and break it. Milgrom himself related the wrong of negligence to
accidental homicide (Num 35), and it is to an accident, just one aspect of negligence, that
he attached the term שָׁ גַג/ שָׁ גָהand applied it to all the cases of wrongs done בִּ שׁ ָגגָה. They
are always exclusively accidental wrongs.143 Thus, Milgrom’s reducing negligence to
accidental wrong only presents the obscure and incorrect use of the word that refers to the
concept which includes wrongs done intentionally and unintentionally or accidentally.
However, there is another misuse of the legal terminology. Milgrom’s quotation

Milgrom, “The Cultic  שגגהand Its Influence in Psalms and Job,” 118. Milgrom’s use of David
Daube’s terminology of “error” and “accident” does not fit the concepts he related to them since Daube
defined error and accident as follows: “If there is a flaw in your plan, in your assumptions, but the act as
such is executed as intended, without anything to upset it, we speak of error; whereas if the very act goes
wrong, we speak of accident.” David Daube, “Error and Accident in the Bible,” RIDA 2 (1949): 189.
Daube’s error sounds like MLS’s ignorance in the event of the misconception of the law by an individual
and only partially fits Milgrom’s negligence. In other words, it is not unintentional, but intentional activity.
Daube’s accident is an intentional act which an individual accidentally turns into an unplanned activity. It
does correlate with Milgrom’s understanding of ignorance. This also reflects Milgrom’s loose use of
terminology to define types of sins in Lev 4–6.
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above indicates that the he assumed that accidental nature of the wrong is done by both
negligence and ignorance. As I discussed above, MLS theorists have recognized and
endorsed the fact that inadvertent wrongs are not always unintentional or accidental.
Thus, Milgrom misused his overarching concept of inadvertence in the same way that he
misused the concept of negligence. That is, he reduced inadvertence to unintentional or
accidental wrongs only. I come back to the use of MLS terminology as I conclude the
analysis of Milgrom below.
Third, based on the quotation above, Milgrom defined ignorance as acting
knowingly, but being unaware of the fact that one’s acting is wrong. He did not explain
how this scenario unfolds. This vague statement is explained by the definition of
ignorance by MLS provided above. Ignorance results from not knowing the law or by a
wrong perception of it. It is a conscious and intentional act, but a doer is unaware that his
act is breaking the law since he either does not know the law or his perception of it is
incorrect. This correlate with Milgrom’s understanding of ignorance.
Milgrom cited two cases to show the sin of ignorance: 1 Sam 14:32–34 and Ezek
45:20.144 The case of 1 Sam 14:32–34 is of the warriors who ate meat with blood in it.
However, this case does not look like ignorance, but rather, an intentional act due to their
hunger and physical exhaustion. Verse 31 states that after the battle was over, “the people
were very weary.” Verse 34 also states that after Saul provided the solution, a big stone
was installed so the people could use it to drain blood from the slaughtered animals for
food, “all the people that night brought each one his ox with him and slaughtered it
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there.” The narrative presents a smooth transition from eating with the blood to going
through a process of draining it from the animals and then eating it; it seems that they
were familiar with the reasoning behind this prohibition, but still broke it since they were
hungry and exhausted. Rather, this was intentional sin out of hunger and exhaustion. The
context of Ezek. 45:20 does not provide any insights into the nature of sins that were to
be atoned by the prince, except that the verb  שָׁ גָהwas used to refer to the action of
sinning. This is extremely insufficient to argue that the sin in these texts is one of
ignorance.
The cases of ignorance are very much unlikely in the society of ancient Israel. In
the light of covenantal obligations which included stipulations, laws, that Israelites
obliged themselves to as they accepted a covenant with God and in the light of the texts
such as Deut 24:8, 33:10, that Milgrom referred to in support of a plausible idea that the
law was publicly taught in Ancient Israel.145 It is hard to imagine that the Israelites did

That function of the priesthood was, as Milgrom said, “stressed in the later literature (2 Kgs
17:27b; Ezek 22:26; 44:23; Hag 2:11; Mal 2:7). It is also emphasized in H: ûlĕhôrōt ʾet-bĕnê yiśrāʾēl ʾēt
kol-haḥuqqim ʾăšer dibber YHWH ʾălêhem bĕyad-mōšeh,‘ and you must teach the Israelites all of the laws
that the Lord has imparted to them through Moses’ (10:11)” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 52; Gane, Old
Testament Law for Christians, 33, 117. Contrasting the mysterious character of the Babylonian temple
program, Milgrom stated that “that the priests must teach their lore to the Israelites” that is diametrically
different from the Mesopotamian religion systems. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 52. The following quotation
provides insights into the limited and mysterious nature of the Mesopotamian temple program: “The ritual
which you perform, (only) the qualified person shall view. An outsider who has nothing to do with the
ritual shall not view (it); if he does, may his remaining days be few! The informed person may show (this
tablet) to the informed person. The uninformed shall not see (it)—it is among the forbidden things of Anu,
Enlil, and Ea, the great gods” (ANET 336a; for the Egyptian equivalent, see the NOTE on 1:2). Milgrom,
Leviticus 1–16, 52. Finally, as Milgrom noted again: “Furthermore, the recurring refrain in P is wayyōʾmer
YHWH ʾel-mōšeh lēʾmōr dabbēr ʾelbĕnê yiśrāʾēl ‘The Lord spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the
Israelites’ (e.g., 1:1–2; 4:1; 7:22; 11:1; 12:1; 15:1). The torah of the Lord is, therefore, not an esoteric
doctrine, stored in the Temple archives and available solely to the elite priesthood (see also the NOTE on
‘to them,’ 1:11). Hence, the Lord’s commandments compose the curriculum of the priest-teachers, so to
speak, in Israel’s schoolhouse. Its purpose is to reduce the incidence of impurity in Israel so that holiness,
the sphere of God, can expand beyond the sanctuary.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 52.
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not know the majority of the law. To the contrary, due to the nature of the law146 it is
expected that the Israelites would be quite familiar with it.147 Shalom M. Paul noted that
each member of the community, then, has a dual responsibility: to observe the law
personally and to see that the law is observed by the group. Each must see that justice
is executed and that all crimes are punished—otherwise the community and its
members are threatened with dire consequences. … Law becomes the single most
important factor in the life and destiny of Israel.”148
Even if the public impact of the law on individual court cases was less direct than
that of modern statutory law149 and because it was available to any Israelites, parties
involved in the case could settle the matter without involvement of the third-party.150 All
these insights into the role and status of the law in ancient Israel suggest that the cases of
ignorance were significantly reduced. Not that they would never happen, but such
importance and inclusion of the law in public life and exposure to it reduced the chance
for these kinds of violations.
Fourth, Milgrom surprisingly equaled the wrong of negligence with “error” and
ignorance with “accident,” as can be observed from the quotation above.151 However, as
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Christians, 33. Based on Deut 17:18–20, the future king was to have his own copy of the law and read it so
he could learn and follow it. Gane, Old Testament Law for Christians, 33.
147

Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant, 38–39.

148
Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant, 38; See also Greenberg, “Crime and Punishment,”
IDB 1:733–34.
149

Michael LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah: The Re-Characterization of Israel's Written
Law, LHB/OTS 451 (New York: T & T Clark, 2006), 47.
150

Bernard S. Jackson, Wisdom-Laws: A Study of the Mishpatim of Exodus 21:1–22:16 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006), 29.
These terms are borrowed from David Daube. Daube, “Error and Accident in the Bible,” 189.

151

287

he explicitly stated in the quotation, negligence is conceptually an accident in his
understanding. He related ignorance to “accident,” which is a totally different concept
than ignorance.152
Fifth, Milgrom suggested that common to both ways of breaking the law is
unconsciousness of the sin and consciousness of the act. This part of the statement is the
most critical point of Milgrom’s evaluation of sin and consequently, in the notion of
intent in  שׁ ָגגָהcontexts. This is addressed further in the following analysis of שׁ ָגגָה, but at
this point, I want to emphasize the major weakness of this interpretation.
Putting aside Milgrom’s inaccurate use of MLS’s legal terminology, perhaps he
did not intend it to be used with the precision with which it was presented in this work,
but his interpretation of sin in Lev 4–5 downsized the types of sins that can be forgiven
through the sin offering to sins that are always accidentally or unintentionally committed
where a sinner is never aware at the time that he is committing sin. The sinner becomes
aware only later that the activity of which he is conscious is sinful.
Such an understanding of sin excludes the major class of sin which is sin
committed out of GHS and weakness. The concept of GHS is conceptually identical (or
close) to the concept of weakness of will, and as noted above, this concept is debated in
the major works of philosophy back to Socrates, Plato, and others, and is widely accepted
within Christianity from its beginnings. Sin resulting from GHS may be sin committed in
full consciousness and knowledge by sinners which, by consciously committing it, they

“1. An unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in the
usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated. 2. Equity practice. An unforeseen and
injurious occurrence not attributable to mistake, negligence, neglect, or misconduct.” BLD, 8th ed., s.v.
“Accident.” Mistake is a form of ignorance. DMLU, s.v. “Mistake.”
152
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break God’s law. This sin is intentional activity where there is consciousness of its
meaning and consequences. This type of sin is missed by some modern commentators,153
but some admit that this type of sin has to be taken into consideration.154 Averbeck stated
regarding sin in Lev 4–5: “It probably has the sense of someone straying from the
commands of the Lord (see 4:2b) whether unintentionally or because they were tempted
to do so and followed their temptations.”155

אָשַׁ ם
The meaning of the verb  אָשַׁ םis crucial. Scholarly proposals on the meaning of
this term are various, and Sklar conveniently summarized and critiqued them.156 As
mentioned above, there are four proposals for the verb’s meaning: (1) “to be/become
guilty, to incur guilt, to be/to become liable for guilt,” (2) “to feel guilt,” (3) “to realize
guilt,” and (4) “to suffer guilt’s consequences.”157
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The key representatives are Jacob Milgrom, Roy E. Gane, David P. Wright, and Jay Sklar
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To Be/Become Guilty, To Incur Guilt, To Be/To
Become Liable for Guilt
The traditional meaning “of  אָשַׁ םhas been understood as the objective statement
of guilt.”158 First, as noted below, limiting  אָשַׁ םto objective meaning creates difficulty in
Lev 4–5 since the transition between vv. 13–14 is expressed by the conjunction  וwhereas
transition between vs. 22–23 and 27–28 is expressed by a different particle, אֹו. The most
natural meaning for  אֹו159 “or” is not possible using the traditional meaning since it
produces the following translation: “If anyone sins, and is guilty or is told what their sin
is, then he or she shall bring an offering.”160 This reading requires a different translation
for  אֹוsince, in this case, sinners are guilty and required to bring a sacrifice before they
even know they have sinned.161 The difficulty is augmented even more due to the
assumption that the sinner is not aware of the sinfulness of their sin in these chapters.162
It has to be noted that Sklar reasoned under the assumption that the sin in these
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Péter-Contesse, Lévitique 1–16, 71; Janowski, Sühne als Heilsgeschehen; Toorn, Sin and
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texts is unknown to the sinner. This detail prevents him from allowing a subjective sense
of  אָשַׁ םwhich, if it was assumed in אָשַׁ ם, would provide smooth reading without
exclusion of the objective sense.
The other translations are not troubled by the natural translation of  אֹוas “or”
since sinners either (1) recognize their sin and subsequently feel guilty or their sin was
made known to them, (2) they simply realize their sin or their sin was made known to
them, or (3) they realize their sin because of suffering or their sin was made known to
them. Subsequently, after recognizing in their sin in some way, the sinners bring the
sacrifice or begin the process of rectifying their sin.163
Second, Sklar noted that reading Lev 5:23 also does not make sense if it is
assumed that  אָשַׁ םbears only the objective sense. He assumed that the sin in Lev 5:20–26
is intentional and that the sinners are aware of it, which further means that they know that
they are guilty from the outset. Excluding the subjective element of  אָשַׁ םand reading this
text with the objective sense only poses a problem of insufficiency of objective guilt to
motivate the sinner to bring the sacrifice.164 I return to this text and the solution to it
below as I analyze Milgrom’s “to feel guilt” translation.
Bruce Wells’ Suggestion
Wells’ explanation of  אָשַׁ םis not new in terms of the verb’s meaning per se: he
retained an objective sense of it “to be/become guilty,” but his suggestion is new in that
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he proposed that sinners basically do not need to be aware of their sin in order for it to be
extirpated, and consequently, forgiven. Gane expressed the same understanding of sin in
Lev 5:17–19. Sinner never knew nor recalled their sin.165 Wells’ view of  אָשַׁ םis not
based on the study of this verb in the Pentateuch or OT, but is totally informed by the
ANE text, specifically the Mesopotamian Šurpu incantations, and then applied to Lev 4–
5. Unlike Milgrom who tried to establish the meaning of  אָשַׁ םby considering both
biblical and ANE texts, Wells mainly relied on the Šurpu incantations. He rightly
dismissed attempts of some scholars who combined  והוּא יָדַ עand  ואָשֵׁ םin Lev 5:3–4 to
claim that sinners acquire knowledge of their sin, become guilty, and subsequently offer
sacrifice.166 The verb  יָדַ עis qatal in  יָדַ ע והוּאand thus, cannot be temporarily placed
before ונֶּעלַם, which refers to sinners initially forgetting their sin. Wells added the
argument from Lev 4 where he also thought that the “knowledge [of sin] never precedes
the guilt and the guilt sometimes does the prompting without knowledge ever being
acquired.”167 He did recognize two alternatives in Lev 4:22–23 and 27–28, but limiting

 אָשַׁ םto the objective sense only prevented him from seeing that there is no knowledge of
sin in the first alternative, but rather, the guilt itself is the only motivator for the sinner to
offer sacrifice. Knowledge of sin is not needed at all.168 This argument is heavily
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influenced by the understanding that  אָשַׁ םrefers to the sinners’ objective guilt only,
which is in contradiction to the conceptual and literary reading of Lev 4 suggested in this
work.
Wells declared the subjective-psychological sense (feelings of guilt or remorse,
pangs of conscience) as an anachronistic claim that it was unlikely for the ancients to
identify guilt in this way.169 Rather, the person would experience some tangible signs of
being guilty of sin or of suffering divine punishment.170
Wells stated that this kind of attitude is demonstrated in the belief of Job’s three
friends as they witnessed his experience of great misfortune and severe physical pains. As
Job did not know what his sin was, so the ancients did not know their sin when struck
with physical sufferings. Wells demonstrated this by using the Šurpu incantations. There,
he pointed out “that there was a way for a person, usually someone who was ill, to go to a
priest and obtain pardon for sin and relief from its effects, even if the person had no
inkling what sin he or she may have committed.”171 Wells then cited M. J. Geller’s
observation on the case of a sick person who visited the priest due to their sickness:
“Since the patient does not know the exact nature of his transgression, the incantation
priest recites an exhaustive list of 95 possible personal misdemeanours, presumably
hoping to include the relevant sin.”172 Wells concluded that “it is then assumed that if the
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offending sin is included in the recitation and the proper ritual performed, people will
receive the pardon and relief they seek. Also included in the Šurpu texts is a section
indicating that a person can ask “for some omen or sign confirming his guilt, or
identifying his exact sin.”173 Wells’ final conclusion was that “this is the context in which
to understand the term ʾāšam Leviticus 4 and 5.”174 This would translate into the
following scenario: A person would experience some kind of misfortune, Wells
suggested sickness, losing a loved one, or other sort of suffering, which could make him
think that he was guilty and incite him to seek out a priest in order to perform ritual
involving a purification offering. Thus, it was not knowledge of sin, but the onset of the
guilt that triggers the entire process.175
The contextual and conceptual difference between pagan religions of ANE and
the one of ancient Israel is considerably immense,176 as is the difference between the
roles of the priest in these two religion systems177 which call for detailed work in
potentially establishing the connection and mutual influence. The context of the sick
person from Šurpu texts does not resemble any context in the OT.
There are three well-taken points in Well’s understanding of  אָשַׁ םand Lev 5:1–4.
First, upholding the objective sense of  אָשַׁ םas the reference to the sinner’s guilty

Wells, The Law of Testimony, 68; Geller, “The Šurpu Incantations,” 182.

173
174

Wells, The Law of Testimony, 68.

175

Wells, The Law of Testimony, 69.

176

Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 42–43.

Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 52–57; Hector Ignacio Avalos, “Illness and Health Care in Ancient
Israel: A Comparative Study of the Role of the Temple” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1991).
177

294

condition is obviously present in this verb. Second, the point that the ancients
experienced guilt in a tangible way is also a well-taken point. However, it has to be
mentioned that Milgrom and others have already stated that physical, along with
psychological, suffering is a part of the sinner’s being אָשַׁ ם, as was discussed above.178
Third, Wells rightly noted that the phrase  והוּא יָדַ עshould be understood as a pluperfect
and refers to the knowledge of the sin that was subsequently forgotten prior to the
experience of אָשַׁ ם. The other points of his argumentation are misleading, overexaggerated, and not supported by the OT. The main concern of Wells’ suggestion is an
unconvincing lexical and conceptual connection between these two texts.
First, a proper method of inferring insights from ANE texts to the biblical texts
has been highly debated over the last 150 years, resulting in two totally opposing
positions. One camp is recognizable for overemphasizing parallels (parallelomania)179
between the two texts corpuses and another one for downplaying them
(parallelophobia).180 The right direction for arriving at a sound comparative method is a
middle ground proposed by William W. Hallo, termed a “contextual method,” that seeks
to observe both the similarities, as well as differences between the two texts.181 William

178

Jacob Milgrom, Cult and Conscience: The Asham and the Priestly Doctrine of Repentance,
SJLA 18 (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 76.
Sandmel, “Parallelomania,” 1–13.

179

R. Ratner and B. Zuckerman, “‘A Kid in Milk’?: New Photographs of KTU 1.23, Line 14,”
HUCA 57 (1986): 15–60, especially 52.
180

181
William W. Hallo, “Compare and Contrast: The Contextual Approach to Biblical Literature,” in
The Bible in the Light of Cuneiform Literature: Scripture in Context III, eds. William W. Hallo, Bruce
William Jones, and Gerald L. Mattingly, Ancient Near Eastern Texts and Studies 8 (Lewiston, NY: Mellen
Press, 1990), 1–30; William W. Hallo, “Biblical History in Its Near Eastern Setting: The Contextual
Approach,” in Scripture in Context: Essays on the Comparative Method, eds. C. D. Evans, W. W. Hallo,

295

Younger correctly stated that “the best comparative studies recognize that the literature of
the ancient Near East was produced not only out of a particular culture but also out of a
larger literary tradition, and that comparison with other literature that is similar within
that tradition—serving the same purpose, using the same structure, or referring to the
same subject—reveals certain aspects of a text that might remain hidden.”182 This method
seeks to expose what is traditional, conventional, or generic in a story in order to lessen
the conjectural element in historical analysis, or the subjective element in literary
criticism. A balanced evaluation of the evidence is comprised of four closely linked lines
of assessment: (1) linguistic, (2) geographic, (3) chronological, and (4) cultural (not
necessarily in this order).183 In addition, this method cautions that there is a degree of
uncertainty in the interpretative process.184
In terms of the comparative approach, Wells followed Meir Malul by accepting
the “historical compassion approach,” which seems to be a better alternative than the
“typological comparison approach,” since the former looks for the correspondence
between two societies that share common geographical and historical settings in contrast
to the latter that compares geographically and historically unrelated societies.185

and J. B. White, PTMS 34 (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 1980), 1–12; William W. Hallo, The Book of the
People, BJS 225 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), 17–23.
K. Lawson Younger, “The ‘Contextual Method’: Some West Semitic Reflections,” in Archival
Documents from the Biblical World, ed. William W. Hallo, COS 3 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), xxxvii.
182

Younger, “The ‘Contextual Method’”, xxxvii.

183

Younger, “The ‘Contextual Method’”, xli.

184
185

Wells, The Law of Testimony, 6; Meir Malul, The Comparative Method in Ancient Near Eastern
and Biblical Legal Studies, AOAT 227 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1990), 13; Claus Westermann,
The Structure of the Book of Job: A Form-Critical Analysis, trans. Charles A. Muenchow (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1981), 33; Paul Maxwell and John Perrine, “The Problem of God in the Presence of Grief:
Exchanging ‘Stages’ of Healing for ‘Trajectories’ of Recovery,” JSFSC 9.2 (2016): 192.

296

However, Wells excluded most literary and contextual links from his method,186 which is
crucial for establishing the fact that the Šurpu incantations and Lev 4–5 share the same
characteristics, thus justifying their comparison. This would be essential, as Hallo’s
“contextual approach” suggests, in order to establish ground for comparing two texts
from different geographical, cultural, and chronological settings and is required to
precede a bold statement such as Wells made that the  ואָשֵׁ םfrom Lev 4–5 is to be
understood in the same context where the sick find healing in Šurpu incantations. In
addition, Wells’ work focuses on similarities only neglecting the importance of
considering contrasts which is contrary to Malul’s understanding of the “historical
comparison approach.”187
Second, it is problematic to take the assumptions of Job’s friends which were
never explicitly spelled out in the OT nor defined as a common way of sinners’
realization of their unknown or forgotten sin and use them to interpret the technical text
of Lev 4–5, the only text besides Num 15 that resolves the situation in which a person
sinned. These assumptions were proven to be totally wrong later in the book of Job.188
There is a need to establish more solid connections between the two texts in order to have
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one influence over the other. The nature of these two texts is totally different; this is
reflected in the use of different literary genres. Job, for the most part, belongs to wisdom
literature that deals with concepts and notions,189 while Leviticus, for the most part, is
legal/cultic law. Belief that sufferings, physical or psychological, can come on people
because of their sin is definitely a part of ANE and the biblical worldview, but singling it
out as the only way by which sinners realize that they have committed sin and need to
offer a sacrifice would be a matter of arbitrary, subjective opinion and forced
interpretation, rather than a textually proven assessment. If that were true, it would
greatly dispute the sophisticated and intellectual cognition the ancients had.
This inexhaustive list of serious weaknesses in Wells’ comparative method that is
reflected in his interpretation of Lev 4–5 led me to dismiss his suggestion that  אָשַׁ םrefers
to the physical pain caused by the sinners’ sin, which actually motivates sinners to offer
sacrifice rectifying the situation in which they find themselves. His work shows a poor
connection between the contexts of Šurpu incantations and Lev 4–5 in order to infer
insights from the former and apply them to the latter.
“To Realize Guilt”
Kiuchi proposed that  אָשַׁ םmeans “to realize guilt.”190 Kiuchi also assumed that
the sinners are unaware of their sin in Lev 4,191 but he allowed for “or” as the meaning
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for אֹו, which introduces two alternative ways in which sinners realize their sin. Sinner are
told their sin after the particle, but it was the way sinners learn about their sin before it is
described by  אָשַׁ םthat led them to propose that  אָשַׁ םcontains sinners’ realizing their sin.
Since the consciousness of sin is missing in the verb שׁגה, it must be expressed through

אָשַׁ ם.192 Kiuchi’s suggestion also provides a persuasive reading of the texts in Lev 4–5
since it solves the difficulty that, chronologically, sinners are not aware of their sins or
they forget them until the inference that sinners realize their sin that is told to them by
others, and subsequently bring the sacrifice. Sklar first critiqued Kiuchi’s suggestion that

 אָשַׁ םdoes not necessarily convey sinners’ consciousness of sin. Sklar thought that אָשַׁ ם
can refer to the suffering caused by sin which leads to the realization of the sin. In this
case,  אָשַׁ םexpresses the result of sin, rather than the lack of realization itself. However,
Sklar did, in a way, uphold Kiuchi’s proposal by stating that sinners could realize their
sin, which would subsequently lead them to feel guilty. This point of Sklar’s critique is
fully informed by Milgrom’s understanding of  אָשַׁ םthat is limited to the subjectiveconsequential meaning of it193 and is not convincing. As such, it opens up the possibility
for the inclusion of both realization of sin and feeling guilt in the semantic domain of

אָשַׁ ם.
Sklar’s second point of criticism of Kiuchi’s suggestion is that the translation, “to
realize sin,” creates an unreasonable reading of Lev 4:3: “If the high priest sins so as to
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make people realize their guilt.”194 First, Kiuchi never excluded the notion that this text,
due to the infinitival idea, meaning leshmat, “causing guilt to the people,”195 assumes
some sort of consequences on the people because of the high priest’s sin, but rather noted
the fact that when the high priest commits sin, the entire people, besides him, is ;אָשַׁ ם196
in his words, “the people realize guilt.” Behind Kiuchi’s proposal that leshmat197 means
“so that the people realize guilt” stands his subjective and objective understanding of

אָשַׁ ם, meaning that they realized their guilt and are guilty, which correlates with the
experience of the high priest himself.198 Sklar’s criticism is informed by Milgrom’s idea
that  אָשַׁ םis the sinner’s purely subjective-psychological experience of guilt for the sin,
not the objective. Second, the correlation between the high priest’s sin and the experience
of guilt of the people is a well-established interpretation of this text;199 it is thus expected
that the high priest’s sin has an impact on, and is eventually noticed by, the people. Thus,
this point of criticism essentially depends on whether one allows for the  אָשַׁ םto
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encompass in a subjective and objective sense or only in the subjective, which makes it
highly inadequate.
“To Feel Guilt”
Milgrom is the key proponent of the “to feel guilt” understanding of אָשַׁ ם. He
proposed the following meaning of אָשַׁ ם: “When it is followed by the preposition l and a
personal object it means “to incur liability to” someone for reparation; without an object,
it refers to the inner experience of this liability, meaning “to feel guilt.””200 It either
conveys that the guilt is incurred by someone in the former or to the sinner’s
psychological experience of guilt in the latter case, but he denied that the root contains
the reference to sinners’ realizing their sin. Milgrom displayed an inconsistency of his
own reasoning since he stated that one of the ways sinners realize their sin is on their
own.201 Chronologically, this happens before sinners are told of their sin, before  וin v. 13
or  אֹוin vv. 22 and 27. The subjective-psychological component of  אָשַׁ םis also
augmented by the consequential sense of it. Milgrom explained the subjective-
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psychological sense in the following way:
Wrongdoing creates guilt and fear of punishment, and, conversely, suffering
reinforces the presence of guilt feelings because it is interpreted as punishment for
sin. Thus it is logical to expect that a language that, as observed, will express the
consequential syndrome of sin-punishment by a single word will also have at least
one root in its lexicon to express another consequential relationship, that which exists
between sin-punishment and guilt feelings. This root, I submit, ʾšm.202
Milgrom limited  אָשַׁ םin cultic texts, when used as an intransitive verb, to the
subjective sense only:
In the cultic and legal texts, however, where metaphors are eschewed, a precise term
would be essential to pinpoint the existence of guilt: it is the verb ʾāšam. Thus,
contrary to usual translations, ʾāšam without an object does not refer to a state of
guilt; rather, in keeping with its consequential meaning, it denotes the suffering
brought on by guilt, expressed now by words such as qualms, pangs, remorse, and
contrition. ʾāšam would then mean to be conscience-smitten or guilt stricken, and
henceforth it will be rendered as “feel guilt.” 203
Sklar critiqued the essence of the arguments in both Milgrom’s quotations. First,
Milgrom assumed that  אָשַׁ םencompasses a consequential connection between sinpunishment and guilt feelings without providing valid arguments for such a claim. Sklar
correctly stated that just because it is logical for a word with a certain meaning to exist in
a given language does not necessarily mean that that word actually exists in that
language.204 Second, Milgrom also saw the need of a word in cultic and legal texts that
would convey the notion of guilt and proposed that that word is אָשַׁ ם. However, he did
not provide any substantial proof for such a claim. Sklar correctly pointed out that the
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proof for this meaning of  אָשַׁ םmust come from the study of the root itself within its
contexts.205
Kiuchi noticed that Milgrom’s line of thinking to come to this subjectiveconsequential understanding of  אָשַׁ םis supported by two observations. First, it is
reasonable to assume that sinners are aware of the sinfulness of their act, even while
planning it, since the sin in Lev 5:22 is intentional but Milgrom proposed that “only the
element of remorse fits wĕʾāšēm here.”206 Sinners feel guilt and, therefore, begin the
process of rectifying their sin, v. 23.
Second, if one applied the objective sense, “be guilty,” the protases in Lev 4–5
would lose their prescriptive function since the objective sense of אָשַׁ ם, “to be/become
guilty,” is an external assessment of the sinners’ condition that is alienated from the
sinners’ own internal assessment of themselves. This is further confirmed by the fact that
the term immediately precedes the bringing of the sacrifice or the beginning of the
rectifying process of the sinners’ sin.207
However, the understanding of  אָשַׁ םwith a translation/meaning of “to feel guilt”
creates an inconsistent reading of Lev 4–5. This limited view of  אָשַׁ םas a subjectivepsychological-consequential sense especially affects the protases in Lev 4:3, 13–14, 22–
23, 27–28; 5:3–5, 17, 23.
Lev 4:3. In this text, the community becomes  אָשַׁ םby the high priest’s sin. The
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prepositional phrase  לאַשׁ ַ ֹ֣מתis morphologically nominal, but syntactically infinitival.208
In this context,  אָשַׁ םmodifies the noun “people” and the verb indicates that the people are
endangered because of the high priest’s sin. Applying his consequential understanding of

אָשַׁ ם, Milgrom claimed that  אָשַׁ םeven includes some sort of penalty on the people.209 At
this point, אָשַׁ ם, besides bearing the subjective-consequential sense, simultaneously
conveys the objective fact that the people are guilty for an unknown reason.
Sklar, noting the sameness of ritual and sacrifice in the first two subcases (vv. 3–
12 and 13–21) which would imply the same sort of guilt, critiqued Milgrom for changing
a consequential understanding of  אָשַׁ םin v. 3, “to the detriment (of the people),” into a
subjective one in v. 13, “they feel guilty.” The understanding of  אָשַׁ םshould be the same
in the two subcases.210
Milgrom excluded the consciousness of sinfulness of the act from  אָשַׁ םbased on
Lev 5:17, 23 because sinners are aware of their sin and guilt before  אָשַׁ םin v. 23, or in v.
17, they are unaware of their sin and thus, cannot realize it.211 Milgrom proposed that in
5:17, the sinner was unaware of both his sin along with its sinfulness and therefore, אָשַׁ ם
refers to the sinner’s “suspecting that he has done wrong.”212 This sin turns out to be the
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sin against God like the sin in vv.14–16.213 Milgrom connected the subcases in vv. 14–19
and 20–26 [6:1–7] as being the laws that treat sins against God. The former treats
sacrilege against sancta and the latter deals with sacrilege involving oaths.214 This was
Milgrom’s starting point for arriving at the subjective-psychological-consequential sense
of אָשַׁ ם. Accordingly, it can only refer to the state of remorse.
The fear of unknown sins is a well-known concept in ANE people. Hence, sinners
suffer either mentally or physically, which make them conclude that they must have
committed a sin. Yet, despite the ancient’s fear of unknown sin, the law assumes an
objective fact that a person committed a sin. The law does not envision the situations in
which sinners suspect that they have committed wrong, but rather, states that sinners
committed sin and subsequently feel guilty. Kiuchi correctly stated that “when he [the
sinner] feels guilty, he [the sinner] knows what the sin was.”215 Sinners are undeniably
aware of their sin and guilt before even feeling guilty. Accordingly,  אָשַׁ םincludes
consciousness of sin by the sinner. Sklar noted similar weakness. That is, Milgrom’s
psychological sense, “to feel guilt,” inadequately accounts for the fact that sinners cannot
feel guilt for the sin they do not know. In addition, Milgrom’s psychological or physical
suffering as an element of  אָשַׁ םassumes that sinners come to know their sin and feel guilt
for it.216
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Finally, it is highly questionable whether the realm of conscience can be separated
so finely from the realm of consciousness.217 Hartley argued that this precision is not the
customary manner of expression in the Hebrew Bible:
While Milgrom has made an excellent point, nevertheless,  אשׁםhas an objective
usage for a person’s ethical/legal culpability, rather than for a person’s existential
feelings. In that Hebraic thought tends not to make strict categorical distinctions, it is
possible that both of these meanings are present in some occurrences of the verb; a
person who is guilty and accountable before God would also experience the stirring
of guilt in his conscience, awaking him to his need to take the steps to expiate his
wrongdoing.218
In 5:23, sinners are aware of their sin expressed by the Hebrew term  מָ עַלfrom the
outset. This term was used previously in v. 14 and since the Pentateuch does not define it,
nor does the rest of the Bible, Milgrom studied it in the  מָ עַלcontexts in the Bible, in
rabbinic texts, and in similar contexts within ANE texts to find its meaning and applied it
to v. 23.219 Based on all these three sources, Milgrom proposed that  מָ עַלrefers to
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sacrilege against sancta or sacrilege involving oaths.220 Sinners, in v. 23, are aware of
their sin subjectively and objectively, but it seems reasonable to think that only after they
experience the consequential aspect of ( אָשַׁ םpangs of their consciousness) is their
subjective and objective experience of guilt placed in the right context and they fully
understand their sin.221 This scenario of a sin in v. 23 resonates with sin out of the
weakness of will. People sin regardless of the fact that they know that they are sinning
against God. This would mean that Milgrom’s proposal that sinners are fully aware of
their guilt even while planning their sin is not correct.222
A simple inclusion of the objective sense of  אָשַׁ םalong with the subjective solves
the inconsistent reading of Lev 4–5. Sinners sin, know that they are guilty, experience the
feelings or pangs of guilt, realize the full scope of their sin, and decide to undergo the
necessary steps to rectify their sin. A limiting  אָשַׁ םto subjective-psychologicalconsequential sense of  אָשַׁ םto “feel guilt” is a contradictory choice in this context.
Lev 4:13–14, 22–23, 27–28. One of the problems with these texts was caused by
the attempt to amend the opening of the vv. 23, 28 that starts with the Hebrew particle אֹו
based on the fact that v. 14 begins with the conjunction ו, instead causing  ואָשֵׁ םto be
translated objectively “to be, become guilty.”223 The particle introduces an alternative to
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the preceding  ואָשֵׁ םand there is no need to amend it.224 Taking  אֹוto mean “or” and
excluding consciousness of sin from  אָשַׁ םwould mean that sinners feel guilty even
though they do not know their sin. On the contrary, sinners are fully aware that their act
is sinful before they offer a sin offering or proceed to rectify their sin.225 They become
aware of their act’s sinfulness in two ways, on their own which is contained in the verb

( אָשַׁ םthey suffer the pangs of their consciousness or feel guilt, subsequently recall their
sin and realize that they are guilty), or they are informed about their sin by someone else.
The Hebrew particle  אֹוundeniably separates two different ways of sinners’ cognition
about their sin (Lev 4:22–23, 27–28).226
This separatedness does not disappear nor diminish because of the fact that that
the transition in v. 14 is expressed through the conjunction  וinstead of אֹו, since  וis
frequently used to separate two different/contrasting items in the Pentateuch, especially in
conditional phrases or alternative cases as this one is.227 Commenting on Lev 4:14,
Milgrom himself confirmed the two ways of sinners’ learning of their sin in Lev 4:22–23
and 27–28: “The individual who errs either finds out the nature of his error on his own or
(ʾô) someone else informs him of it.”228 Again, Milgrom confirmed that the same
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principle operates in vv. 23–24 as he commented on v. 23: “Either the chieftain discovers
his error (and regrets it) or someone else informs him.”229 He and Kiuchi,230 by not
reading  וwith the meaning of “or,” totally missed the point about two alternative ways of
realizing sin, which also means that  אָשַׁ םincludes realization of the sin by the sinner.
Instead he erroneously stated: “Here [v. 14] the temporal sequence is reversed, wĕʾāšēmû
wĕnôdĕʿà ‘and they feel guilt when [the wrong] becomes known’: the second verb
precedes the first in time.”231 Milgrom explained this by saying, “But as the community
as a whole has erred there can be no ‘or’; the communal guilt results from the eventual
discovery of the error by the community itself.”232 The temporal sequence reversal is
syntactically unlikely since both verbs are weqatals meaning the action conveyed by the
second verb temporally follows the action conveyed by the first verb. The temporal
reversal is clearly implied in Lev 5:3–4, 17–18, since all  יָדַ עverbal forms are qatal,
pluperfects which is not the case in Lev 4:13–14.
In addition, the clause beginning with ונִֽ ֹודעָה, the beginning of v. 14, is further
explained by the relative clause ֲָשׁר חָ ט ָ֖אוּ עָלֶּ ָ֑יה
ֹ֥ ֶּ  אwhich would be redundant since אָשׁמוּ
ִֽ ֵ ו
was already explained with another set of clauses, אַחת
ַ ֨ יִּ שׁגּ֔ וּ ונֶּעלַ ֹ֣ם דָּ ֔ ָבר מֵ עֵינֵ ָ֖י הַ קָּ ָהָ֑ל ְ֠ועָשׂוּ

ָל־מצֹוַ֧ ת יהוָ ֛ה
ִּ  ִּמכ, which basically communicate the same idea that the people sinned. It
makes more sense to view the clause that opens v. 14, ונִֽ ֹודעָה, as an alternative way of
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realizing sin since the text would be redundant if the  ונִֽ ֹודעָהwere temporarily transported
before אָשׁמוּ
ִֽ ֵ ו, thus making the set of clauses that follows  ונִֽ ֹודעָהtotally superfluous.
This would go against the subsequent two subcases in Lev 4:22–23, 27–28, which
use the same verbs and temporal sequence, but also use the particle  אֹוwhich definitely
separates the two alternatives. Thus, instead of emending “ אֹוor” in different ways233 in
vv. 23 and 27 that produce a smooth reading, one should note and apply a regular “or”
meaning for  וand uphold two alternative ways of realizing sin by the sinner in the last
three subcases in Lev 4.
In 4:13–14, the whole community sins ()יִּשׁגּ֔ וּ, forgets their sin ( ונֶּעלַ ֹ֣ם דָּ ֔ ָבר מֵ עֵינֵ ָ֖י

)הַ קָּ ָהָ֑ל, and becomes guilty (אָשׁמוּ
ִֽ ֵ )ו. If  אָשַׁ םthat ends v. 13 does not include both
subjective and objective meanings, but rather, just the subjective as proposed by
Milgrom,234 Sklar,235 and Gane,236 the text would be irrational and Sklar’s critique would
be well taken. This scenario would have sinners bringing the sacrifice for a sin they do
not even know. To the contrary, the context suggests that  אָשַׁ םshould include both
semantic meanings of אָשַׁ ם. In case both aspects of  אָשַׁ םare assumed, the following

For the alternative translations of  אֹוin v. 23 and 28 see Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice,
Atonement, 30.
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Accepting that  אָשַׁ םassumes just the objective and excludes the subjective, Sklar noted that this
reading is senseless in 4:13, 22, 27: “This is because the sin is hidden from the sinner; as a result it would
make no sense to say that ‘if anyone sins, and is guilty or is told what their sin is, then he or she shall bring
an offering’, for in the first instance the sinner is not aware of their sin and would thus not even know to
bring a sacrifice.” Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 30.
235

236

Gane, Cult and Character, 205, 211n58.

310

scenario would be in place. The people sinned, forgot their sin, subsequently remembered
it (through feelings or pangs of guilt, subjective-consequential element of )אָשַׁ ם, realized
that they were guilty (objective element of )אָשַׁ ם, and brought the sacrifice to receive
forgiveness. In addition, before the point when the text proceeds with the procedure to
address their sin, that is, to bring the sacrifice ()והִּ ק ִּ ֨ריבוּ, the opening clause of v. 14 that
stands between אָשׁמוּ
ִֽ ֵ  וand  והִּ ק ִּ ֨ריבוּbegins with the weqatal of יָדַ ע. The conjunction
introduces another and totally different way in which the sin is being objectively realized.
Someone else lets the people know that they sinned since they are not aware of their sin
at all. This reading suggests two types of sin. The first type of sin is done both
intentionally or unintentionally, subsequently forgotten, and eventually remembered,
while the second type of sin is unknown to the people. They need somebody else to tell
them.
This reading of protases in Lev 4 suggests that  אָשַׁ םassumes both the objective
and the subjective sense without excluding the consequential component of the subjective
sense. Only allowing the verb  אָשַׁ םto encompass all these senses that are derived from
the immediate context of Lev 4 provides a credible reading of the text.
“To Suffer Guilt’s Consequences”
Following K. van der Toorn,237 Sklar adopted the idea that  אָשַׁ םshould be
translated as “to suffer guilt’s consequences” based on the fact that terms for sin in
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general have a consequential meaning. He stated that “ אָשַׁ םis often explicated with the
description of the punishment it describes.” In addition, he suggested that this is
confirmed by the uses of  אָשַׁ םoutside of the Pentateuch (Psa 34:22 [21]; Hos 10:2;
14:1[13:16]; Isa 24:6; Jer 2:3).238 These texts are not commented on, for the latter
argument is dismissed since, in essence, it is an old hermeneutical mistake called root
fallacy.
Sklar claimed that this translation of  אָשַׁ םprovides smooth transitions from Lev
4:22 to 4:23 and from vv. 27 to 28 since it allows for the “or” translation of the particle

אֹו. It fits the context well in which the sinners are initially not aware of their sin, but
subsequently, learn of it when they experience guilt’s consequences, both physical and
psychological, which was common in ANE. Sklar cited another text outside the
Pentateuch to support this particular point (2 Sam 21:1). In addition, this translation does
well with Lev 5:23 since sinners, struck by guilt’s consequences, decide to rectify their
sin. Finally, this translation introduces the same sort of suffering for both subcases in Lev
4:3–12 and 13–21 since the sin is the same in both cases and necessitates that the effect
of it be the same, as well.239 He then concludes that “the most appropriate translation for

 אָשַׁ םin the priestly literature is a general consequential one; that is, it refers to the general
consequences brought on by the guilt of sin and may be translated with ‘to suffer guilt’s
consequences.’”240
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This proposal does contribute to the debate since it provides a smooth reading of
the transitional particles in vv. 3, 13–14, 23–24, and 27–28. However, it excludes the
notion of the objective sense after sinners come to realize their sin. This detail is crucial
for an even more natural reading of the transitional particle in these verses.
Conclusion on אָשַׁ ם
The solution I propose is that both aspects, subjective-psychologicalconsequential and objective, are contained in the verb אָשַׁ ם. Based on the analysis from
above, my understanding of  אָשַׁ םconcurs with the one of Eugene Carpenter’s and
Michael A. Grisanti’s observation: “ [It] signifies the state in which the perpetrator finds
himself as a result of his offense.”241 Knierim augmented this understanding by stating
that “the double usage—from a modern perspective—of the one root ʾšm (see 3a)
apparently relates to a common foundation assumed in all aspects from judgment of guilt
to resolution of guilt: it is the obligation, the duty, the liability, that results from incurring
guilt.”242  אָשַׁ םis a multifaceted verb encompassing basically all the proposed
translations: (1) to be/become guilty, (2) to realize guilt, (3) to feel guilt, and (4) to suffer
guilt’s consequences. These meanings are not mutually exclusive, but rather,
complementary. The context is a determining factor if both or one particular sense is to
be a preferred meaning. Inclusion of both of these factors, the subjective-psychologicalconsequential and objective sense of the verb  אָשַׁ םexpressed in the four ways of

Carpenter and Grisanti, “אָשַׁ ם,” NIDOTTE 1:547.
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translating it, and the literary and grammatical flow of the texts provides the most
satisfactory and consistent reading of Lev 4–5. The contexts in Lev 4–5 suggest that the
terms would be open to take on any, some, or even all of these meanings since choosing
only certain meanings does not provide satisfactory nor consistent reading. The struggle
of choosing the right translation remains since at least four different English translations
were suggested in the history of research of this term. However, “to be/become guilty”
remains the least misleading translation since it embodies all the others and it remains the
most basic meaning of the term in the context of legal/moral standing.243
This understanding of  אָשַׁ םreconciles all conceptual and literary difficulties if just
one of the suggested understandings/translations of  אָשַׁ םis accepted.
First, it chronologically places sinners’ recognition of the sinfulness of their sin
before they offer sacrifice or make confession in Lev 5:1–5, 17, which is obvious in Lev
4:3, 13–14, 23–24, and 27–28. Sinners are always fully aware of their sin before offering
sacrifice.
Second, it provides the rationale of how sinners who are aware of their sin are
motivated to rectify their sin in Lev 5:23. Besides being objectively and subjectively
aware of their sin, sinners also experience the consequential aspect of ( אָשַׁ םpangs of their
consciousness), and their objective and subjective experience of guilt is placed in the
right context; they fully understand their sin.
Third, this chronology of activities where sinners’ awareness of their sin before
they begin to rectify it is preserved and upheld by the recognition of the temporal

Hartley, Leviticus, 76–77; Knierim, “אָשַׁ ם,” TLOT 1:194.
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sequence of activities in Lev 4–5 is expressed by wayiqtol and weqatal verbs and of the
pluperfect sense of qatal verbs.244
Fourth, it recognizes that the two different ways by which sinners become aware
of their sin, which are obvious in Lev 4:23–24, 27–28, can apply in the other translations
in Lev 4:3, 13–14 by understanding the Hebrew particle  אֹוin the most natural way as
“or” and understanding the Hebrew conjunction  וto mean “or,” as well as is one of its
frequent meanings in the Pentateuch and the Hebrew Bible.245
Fifth, the presence of two different ways for sinners’ recognition of their sin also
explains why both אָשׁמוּ
ִֽ ֵ  וand  ונִֽ ֹודעָהin Lev 4:12–13, 22–23, 27–28 are accompanied by
additional clauses that basically communicate that sinners have committed sin. This is not
the case in Lev 5:5, 17, 23, where only  אָשַׁ םoccurs with no additional clauses to
communicate the act of sinning. The only exception is a short reference to והָ יָה ִּ ִֽכי־ ֶּיח ֱָטֹ֣א
in v. 23.

שָׁ גַג/שָׁ גָה/ שׁ ָגגָהand יָדַ ע
I suggest that  אָשַׁ םcannot inform the meaning of the verbs  שָׁ גַגand  שָׁ גָהor the
noun  שׁ ָגגָהbecause אָשַׁ ם, being a stative verb, describes the effect of the sinner’s sinning
(שָׁ גַג/ )שָׁ גָהor of sin ( )שׁ ָגגָהon the sinner.
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The only exception is Lev 5:24, where the yiqtol instead of wayiqtol verb comes after qatal
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These two roots are crucial for determining the nature of sins in Lev 4–5246 and
affect the meaning of אָשַׁ ם. Milgrom noticed that the two verbal forms,  שָׁ גַגand שָׁ גָה,
have coalesced.247
The verb  שָׁ גַגis used 2 times, the verb  שׁגה3 times, while the noun  שׁ ָגגָהis used
15 times in the Pentateuch.248 The basic meaning of the verb is “to err, to lead astray.”249
The root conveys activities that are done unintentionally and intentionally in the OT.250
Scholars have generally understood  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהadverbially as “unintentionally, unwittingly,
inadvertently.”251
Based on the study presented below,  שׁ ָגגָהis a generic term for sin, like  חָ טָ אand

עָֹון, referring to the intentional or unintentional act as confirmed by the use of this term in
Lev 4–5. However, it does not refer to brazen or high-handed sin. That is, it is used in
contexts where sinners know that they have sinned (Lev 4:2, 3 [through v. 2], 22, 27;
5:14–16, 17–19; Num 15:24, 25x2, 26, 27, 28, 29; 35:11, 15), as well as in the ones
where they do not know (Gen 43:12; Lev 4:2, 3 [through v. 2], 27; 5:17–19; 22:14; Num
15:24, 25x2, 26, 27, 28, 29).
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Determining the difference between the consciousness of an act and its sinfulness
is crucial for the meaning of שׁ ָגגָה.252 I suggest that the contexts this term occurs in
provide arguments for such distinction.
The verbal form of the term  ָעלַםoccurs 10 times in the Pentateuch (Lev 4:13; 5:2,
3, 4; 20:4 [x2]; Num 5:13; Deut 22:1, 3, 4), and its basic meaning is “to be concealed,
hidden.”253 This indicates the lack of knowledge.254
Based on his proposal that  אָשַׁ םrefers to the consciousness of the sinfulness of an
act, Milgrom suggested that  שׁ ָגגָהrefers to the sinner’s consciousness of an act of
sinning, but not its sinfulness255 or that he is unaware of both.256 With some adaptations,
Hartley,257 Hill,258 and Kiuchi259 have all accepted Milgrom’s proposal. Knierim,260
Rendtorff, Seidl, Schenker, and Janowski, on the other hand, have rejected Milgrom’s
proposal claiming that  שׁ ָגגָהdoes not convey the subjective state of the actor.261 Knierim
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Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 228. Even though  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהdoes not adverbially modify the verbs of
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suggested that if sinners are cognizant of their sin or not is to be deduced from the
immediate context, rather than from the term שָׁ גַג/שָׁ גָה.262 Knierim’s claim has been
confirmed in the present study. The literary, grammatical, and syntactical contexts prove
to be crucial in determining the nature of the sin conveyed by this and all other nouns.
Kiuchi’s observation that a meaning of a word should be distinguished from
information or a situation inferred from the context agrees with the overall method
utilized in this study.263 The context is the primary determinant of the word meaning.264
Accordingly, it is important to determine whether the consciousness of the act and
unconsciousness of its sinfulness is the meaning of  שׁ ָגגָהor is inferred from a given
context.
Kiuchi made another critical point. The meaning of  שׁ ָגגָהin the context of Lev 4
suggests the existence of commands, God’s prohibitions, which means that an act can be
defined as sinful only in the context of prohibitions. Thus, Kiuchi proposed that שׁ ָגגָה
refers to the unconsciousness of sinfulness of an act, rather than consciousness of an
act.265 The distinction between consciousness of an act and its sinfulness is crucial for the
meaning of  שׁ ָגגָהin Lev 4–5. However, the meaning of  שׁ ָגגָהhas to be confirmed by the
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immediate context. Two key texts that illuminate the meaning of this term are Lev 5:17–
19 and 4:13.
Lev 5:17–19. Milgrom found the argument for his claim that  שָׁ ַגגrefers to the
consciousness of the act but not its sinfulness in the absence of  שָׁ גַגfrom the protasis of
this subcase. The sinner has sinned, but is not aware of this. The missing element of the
sinners’ remorse for their sin is expressed by אָשַׁ ם. This demands a detailed study of this
subcase.
The protatis in v. 17 introduces the activity of sinning with two clauses. In all
other protasis in Lev 4–5, this pattern presents two alternative ways of sinning. That
pattern is overruled in this pericope by its grammar, syntax, and literary structure. The
first clause  ו ִּאם־ ֶּנפֶּשׁ ִּ ֹ֣כי ֶּ ִֽתח ֔ ֱָטאin v. 17 looks like the first alternative in the previous
protases in Lev 4–5, while the other one ָל־מצֹות יהוָה אֲשֶּׁ ר ל ֹא תֵ עָשֶּׂ ינָה
ִּ  ועָשׂתָ ה אַחַ ת ִּמכis
like the second contrasting alternative of the same verse. However, two times in this text,
it is stated that sinners did not know that they had sinned. The first  ל ֹא־יָדַ עis reference to
the act of sinning conveyed with the verb  עָשָׂ הin v. 17, ָל־מצֹות יהוָה אֲשֶּׁ ר
ִּ ועָשׂתָ ה אַחַ ת ִּמכ

ל ֹא תֵ עָשֶּׂ ינָה. That the absence of knowledge chronologically follows the act of sinning is
supported by the syntax and grammar in v. 17 since  ל ֹא־יָדַ עis inflected as weqatal and
follows עָשָׂ ה, also weqatal, that has a future sense. The second  ל ֹא־יָדַ עrefers to the act of
sinning expressed by the verb  שָׁ גַגin v. 18, וכִּ פֶּר ָעלָיו הַ כֹ הֵ ן עַל ִּשׁגג ַָ֧תֹו אֲשֶּׁ ר־שָׁ גָג. The
inflection of the verb  שָׁ גַגis qatal and it is followed by ל ֹא־יָדַ ע, also qatal, that
corresponds to the preceding  שָׁ גַגin this aspect. Thus, it should be translated as the
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pluperfect, “he had not known.” Accordingly, the short relative clause, אֲשֶּׁ ר־שָׁ גָ ֛ג, and the
following clause, ו ֹ֥הוּא ִֽל ֹא־י ַ ָָ֖דע, refer to the time prior to the time expressed in the first two
clauses in v. 17, ו ִּאם־ ֶּנפֶּשׁ ִּ ֹ֣כי ֶּ ִֽתח ֔ ֱָטא, and ָל־מצֹות יהוָה אֲשֶּׁ ר ל ֹא תֵ עָשֶּׂ ינָה
ִּ ו ָעשׂתָ ה אַחַ ת ִּמכ. It
refers to the time of committing the sin, also potentially including the time prior to it. The
first  ל ֹא־יָדַ עmodifies the verb  עָשָׂ הof the second clause in v. 17, referring to the sinners’
absence of knowledge, unawareness after they have sinned, while the second ל ֹא־יָדַ ע
modifies the verb  שָׁ גַגin v. 18, saying that they did not even know that they had
committed sin. This sin is a sin out of ignorance, where sinners never knew that they had
sinned, neither before nor after the act. Accident is not possible here regardless of the
presence of the  שׁ ָגגָהthat could add the element of accident in this sin because grammar
and syntax point to the ignorance. The present study assumes that this scenario of sinning
has been very limited in Israel due to the nature of BL that conditioned Israel’s good
acquaintance with it. However, it is uniquely addressed here.
The use of verbs that denote the activity of sinning in this pericope demonstrates
that the verbs חָ טָ א, עָשָׂ ה, and  שָׁ גַגare equivalents in the sense that they describe the same
act of sinning in this pericope, although from different perspectives. The sinning that is
expressed by  חָ טָ אand  עָשָׂ הin the first two clauses in v. 17 is expressed by the verb שָׁ גַג
in v. 18. The noun used to denote the sin expressed by all these three verbs is שׁ ָגגָה. As
regards usage of terms, this pericope is the most complex and proves that in sin
terminology, both the verbs that express the activity of sinning and nouns that label the
act of sinning are interchangeable and possess multiple meanings.
The above interpretation of 5:17–19 confirms that Milgrom and Kiuchi are both
320

partially correct in their understanding of what the sinner has been aware of in this
pericope. Milgrom is right that  ל ֹא־יָדַ עrefers to the sinner’s unconsciousness of an act,266
but so is Kiuchi that the sinner is unconscious of the act’s sinfulness.267 Intention is not
important here since sinners do not know that they have sinned as the verb  עָשָׂ הthat is
modified by  ל ֹא־ ָידַ עin v. 17 suggests, nor did they know that their activity represents
breaking of the law when  ל ֹא־יָדַ עmodified the verb  שָׁ גַגand noun  שׁ ָגגָהin v. 18. It is
likely that the intention is involved, if not based, on the use of the verb שָׁ גַג, then based
on the verb  עָשָׂ הwhich refers to the intentional activity, in this case, of breaking God’s
commandments,268 but they did not know the law.
The grammar and syntax of this pericope have an advantage over the literary
structure that has been in accordance with the grammar and syntax in all other protases in
Lev 4–5. The context, grammar, and syntax of 17–19 annulled the established literary
structure.
Lev 4:13. This verse separates itself from the rest of the verses in Lev 4 due to the
extra clause, ונֶּעלַ ֹ֣ם דָּ בָ ר מֵ עֵינֵי הַ קָּ ָהָ֑ל, and use of a different verb, שׁגה, instead of a regular

 חָ טָ אto denote the act of sinning. This clause is the key for the proper reading of the
protasis. All the other subcases contain two verbs that convey the activity of sinning at
the beginning of their pericopes, vv. 2, 22, 27, and these verbs are  חָ טָ אand עָשָׂ ה. The
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meaning of the construction consisting of the verb  ָעלַםand the preposition  ִּמןthat is
attached to the noun or pronoun is well established and refers to the lack of knowledge
(Lev 5:2, 3, 4; Num 5:13) as presented below.
That consciousness of an act or unconsciousness of its sinfulness are not
contained in the verb  שָׁ גָהin this pericope is evident from syntactical, grammatical, and
conceptual standpoint. Syntactically, the verb  שׁגהis a predicate of an opening clause of
Lev 4:13, ו ִּאם כָל־עֲדַ ת יִּשׂ ָראֵ ל יִּשׁגּוּ. The following new clause, marked off with the
conjunction  וis ונֶּעלַם דָּ בָ ר מֵ עֵינֵי הַ קָּ הָ ל. The third new clause set off by another
conjunction  וis ָל־מצֹות יהוָה אֲשֶּׁ ר ל ֹא־תֵ עָשֶּׂ ינָה
ִּ ועָשׂוּ אַחַ ת ִּמכ. Most scholars have
understood that these clauses follow each other chronologically and have the second
clause modify the first one, which means that the conjunction  וis taken to mean “and.” In
that case, the two clauses are translated as “now if the whole congregation of Israel
commits error and the matter escapes the notice of the assembly,” and Milgrom’s
understanding that the clause  ונֶּעלַם דָּ בָ ר מֵ עֵינֵי הַ קָּ הָ לmodifies the verb  שׁגהresults in the
claim that  שָׁ גָהrefers to the consciousness of act of sinning, but unconsciousness of its
sinfulness.269 It is correct to state that  ונֶּעלַם דָּ בָ ר מֵ עֵינֵי הַ קָּ הָ לmodifies ו ִּאם כָל־עֲדַ ת יִּשׂ ָראֵ ל

יִּשׁגּוּ, but this is not the only clause that modifies שׁגה. On the other side, Kiuchi correctly

Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 242. It is surprising that Milgrom totally excluded the verb  עָשָׂ הfrom
his comments in Lev 4. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 246–47, 251, 264–65. It is surprising since he devoted
considerable attention to this verb in various other contexts in his three volume commentary, basically
correctly claiming that  עָשָׂ הconveys intentional activity. Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1522, 1582; Milgrom,
Leviticus 23–27, 2292–93, 2304.
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proposed that the object of  ונֶּעלַםis not  שׁגהfrom the previous clause, since  שָׁ גָהgoverns
a separate clause, but rather, דָּ בָ ר. However, he then erroneously suggested that it is
explained by the verb  עָשָׂ הthat opens the next clause, ָל־מצֹות יהוָה אֲשֶּׁ ר ל ֹא־
ִּ ועָשׂוּ אַחַ ת ִּמכ

 תֵ עָשֶּׂ ינָהand concluded that  שׁגהconsists of two elements: (1) violation of a divine
prohibition, and (2) hidden nature of the act.270
If the general understanding of this protasis is accepted, then the clause ועָשׂוּ אַחַ ת

ָל־מצֹות יהוָה אֲשֶּׁ ר ל ֹא־תֵ עָשֶּׂ ינָה
ִּ  ִּמכis redundant since it just repeats what has been conveyed
already by the verb  שׁגהand in the main casuistic statement, the protasis in v. 2. I suggest
that Kiuchi’s first point is correct, but suggest that the syntax of the three clauses points
to the double nature of the act of sinning. That is, along with the clause271 אָשׁמוּ
ִֽ ֵ ו, these
three clauses constitute the first sentence, v. 13, that is followed by the second sentence
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Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 27–28.

“A clause is the syntactic combination of a subject and predicate. … The two clauses together
constitute a sentence, … When a sentence consists of only one clause it is called a ‘simple sentence’; when
it consists of more than one clause it is called a “compound” or ‘complex’ sentence, depending on how the
clauses within the sentence are joined.” Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax,
69. Before defining these three types of clauses, it is helpful to introduce general understanding of the
sentence. Francis I. Andersen defined the sentence in BH as follows: “A sentence is a grammatically selfcontained construction,” meaning that “the grammatical functions of all constituents in a sentence may be
described in terms of relationships to other constituents in the same sentence.” Francis I. Andersen, The
Hebrew Verbless Clause in the Pentateuch, JBLMS 14 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), 20. In addition,
Andersen also noticed that “Grammatical completeness … may prove as hard to establish as completeness
of thought.” Francis I. Andersen, The Sentence in Biblical Hebrew, JLSP 231 (The Hague: Mouton, 1974),
22. Waltke defined a simple sentence as “consisting of grammatical elements that cannot exist apart from
their syntactical connection with each other and that together constitute a unified utterance.” Waltke and
O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 79. Waltke defined the compound sentence as
containing multiple “verbs, with the single subject and the single adverbial modifier, follow each other with
only the conjunctions to join them.” Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 79.
The complex sentence consists of at least two clauses, the second of which is subordinate to the first,
usually a relative clause, and modifies that subject of the first clause. Waltke and O’Connor, An
Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 79.
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consisting of another two clauses that form most of v. 14, ֲָשׁר חָ ט ָ֖אוּ עָלֶּ ָ֑יה
ֹ֥ ֶּ ונִֽ ֹודעָה ַ ִֽהחַ ֔ ָטּאת א
and והִּ ק ִּריבוּ הַ קָּ הָ ל פַר בֶּ ן־בָ קָ ר לחַ טָּ את. This entire construction is actually a modified real
conditional clause272 that functions as a protasis which describes the subcase of the entire
community’s sinning. The understanding of the particle ו,273 which connects all of these
clauses and the two sentences, is crucial in this text in order to grasp the full meaning of
what the sentences convey.
The essence of the protasis is contained in the first clause, ו ִּאם כָל־עֲדַ ת יִּשׂ ָראֵ ל

יִּשׁגּוּ, and is modified with the two following clauses that propose two different
alternatives. The verbs that govern these four clauses is the opening yiqtol and three
weqatal that follow. This grammatical and syntactical construction is regularly used in
BH to convey succession of thought274 which is the case in this construction. The first

272
Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 636–37. “Any two clauses,
the first of which states a real or hypothetical condition, and the second of which states a real or
hypothetical consequence thereof, may be taken as a conditional sentence.” Thomas Oden Lambdin,
Introduction to Biblical Hebrew (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1971), 276.

The particle  וis a macrosyntactic sign. “Macrosyntactic signs are words, particles, and
expressions which serve … to mark out the major divisions of a text. … The speaker inserts such
macrosyntactic signs in order to highlight for the hearer the beginning, transitions, climaxes, and
conclusions of his address. …. Even if the spoken (colloquial) language is the essential sphere of such
macrosyntactic signs, nevertheless its influence can be also observed in the literary, fixed linguistic forms,
such as we encounter in the Bible, especially in contexts involving dialogue.” Wolfgang Schneider and
Oskar Grether, Grammatik des Biblischen Hebräisch: Ein Lehrbuch (München: Claudius-Verlag, 1974),
261. The particle  וcan also be used at different syntactic levels, thus, besides the macrosyntactic or
intersentential level, it is often used on the interclausal level. Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to
Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 79.
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Waltke stated that “scholars are agreed that the we in the wəqatalt́ construction usually (though
not always) signifies succession (temporal or logical), but they are not agreed about the meaning of the
suffix conjugation in this construction.” Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax,
523.
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alternative is conveyed with דָּ בָ ר מֵ עֵינֵי הַ קָּ הָ ל275  ונֶּעלַםand refers to the sinning that does
not come out of awareness or intention.276 The second alternative is expressed by ועָשׂוּ

ָל־מצֹות יהוָה אֲשֶּׁ ר ל ֹא־תֵ עָשֶּׂ ינָה
ִּ אַחַ ת ִּמכ. The first argument that this clause represents an
alternative to the previous clause is found in the fact that regardless of the very large
semantic field of עָשָׂ ה,277 in the context of God’s commandments in the Pentateuch, it
refers to the intentional activity of breaking them whatever that might be (Ex 15:26; 20:6;
Lev 4:13, 22, 27; 5:17; 26:14–15; Num 15:22, 40; Deut 5:10; 6:25; 15:5; 27:10; 28:1, 15;
30:8; 31:5). Aside from Lev 4–5, this verb is used in Lev 26:14–15 which clearly refers
to the intentional activity of sinning, breaking God’s commandments. The second
argument is found in the semantics of these two clauses. The first clause points to the
unawareness of the sinner that he/she has sinned, while the second clause conveys
intentional activity of sinning. Thus, having established the contrastive nature of these
two clauses based on the meaning of the words from their immediate context and
considering grammar and syntax of conditional clauses, the conjunction  וthat connects
these two clauses, that modifies the opening clause of the protasis, is best understood as
“or” rather than “and.” The opening clause  ו ִּאם כָל־עֲדַ ת יִּשׂ ָראֵ ל יִּשׁגּוּis modified with the

Kiuchi’s remark that this word is definite, referring to something, is implausible since it does
not have the definite article and is syntactically unsupported since it belongs to the clause that modifies the
opening clause of the protasis introducing the first alternative of the way the activity of sinning took place.
275

Rooker’s claim that this clause refers to initial hiddenness of the act lacks grammatical and
syntactical grounds. Rooker, Leviticus, 112–13. Namely,  ונֶּעלַםis a weqatal verb that temporally,
chronologically follows the verb שָׁ גַג/ שָׁ גָהfrom the previous clause. The use of this verb that can be used as
a pluperfect is found in Lev 5:2–4, but there,  ָעלַםis not inflected as weqatal, but as qatal.
276

J. Vollmer, “עשׂה,” TLOT 2:945; Eugene Carpenter, “עָשָׂ ה,” NIDOTTE 3:543.
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two following clauses  ונֶּעלַם דָּ בָ ר מֵ עֵינֵי הַ קָּ הָ לand ָל־מצֹות יהוָה אֲשֶּׁ ר ל ֹא־
ִּ ועָשׂוּ אַחַ ת ִּמכ

תֵ עָשֶּׂ ינָה, thus giving the following meaning: “if the whole community of Israel errs and
the matter escapes the notice of the community (unknowingly or in a hidden way) or they
do any of the Lord’s commandments that are not to be done, and they are guilty.” In other
words, two ways of sinning expressed through this protasis are (1) unconsciousunintentional (out of ignorance or accident), and (2) intentional-non-brazen.
This interpretation of Lev 4:13–14 suggests that the verb  שׁגהin this context is
equivalent to the verb חָ טָ א. The verb  שׁגהfrom the first clause of v. 13 that conveys the
activity of sinning is replaced by the verb  חָ טָ אin v. 14 that refers to the same act of
sinning.  שׁגהand  חָ טָ אare very neutral verbs in terms of conveying the intent of the
activity they refer to, which means that they can refer to both intentional or unintentional
activities. As such,  שׁגהand  חָ טָ אinclude the sinners’ awareness of the act’s sinfulness in
case of intentional sin. In that case, sinners are aware of their act, as well.
The remaining protases in Lev 4:2–3, 22–23, 27–28 do not have an  עלםelement
and consistently use the verb חָ טָ א, modified by the prepositional phrase בִּ שׁ ָגגָה. The verb

 חָ טָ אgets more nuanced meaning in vv. 2–3, 22–23, and 27–28. It is the noun  שׁ ָגגָהthat
brings out nuances contained in the verb חָ טָ א. Before analyzing these protases, it is
necessary to define  שׁ ָגגָהwhen accompanied with the preposition  בor ( לNum 15:24)
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because this prepositional phrase frequently modifies the verbs חָ טָ א,278 שָׁ גַג,279 עָשָׂ ה,280

 אָכַלor .and 35 5 and Num 15–in Lev 4 282ָנכָה

281

The study of  שׁ ָגגָהin relation to these verbs augments the semantic domain of the
term שָׁ גַג/שָׁ גָה. It was demonstrated that the noun  שׁ ָגגָהonly refers to the intentionality of
the activity, but unawareness of the activity’s sinfulness in the context of Lev 5:17–19.
However, the phrase  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהconveys some additional nuances to the nature of sins or the
activity of sinning.

בִּ שׁ ָגגָה
As in Lev 4:13, the protasis in Lev 4:2, 27, 5:15; and Num 15:27, 28,283 where

 בִּ שׁ ָגגָהmodifies the verb חָ טָ א, also proposes two ways in which the sin has been
committed. Milgrom and others are right284 “that the verb ḥāṭāʾ can cover the entire range
of sin from accidental misdemeanors … to deliberate crimes.”285 In addition to the
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Lev 4:2, 27, 5:15; Num 15:27.
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Num 15:28.
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Lev 4:22, Num 15:24, 26, 29.
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Lev 22:14.
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Num 35:11, 15.
The nominal of  חָ טָ אfunctions as a verb.
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For further list of scholars see Gane, Cult and Character, 292nn30–35.
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Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 320.
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modifying verb חָ טָ א, the phrase modifies the verb  עָשָׂ הin Lev 4:22 and Num 15:26,286
29.
In Lev 4:2, the protasis consists of two clauses, but the opening clause, ֶֶּ֗נפֶּשׁ ִּ ִֽכי־

ָשׂינָה
ָ֑ ֶּ ֲשׁר ֹ֣ל ֹא תֵ ע
ָ֖ ֶּ תֶּ ח ֱָטֶ֤א בִּ שׁ ָגגָה ִּמכֹ ל ִּמצֹוֹ֣ ת יה ֔ ָוה א,287 in which  חָ טָ אis modified by בִּ שׁ ָגגָה
potentially points to both intentional or unintentional sinning. The notion of intentionality
and unintentionality is contained in both  חָ טָ אand בִּ שׁ ָגגָה. However, the following clause
introduces the alternative and more determined way of sinning, ועָשָָׂ֕ ה מֵ אַחַ ת מֵ הֵ נָּה. The
verb  עָשָׂ הin the context of God’s commandments points to intentional activity. The
contrastive nature of these two clauses, based on their meanings, suggests that the
conjunction  וshould be translated as “or” and the verb  חָ טָ אis understood to refer to
unintentional sinning in order to avoid a mere repetition of the same meaning in the
following clause. Thus, the two clauses should be translated as “when a person sins
unintentionally in regards to any of the Lord’s commandments or does any them:” The
very same pattern is seen in 4:27 with infinitival inflection of  עָשָׂ הin contrast to weqatal
in Lev 4:2.
The context of Lev 5:15 is vague since  וחָ טאָה בִּ שׁ ָגגָהactually modifies the
opening clause of the pericope, י־תמ ֹ֣ ֹעל ֔ ַמעַל
ִּ  ֶּנפֶּשׁ ִּ ִֽכand the verb  מָ עַלdoes not provide

It is assumed that in this text  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהmodifies the verb  עָשָׂ הsince the community’s activity of
sinning is expressed by it in v. 24.
286

287

This clause implies sinning against all divine commandments. Kiuchi, Purification Offering,

22–23.
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many insights into the intentionality or unintentionality of the activity.288 The use of
to very particular, intentional sthat it often refer sPentateuch demonstratethe ni 289מָ עַל
sins of disloyalty, mainly towards God290 (Lev 26:40; 31:16; Deut 32:51), and
sometimes, to other human beings (Num 5:12, 27). Theoretically, sacrilege can be
committed intentionally and unintentionally. However, the second, contrasting clause

 וחָ טאָה בִּ שׁ ָגגָהsuggests that י־תמ ֹ֣ ֹעל ֔ ַמעַל
ִּ  ֶּנפֶּשׁ ִּ ִֽכpoints to intentional sin. Accordingly, the
pattern of two alternative ways of sinning exists in this pericope. All three terms
involved, מָ עַל,  חָ טָ אand  שׁ ָגגָהcan refer to both the intentionality and unintentionality of
the committed activity.
Lev 22:14. This text does not provide any new insights into the meaning of בִּ שׁ ָגגָה
that has not been identified in other contexts. Here,  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהuniquely modifies the verb

אָכַל. It seems logical to conclude that, as with the previous contexts,  בִּ שׁ ָג ָגהrefers to both,
intentionality and unintentionality.
In Num 15:27, the protasis is simple, consisting of one clause, אַחָ֖ת תֶּּ ח ֱָטֹ֣א
ַ ו ִּאם־נֶּ ֹ֥פֶּשׁ

בִּ שׁגָגָ ָ֑ה. Not much can be inferred from this context since both terms,  חָ טָ אand שׁ ָגגָה, can
refer to the intentionality and unintentionality of the committed activity. However, the
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Levine, Leviticus, 30; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 320.
Robin Wakely, “מָ עַל,” NIDOTTE 2:1012–13; Rolf P. Knierim, “מָ עַל,” TLOT 2:681.
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Milgrom’s claim that  מָ עַלconstitutes a sin against God in all of its occurrences is broad and
imprecise since not just מָ עַל, but all the sins expressed by all terms for sin in OT are ultimately sins against
God. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 345–46. Sometimes, a human party directly suffers the consequences of
( מָ עַלNum 5:12, 27). I accept, rather, Knierim’s and Wakely’s proposal that  מָ עַלrefers to the unfaithfulness
or disloyalty mainly to God, but also to human beings.Wakely, “מָ עַל,” NIDOTTE 2:1012–13; Knierim,
“מָ עַל,” TLOT 2:681.
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major casuistic statement of this legal case further confirms the presence of the elements
of intentionality and unintentionality related to this sin.
The protasis in 15:22291 consists of two clauses,  ו ִּ ֹ֣כי ִּתשׁגּ֔ וּand ו ֹ֣ל ֹא תַ ע ֲ֔שׂוּ ֵ ֹ֥את כָל־

ר־דּ ֶּבֹ֥ר יהוָ ָ֖ה אֶּ ל־מֹ ֶּ ִֽשׁה
ִּ ֶּהַ ִּמּצֹוָ֖ ת הָ ֵ ָ֑אלֶּּה אֲשׁ. The verb  שׁגהis a neutral verb and can refer to both
intentional and unintentional activity, while refers to intentional generally 292עָשָׂ ה
activity. Milgrom rightly stated that  עָשָׂ הpredicates active violation.293 Thus, two
alternative ways are potentially present in the major protasis which covers the subcases in
15:27–29. The trend noted in Num 15:1–16, as a literary context of Num 15:22–31,
strongly suggests that this chapter introduces innovations. The requirements for the
sacrifices in 15:22–31 were also modified.294 Num 15:22–31 does not contain a
subheading, which means that it belongs to the previous section, vv. 17–21, and
ultimately, the opening section, vv. 1–16,295 which also says that dependence of this
section to the entire chapter assumes the context of commandments. Within this context
of expanding legislation, the verb  שׁגהis more specified, as in Lev 4, to convey breaking
God’s commandments hypothetically, intentionally, or unintentionally. The verb עָשָׂ ה

“The language of Num 15—kol-hammiṣwôt …kol-ʾăšer ṣiwwâ any of the commandments …
anything that [the Lord] has enjoined’ (vv 22, 23)—must be understood literally: the word kol- embraces all
of the commandments, positive and negative, performative and prohibitive.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 265.
291

Milgrom did not give details on the meaning of the verb  עָשָׂ הin the context of Num 15:22–26
and its importance for the interpretation of this passage other than saying that the verb is used as a technical
term for the entire process of offering a sacrifice. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 265–66. This is in contrast to
his detailed analysis of this verb in the context of Lev 26:14 that provided him with appropriate and valid
insights into the meaning of this text.
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Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 265.
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Levine, Numbers 1–20, 395–96.

295

Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 265.
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governs the second clause that introduces the alternative way of sinning and, if not
modified in the immediate context, it refers to intentional sinning. Nothing in this
particular context indicates that  ָעשָׂ הshould be taken as pointing to unintentional sinning.
In addition, the protases of significantly longer subcases in Lev 4 all contain two
alternative ways of sinning which is not the situation here, most likely due to the
considerably abbreviated nature of the texts of these subcases, with emphasis on the
sacrificial innovation and not on the precise ways of sinning. Accordingly, the protasis in
v. 22 governs all others found in vv. 24 and 27, but not 30 since the subcase in v. 30 uses
the verb  עָשָׂ הwhich is further modified with the phrase  ביָד ָרמָ הthat even more
intensifies the intentional nature of sinning presented in this subcase. In addition, it is
punishable by capital punishment. The data from the immediate context confirm that the
major protasis does not cover the subcase in vv. 30–31.
Thus, the major protasis that introduces two alternative ways of sinning in v. 22
applies to the first two subcases in vv. 24–26 and 27–29. It does not cover the last
subcase in vv. 30–31 due to the specific, brazen nature of sin it deals with.
That the terms  חָ טָ אand  שָׁ גָהare being used equally is proven by their
interchangeability in subcase 15:27–29. That is, in v. 27,  חָ טָ אis modified by בִּ שׁ ָגגָה,
while in v. 28, the activity of sinning, expressed by the verb שָׁ גַג, is modified by the
nominal phrase  בחֶּ טאָֹ֥הthat functions verbally, which is modified by the adverbial phrase

בִּ שׁ ָגגָה.296 This relatedness and interchangeability proves that these terms generally share
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the same semantic range if not also modified by the immediate context. Both terms refer
to the intentionality and unintentionality of the committed activities.
The unique use of  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהis found in Lev 4:22. Like the protasis in 4:2–3, 27–28,
this one consists of two clauses that introduce two alternative manners of sinning. The
first alternative is to sin intentionally -  אֲשֶּׁ ר נ ִָּשׂיא ֶּיחֱטָ אand the second is to sin
unintentionally - ָשׂינָה בִּ שׁגָגָ ָ֖ה
֛ ֶּ ֲשׁר ל ֹא־תֵ ע
ַ֧ ֶּ ֱֹלהיו א
ָ ָ֜ ָל־מצֹות יה ֨ ָוה א
ִּ אַחֹ֣ת ִּמכ
ַ ועָשָָׂ֡ ה. However, the
verbs used in previous protasis to refer to the intentionality and unintentionality
exchanging place. That is, in 4:2–3, 27–28; 5:17,  חָ טָ אmodified by  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהis used to refer
to unintentional sinning, while  עָשָׂ הalone was used to refer to intentional sinning. They
exchanged places here. However, the text still portrays two alternative ways of sinning,
and the fact that the verbs exchanged their established places in the protasis structure
does not affect the meaning of any of the clauses based on the fact that both  חָ טָ אand עָשָׂ ה
convey intentionality and unintentionality in their semantic range. It is based on the fact
that it is modified by  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהso that עָשָׂ ה, normally conveying intentionality, is taken to
communicate unintentionality in this context, while  חָ טָ אconveys intentionality.
The phrase  לִּ שׁ ָגגָהmodifies the verb  עָשָׂ הin 15:24, whereas  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהmodifies it in
Num 15:26, 29. The preposition

לis uniquely attached to  שׁ ָגגָהin v. 24 to mark either
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its adverbial function to the verb  עָשָׂ הor to mark it as direct object of עָשָׂ ה. The latter is
more probable since  עָשָׂ הis inflected as passive and when inflected as such, is used to

This is  לof manner, often used in this way to form “such phrases as lārōb ‘abundantly’ and
lāṭōhar ‘clearly.’” Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 206.
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refer to the impersonal subject (Lev 7:9; 18:30; Deut 13:14; 17:4), which does fit this
context since the subject of  עָשָׂ הwould be עֵדָ ה, that is in the same clause, and  עָשָׂ הin the
following clause, assuming the same subject is active.

 בִּ שׁ ָגגָהis used adverbially in Num 15:26, 29 to refer to the way the act of sinning
has been committed. In v. 26, it stands on its own in a verbless clause referring to the sin
of the community. The fact that  שׁ ָגגָהis subject of the niphal passive form of the verb

 עָשָׂ הin the protasis that introduces the subcase of the community in v. 24 reveals that
 בִּ שׁ ָגגָהmodifies the verb  עָשָׂ הsince the activity of sinning of the community is conveyed
by that verb in v. 24. In v. 29, the phrase modifies the verb  עָשָׂ הwhich is contained in the
text, the ending of the verse.
The subcases in vv. 22–26 and 27–29 are sharply contrasted with the subcase in
vv. 30–31. The activity of killing is more closely defined by the adverbial phrase ביָד ָרמָ ה
that even more intensifies the intentional nature of this activity. In addition, it is
punishable by capital punishment, with no chance for the doer to received atonement and
forgiveness. As was established earlier, this attitude of sinning is called “brazen sin”;
then it is not just intentional in performing an illegal act, but intent on annihilating the
party on the opposite side.
The phrase has been used more specifically in Num 35:11, 15, where it modifies
the verb  ָנכָה, which in this context, means “to kill,”298 that refers to the act of homicide,
the activity of killing another human being. The analysis of this law that has been done
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on pages 272–78 of this study shows that  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהhas been used to convey both the
accidental and the unintentional activity of a human being that unfortunately resulted in
the death of another human being. The intentional killing is defined in vv. 16–21 with the
terms that convey prior planning of murder, while those terms are juxtaposed with
another set of terms in the section that describes unintentional killing in vv. 22–24. Thus,
while  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהdirectly modifies the verb  ָנכָהthat conveys “to kill,” a meaning that is
informed by another set of verbs in vv. 22–24, they all point to the fact that the act of
homicide took place accidentally and unintentionally. Accordingly, the context of Num
35 suggests that  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהconveys the unintentional and accidental nature of the act and is
followed by the phrase  בִּ בלִּ י־דַ עַתin order to emphasize that it does not imply previous
mental planning of the act.299

עָשָׂ ה: Pattern of Uses in the Pentateuch
Before concluding the analysis of Lev 4–5, the present study examines the pattern
of uses of the verb  עָשָׂ הsince some parts of this analysis may be questioned by the claim
that  עָשָׂ הand the verbs of sinning in these chapters refers to the same verbal activity.
It is well documented that ’עָשָׂ הs semantic range is vast.300 Due to its semantic
flexibility,  עָשָׂ הoften gets its meaning in a given context and can include a variety of
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Botica, Concept of Intention, 34–36. For a more specific meaning related to the terms
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Carpenter, “עָשָׂ ה,” NIDOTTE 3:544. Vollmer, “עשׂה,” TLOT 2:945.

300

334

verbal activities.301 Carpenter noted the pattern in Gen 1–11 that when God is subject of

עָשָׂ ה, “it is a word whose meaning is determined by the function its context assigns to it.
In itself it simply indicates activity of whatever kind its context demands,
making/doing.”302 The same principle is detected with  עָשָׂ הand a human subject.303 The
present study also identified the same  עָשָׂ הuses in BL texts and narratives. The context
remains the key factor for determining the meaning of this verb.

 עָשָׂ הin the Contexts of Verbs that
Express the Activity of Sinning
In order to provide a more specific semantic range of  עָשָׂ הI identified and
examined the texts which contain the identical syntactical structures where the verbs עָשָׂ ה
and the verbs of sinning are found in the same context like the one found in Lev 4–5. The
texts are listed in Table 20.
Semantically, the statistics are indecisive. The texts can be divided into two
groups: cultic laws (Exod 29:36; Lev. 4:2, 13, 22, 27; 5:10, 17; 6:3; Num 6:11; 15:22;)
and narratives (Gen 20:6, 9; 39:9; Exod 5:16; 32:31; Num 32:23; Deut 9:16, 18; 20:18).
Some of these texts contain both patterns of uses, such as when the verbs of sinning
precede and follow the verb עָשָׂ ה.
More certainty is detected in the 10 texts where  עָשָׂ הprecedes the verb of sinning
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Table 20. The verb  עָשָׂ הand the verbs of sinning
Activity ()עָשָׂ ה
1, Taking Sarah
v. 2–3
1, Lying v. 5
1, Sex v. 7, 12
1, Making bricks
v. 16
1, Offering
sacrifice
2, Making idol
2, Breaking the law

Intention
yes

Activity (sinning)
2, חָ טָ א, sex

Intention
No

Sem. Overlap
No

yes
no
no

2, חָ טָ א, unknown
2, חָ טָ א, adultery
2, Chet, out-turn,
norm
2, חָ טָ א, purify

No
No
No

no
yes
no

Yes

yes, partially

Yes
No

yes, partially
yes, potentially

2, Breaking the law

yes

No

yes, potentially

2, Breaking the law

no

Yes

yes, potentially

2, Breaking the law

yes

No

yes, potentially

yes

Yes

no

no
yes

1, חָ טָ א
2, חָ טָ א

Yes
Yes

yes, potentially
yes

yes

2, חָ טָ א

No

no

yes
yes
yes
yes

1, שָׁ גַג
2, חָ טָ א, lying
1, חָ טָ א, idolatry
2, חָ טָ א, idolatry

No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Deut 9:18

1, Offering
sacrifice
2, Breaking the law
1, Various
activities
1, Offering a
sacrifice
2, Breaking the law
1, Helping to take
2, Making idol
1, Making idol,
idolatry

1, חָ טָ א, idolatry
1, חָ טָ א, breaking
the law
1, שׁגה, breaking
the law
1, חָ טָ א, breaking
the law
1, חָ טָ א, breaking
the law
2, חָ טָ א, oath, vow

Deut 20:18

1, Teaching

yes

2, חָ טָ א, idolatry

No

yes, potentially
no
yes, partially
yes, Inf.
Complementing
verb
yes, partially

Gen. 20:6
Gen 20:9
Gen 39:9
Exod 5:16
Exod 29:36
Exod 32:31
Lev 4:2
Lev 4: 13
Lev 4: 22
Lev 4: 27
Lev 5:10
Lev 5: 17
Lev 5:22[6:3]
Num 6:11
Num 15:22
Num 32:23
Deut 9:16

yes
yes
yes

in cultic laws (Exod 29:36; Lev 5:10, 22 [6:3]; Num 6:11) or narrative (Gen 20:6, 9; 39:9,
Exod 5:16; Num 32:23; Deut 20:18). Semantically,  עָשָׂ הoverlaps with the verbs of
sinning in 4/10, while in 6/10, it does not. In cultic texts, the statistics are even, 2/4 for
semantic overlap and 2/4 for semantic distinctiveness. Semantic distinctiveness is more
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emphasized in the narrative texts 4/6 in contrast to the overlap in 2/4 texts.304
Less certainty is found in the 9 texts when the verbs of sinning precede  עָשָׂ הin
cultic laws (Lev 4:2, 13, 22, 27; 5:17; Num 15:22) or narrative (Exod 32:31; Deut 9:16,
18). There is only one text, a narrative one, where  עָשָׂ הunquestionably overlaps with the
verb of sinning (Deut 9:18) while the statistics in all other texts are uncertain. This
uncertainty is reflected in the fact that in all 6 cultic law texts where the verb of sinning
precedes ( עָשָׂ הLev 4:2, 13, 22, 27; 5:17; Num 15:22), there is the potential that these two
verbs might overlap semantically. In the 2/3 narrative texts, the verb  עָשָׂ הsemantically
overlaps with the verb of sinning in part only, while only once (Deut 9:18) did they
overlap certainly.
These statistics demonstrate that certainty of the semantic overlap of the verb עָשָׂ ה
and the verbs of sinning when they occur in the same context is very low. In other words,
the statistics of use do not provide grounds for the claim that  עָשָׂ הand the verbs of
sinning refer to the same activity. A given context remains the final determiner as to
whether this is the case or not.
Does  עָשָׂ הRefer to the Same Activity
as the Preceding Verb?
In order to add more precision to the uses of עָשָׂ ה, the present study followed the
same syntactical pattern that is used in Lev 4–5, namely, that of any verb that is followed
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by weqatal of עָשָׂ ה. The statistics of this search demonstrated that ’עָשָׂ הs uses in the
books of Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers demonstrate that the verbs preceding  עָשָׂ הdo
not semantically conflate with it in 61 out of 63305 texts without considering Lev 4:2, 13,
22; 5:17. Two exceptions are Exod 20:9 and 32:31. In the former text,  עָשָׂ הis
semantically conflated with the verb  עָבַ דand does not reveal additional particulars
beyond the meaning carried by עָבַ ד. In the latter text,  עָשָׂ הrefers to the same activity of
sinning as  חָ טָ אdoes, but it explains exactly what the sin was. These statistics on  עָשָׂ הdo
not prevent the interpretation of it in Lev 4–5 that claims that  עָשָׂ הrefers to the
intentional activity except when the text explicitly marks it as unintentional activity.
Second, there is a law possibility that  עָשָׂ הsemantically merges with the verbs of sinning
and there is almost no possibility that it coalesces semantically with the verbs in the
constructions as in Lev 4–5, that is, a verb followed by the weqatal of עָשָׂ ה.

Conclusion on בִּ שׁ ָגגָה
The literary context, grammar, syntax, and lexical terms of Lev 4:2, and 27 point
to the existence of two alternative ways of sinning, intentional and unintentional. בִּ שׁ ָגגָה
that modifies  חָ טָ אclarifies that this verb refers to unintentional sinning, while the verb

 עָשָׂ הexpressed intentional, but non-brazen sinning.
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The same contextual elements of Lev 5:15 also point to the same conclusion. That
is, sacrilege is done intentionally, but non-brazenly, י־תמ ֹ֣ ֹעל ֔ ַמעַל
ִּ  ֶּנפֶּשׁ ִּ ִֽכ, and
unintentionally, out of ignorance or accident, וחָ טאָה בִּ שׁ ָג ָגה.
There are two foundational points that are inferred from  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהcontexts. First,
Num 15:22–31 and its immediate context suggests that the semantic range of the phrase

 בִּ שׁ ָגגָהis limited to non-brazen sin. The sin may or may not have been intentional, which
consequently includes the accidental nature of the act when it was committed, act, but the
activity was not expression of a brazen attitude. The sin stands in sharp contradiction to

 ביָד ָרמָ הsin which articulates brazen sin deserving of capital punishment. Second, Num
35:11, 15 and its immediate context suggests that the semantic range of the phrase בִּ שׁ ָגגָה
includes activities committed as a result of accident with no intentionality included on the
sinner’s part.
Based on the use of  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהit Num 15:22–31 and 35:11, 15, I suggest that this
phrase refers to accidental sinning and nonbrazen sinning. If the immediate context of the
phrase does not provide arguments for a different nuance of meaning, this is the meaning
that should be assumed by the phrase בִּ שׁ ָגגָה, including in Lev 4–5.

 יָדַ עand ָעלַם
Lev 5:2, 3, and 4. The verb  ָעלַםis closely related to the verbs  יָדַ עand  אָשַׁ םin Lev
5:3, 4. That is, the Hebrew reads it  ונֶּעלַם ִּממֶּּ נּוּ והוּא יָדעin vv. 3 and 4. The phrase that
conveys the absence of knowledge is immediately followed by the phrase that expresses
the presence of knowledge. Wells logically asked the following question: “The question
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then becomes whether the presence of knowledge (wehû yādaʿ) chronologically precedes
the absence of knowledge (‘it is hidden from him, though he knew’) or whether it follows
the absence of knowledge (‘it is hidden from him, but then he comes to know’).”306
Accepting the latter option means that the person involved was not conscious of
his sin. On the other hand, accepting the former option means that the person involved
had knowledge of his sin, was aware of it, but consequently lost knowledge of it. He
forgot about it. There are at least two valid reasons why the latter option fits the literary
context and syntax of the text better.307
First, the order and inflection of the verbs  ָעלַם, יָדַ ע, and  אָשַׁ םin vv. 3 and 4 are
identical. The clause in which the verb  יָדַ עis inflected as qatal begins with the waw
conjunctive and is positioned between two clauses that begin with waw consecutives and
weqatal verbs  ָעלַםpreceding and  אָשַׁ םfollowing the  יָדַ עclause ( ונֶּעלַ ֹ֣ם ִּמ ֶּ ָ֑מּנּוּ והוּא־י ַ ָֹ֥דע

אָשׁם
ָ֖ ֵ )ו.308 Milgrom correctly interpreted the tense of the verbs based on the syntax and
grammar: “A verb in the perfect between two perfects governed by waw consecutives has
the force of a pluperfect, giving the reading that originally he knew that he had become
impure but subsequently he forgot (Tg. Ps.-J.).”309 The same construction with the same
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Wells, The Law of Testimony, 65–66. The verb  אָשַׁ םcontinued the aspect of the epexegetical
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tense is found in Lev 13:6, 32 and in a reversed way, in Lev 26:44. Thus, contextually
and syntactically, the clause  והוּא־יָדַ עis best translated as a pluperfect “and he had
known.”310
Such a translation finds support in v. 2 where 311 והוּא טָ מֵ אoccurs instead of והוּא־

יָדַ ע. Employing a pluperfect sense for  והוּא טָ מֵ אleads to the “and he had become
unclean” and logically fits the context better than the future tense that would yield, “and
then he becomes unclean,” because the act of becoming unclean, והוּא טָ מֵ א, does not
follow the absence of the knowledge, ונֶּעלַם ִּממֶּּ נּוּ, about it, but rather, precedes it.
Accordingly, the act of possessing the knowledge in vv. 3 and 4 is also unlikely to follow
the absence of the knowledge about it, but rather, precedes it.312 All aspects of this
sentence, the grammar, syntax, and logical sequence of actions, favor this understanding.
Second, all vv. 1–4 form protases of which the apodosis is found in vv. 5–6 where
the confession is introduced as the remedy for the sins previously portrayed. There are
two characteristics related to the sins listed in vv. 1–4. They are either public offenses,313
vv. 1, 4, or forgotten failures to prevent defilement spreading and eventually defiling the
sanctuary,314 vv. 2–3. All these particular sins affect other people and potentially, God’s
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sanctuary. I suggest that this is one of the reasons why they are separated from the sins in
Lev 4 where the text does not treat cases in which the sin is forgotten, but presumably
dealt with them immediately after it was committed. As such, they require confession
since they are publicly done, vv. 1, 4, or the public/community is affected or endangered
by them, vv. 2–3.
It needs to be noticed that the syntax and the grammar of  ָעלַםand  יָדַ עin 5:2–4 are
different from that of 4:13. In 5:2–3, as noticed, the verbs ( יָדַ עvv. 3–4) and ( טָ מֵ אv. 2)
are inflected as qatal which is best interpreted as pluperfect. In contrast, in 4:13 the verb
is weqatal and follows the flow of the text. It refers to the activity taking place after the
activity expressed by the verb שׁגה, or here, it describes it. Thus, context, including
grammar and syntax, proves to be determinative of the meaning of the words.
Conclusion on שָׁ גַג/שָׁ גָה/ שׁ ָגגָהand ל ֹא־יָדַ ע
Milgrom’s proposal that the absence of the terms שָׁ גַג/ שָׁ גָהfrom Lev 5:17–19
proves that this term refers to the sinner’s consciousness of act is disproved by a fresh
interpretation of this pericope. Along with the fact that  ל ֹא־יָדַ עis used two times in vv. 17
and 18, it needs to be emphasized that the terms שָׁ גַג/ שָׁ גָהand  שׁ ָגגָהare also used in v. 18.
The fact that  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהdoes not adverbially modify the verbs of sinning  חָ טָ אand  עָשָׂ הin
5:17, along with the use of nominal and verbal derivatives of the root שָׁ גַג/ שָׁ גָהto describe
sin in v. 18, does not disprove Milgrom’s claim that sinners in this pericope are not aware
of their act nor its sinfulness. However, this claim is not based on the fact that שָׁ גַג/שָׁ גָה
does not modify the verbs of sinning in the protasis, thus conveying the sinners’
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awareness of their act. The terms שָׁ גַג/ שָׁ גָהused in v. 18 define sin in 5:17–19. שָׁ ַגג/שָׁ גָה
are used as generic terms for sinning and for sin like  חָ טָ אand its derivatives. The use of
the phrase  ל ֹא־יָדַ עsuggests that this phrase, by referring to the sinner's unawareness of sin
prior to, after, and consequently during the act, delineates a totally unique and new type
of sin in Lev 4–5; a sin out of ignorance. The sinner intentionally commits an act, but not
knowing the law, they are unaware that they have sinned. Consequently, they are not
aware of the sinfulness of their act. This argument disproves Milgrom's postulate that the
term שָׁ גַג/ שָׁ גָהalways refers to the sinner’s consciousness of the act but not its sinfulness.

שָׁ גַג/ שָׁ גָהcarries a different meaning. That is, the use of  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהin Num 15:22–31 and
35:11, 15 suggests that the term refers to accidental and nondefiant sinning.
Finally, the uses of this term in Lev 4–5 determine the final semantic nuance of
this term. That is, the extra clause in 4:13, ונֶּעלַם דָּ ֔ ָבר מֵ עֵינֵי הַ קָּ הָ ל, the use of  שׁגהin the
major casuistic statement instead of the regular  חָ טָ אalong with the context, grammar, and
syntax of this pericope signals that the whole protasis in 4:13–14 should be read as
proposing two alternative ways of sinning. The first alternative, ונֶּעלַם דָּ ֔ ָבר מֵ עֵינֵי הַ קָּ הָ ל,
conveys unintentional sin out of ignorance or accident, while the second one, ועָשׂוּ אַחַ ת

ָל־מצֹות יהוָה אֲשֶּׁ ר ל ֹא־תֵ עָשֶּׂ ינָה
ִּ  ִּמכ, expresses intentional, but non-brazen sin. This reading
implies  שׁגהin a major, introductory statement does not refer to consciousness of the act,
nor to its sinfulness; rather, it is used as a general verb for sinning like  חָ טָ אwith the
potential of referring to all possible ways of sinning.
The verb שָׁ גַג/שָׁ גָה, like the verb חָ טָ א, expresses all types of sinning in the OT.
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The immediate and wider context of each use clarifies whether the verb is used in a
generic way or conveys some specific way of sinning.
Based on the understanding of crucial terms in Lev 4–5 and Num 15, חָ טָ א,

שָׁ גַג/שָׁ גָה, אָשַׁ ם, יָדַ ע, and  ָעלַם, presented above, the final outcome is the following
interpretation of the nature of sins and intent in the respective chapters.
The four subcases in Lev 4 all assume two alternative ways of sinning:
unintentional, accidental, and potentially out of ignorance, and intentional, but nonbrazen. The next four subcases in Lev 5:1–4 are intentional, but non-brazen sins that were
forgotten and eventually remembered. The pericope of Lev 5:14–16 is unique for that
reason, separated from subcases in Lev 4, because it deals with sins against the sancta.
However, in terms of the nature of sinning due to the use of a general verb  חָ טָ אand the
theoretical potential, the pericope assumes the same types of sins as are in Lev 4,
unintentional, accidental, or out of ignorance and intentional but non-brazen. Leviticus
5:17–19 is another unique type of sinning that is only well-established here, and that is a
sin of ignorance. The final pericope in Leviticus, 5:20–26 [6:1–7], encompasses
exclusively intentional, but non-brazen sins. Numbers 15:22–31 deals with two types of
sinning. The first is described in vv. 22–29 and are non-brazen sins which may include all
types of non-brazen sins defined in Lev 4–5. The second is brazen sin that includes the
full intention of the sinner, along with the attitude of rejecting God’s personality and
authority.
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Expiable and Inexpiable Sins in the OT
Any sort of capital punishment or kārēt315 seems to be the determinative factor in
dividing sins into expiable and inexpiable. In addition, the phrase  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןfrequently
points to capital punishment, which further means that it refers to inexpiable sin. Finally,

 אָשַׁ םnormally points to expiable sin, but it is conditioned by sinners’ following the
procedure to be forgiven, namely offering a sacrifice, applying blood on appropriate parts
of the sanctuary, and taking necessary steps toward the restitution for their sin.  אָשַׁ םitself
includes some sort of punitive consequences for sinners who forget their sin or are not
aware of it in order to make them remember their sin and take necessary actions to avoid
punishment for it. These punitive consequences could eventually lead to capital
punishment if the sinner refuses to offer the appropriate sacrifice and be forgiven. In
addition, some sins that deserve capital punishment like eating the meat of a peace
offering while impure in Lev 7:20 are forgivable if committed accidentally or out of
ignorance and the sinner offers sacrifice and make necessary restitutions. If they refuse to
offer sacrifice, the capital punishment that is stated in that particular law, which is kārēt,
applies. This is also confirmed by Lev 17:11 that the atoning blood ransoms sinner’s life,
which implies that the sinner’s life is in danger when his/her sin is unresolved.316
In the chapter “Numbers 15:22–31 and the Spectrum of Moral Faults,” Gane
reviewed previous work on the kinds of sin in the OT and endorsed Adrian Schenker’s
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understanding, however, he modified it by adding two additional qualifications.317 The
entire debate on this topic involves the two comparative laws of the sin offering: Lev 4–5
and Num 15:22–31.
Gary A. Anderson has argued that Num 15:22–31 encompasses two kinds of sin,
expiable inadvertent and inexpiable high-handed, that cover the entire spectrum of moral
sins.318 The outcome of this interpretation, as Anderson himself stated, is that any sin
committed advertently (intentionally) results in capital punishment: “This text singles out
for special emphasis two facts: first, all sins committed inadvertently require sacrificial
atonement; and, second, any sin that is committed advertently results in the banishment
of the person in question.”319 Anderson related the second group of sins with the minority
of sins of an “egregious nature” that are associated with the cult or ritual.320 This division
and its rationale is disproven by the texts since Lev 4–5 and Num 15 encompass both
intentional and unintentional sins and both are forgivable as suggested in the present
study.
Milgrom, following rabbinic tradition, proposed that expiable deliberate sins (Lev
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5:5, Num 5:7) require voluntary confession in order to reduce them to the category of
inadvertent, expiable sins. He assumed that Num 15:30–31 does not allow sacrificial
expiation only for the unrepentant sinner.321 Gane rightfully critiqued this view based on
the fact that Num 15:30–31 does not prescribe confession to provide expiation through
repentance. The specific cases of intentional, but expiable sins in Lev 5:20–26 and Num
5:6–8 do not provide enough grounds for the claim that all other deliberate sins can be
expiated.322 In addition, the absence of capital punishment significantly dissociates sin in
Lev 5:20–26 and Num 5:6–8 from the one in Num 15:30–31. In addition, contrary to
Gane in regard to premeditation,323 it is very possible that the blasphemer acted with
premeditation during the brawl (Lev 24:10–14, 23). Why would one, in the middle of a
fierce, physical fight, curse God but not his immediate enemy whom he fights with and is
most likely overpowered by? It is very possible, keeping in mind the background of this
man,324 that he spoke out of his attitude of rebelliousness to God.
Two scholars, Bradley McLean and Baruch Levine, defined the  ביָד ָרמָ הsins, vv.
30–31, as premeditated to distinguish them from the ones that are unpremeditated.325
Gane criticized this view by claiming that שָׁ גַג/ שָׁ גָהdoes not cover unpremeditated
deliberate sins and that intent is not crucial in defining a sin as expiable or inexpiable.326
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However, based on the reading of Lev 4–5 proposed in this study, שָׁ גַג/ שָׁ גָהdoes provide
sufficient data for determining whether the sinner acted with intent or not. Intention only,
along with unintentionality, is present in all four subcases in Lev 4; 5:1–4, 14–16, 17–19,
20–26. Gane is convincing that in the end, intent itself does not necessarily define
whether the sin is expiable or inexpiable.
Gane also found Angel Rodríguez’s and Mark Rooker’s interpretation of Num
15:30–31 untenable. They, like Milgrom, proposed that subsequent repentance reduces
deliberate sin to inadvertent and thus, expiable.327 Beside good points of this
interpretation,328 Gane criticized this approach, as well. First, Gane correctly noted that
allowance for the expiation of some deliberate sins does not warrant expiation of all
deliberate sins.329 This is evident in light of the fact that capital punishment is related to
some deliberate sins. Second, Gane’s second point was informed by the ADH of the
sanctuary, which means that inexpiable sins reach the sanctuary through the air
automatically as they are committed. He noted that Rodríguez’s and Rooker’s claim that
any deliberate sin of which the sinner repents is expiable through the sacrifice, based on
the fact that in Lev 16:16, 21, rebellious sins, פשָׁ עִּ ים, were purged from the sanctuary on
the Day of Atonement. They, in Gane’s understanding, missed seeing that removal of
these sins from the sanctuary does not imply that the sinner who committed them
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experienced expiation.330 In light of the study of the term  פֶּשַׁ עsins in the current study,

 פֶּשַׁ עsins do not refer to sins inexpiable through sacrifice. They are expiable through the
sacrifice at least by being part of the list of sins in Lev 5:20–26. This critique of Gane
does not mean that  ביָד ָרמָ הsins are expiable, but rather, that  ביָד ָרמָ הsins cannot be
associated with the term  פֶּשַׁ עonly, and that  פֶּשַׁ עsins are in the sanctuary because פֶּשַׁ ע
may refer to expiable sins. Third, Gane also noticed that since all sins can be expiated in
Rodríguez’s and Rooker’s interpretation if the sinner repents, this leaves no room for
inexpiable sins.331 I have also supported this claim with the fact that capital punishment
speaks for the inexpiability of some sins.
Anthony Phillips suggested that expiable deliberate sins in Lev 5 are different
from  ביָד ָרמָ הin Num 15:30–31 by being an exception to the general rule of deliberate,
inexpiable sins. Basically, these sins are undetectable and expiable on the basis that the
sinner themselves admit them. Leviticus 5:20–26 had the purpose of encouraging the
sinner to do so.332 Gane rightfully corrected Phillips’ proposal by reminding that Num
15:30–31 does not state that this kind of sin is necessarily detectable by human agents,
but does state that the sinner experiences capital punishment administered by God.333
Thus, Phillips’ suggestion, regardless of its appeal and possibly presence in the function
of the law by endorsing one of the main roles of the BL to make covenant people
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intrinsically and ethically sound, is disproven by the text.
Gane’s own interpretation of the discrepancy between Lev 4–5 and Num 15
agrees with Schenker’s understanding of this subject. Schenker understood that there are
two types of deliberate sins, and it is the sinner’s attitude that differentiates them. Those
committed in open, rebellious attitude towards God’s rulership and those that are
deliberate, but are not committed rebelliously. He proposed that Num 15:22–31 contrasts
the least serious types of sin, vv. 22–29, and the most serious types, vv. 30–31. This
passage does not deal with the sins in between these two types.334
Gane first supplemented this view with the claim that Lev 5:1, 5–6; 5:20–26, and
Num 5:5–8 specify exactly which non-defiant deliberate sins can be expiated through sin
and reparation offerings after voluntary confessions and necessary reparations.335 Second,
Gane suggested that the sins are ultimately against God himself. They may not be
detected by humans, but God is able to see them. While Gane’s latter point is profoundly
correct, the former one needs modification. That is, it is too restrictive to delimit the nondefiant deliberate sins to those found in Lev 5:1, 5–6 and 5:20–26 due to the fact that the
Pentateuch lists many other sins that are deliberate, but non-defiant and thus, expiable.
The list in Lev 5:20–26 is especially not concerned with the exact examples of
misappropriation of the property as such, but rather, encourages individuals to confess to
having sworn a false oath. Exodus 21:37–22:12 and Lev 19:11–13 list many other
variations of sins that are some form of misappropriation of another’s property and are
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deliberate, but yet expiable.336 Thus, Lev 5:1, 5–6 and 5:20–26 is taken to be a
representative procedure with regards to any kind of sin against another’s property that
would include taking an oath before God and not only the sins that are expiable,
regardless of being deliberate, but non-defiant.
The outcome of Gane’s study is that there are 3 kinds of sin: (1) inadvertent sins
represented in Num 15:22–29, (2) intentional defiant sins represented in Num 15:30–31,
and (3) intentional non-defiant sins represented in Lev 5:1, 5–6; 5:20 [6:1–7] and Num
5:5–8. Two of these kinds, the first and the third, can be expiated through the sacrificial
system, while the second cannot.
Gane’s study divides intentional sins into two categories: (1) those committed
defiantly with the intent to break with God and (2) those that are not done with such an
attitude; this division is correct. I came to the same conclusion, but differ with him in the
selection of texts used to prove this. Based on the interpretation suggested in the present
study that the protasis in Lev 4–5 and Num 15:22–31 all except of Num 15:30–31,
present two alternative ways of sinning, intentional and unintentional, I suggest that nonbrazen, intentional, as well as unintentional sins are found in both Lev 4–5 and Num
15:22–29.
It has to be added that this distinction cannot be supported by the terminological
study of the terms for sin that this study is limited to since they are used interchangeably
in the Pentateuch as I verified above. Rather, the texts in which these categories of sin are
found classify them as such in two ways. First, the verb  שָׁ גָהis used to mark both
unintentional and intentional sin in the procedure which discusses the expiation of these
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sins as in Lev 4:13 and Num 15:22. The adverbial use of the nominal derivative  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהis
also used for the same purpose as in Lev 4:2, 22, 27; 5:15; 22:14 and Num 15:26, 27;
35:11, 15.337 Second, Num 5:5–8 indicates that some intentional sins can be expiated by
the use of the verbal and nominal forms of  מָ עַלwhich can refer to both intentional and
unintentional sins. Regardless of being intentional, these sins are expiable. Third, the
general and all-encompassing verb  חָ טָ אused throughout Lev 4–5 refers to both
intentional and unintentional sinning and is defined by the context.
This view is implied by Keil and Delitzsch who expanded the category of
expiable sins to inadvertent and deliberate:
But sinning “in error” is not merely sinning through ignorance (vv. 13, 22, 27, 5:18),
hurry, want of consideration, or carelessness (Lev. 5:1, 4, 15), but also sinning
unintentionally (Num 35:11, 15, 22, 23); hence all such sins as spring from the
weakness of flesh and blood, as distinguished from sins committed with a high
(elevated) hand, or in haughty, defiant rebellion against God and His
commandments.338
The methodology and arguments for arriving at this understanding of types of sin
by Keil and Delitzsch are different from those presented in the current study. Gane’s
criticism that this approach on the account of a broad interpretation of שָׁ גַג/ שָׁ גָהwhich he,
with a majority of scholars, held to refer to inadvertence339 is not valid since this
interpretation of the term שָׁ גַג/ שָׁ גָהwas proven to be the most accurate one in the present
study. Consequently, this division of sins is proven to be the most accurate.
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 ביָד ָרמָ הSins
It is shown already in the preceding subheading that there is general agreement
among scholars regarding the meaning of the phrase  ביָד ָרמָ הin Num 15:30. It signifies
inexpiable, unforgivable sin, and scholars have rightfully come to that conclusion.340
This phrase refers to the activity done deliberately, presumptuously.341 Caspar
Labuschagne noted that based on texts such 1 Kgs 11:26ff, Mic 5:8, Deut 32:27, and
Exod 17:11, the phrase has military origin: “The origin of the expression is without any
doubt the physical gesture of the raised hand, with or without a weapon in it, which
indicates that one is triumphantly determined to fight and win.” The phrase conveys the
attitude of readiness to fight and the will to prevail. Besides this argument, Labuschagne
also noted three additional arguments to understand the phrase in this way: (1) in the
remaining two occurrences of the phrase in Exod 14:8 and Num 33:3b, the human party,
people of Israel, is the subject of the sentence, and thus, the phrase describes the posture
or attitude of the people signifying their determination to fight and will to prevail in the
given situation; (2) the Exodus of Israel from Egypt account contains the element of
Israel’s readiness for the battle as they were leaving Egypt; and finally (3) Israel left
Egypt organized as a military unit, mustered in their tribal hosts.342 These pieces of
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evidence suggest that the phrase refers to the deliberate, intentional activity of the subject
which it modifies. Labuschagne cautioned that “in Num 15:30 the expression has a
weakened meaning: ‘deliberately,’ but it is not impossible that here also it still retains
something of its original force and connotes the idea ‘ready to commit rebellion,’
‘defiantly’”.343 Based on the fact that v. 30 expresses a personal affront to God344 and that
the OT stipulates capital punishment for  ביָד ָרמָ הsins the present study accepts the full
force meaning of this phrase. Applied to this context, the phrase conveys the fact that a

 ביָד ָרמָ הsin is not only committed intentionally, but also represents a personal affront
against God, rebellion against his personality, his authority, and his covenant.345
All these points show that the OT does provide certain guidelines for identifying
intentional, brazen sin. However, Num 15 does not relate this kind of sin to any of the
three key terms for sin in the OT.

Intentional and Unintentional Sins in the OT
There are two types of sins in the OT, intentional and unintentional. I divided the
former group into non-brazen and brazen intentional sin. The former is expiable through
the sacrificial system and cult, while the latter is not, but the sinner suffers terminal
punishment.
In the case of intentional sin, sinners are totally aware of both elements of sin:
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(1) that they perform certain activity, and (2) that that activity breaks God’s law; they are
committing sin. This intentionality can come out of sinner’s GHS and weakness and out
of an attitude to deny God, his personality, and authority.
I deliberately abstain from using any of the mass of adjectives such as wanton,
defiant, deliberate, inexpiable, done wittingly… that refer to intentional sin, but limit
myself to a simple “intentional sin” that comprises two distinct types: (1) non-brazen sin,
coming out of GHS and weakness, on the one hand, and (2) brazen sin, the desire to deny
and break with God on the other. Scholars have usually attached these adjectives to sins
that are intentional, but not inexpiable/unforgivable, and my decision to abstain from
using them aims to avoid a potential misunderstanding that intentional sin is
inexpiable/unforgivable.346 The analysis of texts I proposed confirms the fact that

Compare the following quotations from Milgrom’s commentary with my emphasis added. “P
holds that the sanctuary is polluted by Israel’s moral and ritual violations (4:2) committed anywhere in the
camp (but not outside) and that this pollution can and must be effaced by the violator’s purification offering
and, if committed deliberately, by the high priest’s sacrifice and confession (16:3–22).” Milgrom, Leviticus
1–16, 48. Indeed, there are only four passages in P in which confession (hitwaddâ) is explicitly required,
and each case deals exclusively with deliberate sin (5:1–4; 16:21; 26:40; Num 5:6–7). Milgrom, Leviticus
1–16, 301–2. But what function does confession serve? Why must contrition of the heart be augmented by
the confirmation of the lips? Confession must, then, play a vital role in the judicial process. Because it
occurs only when deliberate sin is expiated by sacrifice, the conclusion is inevitable: confession is the legal
device fashioned by priestly legislators to convert deliberate sins into inadvertences, thereby qualifying
them for sacrificial expiation. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 301–2. Milgrom contradicts himself greatly in the
following quotation that qualifies deliberate sins as inexpiable and unforgivable: “In the Priestly laws,
however, there is no sacrificial expiation for capital crime or, for that matter, for any deliberate violation.
The presumptuous sinner is banned from the sanctuary because he ‘acts defiantly (bĕyād rāmâ) … reviles
the Lord … has spurned the word of the Lord and violated his commandment’ (Num 15:30–31; contrast vv.
24–29).” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 710. Also, see Noorditzij’s limitations to define the intention of the
sinner in statements on Lev 4:3–12 where he clearly defined sin as unintentional only:. “If the high priest
sinned by doing ‘what was forbidden in any of the Lord’s commands’ (v. 2; cf Gen 29:26; 34:7; 2 Sam
13:12), i.e., if he unintentionally transgressed an express prohibition (cf. Lev 5:17)—for sins committed
‘defiantly,’ and thus deliberately, there was only one penalty, viz., death (Num 15:30)—he thereby brought
guilt on the people.” Noordtzij, Numbers, 57. Compare his comments on Lev 5:20–26 where he refrains
from expressing the type of this sin: “These verses (MT 5:20–26) no longer deal with the unintentional
violation of what belonged to the Lord, but rather with unlawful appropriation of what one knew to belong
to one of his countrymen.” Noordtzij, Numbers, 72–73. Emphasis mine. In addition, see his inability to
include this pericope in his comparison of Lev 4–5, that in his words present unintentional sins, and Num
15:30, which discuss intentional sin. Noordtzij, Numbers, 55.
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intentional, non-brazen sins are expiable/forgivable, as are unintentional ones.
In the instance of unintentional sin, sinners are totally aware of only one element
of the sin: that they have intentionally done a certain activity, but not the sinful element,
that that activity breaks God’s law, and that they are thereby committing sin.
Unintentional sins are always expiable/forgivable, but yet, some do include diminished
punishment.
I also intentionally refrain from using a variety of adjectives that refer to
unintentional sin such as negligent, unwitting, or inadvertent because the majority of
them present a complex definition attached to them by MLS that do not or just partially
match the descriptions of sins in the Pentateuch. As was shown in the case of Milgrom’s
work on Lev 4–5 and Num 15, applying these strictly defined terms of MLS to sins as
they are described in the Pentateuch produces incoherence between the terminology and
the concepts they are supposed to signify. In order to avoid miscommunication and
terminological confusion, I use the simple term, “unintentional sin,” meaning “out of
ignorance” or “by accident.” This terminology comes out of the interpretation of Lev 4–5
and Num 15 presented in the current study and  פֶּשַׁ ע,חָ טָ א, and עָֹון.347 Other texts do
provide more comprehensive descriptions of sins such as homicide laws (Exod 21:12–25,
Num 35:9–34), but they are attached to specific sins and are not introduced as allencompassing and comprehensive legal cases that cover sin in general like Lev 4–5 and
Num 15. Table 21 demonstrates these sin types visually, while Table 22 demonstrates the
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Table 21. Sin’s expiability/inexpiability
Unintentional
(Accident, ignorance)
Expiable, forgivable

Intentional but non-brazen
(GHS/weakness)
Expiable, forgivable

Intentional brazen
(Desire to break with God)
Inexpiable, unforgivable

Table 22. The sinner’s awareness

Intent to act
Intent to sin

Unintentional
Intentional
Accident Ignorance Non-brazen Brazen
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes

separation of a sinner’s awareness in relation to these sin types:
This simple terminology allows for inclusion of all other sins in the Pentateuch
some of which are thoroughly described, but also the ones that lack context that would
define them under all-encompassing legal cases of Lev 4–5 and Num 15. Thus, sin in the
Pentateuch is simply described as expiable/forgivable and inexpiable/unforgivable which
does not correlate with another simply division of sins as intentional and unintentional
because some intentional, but non-brazen sins are expiable/forgivable, as some
unintentional sins for which the sinner chooses not to offer sacrifice are not. The
sacrificial system offered a way of reconciliation with God to any sinner for the majority
of sins, but it was God only who granted forgiveness. In other words, any sinner could
offer a sacrifice for any sin, but God was the one who decided whether the sin would be
forgiven or not.
Some intentional sins are inexpiable/unforgivable in the OT due to the fact that
the sinner is punished by capital punishment either by God or a human agency. These are
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 ביָד ָרמָ הsins (Num 15:30–31).348 Some intentional sins are expiable/forgivable, but
expiation of them is conditioned by obedience to divine regulations of bringing a
sacrifice for them. This same principle is also applicable to the cases of unintentional sin
(Lev 4–5). If the sacrifice is not offered, then the sinner who commits intentional
expiable/forgivable and unintentional expiable/forgivable sins experiences terminal
punishment. Thus, the status of expiable/forgivable or inexpiable/unforgivable sins in
great part rests on the sinner’s response. The terminology is not helpful in determining
whether a sin belongs to one or another category, but context is.

Interpretation of Leviticus 16:21
Leviticus 16:21 is a known, twofold, interpretative crux, and scholars rightfully
relate it to Lev 16:16. First, the crux is the function of the prepositional phrase lekol and
the second one is the interpretation of the Hebrew terms used in these texts. Gane has
collected major scholarly proposals on how to interpret it, and he himself proposed a
solution to both the cruxes.349
Milgrom made a difference between the last two terms which are the same in both
texts,  פֶּשַׁ עand חָ טָ א, and understood the first term in each text,  טֻמאָהin v. 16 and  עָֹוןin v.
21, as encompassing the latter two.350 Rolf Rendtorff proposed a similar interpretation.
The opening  טֻמאָהexplains the following two terms,  פֶּשַׁ עand חָ טָ א. He assigned an
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explicative meaning to the  וattached to פֶּשַׁ ע, “impurities—that is, brazen sins and other
sins.”351 Gane criticized this approach because assigning an explicative meaning to the ו
“raises the suspicion of circular reasoning.”352 It implies that  טֻמאָהincludes moral sins,
and vice versa. Even though present in a limited number of texts, these two terms
overlap, at least  טֻמאָהincludes חָ טָ א.353
Büchler also considered that  פֶּשַׁ עand  חָ טָ אqualify  טֻמאָהin v. 16 on the basis of
intent.  טֻמאָהincludes defilement done deliberately, פֶּשַׁ ע, and done unwittingly, חַ טָּ אֹות.354
Noting that the  וimpacts the interpretation he proposed, he stated that all three terms are
synonyms and that, in v. 21, they refer to the same evils from a different perspective.355
Thus, moral and ritual sins are equal in this interpretation.
Kiuchi took Büchler’s route, but still, in arguing in a reversed order that moral
and ritual impurity in Lev 16:16 is identical. טֻמאָה, ritual impurity, does not refer to ritual
impurities themselves, but is rather, a moral fault that originates from breaking laws
concerning ritual impurity. Consequently, חַ טּ ֹאתָ ם, which he translated “with respect to all
their sins,” modifies both  פֶּשַׁ עand  ט ְֻמאֹ תsins.356  עָֹוןthat replaced the opening  טֻמאָהin
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v. 21 refers to a guilt/consequence of the ritual and moral impurity. Based on the same
syntax of the phrase  לכָל חַ טּ ֹאתָ םin v. 16, Kiuchi proposed that  עָֹוןrefers to different
nuance of חַ טּ ֹאתָ ם.357 Kiuchi’s interpretation points to a fruitful direction since he took
into account what none of the previous scholars did, the fact that  חַ טּ ֹאתָ םis separated
from the first two terms,  טֻמאָהand  פֶּשַׁ עin v. 16, and  עָֹוןand  פֶּשַׁ עin v. 21. However, his
understanding of  טֻמאָהis questionable. Gorman also noted that  חַ טּ ֹאתָ םis a summarizing
term, but with the meaning of “sin.” This term, then, encompasses sins expressed by the
previous two terms.358
Schwartz has given proper attention to the fact that  וattached to  פֶּשַׁ עis a
conjunction and suggested that  טֻמאָהand  פֶּשַׁ עare two distinct sins.359 However, he took

פֶּשַׁ ע, deliberate sins, to be a subcategory of חַ טּ ֹאתָ ם, sins in general.360 For Schwartz,
these two texts point to two types of sin, ritual and moral impurity, with the addition of a
subcategory of moral impurity,  חַ טּ ֹאתָ םin both texts. This interpretation suffers because it
is based on the assumption that  פֶּשַׁ עare inexpiable/unforgivable sins. Based on the same
assumption Schwartz made a distinction between  פֶּשַׁ עand חַ טּ ֹאתָ ם. This assumption is
proven to be unsupported by texts.
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Gane’s Proposal on Function of
the Prepositional Phrase לכָל
Gane also proposed his own interpretation of these two texts. He first criticized
Schwartz on the grounds of his understanding of the phrase לכָל־חַ טּ ֹאתָ ם. That is, Gane
wanted to establish whether  לכָל־חַ טּ ֹאתָ םcan be taken to encompass items preceding it.
He established the fact that two patterns of uses of lekol occur. First, “elsewhere in
Leviticus, when ( לכלlit., “to all”) is placed just before a final item in a list, if this item
includes all of the previous terms in its semantic range, it is a summarizing category, as in
11:42.” Second, “if the final item following  לכלdoes not include all of the previous ones,
it represents a separate item to which the list is extended, as in v. 46.”361
Based on these two patterns, Gane proposed that  חַ טּ ֹאתָ םin Lev 16:16, 21 is not a
summarizing item, but rather, a separate item added to the list.362 He added another
reason for ’חַ טּ ֹאתָ םs distinctiveness: “Returning to 16:16, the usage is like that of 11:46 in
that חַ טּ ֹאתָ ם, the final item following לכל, cannot be an overall summarizing category
because it does not include in its semantic range the earlier  טֻּמאֹ ת בנֵי יִּשׂ ָראֵ לand

פִּ שׁעֵיהֶּ ם.”363
Gane’s first pattern of uses of  כֹ לis well supported in contrast to the second one.
That is, Lev 11:46 differs significantly from Lev 16:16, 21 since in the former, the
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conjunction  וis attached to the כֹ ל, which is not the case in the latter. Thus, it is natural
that the  וintroduces another new item in the list. However, that is not the case in Lev
16:16, 21. Consequently, the inferences from Lev 11:46 to Lev 16:16, 21 are not
justifiable since they are grammatically and syntactically different.
Regarding his second argument, Gane is partially correct. That is, in reference to
16:16, he is right that  טֻמאָהis outside the semantic range of  חַ טּ ֹאתָ םas it was established
under the subheading, “Relevant Terms for Moral Impurity in the OT,” in the present
study.  טֻמאָהgenerally refers to ritual impurity. Yet, there are several contexts where root

טָ מֵ א, out of which the noun  טֻמאָהis derived, encompasses moral impurity. The fact that
 חַ טּ ֹאתָ םmay belong to the semantic range of  טָ מֵ אwas presented under the subheading
“Impurity in the OT in Modern Studies, Jonathan Klawans” of the present study. Yet, it
does not affect the interpretation of 16:16 because the last item in the list is not  טֻמאָהbut

חַ טּ ֹאתָ ם.
However, Gane incorrectly assumed that  פֶּשַׁ עand  חַ טּ ֹאתָ םsemantically do not
overlap. Applying the terminological/contextual/intertextual method for studying sin
established in the present study demonstrated that they do semantically overlap.
The fact that  טֻמאָהis replaced by  עָֹוןin v. 21 removes any obstacle to understand

 חַ טּ ֹאתָ םas a summarizing category since  חַ טּ ֹאתָ םsemantically overlaps with both terms.
The findings of the present study confirm that three key terms for sin,  פֶּשַׁ ע,חָ טָ א,
and עָֹון, do overlap in the Pentateuch but they also uniquely refer to certain sinful
activities. There are a considerable number of scholars who consider these three terms as
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complimentary to describe sin in its totality when they are found in the same context.364
Gane’s Proposal on the Interpretation
of Hebrew Terms
Gane proposed that ַע ֶפּשׁ, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןall have distinct meanings in Leviticus 1–
16, and others have followed him.365 This claim is based on the use of these terms in
various parts of the OT.366
Attempting to be more specific on the nature of the  חַ טּ ֹאתָ םsins, Gane suggested
that the  חָ טָ אsins in the Pentateuchal ritual law are restricted to non-defiant expiable sins.
He listed the 3 following types of sin that  חָ טָ אrefers to: (1) expiable, non-defiant sins,
including inadvertent sins (Lev 4:3, 14, 23, 26, 28), (2) sins of forgetting to perform a
duty to God (Lev 5:6), and (3) some deliberate sins (Lev 5:6, cf. v. 1; Num 5:6–7; also
Lev 5:21–23 [6:2–4]), but excluding sins committed defiantly, ביָד ָרמָ ה, for which there is
no opportunity for expiation, but rather, the sinner suffers kārēt punishment.367 This view
of the  חָ טָ אsin in Leviticus and the rest of the Pentateuch will be evaluated below, and it
will be suggested that the  חָ טָ אin Leviticus and the rest of the Pentateuch refers to
expiable and inexpiable, as well as intentional and unintentional sins.
First, it is necessary to note that Gane based his claims about  חָ טָ אon the
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Pentateuchal ritual laws only. However, it seems that Gane restricted the term
Pentateuchal ritual laws to the Leviticus texts and Num 5:6–7, even though the term
occurs in the texts of the entire Pentateuch, and not just Leviticus and Num 5:6–7. Gerald
A. Klingbeil suggested the list of ritual texts in the Pentateuch that covers the entire
corpus of the Pentateuch. This list emphasizes the fact that ritual texts in the Pentateuch
are spread over chs. 1–23 in the book of Leviticus, as well as in the entire Pentateuch.368
Singling out some Leviticus texts and Num 5:6–7 as the only Pentateuchal ritual texts is
not hermeneutically sound since these texts are some, but not all, the Pentateuchal ritual
texts. Inclusion of all Pentateuchal ritual texts would bring a significantly different
definition of  חָ טָ אsin in the Pentateuchal ritual texts. It is attested that Num 9:13 is a ritual
text,369 dealing with exceptions in regards to Passover regulations. These details,
demonstrating the syntactical connection between the  חָ טָ אsin and the verb כ ַָרת, and חָ טָ א
and the verb מוּת, the term  חָ טָ אrefers to inexpiable, intentional sin (Num 9:13 and Lev
22:9, respectively), which was shown in more detail earlier (pp. 194–98).
Second, Gane excluded Lev 26:18, 21, 24, 28 from Pentateuchal ritual law texts
most likely because he agreed with Levine that this section does not belong to legal or
ritual texts, but is rather considered as the climax of the entire book of Leviticus.370
Levine himself, however, claimed that ch. 26 is the epilogue of the Holiness code.371
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Milgrom also held this position about ch. 26.372
Singling out chs. 1–6 in Leviticus and Num 5:6–7 would not be viable
hermeneutics even if one accepted the presence of two priestly sources, H and P, in the
book of Leviticus. That is, both of these two sources are tightly connected and frequently
intermingled in terms of content and form. It is suggested that H, the latter source, was a
redactor of P, the earlier source. In terms of ritual texts, it is attested that both of these
sources dealt with the same laws. At this point, it is vital to emphasize that both of them
deal with the same ritual laws. Milgrom showed that the law concerning the ingestion of
meat of the offering found in Lev 7:18373 (P source) was reworked in Lev 19:7–8 (H
source). Accordingly, both sources contain ritual texts that deal with the same laws.374
This law is just one that is worked out in both sources.375
This close connectedness of P and H in content suggests that both of them should
be considered if one studies rituals laws in the Pentateuch. In other words, the presence of
two sources should not prevent one from deriving implications from each of them to form
a functionally integrated system.376 The same principle is applicable to many given
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elements of a broader religious system of Ancient Israel.377 This suggestion points to the
fact that Lev 26:18, 21, 24, 28 should be taken into consideration when one studies the
nature of the  חָ טָ אsin in Leviticus. In addition to the first point above, this reasoning
would also create a very different understanding of  חָ טָ אsin than the one Gane proposed.
That is, scholars have recognized that the punishments in Lev 26 are God’s response to
the sins of his people, and that their unresponsiveness to those punishments represents
people’s stubbornness to God’s dealing with them.378 The term  חָ טָ אis used in all these
texts to refer to their sins. The context indisputably suggests that these sins are both
brazen intentional and inexpiable sins.
Third, Milgrom379 and others380 correctly claim that sin in Lev 5:1 is an
intentional sin. In his monograph “The Problem of “Curse” in the Hebrew Bible,”
Herbert Brichto noted that the institution of public proclamation, ʾālâ, of eliciting
information regarding the status of property, commission of crime, and so on was
common in ANE and Israel.381 In Israel, ʾālâ took the form of a conditional imprecation
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against the perpetrator of a crime, and against accessories after the fact and witnesses
withholding material evidence. In addition, it requires the awareness that every adjuration
involves a contingent curse. Brichto suggested that the translation of the ʾālâ in Lev 5:1,
which has the lexical form qôl ʾālâ, would be “a public summons backed by a contingent
curse.” Besides Lev 5:1, which is one of the key ʾālâ texts Brichto referred to in the OT,
he also listed Prov 29:24 and Judg 17:2.382 Milgrom listed more texts dealing with the
ʾālâ, along with examples of it from the ANE contexts, and rabbinic and historical
sources.383
Fourth, uses of nominal and verbal derivatives of the root  חָ טָ אshow a different
nature of  חָ טָ אsin. Of 25 uses of nominal derivatives of  חָ טָ אwhen it refers to sin, it
describes intentional sin 14 times, and it refers to either unintentional (4:3, 14, 23, 26,
28x2, 35) or sin in general (Lev 16:30, 34) 9 times. Two times the context is not clear
where intentional or unintentional sin is in view. Of 30 verbal uses of the term חָ טָ א, there
are 25 uses when the verb refers to the activity of sinning; 11 times it is in designate
intentional (5:1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, [6:2] 21, [6:3] 22, [6:4] 23; 19:22), whereas 14 times,
it is designated unintentional sinning (4:2, 3x2, 14, 22, 23, 27, 28x2, 35; 5:15, 16, 17).
Having established this, Gane’s definition of the  חָ טָ אas an expiable unintentional
sin in Leviticus 1–16 seems not to be supported by the Pentateuchal texts. This term is
defined in the wider context of the book of Leviticus and the Pentateuch as intentional
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and unintentional, as well as expiable and inexpiable. In addition, isolating only the uses
of  חָ טָ אfrom ch. 1–24 of the book of Leviticus and deducing the meaning for this term
only from them is hermeneutically unsound.
With regard to the term פֶּשַׁ ע, Gane proposed that it conveys inexpiable sin in
contrast to expiable חָ טָ א. Gane’s definition of  פֶּשַׁ עsin rests on two erroneous arguments.
First, the term is mentioned only 2 times in the Pentateuchal ritual law (Lev 16:16, 21).
This term is never used to denote any sin in the book of Leviticus. Second, the serious
nature of wrongs is conveyed by the nominal and verbal forms of  פֶּשַׁ עelsewhere in
OT.384
In regards to Gane’s first point, it is important to note again that the Pentateuchal
ritual law is limited to Leviticus in Gane’s interpretation. However, since the use of פֶּשַׁ ע
is quite limited in the Pentateuch, Gane’s understanding of it would stand the test even if
all Pentateuchal ritual law texts had been considered since outside of Lev 16:16, 21, פֶּשַׁ ע
is never used differently in the Pentateuch. All other uses are found in the narrative
sections of Genesis, Exodus, and Numbers, and one legal text in Exod 22:9. Considering
all these usages radically changes the understanding of פֶּשַׁ ע.385
Regarding Gane’s second point, it is significant to observe that the understanding
of  פֶּשַׁ עas an inexpiable sin is based mainly on the insights about this term from the rest
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of the OT and not the Pentateuch. The verbal form of פֶּשַׁ ע, out of which the idea of
breaking with God was derived which points to the most severe sin in the OT, is never
used in the Pentateuch. All the contexts where the nominal form of  פֶּשַׁ עis used in the
Pentateuch were discussed above and they confirmed that  פֶּשַׁ עis not inexpiable sin, but
to the contrary is expiable sin in the Pentateuch and in the rest of the OT. The latter claim
was demonstrated by scholarly research above, as well. This hermeneutical unsoundness
that can be detected in this point was already mentioned in the present study. Barr called
it root fallacy, and it refers to the belief that in biblical Hebrew, there is a root meaning
that is effective throughout all the variations of a given root, and as such, is taken as a
part of the actual semantic value of any form of that root.386 Study of the  פֶּשַׁ עby
applying the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach brought a totally different
understanding of the term. That is, it covers intentional and unintentional sin which is
both expiable and inexpiable.
The most ambiguous meaning of  עָֹוןis found in Lev 16:21 where context does not
provide a clue as to which of the 3 potential meanings or all three is intended. Scholars
have suggested various proposals on the meaning of  עָֹוןin these two texts. Milgrom
suggested that  עָֹוןis a key term for sin overall.387 Gane suggested that  עָֹוןin Lev 1–16
refers to culpability.388 He stated that it can stand for “any part of the process of wrongful

386

Barr, Semantics, 100.

387

Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 25, 1043.

388

Gane, Cult and Character, 294, 299–300.

369

act-blame-punishment, whether the act is intentional or not.”389 However, he suggested
that its meaning is restricted to culpability in the sense of consequential liability to
punishment which the offender must bear, the understanding formulated by Schwartz.390
However, based on the evidence presented in the current study,  עָֹוןdoes not refer to any
specific sin in terms of being intentional/unintentional or expiable/inexpiable, but rather,
along with the  חַ טָּ אֹותand פֶּשַׁ ע, contributes to the understanding of totality of sin which
was intended to be conveyed in this text.
As was suggested above, a fair interpretation of Lev 16:21 would imply that עָֹון
along with  פֶּשַׁ עand  חַ טָּ אֹותin this text point to the totality of sins, rather than to any
specific sin.
Some theologians have suggested that even though each of these three terms has
particular meaning, not much attention should be placed on the differences in their
meaning since they were used as synonyms.391
The research of these terms presented above demonstrates that the following
quotation by Rolf Knierim summarizes a fair approach when it comes to the precise
meaning of these terms: “Even though this triad is formulaic and systematically expresses
the mass of all possible errors, one may not simply view the three terms in the triad as
synonyms. Each disqualifies ‘sin’ in its own way. Nevertheless, where they are used
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together as a formula, they are intended to represent all other terms for ‘sin.’”392
Crüsemann suggested that the repetition of “all” (all) in this chapter (vv. 16, 17, 21, 30,
34) in connection with a variety of important terms for sin emphasizes the
comprehensiveness of the atonement and the elimination of the nation’s sins.393 Other
major scholars of ancient Israel’s cult have also agreed that פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןare used as
synonyms.394 This triad was frequently used in the OT to refer to the totality or
completeness of sin (Exod 34:7; Lev 16:21; Job 13:23; Ps 32:5; Isa 59:12; Ezek 21:24
[29]; Dan 9:24).395

William H. Shea’s Proposal
William Shea proposed a viable proposal for the understanding of this verse. In
contrast to many scholars, he proposed that the Hebrew term  חַ טָּ אֹותin Lev 16:16 and 21
does not refer to the sins, but rather to the sin offerings of the sons of Israel.396 His
proposal is semantically possible since the term is found in both singular (Lev. 4:3, 8, 14,
20–21, 23–26, 28–29, 32–35; 5:6–13; 6:17, 25, 30; 7:7, 37; 8:2, 14; 9:2–3, 7–8, 10, 15,
22; 10:16–17, 19; 12:6, 8; 14:13, 19, 22, 31; 15:15, 30; 16:3, 5–6, 9, 11, 15, 25, 27;
19:22; 23:19) and plural (Lev. 16:16, 21, 30, 34; 26:18, 21, 24, 28) forms to refer to both
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sins and sin offerings. Shea’s syntactical and contextual approach to study which
meaning is intended in context is hermeneutically very sound. However, limiting the data
of research to Lev 16 in the first part of his method, which he called “a direct lexical
approach,” disturbs his hermeneutical soundness and is unnecessary. The plural is
uniquely used in Lev 16:16, 21, לכָל־חַ טּ ֹאתָ ם, since all other plurals in the entire
Pentateuch have different prepositions including (16:30, 34:  ִּמכֹ ל חַ טּ ֹאתֵ יכֶּם/ ; ִּמכָל26:18,
24, 28; Num 5:6: עַל־חַ טּ ֹאתֵ יכֶּם, 26:21:  ;כחַ טּ ֹאתֵ יכֶּםLev 26:21:  ;כחַ טּ ֹאתֵ יכֶּםNum 16:26:

 )כחַ טּ ֹאתֵ יכֶּםand the context does not leave any doubt that the meaning “sins” is implied.
However, one could ask whether the number of the noun affects its semantic choice in a
given context. Thus, while this argument is a good starting point, a more elaborate
approach is needed to establish such a claim.
The second part of Shea’s method is more complex since he examined the
relationship of various patterns of uses of the verb  כִּ פֶּרin relation to טֻמאָה, פֶּשַׁ ע, and

חַ טָּ אֹות, the use of these three nouns themselves, related prepositions, conjunctions, and
adjectives. I will examine Shea’s most relevant arguments for the present study.

Related Nouns
Shea proposed that  טֻמאָהand  פֶּשַׁ עrepresent two terms that summarize all sins
discussed in Lev 1–15. The former covers sin in Lev 1–7, while the latter represents
uncleanness in Lev 11–15. This inference makes  חַ טָּ אֹותredundant. It would just provide
another shade of meaning for the term פֶּשַׁ ע. He noted the same redundancy in v. 21
where  עָֹוןreplaced  טֻמאָהand  חַ טָּ אֹותfollows two terms for sin in both verses.
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Redundancy is even more intense since all these terms would refer to moral sins.397
Shea’s recognition, that  חַ טָּ אֹותis redundant if taken to mean sin like the previous
two terms in vv. 16 and 21, is logical. A semantic overlap between ַע ֶפּשׁ, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןis
demonstrated in the present study,398 thus it would not be surprising if the author
intentionally used semantic overlaps of the terms. In terms of intent, פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and עָֹון,
all refer to intentional and unintentional sins, and in terms of expiability, the former two
refer to both expiable/forgivable and inexpiable/unforgivable sin, whereas  פֶּשַׁ עalways
refers to expiable sin. Thus, on the one hand, all of them refer to expiable/forgivable sins,
while on the other hand, all of them designate inexpiable/unforgivable sins.

Related Prepositions
Shea’s argument based on the use of prepositions  לand  כֹ לwhen they modify the
noun  חָ טָ אis more solid. Again, taking into consideration only Lev 16, Shea identified
that  חָ טָ אis modified by the preposition  ל4 times in vv. 3, 5, 16, 21 and 2 times by the
prepositions  ִּמןin 16:30, 34. Based on these uses, he identified the pattern that  חָ טָ אrefers
to sin offering when it is modified by ל. When it is modified by the preposition חָ טָ א ִּמן, it
signifies sin.399 With the delimitations to Lev 16, this argument is without weaknesses
and it remains without weaknesses when one examines these two constructions in all of
Leviticus.
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That is,  חָ טָ אrefers to sin offering when it is modified by ל, 15 more times in
Leviticus (vv. 4:3, 14, 20, 32, 33; 5:6, 7, 8, 11; 7:37; 9:2, 3; 12:6, 8; 23:19). The meaning
of sin is never intended by this grammatical construction. When  חָ טָ אis modified by the
preposition  ִּמן, it refers to sin in 4 other occurrences (4:26; 5:6, 10; 19:22). In another 4
occurrences,  ִּמןnever modifies the sin offering directly. In 3/4 occurrences, it modifies
the noun “blood” that is in a construct relationship with “sin offering” (4:25, 34: 5:9). In
one instance in 9:10, it modifies “sin offering” directly, but that one occurrence is
actually highly questionable since the author of Leviticus did not have any other choice
but to use  ִּמןto modify “sin offering” as a secondary, indirect object. The clause reads
“ואֶּ ת־הַ חֵ לֶּב ואֶּ ת־הַ כלָיֹ ת ואֶּ ת־הַ יֹּ תֶּ ֶּרת ִּמן־הַ כָבֵ ד ִּמן־הַ חַ טָּ את הִּ קטִּ יר הַ ִּמּזבֵ חָ ה, The fat and the
kidneys and the lobe of the liver of the sin offering, he then offered up in smoke on the
altar.”
When all the other five patterns of uses of  חָ טָ אare taken into consideration in
Leviticus, the statistics still greatly favor Shea’s arguments, but some grammatical
constructions should be acknowledged. Thus, when  חָ טָ אis accompanied by the direct
object marker, it refers to the sin offering in 21/21 occurrences (4:8, 29; 8:2, 14; 9:7, 8,
15; 10:16, 17, 19; 14:13, 19, 31; 15:15, 30’ 16:6, 11x2, 15, 25, 27). This grammatical
construct never refers to sin. When  חָ טָ אis associated with the preposition כ, it refers to
sin offering in 3/4 occurrences (6:10 [6:17]; 7:7; 14:13), while in 1/4 (26:21) occurrences,
it signifies sin. When  חָ טָ אis modified by a definite article, it refers to the sin offering in
3/4 occurrences (4:21; 6:18 [25]; 9:22) and to sin in 1/4 (4:14) instances. When חָ טָ א
stands without any modifiers, it refers to sin offering in 12/14 occurrences, while in 2/14
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occurrences, it refers to sin. In addition, out of 86 nominal uses in Leviticus,  חָ טָ אrefers to
sin offering 61 times, which leaves 25 times for the meaning of sin. This statistic still
supports Shea’s argument. These 4 additional patterns of use greatly favor Shea’s
suggestion.
Statistics of the 5th pattern does not favor Shea’s proposal, since when  חָ טָ אis
associated with the preposition עַל, it refers to sin offering 4/13 times (4:33, 29, 33; 8:14),
while in 9/13 times (4:3, 28, 35; 5:6, 13; 19:22; 26:18; 24, 28), it designates sin.
However,  עַלnever modifies  חַ טָּ אֹותin Lev 16, thus not greatly affecting his proposal.

Related Conjunction
It is most likely that this argument and the following are Shea’s strongest
arguments for his proposal. This argument is based on the use of the conjunction ו. That
is,  וlinks  טֻמאָהand  פֶּשַׁ עin v. 16 and  עָֹוןand  פֶּשַׁ עin v. 21, but the third term,  חַ טָּ אֹותis
preceded by the preposition  לand the adjective כֹ ל. If  חַ טָּ אֹותwere to represent the third
term in the row, to be connected with the previous two in order to form a triad or triplet,
then it would be necessary for it to be preceded by ו, like the second term always is.400

Related Adjective
The adjective  כֹ לonly precedes  חַ טָּ אֹותin 16:16, whereas the first two terms are
modified by the preposition  ִּמן. Shea stated: “If the meaning of the latter word is ‘sin
offerings’ rather than ‘sins,’ then that meaning could encompass very well all of that
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which has been treated from the former two categories through their sacrifices. In this
case the term would not be simply another category of evil.”401
The distinction between the first two and the third term is threefold: (1) the first
two terms are modified by the preposition  ִּמן, while  חַ טָּ אֹותis modified by the preposition

( ;ל2) the first two terms are linked by the conjunction ו, whereas  חַ טָּ אֹותis not, and (3)
 חַ טָּ אֹותis the more encompassing term since it is modified by the adjective  כֹ לwhile the
first two terms are not. Consequently, Shea concluded that  חַ טָּ אֹותis a separate category
with a distinct or specific meaning than the former two.402
Shea proposed that a similar syntactical relationship is also found in v. 21 where

 טֻמאָהis replaced by the עָֹון. The former two terms are not modified by any preposition
while  חַ טָּ אֹותretains its  לpreposition. The former two are modified by the direct object
marker while  חַ טָּ אֹותis not. Finally, the former two are linked by the conjunction waw
whereas  חַ טָּ אֹותis not, thus standing as a separate item from the two. Shea ultimately
proposed: “Our conclusion from these considerations is that it is possible that our word
could be translated as ‘sin offerings’ in Leviticus 16:16, 21 rather than ‘sins.’”403
The order of the arguments Shea used to support his proposal is followed by the
growth of their probability and accuracy. The first argument based on the inference that

 פֶּשַׁ עcovers sins in Lev 1–7 is possible since the current study demonstrated that these
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two terms semantically overlap. The second one, based on the use of the prepositions ל
and כֹ ל, stated that  חַ טָּ אֹותconsistently refers to sin offering when it is modified by the
preposition ל, and sin when it is modified by the preposition  ִּמןin Lev 16. This pattern
remains valid and solid even when tested within all of Leviticus, which makes Shea’s
second argument firm. The third argument, based on the use of the conjunction, is highly
convincing. That is, the first two terms in both texts are linked with the conjunction ו,
while the third term is modified by the preposition  לand the adjective  כֹ לwhich
grammatically and conceptually separate it from the previous two. Building a triad of
terms that would refer to the conceptually same phenomenon would imply the use of the
conjunction  וas is the case with the second term. The fourth argument is the most
convincing since the adjective  כֹ לmodifies the third term  חַ טָּ אֹותin Lev 16:16, while the
first two terms are modified by the preposition  ִּמן. The first two terms, in this case, would
refer to sin that was dealt with via all the sin offerings offered for them.
Thus, to summarize, there is a threefold distinction between these terms: (1) the
first two terms are modified by the preposition  ִּמן, while  חַ טָּ אֹותis modified by the
preposition ל, (2) the first two terms are linked by the waw conjunction, whereas  חַ טָּ אֹותis
not, and (3)  חַ טָּ אֹותis a more encompassing term since it is modified by the adjective כֹ ל,
while the first two terms are not, which makes Shea’s proposal take better account of the
biblical context and meaning.
The syntax in 16:21 is little bit different, but it still greatly favors the grammatical
and conceptual distinctiveness of  חַ טָּ אֹותfrom the first two terms.  חַ טָּ אֹותis again
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modified by a preposition  לand adjective  כֹ לin contrast to the two former terms that are
not modified by any preposition, but rather, are accompanied by a direct object marker
and adjective כֹ ל. Finally, the former two are linked by the conjunction  וwhereas חַ טָּ אֹות
is not, thus standing as a separate item from the two.
Gane’s interpretation of the חַ טּ ֹאתָ ם, and פִּ שׁעֵיהֶּ ם,  טֻּמאֹ תin v. 16 and חַ טּ ֹאתָ ם, and

פִּ שׁעֵיהֶּ ם,  עֲֹונֹ תin v. 21, rests on the two rules he identified regarding the uses of the
prepositional phrase לכָל. Moskala recognized that  כֹ לalone “is a very relative word” and
establishing its precise meaning depends on the context.404 Adding the preposition  לto it
makes it even more complicated.
Building on Milgrom’s remark on the use of this phrase,405 Gane established his
first rule regarding לכָל. When ( לכָל1) is placed before the final word in the list and
(2) the final item includes all of the previous terms in its semantic range, then it is a
summarizing word. An example of this is Lev 11:42.406 In his second rule, Gane stated
that the adjective  לכָלintroduces a separate item or category when (1) it is placed before
the final word in the list and (2) it presumably does not include, semantically, all the
previous items. An example of this is Lev 11:46. Common for both rules is that the  לכָלis
always placed before the last item in the list and in order to be a summarizing word, the
last word has to include all the previous items in the list semantically or to be a separate
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item or category, the last word does not semantically include all the previous terms in the
list.
The outcome of these rules is that the  חַ טּ ֹאתָ םin vv. 16 and 21 is a separate, rather
than summarizing item in the list. In other words, it is just another term for sin like the
previous two. Gane stated that the use of  כֹ לfollowed by the phrase  לכָלin v. 16
resembles the use of this construction in Lev 11:46 since  חַ טּ ֹאתָ םcannot be an overall
summarizing category of  טֻמאָתand  פִּ שׁעֵיbecause the latter two terms are outside the
semantic range of חָ טָ א. Gane stated: “Even if it could be argued that  חטאֹותinclude

 פשׁעיםthe former clearly do not include  חטאֹותbecause elsewhere in Pentateuchal law
 טֻמאָהis only physical ritual impurity (5:3; 7:20, 21; 14:19; 15:3, 25, 26, 30, 31; 18:19;
22:3, 5; Num 5:19; 19:13).”407 Finally, Gane translated  לכָל חַ טּ ֹאתָ םas “as well as all their
sins.”408
Kiuchi, on the other hand, introduced another syntactical rule that takes the
meaning of this phrase to be totally different than the one Gane suggested. He stated that

 לכָלbasically means “with respect to all,”409 which, based on the present study, is a step
in the right direction. The preposition  לhas a function of specifying what precedes it,410
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while  כֹ לconveys the totality of what follows it. Kiuchi suggested thus that “ לכָלas a
whole functions to specify what precedes it from a different viewpoint.”411 A simple, yet
consistent, rule can be established based on Kiuchi’s definition of this prepositional
phrase: when  לכָלis attached to the noun at the end of a summative list, whether
accompanied by modifiers or not, it always specifies those preceding nouns in the list
from a different perspective. Pentateuchal texts that support this rule include the
following: Gen 9:10; Exod 14:28; 26:2; 27:3; 36:9; Lev 5:4; 11:42; 13:12; 22:5; Num
3:25, 26; 4:31, 32; and Deut 22:3. This rule is foundational to the syntactical and
grammatical analysis of Lev 16:16, 21 that follows below.
The present study also finds Gane’s translation unjustifiable for the following
reasons: First, the structure of Lev 11:42 differs from the one in Lev 16:16. The
preposition  ִּמןdoes not precede any terms in the list in the former, while it precedes the
first two terms and is absent before the last term in the latter text. Thus, these two texts
cannot be compared at the syntactical level in order to derive a valid syntactical rule. The
present study agrees with Gane that in Lev 11:42, the phrase  לכָלis placed before the
summarizing term, but the syntax of this verse is different than the one in Lev 16:16 and
thus, not valid to make a general rule for uses of ל ָכל. The exact syntactical/grammatical
construction found in Lev 16:16 never replicates itself in the Pentateuch.
A study of the uses of  כֹ לfollowed by phrase לכָל, similar to the one in Lev 16:16,
21, points to the rule that does not favor Gane’s conclusion. Namely, the uses of  כֹ לin the
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Pentateuch followed by phrase  לכָלdemonstrate that when  לכָלis placed before a
summarizing term, it is never preceded by the conjunction ( וsee Gen 9:10; Exod 35:24,
36:1; Lev. 11:42, 13:12; 22:5, Num 4:32, 5:9, 14:29, 18:15; Deut 3:13). On the other
hand, the uses of  כֹ לin the Pentateuch followed by phrase  לכָלdemonstrate that when לכָל
is placed before a separate term, it is always joined with the conjunction ( וsee Gen 1:30;
2:20; 9:10; Exod 35:21; Lev. 11:46, 22: 18; Num 4:27, 18:9; Deut 19:15; 29:1[2], 34:11–
12). Since  לכָלin both Lev 16:16 and 21 is not joined with the conjunction ו,it does not
mark a separate item, but the term that somehow is related or summarizes both the
previous terms.
Second, Gane is correct in claiming that the nominal derivative of טמא,  טֻּמאֹ תis
never in the semantic range of  חַ טּ ֹאתָ םand פִּ שׁעֵיהֶּ ם. Yet, the verbal derivative of the root

 טמאfrequently refers to moral impurity as the present study provided textual evidence for
in subheading חָ נֵף. The verbal derivative of the root  טמאrefers to moral defilement in
Lev 18:20, 23, 24, 30, 31; 20:3; Num 5:13, 14, 20, 27, 28, 29, Deut 24:4. Textual proof
that  טמאהrefers to moral impurity does not exist in the Pentateuch, but inasmuch as it
originates from the root  טמאthat does refer to moral impurity, this eliminates the
exclusively ritual nature of טֻּמאֹ ת. This is in spite of the fact that the text never defines it
as moral in nature. However, the understanding that  חַ טּ ֹאתָ םrefers to sin offering does not
claim nor need  טֻּמאֹ תto be in the semantic range of חַ טּ ֹאתָ ם, but rather, that  טֻּמאֹ תis
related to חַ טּ ֹאתָ ם, sin offering. This claim is strengthened even more with the fact that the
sin offering was offered for certain ritual impurity (Lev 12–15).
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Third, Gane’s second rule states that the last word in the list that follows  לכָלdoes
not semantically include all the previous terms. Gane found that the use of  לכָלin Lev
16:16 resembles the one in Lev 11:46. The present study agrees with Gane that in the
latter text,  לכָלhas the role of marking a separate item. However, in Lev 11:46,  לכָלis
preceded by the conjunction ו, while it is not in Lev 16:16 and 21. The presence or the
absence of the conjunction  וchanges the meaning of the phrase. Its presence before לכָל
conveys adding another item to the list of items as it is in Lev 11:46, while its absence
points to the fact that the word following it is not just another item in the list, but rather,
is related to all the items previously listed from a different viewpoint (as noted in the rule
by Kiuchi).
An additional argument for the interpretation of Lev 16:16, 21, where the first two
terms are considered to express totality and completeness of the concept of sin, can be
confirmed by the fact that these terms semantically overlap. In addition,  חַ טָּ אֹותas a
distinct term always keeps its final position, thus pointing to the fact that it is separate in
both texts.
Shea’s proposal is supported by more solid arguments and rests on the more
detailed methodology. Therefore, this study accepts Shea’s proposal as a more probable
one. Thus, the phrase  לכָל־חַ טּ ֹאתָ םin Lev 16:16, 21 is taken to mean “for all their sin
offerings,” instead of a variety of other suggestions such as “as well as all their sins,”412

412

Gane, Cult and Character, 290.

382

and “including all their sins”413 and others.
This translation also correlates with the trajectory of sins presented in the present
study. Shea expressed it in the following way:
Such a translation strongly indicates that the Day of Atonement sin offering ritual
functioned to cleanse the sanctuary from only the confessed sins of the penitent
Israelites. That is, it functioned to remove the sins that had been confessed and
transferred to it by means of the sin offerings that had been offered previously during
the year.414
This meaning of  חַ טָּ אֹותis limited to Lev 16:16, 21 only in contrast to all the other
places where it is a part of the triad equal to all other terms that, as a grammatical and
syntactical composition, designates totality or comprehensiveness of sin. Besides the
arguments presented in the present study,  חַ טָּ אֹותin Lev 16:16, 21 separates itself
syntactically, grammatically, and contextually from all other uses in the texts where it is
an equal part of the triad. The terms are separate grammatical and syntactical units in all
other texts (Exod 34:7; Lev 16:21; Job 13:23; Ps 32:5; Isa 59:12; Ezek 21:24 [29]; and
Dan 9:24), while in Lev 16:16, 21  חַ טָּ אֹותserves as a summarizing term, sin offerings.
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CHAPTER 4
THE MEANING OF  כִּ פֶּרIN PENTATEUCH

Having established the concept of sin, the present study transitions to its second
section, which also consists of two parts. I first present major scholarly suggestions on
the concept of atonement and then, based on a thorough analysis of this concept which
primarily consists of the examination of the uses of the Hebrew verb  כִּ פֶּרin the
Pentateuch, evaluate them in order to suggest a new proposal on the understanding of
atonement in the Pentateuch.
The Meaning of כִּ פֶּר: Review of Scholarly Research
The Hebrew root  כִּ פֶּרtakes a significant place in biblical debates on the
atonement1 and it has generated a considerable amount of research2 regarding its
etymology. However, there is no scholarly consensus regarding its origin. Philologists

Sidney O. Hills, “A Semantic and Conceptual Study of the Root KPR in the Hebrew Old
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have established two alternatives, both well supported from Semitic cognates, which are
well attested to in the scholarly dialogue.3 The first proposal is that the Hebrew  כִּ פֶּרis
related to the Arabic kaffara, and the other relates it to the Akkadian kuppuru. In its base
(I) stem, kafara means “cover, conceal, deny, disbelieve, be ungrateful,” while in the
intensive (II) stem (kaffara) it means “conceal, annul, expiate, do penance.” The
Akkadian kapāru refers to “wipe off, smear on” in the base (B) stem and “wipe off,
clean, rub, ritually purify” in the intensive (D) stem, kuppuru.4
Milgrom was correct in his assertion that the basic idea of both etymologies is “to
rub.” In the case of Arabic, it is “to rub on,” that is, “to cover” or “to rub off,” that is, “to
wipe” in Akkadian.5 Thus, Milgrom established that from the point of etymology:
“Because a substance may either be “rubbed on” or “rubbed off,” the derived meanings,
“cover” and “wipe,” may be complementary and not contradictory.”6 Richard E.
Averbeck also stated that these two along with the meaning of “to ransom,” are not
mutually exclusive.7 The dispute of whether kaffara or kuppuru is to be taken as a
starting point to determine the foundational meaning of the Hebrew  כִּ פֶּרwas a matter of
lengthy debates. Some scholars tried to determine its meaning by examining the usage
and internal OT evidence and concluded that the etymology is not decisive.8
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The difficulty of relating the Hebrew  כִּ פֶּרto Semitic cognates is complicated by
the polysemous nature of the root kpr in all Semitic languages.9 In addition, insights from
comparative studies are also confusing since, as Milgrom stated, both cognates contain
the same idea, “to rub.” The Arabic kafara, I stem, does not correspond to the Hebrew

כִּ פֶּר, piel, and the Akkadian kuppuru, D stem. The Akkadian D stem means “to wipe” and
always in the sense of “to wipe off, wipe away,” not “to wipe on or smear on.”10
Furthermore, making the etymology even more complicated is the fact that in addition to
the meaning “to cover,” the Arabic kafara has the same meaning “to expiate” that
corresponds to the Akkadian D stem, “to remove, to erase.”11 Finally, the Akkadian D
stem is repeatedly used in medical and ritual texts. It seems that the Akkadian cognate
corresponds more closely to the Hebrew  כִּ פֶּרthan the Arabic, at least in OT cultic
contexts.12 However, many still heavily rely on the comparative and etymological
evidence.13
The question that also impacted the debate on the  כִּ פֶּרwas the nature of the
atonement communicated by this verb. The scholars of the 19th and the beginning of the
20th centuries argued that  כִּ פֶּרis related to the Arabic kaffara and claimed that atonement
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refers to the covering over the sin or the sinner.14 Some recognized the connection
between  כִּ פֶּרand ( כֹ פֶּרransom) and claimed that the atonement should be viewed as a
payment of the ransom or appeasement that results from it.15 Some also viewed the כִּ פֶּר
as a symbolic dedication of the worshiper’s life to the holy.16 Regardless of these
differences in the understanding of atonement, scholars agreed on the fact that כִּ פֶּר
indicates the repairing of the relationship between God and humans that was interrupted
by sin.17 Sklar’s following statement explains this claim:
That this is plausible understanding of  כִּ פֶּרis self-evident in the priestly literature, for
it is used in sin contexts to describe taking care of the negative effects of sin in order
to bring about reconciliation between the sinner and the Lord. For this reason, it is
often said that a person is forgiven after atonement has been effected of their behalf:
“And the priest shall make atonement for [the leader] in regard to his sin, and he shall
be forgiven” (Lev 4:26b).18
However, this understanding of atonement becomes problematic because  כִּ פֶּרis
used in contexts where sin was never committed, indicating that no forgiveness is needed
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in contexts like these, but rather, purification. Some such cases are the birth of a child
where a new mother receives  כִּ פֶּרby a sin offering (Lev 12) or the sanctuary receives

כִּ פֶּר, where “sanctuary” is the indirect or direct object of this verb (Lev 16:16, 20,
respectively).19
As a result of the problems caused by translating  כִּ פֶּרwith “to cover” at least in
some contexts, some scholars, relying on the Akkadian kapāru, have suggested that כִּ פֶּר
should be translated as “to purify, purge, effect purgation.”20
Two studies that began to turn the attention from the Arabic kaffara to Akkadian
kuppuru are G. B. Gray’s Sacrifice in the Old Testament: Its Theory and Practice21 and
S. V. Driver’s articles in the Journal of Theological Studies.22 There are four principal
arguments that favor this understanding of כִּ פֶּר. First,  כִּ פֶּרis used as a parallel synonym
in biblical poetry with māḥâ “to wipe” (Jer 18:23b) and hēsîr “to remove” (Isa 27:9),
suggesting that it refers “to purge.”23 Second, Priestly texts often use words for
purification, such as  טָ הֵ רand חָ טָ א, in the same contexts with ( כִּ פֶּרLev 14:52–53;
16:30…).24 Third, this understanding of  כִּ פֶּרwould fit contexts where sin is not

Jay Sklar, “Sin and Impurity: Atoned or Purified? Yes!,” in Perspectives on Purity and
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committed, but emphasis is on the ritual purification.25 Fourth, the Akkadian kapāru, in
the D stem is not just similar to כִּ פֶּר, but is also used in cultic texts in a similar way as

 כִּ פֶּרwas.26
The proponents of this understanding of  כִּ פֶּרdo not claim that it should always be
translated as “to purify,” since, as with kaffara, there are contexts where this
understanding is not functional. Thus, they kept the translation “to expiate/atone” in some
contexts and “to purify” in others. However, the decision of which understanding to
apply to a given text is not an easy task. The works of certain notable scholars in the area
of Ancient Israel cult have proved this to be the case.27

כִּ פֶּר: Baruch A. Levine
In attempting to separate these two understandings of כִּ פֶּר, Baruch A. Levine
proposed that  כִּ פֶּרin biblical cultic texts reflects two distinct verbal forms:  כִּ פֶּרI, the
primary piel form derived from the Akkadian kuppuru, and  כִּ פֶּרII, a secondary
denominative from the nominal ( כֹ פֶּרransom, expiation gift).28 Levine held that  כִּ פֶּרI
means “to purify”29 when it is followed by a direct object or “to make expiation” when it
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is followed by a preposition such as  עַלor בַ עַד.30  כִּ פֶּרII carries the same meaning “to
expiate,” but the additional element that differentiates the “to make expiation” meaning
of I with the prepositions and  כִּ פֶּרII is the fact that  כִּ פֶּרII does not refer to cleansing
primarily, as with  כִּ פֶּרI, but rather, to the ransom of a life.31 Expiation in Priestly texts,
as Levin understood it, possesses a functional or technical sense and means “to perform
rites of expiation.” כִּ פֶּר, associated with the preposition עַל, can refer to a relations
process and means “to perform rites of expiation with respect to” places, persons, and so
on. It points to the fact that the indirect object, marked by the preposition עַל, is a
beneficiary of the rite’s effects, and no physical contact is implied. An example of this
sense is Lev 16:33: “and make atonement for the holy sanctuary, and he shall make
atonement for the tent of meeting and for the altar ( כִּ פֶּר+ direct object). He shall also
make atonement for the priests and for all the people of the assembly ( עַל+ )כִּ פֶּר.” The
sanctuary compartments all received physical action resulting in their purification, while
no physical action was directly performed over the Israelites. They were just beneficiaries
of the expiation.32

 כִּ פֶּרlinked with  עַלcan also refer to a spatial process and means “to perform rites
of expiation in proximity to or upon” sacrificial animal, places, persons, and so on. This
process implies physical contact or, at least, proximity. In Levine’s understanding, the
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expiation rites do not automatically produce purification, but rather, God himself is the
one who accomplishes it.33 The  כִּ פֶּרI in cultic texts refers to the separation or riddance of
impurity from individuals.34 In regards to the kōper, Levine saw it as (1) the payment
made for the purpose of “erasing or “wiping away” guilt incurred by the offense,”35 and
(2) “a substitute for a life (Exod 30:12, Isa 43:3), one’s own or another’s (Prov 21:18).”36
In cultic texts, it becomes an expiatory payment.37 Finally, kōper refers to substitution in
light of Lev 17:11.38
Averbeck seems to be correct when he observed, “Do we really have the same vb.
reflecting two different original derivations that have fallen together? At least
historically, one of them must have been antecedent to the other.”39 In addition, this
distinction between the two translation of the כִּ פֶּר, “to purify” or “to expiate,” proved to
be untenable in Levine’s own interpretation of certain Priestly texts. Levine implied that
the expiation in Lev 4:20 has the meaning of cleansing, ( כִּ פֶּרI) rather than ransom (כִּ פֶּר
II).40 Assuming that the  כִּ פֶּרI meaning is operating in this text can be maintained even
though there is no major impurity involved in this legislation. Levine applied  כִּ פֶּרI
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because he understood sinfulness as a form of impurity41 and thus, his distinction still
stands the test even though the context of Lev 4 is inadvertent sin. The following
statement demonstrates this:
The Akkadian kuppuru, which corresponds to the Hebrew כִּ פֶּר, means “to wipe off,
burnish, cleanse.” In cultic terms, this means that expiation is conceived as cleansing,
as wiping away impurity, contamination, and, by extension, sinfulness itself. Levitical
texts use the verb  כִּ פֶּרto express the concept that through expiation, one is “wiped
clean” of impurities that adhere or cling to a person, infect him, we might say.42
However, the element of an inadvertent sin found in the context of Lev 4 strongly
suggests that the expiation should be understood as ransom, rather than cleansing.43
Commenting on the phrase, “to atone for your lives” ( )לכַפֵ ָ֖ר עַל־נַפשֹׁ תֵ יכֶּ ָ֑םin Lev 17:11,
Levine stated that expiation in this text refers to atonement based on the  כֹ פֶּרas the
following quotation shows: “Literally, this formula means “to serve as kofer (ransom) for
your lives.” God accepts the blood of the sacrifices in lieu of human blood.”44 This form
of atonement is carried by Levine’s  כִּ פֶּרII and is allowed only in the case of
inadvertence.45 Lev 4 exactly fits this context since the sin involved is the one of
inadvertence. It seems that one or the other understanding needs to be eliminated or
perhaps both are operative in this text.
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כִּ פֶּר: Jacob Milgrom
Milgrom delineated four meanings of the  כִּ פֶּרbased on the contexts in which the
verb is found.46 In the first context,  כִּ פֶּרis associated with the sin offering, which in
Milgrom’s atonement theory cleanses the sanctuary rather than a worshiper, and it is to
be translated exclusively as “to effect purgation.”47
In the second group of texts,  כִּ פֶּרbears a meaning of “to rub on”48 or as cover.49
However, Milgrom claimed that this meaning for  כִּ פֶּרcannot be established based on the
cultic texts since the only two examples of this use, paschal lamb and scale-diseased
person, come from the texts where a sin offering was not used (Exod 12:27; Lev 14:18,
20, 29, 31).50 The only potential proof text of this use is Num 16:46–47,51 but this
understanding of  כִּ פֶּרis rarely considered in Milgrom’s works.
In the third group of texts that deal with averting God’s wrath,  כִּ פֶּרis based on the
kōper principle (Exod 30:12–16). This meaning includes the notion of substitution; the
guilty party is substituted by the innocent party or their ransom.52
In the fourth context,  כִּ פֶּרhas a more abstract or figurative notion of “atone” or
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“expiate” (Lev 16:10, 21; 17:11). “The meaning here is that the offerer is cleansed from
his impurities/sins and becomes reconciled, ‘at one,’ with God.” Milgrom further stated
that “Such is also the kippēr role of all of the other sacrifices whose blood is not daubed
on the altar’s horns like the ḥaṭṭāʾt.” He stated that this meaning is also found in ʿōlâ
(Lev 1), minḥâ (Lev 2), milluʾı̂ m (Exod 29:33), and ʾāšām (Lev 5:16, 18, 26) offerings.53
Regardless of Milgrom’s more elaborate contextual work, he relied heavily on the
comparative texts, and his interpretations of texts, like Levine’s, also show tensions. That
is, Num 35:31–33 states that no act of  כִּ פֶּרcan be done for the land polluted by
bloodshed, except the shedding of the murderer’s own blood. Milgrom stated that the כִּ פֶּר
in this text refers to the ransom principle,54 which is in accordance with vv. 31–32, but
the text clearly speaks about the pollution of the land through the shedding of blood (חָ נֵף,
v. 33 and טָ מֵ א, v. 34), which implies that the  כִּ פֶּרof the land should include cleansing
element as well.55 Milgrom emphasized moral defilement alone in this text.56

כִּ פֶּר: Jay Sklar
Sklar proposed that this tension can be solved by understanding that  כִּ פֶּרincludes
both conceptions: purification and ransom.57 He has suggested this by demonstrating that
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 כִּ פֶּרin the contexts of sin requires both elements, ransom and purification. Ransom
delivers the guilty party, the sinner, from the punishment of his/her sin while purification
is needed in this context to cleanse the sanctuary that was automatically defiled by the
sinner’s sin.58 He stated that purification is needed in the contexts of ritual impurity to
purify the individuals from their impurity or consecrate them for a certain ministry, while
ransom is required in cases of major ritual impurities since those individuals would defile
the sanctuary or, in the context of consecration, need ransom on account of the “general
impurity of the people relative to the holy.”59

כִּ פֶּר: Roy Gane
Gane’s study on the  כִּ פֶּרformulae confirmed F. Maass’s claim that in the context
of a sin offering, “ כִּ פֶּרalways indicates the goal of activity rather than prescribing a
specific physical activity.”60 Gane also noted that another point that separates Hebrew

 כִּ פֶּרand Akkadian kuppuru is the physical act by which the goal of the verb is
accomplished. Generally, Akkadian kuppuru in ritual contexts includes physical wiping
of the objects or person from evil which was removed which is rarely the case in biblical
corpus.61 Gane proposed that  כִּ פֶּרformulae in biblical texts include the preposition ִּמן
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indicating that evil has been removed from the offerer. This fact suggests that כִּ פֶּר
includes a purgatory element in reference to the offerer.62 Gane moved the dialogue on
the meaning of  כִּ פֶּרin the right direction by stating:
Whether the origin of the verb  כִּ פֶּרshould be sought outside Hebrew, within Hebrew
as a denominative of the noun “ כֹ פֶּרransom” or “compository payment” (see e.g.,
Exod 30:11–16) or both, it seems impossible to explain the semantic range of כִּ פֶּר
without allowing for the possibility that some meanings of the word are derived by
extension or metaphorical usage, a factor that diminishes the relevance of
etymology.63
S. R. Driver suggested that: “it does not greatly signify, in explaining it, whether
we start from the idea of covering over or from that of wiping out: in either case, the idea
which the metaphor is intended to convey is that of rendering null and inoperative.”64
Having in mind the variety of usages of  כִּ פֶּרin the biblical text, scholars tend to
agree that there is no English word that encompasses all of them.65 Biblical usages of כִּ פֶּר
in the ritual texts and non-ritual texts indicate that some sort of obstacle has been
removed from the offerer or relationship between the two parties.66 Gane affirmed
Driver’s claims that  כִּ פֶּרis a part of the atonement process, but does not express
atonement in its entirety. The sequence of activities related to sin and reparation offerings
the kuppuru/kippēr relationship to the largely analogous case of Akkadian salāḫu (“sprinkle”) and Hebrew
sālaḥ (“forgive”). Feder, “On kuppuru, kippēr and Etymological Sins,” 537–38, 535.
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confirms this, since the priest performs  כִּ פֶּרwhich is followed by forgiveness granted by
God (Lev 4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:16, 18, 26. Accordingly,  כִּ פֶּרmust precede atonement and
has something to do with the obstacle in the divine-human relationship.67  כִּ פֶּרis a
prerequisite for forgiveness.68 However, God is the one who grants forgiveness, not the
rite itself.69 Finally, Gane correctly stated that “the nature of the  כפרin a given sacrifice
depends, of course, upon the goal of that ritual.70

כִּ פֶּר: Yitzhaq Feder
Feder elaborated even more on the point already noted by Gane that the Akkadian
kuppuru conveys a concrete use versus purely abstract meaning of the Hebrew כִּ פֶּר. He
stated: “The Akkadian uses of kuppuru refer specifically to the physical act of purifying
by means of wiping a person or object with a purificatory substance. Occasionally, this
verb can be used to refer to the rite as a whole, but it is never used as a general term
meaning ‘to purify.’71 The Hebrew  כִּ פֶּרoccurs in the formulas that refer to the overall
function of a ritual, instead of to any specific physical act (e.g. Lev. 4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:6,
10). In addition, the majority of cultic uses of  כִּ פֶּרare related to sin offering contexts
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Feder, “On kuppuru, kippēr and Etymological Sins,” 538.

71

397

where the central act is the daubing and sprinkling of blood. However, this ritual is fairly
different from the rubbing rites described by the Akkadian term. That the Hebrew  כִּ פֶּרis
best understood as referring to the abstract effect of the ritual is reinforced by the vast
majority of cultic and non-cultic uses of the  כִּ פֶּרnominal derivative, כֹ פֶּר, as well as
verbal uses.72 Feder concluded: “Thus, the non-cultic and cultic sources are in accord that
kippēr refers to the abstract effects of a person’s actions (‘to appease,’ ‘to expiate’), not a
concrete action such as that described by kuppuru (‘to rub, wipe’).”73 He correctly stated
that none of the  כִּ פֶּרoccurrences carry concrete sense “to wipe.”74
Feder also pointed to the fact that scholars never proposed that the meaning of the
Hebrew  סָ לַחshould be informed by the Akkadian salāhu̮. This is peculiar since salāhu̮ is
frequently used in ritual texts to refer to aspersions with water or other liquids, usually for
the purpose of purification and the notion that ritual cleansing provides compellingly
enough ground for the proposal that this term is a “concrete etymological predecessor to
the Heb. term’s sense ‘to forgive,’ deriving perhaps from the notion that the person is
thereby cleansed of guilt.”75 It is exactly in these contexts that the Hebrew  סָ לַחappears
(Lev 4:26, 31, 35; 5:10, 13, 16, 18, 26). This is never proposed since the Hebrew  סָ לַחin

“In non-cultic sources, one finds  כפרderivatives in reference to placating anger (e.g. Gen 32:21;
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both cultic and non-cultic contexts always refer to the abstract sense “to forgive.” Very
often it follows the  כִּ פֶּרwhen  כִּ פֶּרis accomplished by the sin offering and it does not
appear in contexts where ritual impurity is implied.76 Both, Akkadian kuppuru and salāhu̮
refer to the concrete, literal, physical cleansing, while Hebrew  כִּ פֶּרand  סָ לַחdesignate
abstract effects of the terms whose etymological origin is not definite.
Feder himself proposed that “it seems clear that the only lexicographically
prudent approach requires an analysis of kippēr primarily, and perhaps exclusively, on
the basis of the inner-Biblical evidence.” Feder’s suggestion was anticipated three
decades ago, since Gorman, in 1990, suggested the same method for a proper
understanding of כִּ פֶּר: “Once again it is necessary to grant that kipper has a broad range
of meaning that must be determined in each case by its specific ritual context.”77 This
seems to become the scholarly consensus after countless attempts to relate  כִּ פֶּרwith
various ANE cognates. The present study attempts to begin this process by analyzing כִּ פֶּר
contexts in the Pentateuch. Before proceeding to this task, the present study introduces a
critical element in the  כִּ פֶּרprocess, the states of the  כִּ פֶּרrecipients.

Various States of the Creation
In order to understand properly  כִּ פֶּרwith all its syntactical variations when it
deals with human beings and inanimate objects, their states needs to be addressed.
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Creation, including people, physical objects, and places, is defined by four states. They
can be holy, profane, pure, and impure, and as such, these states can be viewed as two
pairs of opposites: holy versus profane, and pure versus impure. Further, even though
impure is opposite to holy, profane is its antonym. Finally, these states are often
combined with each other, forming four possible pairs. An entity can be profane and
pure, profane and impure, holy and pure, but not holy and impure.78 The following
quotation explains the pairs of state:
“Profane and pure” is a neutral and basic state since it lacks dynamic elements of
holiness and impurity. Most laws that talk about becoming holy or impure assume a
person or object starts with this combined state. Being profane and impure is the
concern of most of purity legislation. “Holy and pure” is the state of most persons,
object, and places considered holy. Only the last, ostensibly contradictory pairing of
holiness and impurity demands attention. While this is not an expected or desired
state, it is legitimate, even demanded, in case of purgation offerings.79
It has to be emphasized that the holy and impure state appears in a very limited
way. Namely, it is the priesthood, sanctuary, and sin offering that can encompass both of
these mutually exclusive states.

Duality of Human Nature
The Creation account separates humanity from the rest of creation. The two
Hebrew nouns that define human nature as God created them,  דּמוּתand צֶּ לֶּם, point to two
basic aspects of human nature. Regardless of the semantic overlaps between them, צֶּ לֶּם
emphasizes concrete, while  דּמוּתstresses the abstract aspect of human beings. The
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former aspect includes the outward, physical, while the latter emphasizes the inward,
moral, spiritual, mental resemblance between human beings and God, which establishes
the duality80 of human beings as perceived by the OT. However, the use of these two
nouns in the Creation account suggests that the human being as a whole, including these
two components, is created in God’s image.81 This duality of human beings is an
important observation in light of the fact that human impurity in the OT corresponds to it.
That is, ritual impurity, as one aspect of GHS, finds its expression in the outward,
physical component of human nature, while moral impurity, as another aspect of GHS,
finds its expression in the inward, moral, spiritual element of human nature.

Human Sinfulness
Besides these four basic states, human beings exclusively experience additional
state of sinfulness.82 Scholars use various phrases such as “universal sinfulness of the
human race,”83 “basic sinfulness,”84 “the rebellious disposition of humanity”85 “common
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human sinfulness,”86 and “general sinfulness”87 to refer to it. Kurtz coined an eloquent
term for it: “the sinful habitus, which is inherent in human nature generally.”88
The OT proposes that “things began as perfect from God’s hand and then grew
steadily worse through man’s sinfulness.”89 The understanding of GHS was a commonly
shared concept by other ANE cultures.90
The following lines from Sumerian religious texts demonstrate this claim. “Never
has a sinless child been born to its mother, . . . a sinless workman has not existed from of
old” (ANET, 590, lines 102–3).” An Akkadian incantation for pacifying an angry deity
uses similar reasoning: “Who is there who has not sinned against his god? Who that has
kept the commandment for ever? All humans who exist are sinful.”91
Cover noted that “rhetorical questions of this sort were popular forms of
expression for this universally acknowledged dogma, reminding the gods that they should
not expect too much.” Some of them follow: “Mankind, as many as there are, Which one
of them comprehends his faults? Who has not transgressed, and who has not committed
sin? Which one understands the way of the god?”92 “Whoever was there so on his guard
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that he did not sin? Whoever was so careful that he did not incur guilt?”93 “Where is the
wise person who has not transgressed and [committed] an abomination? Where is he who
has checked himself and thus not ba[ckslid]?”94 Egypt literature also reflects the same
concept: “Say not:’ I have no wrongdoing.’”95
The OT abounds with statements that show a similar attitude about human
nature.96 Biblical scholars of various genres of biblical literature recognized and
confirmed the concept of general sinfulness of human nature.97 David Daube proposed
that BL is formed with GHS in the background. This does not mean that BL condones sin
in any form, but is aware that it deals with “fallible people.”98 This concept is also
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extensively debated outside of biblical studies.99 Reflecting on biblical ritual and purity
laws, Childs stated:
At the heart of the biblical laws lies a profound sense of human sinfulness as a
powerful destructive force which calls forth forms of institutional protection in an
effort to check its power. Although the concept of sin in the Old Testament at times
seems almost mechanical, when viewed as a whole, sin remains basically an offence
against the God of the covenant.100
Gen 1–11 contains the account of the human fall (Gen 3:1–8),101 understood to be
the introduction of sin into the perfect world. Even though no term for sin is mentioned in
the Fall account of Gen 3, this text is the best representation of what sin is.102 Cover
stated: “Sin ruptured the relationship between the creator and the creature, and set in
motion a series of consequences which, if unchecked, would eventuate in the ‘death’ of
the individual sinner.”103 A multitude of expressions of human sinfulness, that is, sins by
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humanity, further caused God’s judgment.104 First, the couple was expelled from the
garden of Eden because of their sin.105 R. Van de Walle captured the progression of evil:
“Sin increased and evil action multiplied during primeval history: Cain murdered his
brother, the sons of god fornicated with the daughters of man, the hubris of those who,
built the Tower of Babel is a collective transgression parallel to the eating of the fruit and
followed by a parallel lasting punishment, i.e. the confusion of tongues.”106
Later almost all of creation was destroyed, and God granted Noah and his family
a new beginning (Gen 6:5–7). However, the statement in Gen 8:21 witnesses that the
catastrophic event did not alter the fundamental human problem, that is, the intrinsic
sinfulness of humanity.107
The OT texts by some extent define the concept of GHS. First, it affects all
human beings (Gen 8:21; Prov 20:9; Eccl 7:20, 29).108 Second, it is inherited and a
permanent, life-long condition (Ps 51:7 [51:5]; 58:4 [58:3]; Isa 48:8; Job 15:14; 25:4;
14:1, 4; Isa 6:1–7).109 Three, it includes the inclination or determination of human mind
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towards sin (Gen 6:4; 8:21; Deut 31:21).110 Four, it involves the experience of
death/mortality (Gen 2:16–17; 3:14–19, 22–23).111
David R. Blumenthal provided a convenient definition: “Sinfulness is a very deep
dimension of human existence and dealing with it calls upon all our spiritual, intellectual,
emotional, and moral resources—even when we recognize that ceasing to sin is the base
line of repentance.”112
Several events in the Pentateuch show that the consciousness of GHS caused
God’s people or individuals not to approach God and have direct communication with
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him or to feel fatally endangered in God’s presence (Exod 20:19, Isa 6).113 Thus, a human
being can potentially embody two conditions that both point to their mortality. First,
mortality through general sinfulness, and second, as a punishment for a particular sin.114
The Apocryphal books extensively reflect on GHS in the books of 2 Esd, Wis,
and Sir taking the OT traditions of the Fall, the Mosaic law, and the moral teachings of
the prophets as their source materials. According to them sin began in Eden, but is
attributed variously either to Eve (Sir 25:24), Adam (2 Esd 3:21–22), or Satan (Wis 2:23–
24).115 Later on, Judaism and Christianity, based on the OT texts developed their own
beliefs about the sinfulness of human nature.116 Christianity, especially, has a long
tradition of debates on the GHS.117

Sinfulness as Reflected in Human Experience
Günter Röhser recognized a distinction between the act of sin and the state of sin
in his Metaphorik und Personifikation der Sünde,118 conveying more precision regarding

113

Kurtz, Offerings, 36; Trent C. Butler, Isaiah, HOTC 15 (Nashville: Broadman & Holman,
2002), 57; John N. Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 1–39, NICOT (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
1986), 182–83. Judges 13:21 can also be considered as one of the texts. I suggest that the awareness of his
own sinfulness forms the backdrop for Manoah’s fear of dying after seeing God and the temporary lack of
sanity expressed in his statement that they would die because of the intense feelings of unworthiness
characteristic for the context of theophany throughout the OT.
114

Kurtz, Offerings, 134.
David G. Clark, “Apocrypha: Theology,” NIDOTTE 4:404.

115

Gerstenberger, “אוה,” TLOT 1:56.

116

117
Darius W. Jankiewicz, “Sin and Human Nature: Historical Background,” in Salvation: Contours
of Adventist Soteriology, eds. Martin F. Hanna, Darius W. Jankiewicz, and John W. Reeve (Berrien
Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 2018), 91–118.
118
Günter Röhser, Metaphorik und Personifikation der Sünde: Antike Sündenvorstellungen und
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the different the stages of the human experience of sin. On one the hand, the activity of
sinning can be both a conscious and responsible act of human free will and choice;119 on
the other hand, it can be unconscious or unintentional.120 The state of sin can further be
understood in two different ways: (1) the state of having sinned, and (2) the human
inclination to commit sin.121 The former is also referred to as guilt. While the state of
having sinned is a specific one in the sense that it is a result of a particular sin being
committed, the human inclination to commit sin, along with other characteristics of GHS,
is ever present in human experience as it was shown above.

Burnt Offering: A Solution for General Human Sinfulness
As such, human sinfulness needs to be addressed in the divine-human
relationship. Any form of it, the act or the state of sin, represents an obstacle in divinehuman relationship. The offering fitting to overbridge GHS, the ever-present inclination
to commit sin, and other characteristics of GHS in a divine-human relationship is burnt
offering. Kurtz identified clear textual support for the difference between burnt and sin
offering: “Sinfulness tied to burnt and well-being offerings. Also, sin offering does not
deal with this since the sin is specifically mentioned.”122 The development of the burnt
offering constructed from biblical texts confirms this role of the burnt offering.
Its antiquity is well established by biblical texts (e.g., Gen 8:20; 22:2, 7, 8, 13;
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Exod 10:25; 18:12; Num 23:15; Judg 6:26; 13:16; 1 Sam 7:9; 1 Kgs 18:38; 2 Kgs 3:27;
10:24; Job 1:5; 42:8).123 The burnt offering is considered to encompass initially the
purposes of expiation and propitiation.124 This function is retained to some extent after
the coming of the entire sacrificial system (Lev 9:7; 14:15, 17: 16:24). However, the
regulation of the cult assigned specialized expiation to the sin and reparation offerings.125
They were introduced to mend the divine-human relationship when the human party
interrupted that relationship by committing certain kinds of sins. The burnt offering may
have retained the function of entreating God and included a wide range of motives such
as homage, thanksgiving, appeasement, and expiation, as the OT narratives recount.126
Schwartz’s comment on the motives standing behind the offering of the burnt offering is
even more specific: “They [gift offerings, Lev 1–3] could be made at will—in fulfillment
of vows, at private visits to the sanctuary, in supplication in times of distress, in gratitude
for deliverance from danger or harm, or simply in a spontaneous urge to pay homage to
God.”127 Wenham summed up all these motives in the following way: “In these phrases
the general aim of the sacrifice is indicated. It is that the offerer may be accepted (rātsāh)
by God. Peace with God is the goal of sacrifice.”128
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The introduction of the cult assumed specific directions for the burnt offering to
be offered in the morning as the first and in the evening as the last offering of the day
(Exod 29:38–42; Num 28:3–8). Exodus 29:42 states that the burnt offering was to be
offered continually (tāmı̄d) and as such, it symbolized the deity’s presence among and in
relationship with the covenant people.129 It was included in many festivals and special
days (the New Moon, each day of the Feast of Passover, the Feast of Weeks, the Feast of
Booths, the Day of Atonement).130 The phrase, “burnt offerings and peace offerings,” is
used as a merism to represent the entire sacrificial system.131 Hartley stated that “the
frequent presentation of whole offerings enabled the covenant community, despite the
human proneness to sin, to maintain fellowship with the holy God.”132
I agree with Hartley and Klingbeil that the burnt offering specifically retained the
purpose of atoning GHS which would enable the offerer to worship in God’s presence
regardless of the unfavorable state of his/her general sinfulness. Kurtz also stated that
“burnt offering atones for sinfulness, while sin and guilt offering atone for particular
sin.133 In this way, it serves constantly to provide reconciliation between God and sinful
human beings.134 Some rabbinic sources seem to be in accord with the claim that the
purpose of the burnt offering, among others, was to deal with sinful thoughts,135 that is,
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the ever-present inclination to commit sin.

Neglect of GHS in Scholarly Works on Atonement
Leading scholars of ancient Israel’s cult and particularly, of the book of Leviticus
did not include the concept of GHS in their understanding of atonement. When they
infrequently used the noun “sinfulness,” they referred to the state of sin after a sin had
been committed.
In his monumental three-volume commentary on Leviticus of more than 2700
pages, Milgrom rarely used the noun “sinfulness”136 or the adjective “sinful.”137 When he
did, it was a reference to the state of an individual or humanity who had committed sin or
a sin as an act. He never used these terms to refer to a state of human sinful nature as
described above. There is one reference that most likely is an exception, where, he
possibly referred to human sinful nature.138 Milgrom never considered human sinful
nature in his understanding of atonement, and that seems to be a lapse in his
hermeneutics, bearing in mind that atonement of human beings is one of the key topics in
the book of Leviticus.
Wright advanced the concept of human sinfulness to some extent in his Anchor
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Bible Dictionary article “Unclean, Clean.”139 His basic understanding of human
sinfulness seems to be contradictory. Basically, in his interpretation of Gen 2–3,
becoming sinful is a desirable condition for humans. He called it “growing-up:”
Before eating the woman and man are like children: without wisdom or knowledge,
sexually immature, unashamed of nakedness, immortal (i.e., as children who are not
entirely cognizant of their mortality), and not responsible for or aware of sin. After
eating the couple becomes wise and knowledgeable, sexually mature (in the J story
only after the eating does the subject of reproduction come up, 3:16, and naming the
woman Eve “life,” the “mother of all the living” occur, v 20), ashamed of their
nakedness, mortal, and sinful. This suggests that the latent reason for the pair’s
expulsion from the garden is their acquisition of a mature, mortal, human nature.140
Eating forbidden fruit slightly changed human condition, causing women’s
pregnancy to be painful and men’s agricultural activity to be more difficult.141 The major
and key difference in the human condition that eating from the Tree of Knowledge of
good and evil brought was the separation between humans and animals due to a newly
acquired divine knowledge, wisdom, discernment after they ate from it.142 Since God did
not want humans to possess this knowledge, he banished them from the Garden of
Eden.143 This explains why the concept of human sinfulness is totally absent in his other
works dealing with  כִּ פֶּרor portions dealing with it144 that one would certainly expect to
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be taken into consideration. In his interpretation of the Fall in Gen 2–3, the human
condition was not degraded, but on the contrary, had progressed.145
Even though Schwartz’s area of expertise is wide, some of his work related to
atonement presented an influential contribution to the topic. However, he did not use the
noun “sinfulness” in his works related to the topic of atonement.146 Gane also
infrequently used the noun “sinfulness”147 or the adjective “sinful”148 in his Cult and
Character. Uses of both words do not refer to the state of GHS, but always to a state of
committing a sin.
Gane’s detailed analysis of human nature in Leviticus portrays it in a series of
disparities—alive vs. dead, holy vs. common, pure vs. impure, and male vs. female. His
introductory remarks on human nature resonate with the understanding of human nature
offered in the present study. That is, humans are mortal, not inherently holy, and prone to
commit moral faults. This is in contrast to God who is eternal, holy, pure, and just.
Realization of this fundamental difference between God and humans is important in the
context of “the protection and positive growth relationship between the radically different
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divine and human party.”149 He published this study a full decade after publishing his
Cult and Character, which might be reflected in the exclusion of this aspect of human
nature from his understanding of the atonement. Certainly, if the human being, defined as
such, wants to approach God, some sort of mediation is needed, even if no particular sin
is committed by the human party. Gane’s atonement articulated in his Cult and Character
does not address this element of GHS. In Gane’s understanding of atonement, at least as
expressed in his Cult and Character, human beings are in need of atonement only when
they commit sin or contract defilement. Gane did not show much concern for a
disadvantage of GHS as being constant impediment on human part in divine-human
interactions aside from being represented in the states of ritual or moral impurity.
“Physical ritual impurities, on the other hand, are generated by an existing human state of
mortality that must be kept separate from Yhwh.”150 It is not certain if Gane's
understanding of mortality is the same concept as GHS as described in the present study.
In his article, “Sin and Impurity: Atoned or Purified? Yes,” Sklar never used the
terms sinfulness and used the adjective “sinful” only once to refer to moral impurity.151
The foundation for this article is his dissertation, and in it, Sklar dealt extensively with
ritual and moral impurity, but never discussed nor defined the concept of human
sinfulness.

Roy E. Gane, “The Nature of the Human Being in Leviticus,” in “What are Human Beings that
You Remember Them?” Proceedings of the Third International Bible Conference NOF Ginosar and
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Conclusion
Both of these points regarding the state of creation, the four basic states of
creation, and the additional state of sinfulness associated with creation, particularly of
human beings, are important for a proper understanding of כִּ פֶּר, since various physical
objects and particularly human beings, are frequently recipients of  כִּ פֶּרin the Pentateuch.
These states define human beings, and physical entities thus need to be considered in the
process of developing the understanding of  כִּ פֶּרin the Pentateuch.
The concept of human sinfulness underlines both conditions related to the human
experience of sin, the act, and the state. Human sinfulness is a permanent condition of all
human beings which needs to be addressed in any study of divine-human interaction.
While major scholars of ancient Israel cult devoted adequate attention to the four
states of creation when they researched  כִּ פֶּרin the OT, human sinfulness, remarkably,
was totally ignored. This concept did not seem to have an impact in the process of their
formation of the כִּ פֶּר.
Having established the neglect of the concept of GHS in the works of major
scholars of the Ancient Israel cult and the states applicable to human beings and other
physical entities, the present study proceeds to the study of the כִּ פֶּר.

The Meaning of  כִּ פֶּרin the Pentateuch
The frequent use of the verb  כִּ פֶּרin the Pentateuch provides solid grounds for
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gathering insights to form the meaning/s this verb conveys.152 Inferences from cognate
languages or etymological considerations are not conclusive.153 For this reason, the
current study proceeds to suggest the meaning of  כִּ פֶּרbased on its uses in the Pentateuch
and pointers found in the relevant contexts.
The present study of  כִּ פֶּרtakes three critical steps in order to form the proper
understanding of this verb. First, the uses of internal syntactical structure  כִּ פֶּרcontexts
demonstrate that the verb is used with the direct object or without any object, and with
the indirect object (with the preposition בַ ַעד, with the preposition עַל, and others). The
analysis of these contexts is conducted in the same order in the present study. Second,
since the application of blood is frequently used in  כִּ פֶּרcontexts, the analysis includes
examination of (1) the origin of blood in a given context, which reveals (2) the type of
offering the blood was obtained from, that further disclosed (3) who the offerer was,154
(4) the reason for offering, and (5) the location the blood was applied to. These elements
are often absent in non-cultic contexts and therefore, are not included in the analysis. In
other words,  כִּ פֶּרin non-cultic contexts is often achieved without some or all the
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elements listed in the second step. Third, the analysis focuses on identifying certain
Hebrew verbs in  כִּ פֶּרcontexts that, besides this verb, contribute to or convey the meaning
of a given ritual. Some texts, mostly non-ritual texts, will not contain data to answer these
questions raised in steps two and three. Before proceeding with the  כִּ פֶּרcontexts, I first
analyze Lev 17:11 to test whether this text can be taken as a foundational text for the
meaning of blood application by which  כִּ פֶּרis achieved.

Analysis of Leviticus 17:11: The Role of Blood and כִּ פֶּר
Leviticus 17:11 is one of the critical texts that sheds light on the role of blood in
the sacrificial process by which  כִּ פֶּרis achieved, and it was extensively debated in the
history of interpretation. It is enclosed by the two prohibitions concerning blood
consumption in vv. 10 and v. 12 and forms the center of this pericope, Lev 17:10–12,
providing a rationale for the prohibition.155 Scholars traditionally held that this text is
unique “in that it explicitly assigns sacrificial blood the function of ransoming human
life,”156 including blood obtained from the sin offering.157 Gane noted that some scholars
maintained that  כִּ פֶּרalways implies the idea of ransom whether  ֶּנפֶּשׁis included or not.
He also eloquently challenged this idea with the fact that ransom is not a possible
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understanding of  כִּ פֶּרwhen it is related to inanimate objects or parts of the sanctuary
(Lev 16:16, 18).158
Milgrom, however, claimed that blood manipulation in Lev 17:11 is associated
with the well-being offering only.159 In addition, this text poses a question as to whether
substitution can be inferred in the sacrificial ritual.160 Due to the critical importance of
this text for the  כִּ פֶּרprocess, the grammatical and theological analysis of the present
study includes four elements to understand properly the meaning of this text. The proper
understanding of these four elements is necessary for a sound interpretation of the entire
text. The first element is the meaning of the  כִּ פֶּרin this text. The second element is
related to the type/s of sacrifice by whose blood  כִּ פֶּרis achieved. The third element is the
meaning of the second  בpreposition attached to the noun  ֶּנפֶּשׁby which  כִּ פֶּרis
accomplished. The fourth element is examining whether  כִּ פֶּרincludes the concept of
substitution.
Leviticus 17:11: The Meaning of the כִּ פֶּר
A consensus exists among scholars regarding the first element. Leading scholars
of the ancient Israel cult recognized that  כִּ פֶּרrefers to ransom in this text.161 This is
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supported by the use of the phrase  ל ַכפֵר עַל־נַפשֹׁ תֵ יכֶּםfound in v. 11 which reoccurs only
two more times (Exod 30:15–16; Num 31:50). Both occurrences of this phrase mean “to
ransom your lives.” Milgrom noted that this is especially explicit in Exod 30:15–16:
Moreover, the verb kippēr must be related to the expression found in the same
pericope kōper napšô ‘a ransom for his life’ (Exod 30:12). The same combination of
the idiom kōper nepeš and the verb kippēr is found in the law of homicide (Num
35:31–33). Thus in these two cases, kippēr is a denominative from kōper, whose
meaning is undisputed: “ransom” (cf. Exod 21:30). Therefore, there exists a strong
possibility that all texts that assign to kippēr the function of averting God’s wrath
have kōper in mind: innocent life spared by substituting for it the guilty parties or
their ransom.162
Sklar has compellingly suggested that the concept of  כֹ פֶּרinforms the concept of

כִּ פֶּר: “In this regard the life ( ) ֶּנפֶּשׁof the offerer is ransomed by means of the life ( ) ֶּנפֶּשׁof
the animal, which is a payment that the offended party (the Lord) has agreed to (and
indeed, provided), which is less than the penalty the offerer originally expected (viz. their
own life), and which both rescues the offerer and restores peace to their relationship with
the Lord.”163
This definition of  כִּ פֶּרis based on Sklar’s extensive research of the term כֹ פֶּר. That
is, “Sklar used two steps to define kop̱er. The first step is to search for the meaning by an
exegetical analysis of the texts where kop̱er is found, and the second is to compare kop̱er
with other terms in its semantic field.”164 He detected the following pattern in the כֹ פֶּר
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texts: “(1) there is a guilty party, (2) there is an injured party, (3) the guilty party is being
rescued, (4) peace is being established to the damaged relationship between the guilty and
injured party, and (5) the guilty party is totally dependent on the reaction of the injured
party and on the acceptance or rejection of the kop̱er.”165
“Sklar identified two more roots that, along with their derivatives, share the same
meaning and contexts with the term kop̱er. The first root is pāḏāh, along with its four
derivatives (pᵉḏuyim , pᵉḏuṯ, piḏyom, and piḏyon). … The second root is gāʾal and its
derivatives gᵉʾullāh and goʾel. Regardless of the overlap in meaning in some contexts,
there are cases in which the meaning of kop̱er differs from the meaning of the
terms…”166 The contexts with these two roots show slight different semantic nuances that
differ from the  כֹ פֶּרcontexts.
That is, in some  גָּאַלcontexts, the person being redeemed has not done any wrong.
In others, the person who redeems has the automatic right to do so and does not need
approval from the person who possesses the person or object that is being redeemed. In
these contexts, “redemption” or “to redeem” makes more sense, since in  כֹ פֶּרcontexts, the
party that does the ransoming needs and depends on the acceptance of  כֹ פֶּרby the party to
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whom the wrong has been done. Some contexts with  פָדָ הcarry a meaning identical or
very similar to that of כֹ פֶּר.167
The conclusion that comes out of this understanding of  כִּ פֶּרis that animal’s blood
serves as a  כֹ פֶּרof human life. The foundation of the  כִּ פֶּרis the concept of כֹ ֶּפר, ransom.
The broken relationship between God, as an injured party, and the sinner, as a wrong
party, is resolved by God’s acceptance of animal’s blood-life as ransom for the offerer’s
blood-life. The decision as to whether to accept the ransom or not rests solely on the
wronged party, God.

Leviticus 17:11: The Type/s of Sacrifices
The second element generated considerable debate among scholars. It is
traditionally understood that this text proposes a rationale for the function of blood of all
animal sacrifices.168 Milgrom and Brichto argued that this text explains the function of
the blood of the well-being sacrifice only.169 The answer to this question significantly
impacts the understanding of  כִּ פֶּרin the OT.
Milgrom first established that the offerer envisaged in Lev 17:11 is guilty of a
capital offence and therefore, the sacrificial blood they offer serves as their ransom.170 He
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found three lines of evidence for arriving at this conclusion. First, Milgrom stated that “in
a legal context, moreover, nepeš specifically connotes capital crime or punishment (e.g.,
Exod 21:23; Lev 24:15; Deut 19:21), and expressions compounded with it often imply
that life is at stake (e.g., Judg 5:18; 12:3; 1 Sam 19:5).”171 Second, he further confirmed
this by the fact that the other two occurrences of the phrase  ל ַכפֵר עַל־נַפשֹׁ תֵ יכֶּםin addition
to v. 11, have capital punishment in view, namely census (Exod 30:11–16; Num
31:48).172 Third, Milgrom noted that the verb  כִּ פֶּרin Exod 31:11–16 “must be related to
the expression found in the same pericope kōper napšô ‘a ransom for his life’ (Exod
30:12). The same combination of the idiom kōper nepeš and the verb kippēr is found in
the law of homicide (Num 35:31–33).”173
Second, he argued that the sacrifice in this pericope is a nonexpiatory, well-being
offering, supporting this in two points.174 First, he understood the phrase “you will not eat
blood” as a reference to eating the meat with blood in it.175 The only sacrifice of which
the offerer would eat is the well-being offering; thus, Lev 17 deals with this offering.
Second, noting that 17:10–14 consists of two laws (vv. 10–12, and vv. 13–14) which
form a unity, Milgrom inferred that “because the second deals with wild animals—
hunted, obviously, for their meat and not for sport (ʾăšer yēʾākēl)—the first law
undoubtedly also speaks of the flesh of edible animals; these, however, are not game but
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domestic animals, which, according to H, must be sacrificed at the altar.”176 The only
meat from the altar that the offerer is permitted to eat is of the well-being offering.177
Milgrom showed awareness in claiming that the well-being offering only in view
in Lev 17:11 creates two crucial problems. First, the well-being offering would have an
expiatory role which contradicts the fact that it “never functions as a kippūr.”178 The
expiatory sacrifices in Leviticus are sin, guilt, and burnt offering. Second, in Milgrom’s
opinion, the sin that needs to be expiated is a capital offense against God. The following
quotation depicts his course to get to this claim:
As noted, lĕkappēr ʿal-nepeš must mean that the Israelite is guilty of a capital offense
against God, and unless he brings sacrificial blood to the altar, he is subject to the
death penalty. In the Priestly laws, however, there is no sacrificial expiation for
capital crime or, for that matter, for any deliberate violation. The presumptuous sinner
is banned from the sanctuary because he “acts defiantly (bĕyād rāmâ) … reviles the
Lord … has spurned the word of the Lord and violated his commandment” (Num
15:30–31; contrast vv. 24–29).179
Milgrom found the resolution for both of these contradictions in the opening law
of this chapter, Lev 17:3–4. He first argued that the “animal slaughter is murder except at
an authorized altar (vv. 3–4).”180 This is further confirmed in 17:4a. Milgrom stated that
the law “ordains that any Israelite who slaughters a sacrificial animal (for its meat)
without bringing it to the Tabernacle altar as an offering of well-being, dām yēḥašēb lāʾîs
hahûʾ dām šāpāk ‘blood guilt shall be reckoned to that man: he has shed blood’ (v
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4ba).”181 Finally, he found the support for this claim in the fact that
the idiom šāpāk dām is the well-attested accusation of murder (in P, Gen 9:6; Num
35:33; so in all sources: e.g., narrative, Gen 37:22; 1 Sam 25:31; 1 Kgs 2:31; 2 Kgs
21:16; 24:4; legal, Deut 19:10; 21:7; wisdom, Prov 1:16; 6:17; prophetic, Isa 59:7; Jer
22:3, 17; esp. Ezek 16:38; 18:10; 22:3, 4, 6, 9, 12) and the niphal of ḥšb “be
reckoned,” is the declaratory statement in P and H for designating a cultic act as
either acceptable or unacceptable to God (Lev 7:18; Num 18:27, 30; cf. Ps 106:31).182
Second, Milgrom proceeded to conclude that “the blood ransoms the offerer’s life
and clears him of the charge of murder.”183 Accordingly, his resolution is that the wellbeing offering atones in terms of ransoming the offerer who is guilty of murder, that is,
unauthorized killing of an animal.
Milgrom’s thesis that Lev 17 is limited to the well-being offering which atones as
a ransom was extensively critiqued by Kiuchi, Gane, and Sklar.
In the first place, Milgrom’s interpretation depends on v. 10 being restricted to the
well-being offering.184 Yet, the text seems to be more inclusive since the phrase אֲשֶּׁ ר י ֹאכַל

 כָל־דָּ םrefers to any blood, not just the blood of well-being offering.
Milgrom’s comment on this phrase in Lev 17:10 seems to contradict his thesis in
great measure.
Since the blood of game is the topic of the next law (vv. 13–14), one might argue that
“any blood” in this verse refers to only sacrificial animals. The rabbis, however, claim
that this blood prohibition is total: it includes nonsacrificial animals as well (Sipra
Aḥare, par. 3:3; b. Ker. 4b). This view is corroborated by the occurrence of the same
phrase in another attestation of the blood prohibition (7:27), which contains the added
181
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words lāʿôp wĕlabbĕhēmâ ‘of birds and beasts’, a phrase intended to include every
nonsacrificial category: game, blemished animals, and carcasses.185
However, Milgrom made a difference between the phrases where they refer to
“eating meat with blood” and which refer to “eating over blood,”186 that is, some form of
illicit practice such as divination or soothsaying (Lev 19:26).187 Even this seems unlikely
for two reasons.
First, there is a lexical difference when “eating meat with blood” is intended or
when “eating over blood” is intended. In the former phrase, blood is syntactically linked
with the adjective  כֹ לor with and without direct object marker, but blood remains the
direct object of the verb אָכַל, as it is in Lev 17:10, 12, while the latter phrase places the
preposition  עַלbefore  דָּ םwhich never appears in Lev 17.
Second, blood is related to worship in vv. 1–9, but it seems that the shift takes
place from v. 10 where it is emphasized that blood has an atoning role.188 For that reason,
it seems unlikely that, lexically, the very general regulation189 regarding the handling of
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blood in v. 11 should be limited to the well-being offering in vv. 3–7. Finally, v. 8
expands the list of sacrifices to either all sacrifices, in which case, the phrase ַו ֲאלֵהֶּ ם תּ ֹאמַ ר
functions as a merism referring to all sacrifice,190 or just the peace sacrifices. The former
alternative makes more sense in light of the overarching topic in vv. 3–9, that is,
illegitimate sacrifice.191
Sklar noted two reasons that suggest that a general tone of blood consumption
prohibition in v. 10 was transferred to v. 11. First, based on v. 11a, blood contains life
which cannot be factual of the animals offered as a well-being offering only, but for all
animals, not just sacrificial ones, and even more unlikely for the well-being offering.
Second, based on v. 11b, God himself as the owner of life, prescribed an atoning role to
the blood. It is not to be eaten.192 Consequently, v. 11 states two reasons that stand behind
this prohibition: (1) the blood of animals contains its life and cannot be consumed, and
(2) the animals’ blood can be used only to make atonement on the altar.
Besides postulating that the general language in v. 11 does not warrant the
conclusion that the context of this text should be well-being offering,193 Kiuchi pointed to
another inconsistency with Milgrom’s thesis. That is, v. 4 prescribes a kārēt penalty for
the one guilty of slaughtering the animal except at the altar. The same punishment is also
prescribed for blood consumption in v. 10. However, no remedy is given for these sins in
Lev 17. Kiuchi correctly stated:
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If the offerer brought a sacrificial animal to the sanctuary and slaughtered it, this act
would constitute a totally legitimate act. It is not a sin; he has not committed a
murder. In other words, vv. 3–4 do not imply any capital offence to be expiated, and
there is no reason to mention the fact that the blood may not be consumed. On the
other hand, if the offerer killed his animal outside the sanctuary this passage offers no
ritual remedy. In either case the comment in Lev 17:11 is irrelevant on Milgrom's
interpretation.194
He also noticed that Milgrom interpreted the phrase  ל ַכפֵר עַל־נַפשֹׁ תֵ יכֶּםas if it
implies a capital offense partly by the meaning of the independent noun  ֶּנפֶּשׁand partly
by analogy with Exod 30:11–16 and Num 31:48ff. He found it methodologically
incorrect to infer that the use of the identical phrase implies the identical offense. To
argue that  כִּ פֶּרrefers to the same sense would be possible, but not that the phrase refers to
the same offence. The context of Lev 17 does not provide a basis for this suggestion.195
Being an offering that includes blood application, the well-being offering seems to be an
expiatory offering based on Lev 17:11. Kurtz was correct regarding the expiatory role of
a well-being offering when he stated that “if the sprinkling of blood in connection with
the burnt-offering and trespass-offering served as an atonement ()ל ַכפֵר ָעלָיו, the
sprinkling of the blood of the peace-offering, which was performed in precisely the same
way, must necessarily have had the same significance.”196
In his final comment on Lev 17:11, that is, the phrase ל ַכפֵר עַל־נַפשֹׁ תֵ יכֶּם,
Milgrom raised two more points against the traditional understanding of this text:
Why should the blood of the ḥaṭṭāʾt and ʾāšām, the exclusive expiatory sacrifices
brought for inadvertent wrongs, ransom the offerer’s life? What capital crime has he
194
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committed to warrant the forfeit of his life? In particular, as I argued thirty years ago
(Milgrom 1970), is the new mother, whose ʿōlâ and ḥaṭṭāt offerings expressly expiate
on her behalf (wĕkipper ʿālêhā, 12:7, 8), deserving of death because she had a
baby?197
There are two underlying assumptions in this quotation which are incorrect. The
first assumption is related to the first two questions, and it is that one’s life is never at risk
in the case of inadvertent sin. Based on Lev 4–5 and Num 15:22–29, which both state that

 כִּ פֶּרand  סָ לַחis possible for inadvertent sin, it would be more correct to say that one
never has to face death punishment in case of inadvertent sin. Inadvertence does not
mean that there is no punishment for such sin. Rather, as Sklar put it, “the כִּ פֶּ ֶ֤ ר-rite in
contexts of inadvertent sin is characterized by the ransoming of the sinner, that is, the
giving of a legally legitimate ransom payment ( )כֹ פֶּרthat acts as a mitigated penalty.
Within this context, forgiveness functions as an expression of agreement to and
acceptance of the ransom payment ()כֹ פֶּר.”198
The second assumption is that the new mother is not at risk after having a baby.
Based on the overall understanding of ritual impurity, she seems to be at risk because her
impurity is considered severe and requires ( כִּ פֶּרLev 12:7–8) or she would be deserving
of capital punishment for not following God’s regulations for ritual cleansing (Lev 15:31,
Num 19:13, 20).199 According to Milgrom, the goal of the  כִּ פֶּרin Lev 12 was to remove
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impurity from the new mother and bring her back to the state of purity.200
Brichto, like Milgrom, argued that Lev 17:11 should be restricted to a well-being
offering and that the slaughter of a domestic animal anywhere else but at the tabernacle
constitutes a murder.201 However, Brichto uniquely understood  בin the phrase ִּ ִֽכי־הַ דָּ ם הוּא

 בַ ֶּנּפֶּשׁ י ַכפֵרto be beth pretii or “bet of price/exchange,” rather than beth essentiae since
this preposition is often interchanged with  תַּ חַ תin talionic formulas.202 Accordingly, a
general prohibition against blood eating in v. 10 is not limited to a well-being offering,
but refers to burnt, sin, and reparation sacrifices that all have an atoning function.203

Leviticus 17:11: The Nature of the Preposition
 בin כִּ י־הַ דָּ ם הוּא בַ ֶּנּפֶּשׁ י ַכפֵר
The third element includes answering a fundamental question: What is the nature
of the preposition  בin  ?כִּ י־הַ דָּ ם הוּא בַ ֶּנּפֶּשׁ י ַכפֵרConsequently, the answer to this question
also sheds light on the referent of the noun  ֶּנפֶּשׁ, the animal that is offered, or the offerer
who offers it.
There are three proposals regarding the nature of the preposition ב. First, if  בis
beth pretii, the noun  ֶּנפֶּשׁrefers to the offerer’s life as opposed to the life of the sacrificial
animal. The whole phrase is translated as “it is the blood that makes atonement for one’s
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life.”204 Second, if  בis beth essentiae,  ֶּנפֶּשׁrefers to the life of the animal. In this case, the
phrase is translated as “it is the blood, as life, that effects expiation.”205 Third, if  בis beth
instrumentii,  ֶּנפֶּשׁalso refers to the life of the animal. In this case the phrase is translated
as “for it is the blood that makes atonement, by reason of/means of the life.”206

Beth Pretii
If  בis beth pretii, the preposition is translated with the English preposition “for/in
exchange of,” and it occurs in contexts where one item is given for/in exchange of the
other. To support this understanding of ב, scholars usually point to the interchangeability
of  בand  תַּ חַ תin texts that convey the talionic principle. Exodus 21:23 and Lev 24:18 use

 ֶּנ ֶּפשׁ תַּ חַ ת ָנפֶּשׁ, while Deut 19:21 uses  ֶּנפֶּשׁ ב ֶֶּ֗נפֶּשׁ.207 Applied to Lev 17:11, this would
mean that the blood of the animal is given for/in exchange of/in place of the offerer’s life.
The animal’s blood-life becomes the substitute for the offerer’s blood-life. This
understanding would further indicate that the animal’s blood-life serves as a substitution
in place of the offerer’s blood-life.208
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There are four points of critique of this understanding of ב. First, the appeal to the
use of  בin talionic formulas (Deut 19:21) is not decisive because the only use of this
phrase in priestly literature does not use ב, but ( תַּ חַ תLev 24:18).209 Second, the formulas
in Exod 21:23 () ֶּנפֶּשׁ תַּ חַ ת ָנפֶּשׁ, Lev 24:18 () ֶּנפֶּשׁ תַּ חַ ת ָנפֶּשׁ, and Deut 19:21 () ֶּנפֶּשׁ ב ֶּנפֶּשׁ
differ from the one in Lev 17:11 ()כִּ י־הַ דָּ ם הוּא בַ ֶּנּפֶּשׁ. That is, the two nouns preceding
and following the preposition are the same in the former formula and different in the
latter one.210 Third, the substitutionary element, based on the phrase ל ַכפֵר עַל־נַפשֹׁ תֵ יכֶּם
where  כִּ פֶּרfunctions as ransom, that supports the beth pretti understanding is not decisive
since beth essentiae and beth instrumenti are also compatible with the idea of
substitution.211 Fourth,  ֶּנפֶּשׁin v. 11 most likely refers to the life of the sacrificial animal
and not of the offerer. That is,  ֶּנפֶּשׁin 11aa ( )כִּ י ֶּנפֶּשׁ הַ בָ שָׂ ר בַ ֹ֣דּם הִּ ואand  כִּ פֶּרin 11ab ( ַואֲנִּי

 )נתַ ִּתּיו ָלכֶּם עַל־הַ ִּמּזבֵ חַ ל ַכפֵר עַל־נַפשֹׁ תֵ יכֶּםare combined together in 11b ()כִּ י־הַ דָּ ם הוּא בַ ֶּנּפֶּשׁ,
implying that the  ֶּנפֶּשׁin 11ab is the same as the one in 11aa, that is, of the animal.212
Kiuchi, via Janowski, also noted chiasmus of  ֶּנפֶּשׁand  דָּ םin 11aa and in 11b.213 Even
though this understanding of the preposition  בin Lev 17:11 is grammatically and
semantically possible none of the arguments scholars presented seems to be strong
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enough, especially when keeping in mind that  ֶּנפֶּשׁrefers to the sacrificial animal.

Beth Essentiae
The following quotation is educational on the beth essentiae:
This old, rather unclear expression probably means that the noun introduced by the ב
belongs to the essence (in the broad sense) of the thing which is being talked about, or
it may point to the function of the preposition as a link between the subject and
predicate of an equational clause. The expressions Beth of identity and pleonastic
Beth are also found.214
In other words, what follows the preposition ב, beth essentiae, is equivalent to or
explains that which precedes it. Applied to Lev 17:11, כִּ י־הַ דָּ ם הוּא בַ ֶּנּפֶּשׁ, this would mean
that blood is equated with life. There are three arguments to support beth esssentiae.
First, Jenni noted that this equation takes place in Lev 17:14b ()כִּ י ֶּנפֶּשׁ כָל־בָ שָׂ ר דָּ מֹו הִּ וא
and informs the understanding of both  בin v. 11a and 11b. Accordingly, 11a, כִּ י ֶּנפֶּשׁ

הַ בָ שָׂ ר בַ ָ ֹ֣דּם הִּ וא, should be translated as “for the life of the flesh is blood,” and 11b, כִּ י־
הַ דָּ ם הוּא בַ ֶּנּפֶּשׁ י ַכפֵר, “for it is the blood, as life, that effects expiation.”215 Second, this
understanding of  בis in conformity with the fact that  ֶּנפֶּשׁin 11b refers to the life of the
sacrificial animal. Third, the idea of substitution is implied due to the ransom meaning of
the  כִּ פֶּרin v. 11. That is, the life of the animal is substituted for the life of the offerer.216
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Accordingly, beth essentiae is a viable option from the grammatical standpoint. It is
consistent with the understanding that  ֶּנפֶּשׁin 11b refers to the life of the sacrificial
animal. It fits the ransoming nature of  כִּ פֶּרin this text. It has to be added that the equation
of life and blood in Lev 17:14b does not exclude the possibility that  בcould also be beth
instrumentii.217

Beth Instrumentii
The beth instrumentii is the most widely accepted understanding of  בin Lev
17:11b.218 The preposition  בindicates the instrument with which or the means by which
something is done.219
The primary support for the beth instrumentii emanates from the fact that  בis
mainly instrumental when it is syntactically linked to the verb ( כִּ פֶּרGen 32;21; Exod
29:33; Lev 5:16; 7:7; 19:22; Num 5:8; 35:33; 1 Sam 3:14; Isa 27:9; Prov 16:6) except in
the two texts in which it is locative (Lev 6:23; 16:17, 27).220 The other two arguments
coincide with the same argument presented in favor of beth essentiae. It is consistent with
the understanding that  ֶּנפֶּשׁin 11b refers to the life of the sacrificial animal and to the
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ransom nature of the כִּ פֶּר. Rodríguez viewed beth pretii as a form of beth essentiae.221

Conclusion on the Preposition ב
To summarize, from the grammatical stand point, the preposition  בin Lev 17:11b
could be any of the following options: beth pretii, beth essentiae, or beth instrumentii.
However, two last alternatives, beth essentiae and beth instrumentii, are favored since
they agree with the understanding that the referent of  ֶּנפֶּשׁin 11b is the life of the
sacrificial animal. Of the last two, beth instrumentii seems to have stronger grammatical
and intertextual support, namely, the construction  ב+  כִּ פֶּרis mainly instrumental, rarely
locative, but never beth essentiae.222
Sklar noted that either of the last two options, beth essentiae or beth instrumentii,
basically conveys the same meaning to Lev 17:11. He stated:
Indeed, whether one states that blood atone by the means of the life it contains, or
whether one states that the blood atones as life, it is clear that the atoning function of
the blood is grounded in its relation to the life of the animal, that is, the blood is able
to atone because of the life it contains.223
Thus, Sklar suggested the following translation of Lev 17:11: “For the life of flesh
is in the blood, and I myself have bestowed it to you upon the altar to ransom your lives,
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for it is the blood that ransoms by means of/as the life.”224

Leviticus 17:11: Probability of the Idea of Substitution
As emphasized above, the idea of substitution is widely recognized and affirmed
in Lev 17:11 and it does fit the two choices that are favored by the grammar and syntax
of the text. The life of the sacrificial animal takes the place of the offerer on the altar.225
As argued above, inadvertence related to a sin does not mean that the life of the sinner
was not endangered. As Kiuchi stated, “it seems arbitrary to hold that the sin in Exod 30:
12ff. put a person's life in jeopardy whereas the sin in Lev 4–5 does not.”226 As it was
argued on pages 395–96 of the present study, the life of a person is always in need of
ransom from death from the point of committing sin and receiving forgiveness.227 Kiuchi
has shown that
uncleanness, which symbolizes death or the aura of death, is ascribed not only to
corpses or carcasses but to things and persons which have contact with them. The
same is true for an inadvertent sin. Though it does not deserve the death penalty, the
sinner is regarded as being in the realm of death. … Because if nothing is done to
uncleanness or sin that will lead to a person’s death, so it could be posited that a
sacrifice indeed saves the life of a sinner or an unclean person, and that the exchange
of  ֶּנפֶּשׁin Lev 17: 11b should be understood in this sense.228
Thus, it is more correct to say that sinners do not experience death because of the
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privilege of  כִּ פֶּרthat ransoms their lives by moving them from the aura of death and the
forgiveness that God bestows on them. Kiuchi is also correct in suggesting that the term
death penalty should be avoided in the context of inadvertent sin in Lev 4–5, since
neither the phrase  מֹות יוּמָ תnor the kārēt penalty is mentioned in these chapters, which
further points to the fact that these sins do not deserve the death penalty.229 Actually,
none of a variety of capital punishments is implied in Lev 4–5.
Finally, as argued above, the idea of substitution is present in Lev 17:11 because
in itself, it includes the idea of a substitution and because the sacrificial animal instead of
the offerer is slaughtered at the altar in the sanctuary.230

Conclusion on Lev 17:11
The analysis above confirms the fact that the most compelling understanding of
Lev 17:11 is a traditional one which argues that this text encompasses general theological
principles which apply to all atoning sacrifices; the life-blood of the sacrificial animal, as
a כֹ פֶּר, כִּ פֶּר, atones for the offerer’s life. Thus, כִּ פֶּר, to atone for is founded on the כֹ פֶּר,
rather than on other suggestions, including “to cover,” since it avoids misconceptions
related to all other suggestions. This understanding of Lev 17:11 is based on the
following four points. First,  כִּ פֶּרin Lev 17:11 is achieved by the animal’s blood that
serves as a  כֹ פֶּרof human life. God accepts the animal’s life-blood as a ransom instead of
the offerer’s life-blood.  כִּ פֶּרransoms in Lev 17:11 based on the כֹ פֶּר. This insight is
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supported by the ever-present unfavorable status of human beings before God due to their
sinfulness. Consequently, humans constantly need atonement.231 Second, based on the
fact that a general prohibition against blood eating in v. 10 is not limited to a well-being
offering, but refers to burnt, sin, and reparation sacrifices that all have an atoning
function, the present study accepts the traditional understanding that Lev 17:11 envisions
all sacrifice by whose blood  כִּ פֶּרis achieved. In other words, all expiatory sacrifices.
Third, although all three alternatives, beth pretii, beth essentiae, or beth instrumentii, are
valid for the meaning of the second  בpreposition attached to the noun  ֶּנפֶּשׁby which כִּ פֶּר
is accomplished, beth essentiae and beth instrumentii are favored since they agree with
the understanding that the referent of  ֶּנפֶּשׁin 11b is the life of the sacrificial animal and
have stronger grammatical and intertextual support. Fourth, the fact that  כִּ פֶּרin itself
includes the idea of substitution and because the sacrificial animal instead of the offerer is
slaughtered at the altar in the sanctuary, the idea of substitution is implied in Lev 17:11.
This analysis and understanding of  כִּ פֶּרgreatly helped in identifying the meaning of כִּ פֶּר
in some vague contexts below.

 כִּ פֶּרwith the Direct Object Marker
Two potential meanings found in three texts emerge when  כִּ פֶּרis found with a
direct object marker in the Pentateuch (Gen 6:14; Lev 16:20, 33). The first one is “to
cover” or “to rub on” (Gen 6:14) and the verb is in qal stem. This use corresponds to

231
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Akkadian B stem kapāru.232 This is identical to the Arabic kaffaru as stated above. The
second meaning is “to rub off, wipe, purify” (Lev 16:20, 33), and the verb is in piel stem
which corresponds to the Akkadian D stem kuppuru.233 These two meanings are based on
their literary contexts and are confirmed by their correspondence with ANE languages.

Non-Cultic Contexts
Regarding Gen 6:14, commentators believed that the hapax legomenon  כֹ פֶּרis to
be translated with “bitumen,” and the verb referred to the sealing of the bark outside and
inside to make it watertight.234  כֹ פֶּרis uniquely used in this way in the OT235 and this
understanding is well confirmed from ANE lexical, conceptual, and contextual
correspondence where Hebrew  כֹ פֶּרcorresponds with the Akkadian kupru, “bitumen,”
that is used in the Hebrew and Akkadian flood stories.236 Harold R. Cohen emphasized a
critical point that proved that “to smear”237 is the foundational meaning of the Akkadian
kaparu that corresponds to the Hebrew כִּ פֶּר:
The parallels from Atrahasis, however, are somewhat closer than those usually cited
from the eleventh tablet of the epic of Gilgamesh, since the former demonstrate the
use of the bitumen for caulking the boat, obviously what is implied in Gen 6:14 as
232

Chaim Cohen, Biblical Hapax Legomena in the Light of Akkadian and Ugaritic, SBLDS 37
(Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978), 33–34; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1080.
233

Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1080.

234
Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 1:142; Sarna, Genesis, 52; Mathews, Genesis 1–11:26,
364; Victor P. Hamilton, Genesis 1–17, NICOT 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1980), 281.
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well. Furthermore, in context outside the flood story, Akkadian kupru is often used
with its denominative verb kapāru “to smear” and this too is precisely the case in Gen
6:14.238
However, Gen 6:14 is the only place in the OT where the verb  ָכפַרis used in the
qal stem with the meaning of “to smear, rub on, cover.” Therefore, it is misleading to
think that the piel verbal form is a denominative of  כֹ פֶּרsince, in this single instance, the
noun was used with the verbal root that is in qal not piel.239 Avoiding the erroneous
linguistic concept (habit) called “root fallacy,” one should not take the meaning of qal of

 ָכפַרand apply it to the piel stem כִּ פֶּר, especially if the former is found only once in the
Pentateuch and in the entire OT. As Averbeck stated, “Linguistically the same root in a
different stem is a different word.”240 The same syntax pattern between the use of qal of

 ָכפַרin Gen 6:14 and piel in Gen 32:20241 does not change this since the argument can be
made that, in the latter text, the  כִּ פֶּרcan be translated as “to wipe clean”242 that
corresponds to the Akkadian D stem.
Based on contextual insights from Gen 6:14, along with comparative insights that
are lexically, contextually, and conceptually controlled, the qal of  ָכפַרmeans “to cover,
smear on, rub on.” In addition, this meaning should not be transported onto the piel stem
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of the same verb, but rather one should seek hints from the immediate context to
determine the most plausible meaning of the piel uses.

Cultic Contexts
The piel form of  כִּ פֶּרis found in Lev 16:20, 33. The direct recipients of  כִּ פֶּרin
these two texts are the most holy place, the holy place and the sacrificial altar since they
are all presided over by the direct object marker, and the last two are joined with the waw
conjunction. The context of these texts is the Day of Atonement.
It is important to note that the first blood application that these objects receive by
which the  כִּ פֶּרof the compartments of the sanctuary is achieved is mentioned in Lev
16:16. Verses 14–15 state that blood for the blood application to achieve  כִּ פֶּרis taken
from the sin offerings of both the priest/s and the people, and v. 16 confirms that  כִּ פֶּרhas
to do with ritual and moral impurities of the people of Israel as a whole, the priestly tribe
included, as well. Three distinct words convey ritual and moral impurity ( ִּמטֻּמאֹ ת בנֵי

וּמפִּ שׁעֵיהֶּ ם לכָל־חַ טּ ֹאתָ ם
ִּ )יִּשׂ ָר ֔ ֵאל. What follows after the sanctuary receives  כִּ פֶּרis the high
priest’s laying on of hands on and confessing the sins of the sons of Israel over the goat
for Azazel to transfer those impurities onto it (16:21). Scholars have generally reached a
consensus that the laying on of hands in Lev 16:21 means the transfer of sins from the
high priest to the Azazel goat.243 Two points derived from the  כִּ פֶּרprocess in Lev 16

Kurtz, Offerings, 98; Koch, “עון,” TDOT, 10:559; Hartley, Leviticus, 20, 241; Kiuchi,
Purification Offering, 113; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 638, 1040–45; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 196, 273–
74; Gane, Cult and Character, 57–8, 103–4, 161; Wright, “The Hermeneutics of Ritual Innovation,” 7.
Kiuchi also added the idea of substitution. Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 118–19.
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suggest that the verb in this context should be translated “to cleanse” in terms of the sin
removal from the sanctuary to outside the camp.
First, the blood of the high priest’s and people’s sin sacrifices was applied to the
tree compartments of the sanctuary, on and in front of mercy seat, in the first
compartment, and on the altar. The sins were absorbed by that application of the
sacrificial blood and transferred to the high priest himself and then, from the high priest
to the Azazel goat.244 They were relocated, removed from the sanctuary onto the Azazel
goat, thus leaving the sanctuary clean.
Second, the meaning of  כִּ פֶּרcan possibly contribute to inauguration, purgation or
sanctification when the recipients of it are physical, inanimate objects. The sanctuary as
an inanimate object cannot commit, but just receive ritual and moral impurity onto
itself.245 The context is clear in Lev 16; the sanctuary compartments are being rid of the
impurity of the people of Israel, thus implying purgation/cleansing.246 The sins were
cleansed, removed, and the sanctuary is clean again. Scholars agree that  כִּ פֶּרin the
context of Lev 16, when the compartments of the sanctuary are the recipients of it, refers
to purgation.247
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 כִּ פֶּרin  אֵ ת+  כִּ פֶּרcontexts is achieved by the application of the blood obtained
from the priests’ and people’s sin offering onto the most holy place, the holy place, and
the sacrificial altar. Verses 20, 33 and the immediate context of Lev 16 suggest that the
meaning of  כִּ פֶּרhere is to remove, cleanse the sanctuary in its totality.

 כִּ פֶּרWithout Object Marker
There are three texts where  כִּ פֶּרis lexically used without direct object marker,
even though syntactically, the noun/s following the verb constitute its direct object (Gen
32:20 [21]; Lev 16:32; Deut 32:43). They will be treated under separate subheadings
based on their contexts.

Non-Cultic Contexts
Scholars have ascribed multiple meanings to the verb  כִּ פֶּרsuch as “to cover,”248
“to purify, wipe off,”249 “to remove,”250 or “to appease”251 in Gen 32:20 [21].252 Relying
on Godfrey R. Drivers’s linguistic comparative work, Levine concluded that “to wipe
off” is the best meaning in this context. The present Jacob sent had a role of wiping off
the wrath from Esau’s face. In addition, Levine noted that Prov 16:14, “The wrath of a
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king is like messenger of death, but a skillful man will wipe it off,” supports this meaning
of כִּ פֶּר. Finally, Levine found that “to rub, wipe off the face” is a well attested idiom in
Akkadian and Aramaic texts.253 However, Yitzhaq Feder has recently suggested that כִּ פֶּר
in this context cannot be interpreted in a concrete sense, “to wipe off.” The idiom “to rub,
wipe off the face” is not an idiom at all since it is used in actual situations where a baby
rubs his/her face. Thus, it is not an idiom but rather describes actual activity.254 On the
other hand, Claus Westerman translated  כִּ פֶּרas “to cover,” suggesting that covering
Esau’s face will prevent him from seeing Jacob’s guilt.255 The context undoubtedly
suggests that the  כִּ פֶּרof Esau’s face precedes the reconciliation Jacob desired,256 but it
does not contain hints to the precise meaning of the verb. Both of these alternative
meanings could fit the context of Gen 32:20 [21] but never in a concrete sense of real
“wiping off” or “covering” Esau’s face, but rather, in an abstract, immaterial sense of “to
assuage.”257 The face is used to represent anger or negative emotions in a common case
of metonymy where the face is substituted with the emotions it represents.258 Two points
are certain in this context:  כִּ פֶּרprecedes and lays the foundation for the reconciliation
between the two brothers and conveys activity that is purely immaterial, abstract. Thus, it
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is best understood as “to assuage” or “to appease.”
The text in Deut 32:43 is one of the several texts that relate  כִּ פֶּרwith the land as
its direct object. Defilement of the land is dealt in a very limited number of texts in the
OT (Lev 18:25, 28; 20:22 by sexual immorality, Num 35:33–34 by murder, Deut 21:23
by letting the human corpse hang overnight).259 The same applies to the  כִּ פֶּרof the land
which is mentioned only in a single text (Num 35:33), and there is no prescribed
ceremony for the  כִּ פֶּרritual of the land.260 Milgrom’s claim regarding the limited defiling
force of the blood points in the right direction: “Blood never defiles, except if spilled
illicitly (Num 35:33–34); otherwise it only purifies and sanctifies (e.g.,16:19).”261
The critical question in the context of land defilement is whether the land is
defiled ritually or morally, and this question is partly answered on page 78 of the present
study. Klawans clearly stated: “Indeed, in biblical law or narrative the land is never a
source of or a means of transmitting ritual defilement. Rather, the land suffers a
noncontagious degradation. The ultimate result of this defilement, if it remains
unchecked, is the exile of the land’s inhabitants.”262 Milgrom also interpreted the
defilement of the land in terms of being moral in its nature.263 The idiom šāpak dām is the
well-attested accusation for murder in Gen 9:6 and Num 35:33, as it is in other biblical

Milgrom, “Atonement in the OT,” 81; Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 33.

259

Milgrom, “Atonement in the OT,” 81.

260
261

Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 749. The exception to this rule is Lev 6:20 [27] where the blood of the
sin offering which is legitimately slaughtered defiles. Gane, Cult and Character, 91.
262

Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 30.

Milgrom, “Atonement in the OT,” 81; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1438. Gane also seems to side
with Milgrom in believing that the land defilement is moral in nature. Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 795–96.
263

444

genres, and undoubtedly is a moral sin (genres such as narrative, Gen 37:22; 1 Sam
25:31; 1 Kgs 2:31; 2 Kgs 21:16; 24:4; legal texts, Deut 19:10; 21:7; wisdom texts, Prov
1:16; 6:17; prophetic texts, Isa 59:7; Jer 22:3, 17; Ezek 16:38; 18:10; 22:3, 4, 6, 9, 12).264
Leviticus 18:25, 28; 20:22, Num 35:33–34, and Deut 21:23; 32:43 all refer to moral sins
as the defiling agency which produces non-contagious defilement. Paul Garnet accurately
stated that “Yahweh’s wrath against the polluted land, however, is clearly a metaphor for
punishing Israel through the land for her corporate sin in tolerating evil in her midst (cf.
Deut 21:9).”265
The claim that the nature of land defilement is moral is strengthened by the
commandment in Num 5:1–4 that urges Israelites to send away people who were the
source of defilement (lepers and persons with a discharge) or who had contracted some
sort of defilement (unclean because of a dead person). The presence of those individuals
in the land did not defile the land, but rather, the commandment seeks to prevent their
stay in the camp and potential spreading of the contagion in the camp, and eventually, to
the sanctuary. The commandment does not envision danger of land defilement, but of the
people, sanctuary, and holy things.
This trend that the defilement of the land should be considered to be moral in its
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nature is also adopted in the Qumran266 and tannaitic literature.267
These insights regarding the land defilement leave even fewer clues regarding the
meaning of  כִּ פֶּרwhen it takes the land as a direct object. If the defilement of the land
were ritual, then at least the only text that mentions  כִּ פֶּרof the land, Num 35:33, would
contain very limited, but still some, guidelines regarding the  כִּ פֶּרof it. Shedding the
murderer’s blood onto the ground would in some way  כִּ פֶּרthe land. Even if one accepted
the fact that the land defilement in Num 35:33 were ritual in nature, the ritual procedure
for the  כִּ פֶּרof the land would not be applicable to other contexts (Lev 18:25, 28; 20:22;
Deut 21:23, 32:43). However, the fact that the defilement of the land is always moral in
nature (Lev 18:25, 28; 20:22; Num 35:33–34; Deut 21:23) leaves no clues concerning the
meaning of the  כִּ פֶּרin this text. None of the most frequent alternatives for the meaning of

 כִּ פֶּרfits these contexts. These are perhaps the reasons why Milgrom suggested that  כִּ פֶּרin
the context of the land refers to “general moral expiation.”268 The current study also
accepts this understanding.
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Cultic Contexts
The emphasis of Lev 16:32 is on the legitimacy of the high priest to perform כִּ פֶּר
on the Day of Atonement along with the importance of being dressed in proper
vestments,269  כִּ פֶּרis used here in a very general way. However, the waw consecutive
attached to the opening verb  כִּ פֶּרin Lev 16:33 has a copulative force270 and makes verbal
activity of the  כִּ פֶּרconceptually and temporally related to the preceding verse, v. 32. In
Lev 16:33,  כִּ פֶּרtakes the direct object, the three compartments of the sanctuary. Thus,
based on the syntactical and conceptual relationship, the inferences one finds in Lev
16:33 regarding  כִּ פֶּרshould be applied to the  כִּ פֶּרin v. 32. In other words,  כִּ פֶּרconveys
purgation in this verse, as it does in v. 33.

 כִּ פֶּרin  אֵ ת+  כִּ פֶּרin this text is achieved by the application of the blood obtained
from the priests’ and people’s sin offering onto the most holy place, the holy place and
the sacrificial altar. The syntactical and grammatical connection of v. 32 to v. 33 and the
immediate context of Lev 16 suggest that the meaning of  כִּ פֶּרhere is cleansing of the
sanctuary in its totality.

 כִּ פֶּרwith Prepositions
The prepositions used to express the indirect object of the verb  כִּ פֶּרare  בַ עַדand
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עַל. The instances with both  כִּ פֶּרconstructions will be examined respectively.
 כִּ פֶּרwith בַ עַד
The preposition  בַ עַדis syntactically related to  כִּ פֶּרseven times in the Pentateuch
(Exod 32:30; Lev 9:7x2, 16:6, 11, 17, 24) as the following table displays. The analysis of
texts is divided to cultic and non-cultic contexts (see Table 23).

Table 23. The preposition  בַ עַדin relation to כִּ פֶּר
Ref.
Stem
Exod 32:30 piel
Lev 9:7x2 1. piel
2. piel
Lev 16:6
piel
Lev 16:11 piel
Lev 16:17 piel

Aspect
Imperfect
1. Imperative
2. Imperative
Perfect
Perfect
Perfect

Type of impurity
Sin text/sinf. implied
1. sinfulness/sin poten.
2. sinfulness/sin poten.
sin/sinf. Implied
sin/ sinf. Implied
sin/ sinf. Implied

Benefiter
Human
1. human
2. human
Human
Human
Human

Lev 16:24

Perfect

sin/ sinf. Implied

Human

piel

Lexical construction
את ֶ ֶֽכם׃
ְ ֲַאכַפְּ ָ ֶ֖רה בְּ עַ ֹ֥ד חַ טּ
1. וְ כַפֹּ֥ר ַ ֶֽבּעַדְ ךֶ֖ וּבְ עַ ֵ֣ד הָ עָ ָ֑ם
2. וְ כַפֵּ֣ר ַ ֶֽבּע ָ֔ ֲָדם

יתֹו
ֶֽ וְ כִ פֶּ ֹ֥ ר בַּ ע ֲֶ֖דֹו וּבְ עַ ֹ֥ד בּ
יתֹו
ֶֽ וְ כִ פֶּ ֹ֥ר בַּ ע ֲֶ֖דֹו וּבְ עַ ֹ֥ד בּ
יתֹו
ָ֔ וְ כִ פֶּ ֶ֤ר בַּ עֲדֹו וּבְ עַ ֵ֣ד בּ
וּבְ עַ ֶ֖ד כָּל־קְ ַהֹ֥ל י ְִשׂ ָר ֶֽאל
וְ כִ פֶּ ֹ֥ר בַּ ע ֲֶ֖דֹו וּבְ עַ ֹ֥ד הָ ָ ֶֽעם

Non-Cultic Contexts
Exod 32:30.  כִּ פֶּרis used in 32:30 to express Moses’s attempt to reconcile the
Israelites and God after their act of idolatrous worship (Exod 32:19–20). Milgrom, one of
the strongest voices of “to purge” translation for כִּ פֶּר, correctly stated that  כִּ פֶּרconveys
ransom in this context: “This kippēr must be sharply distinguished from that of the
sanctuary. In the latter instance, the impurities are purged to keep them from provoking
the indwelling God to leave. In the ransom cases, however, kippēr has the immediate goal
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of preventing the divine anger from incinerating innocent and guilty alike.”271
The  כִּ פֶּרin this text is very ambiguous. It does not include sacrifice nor blood
manipulation. However, the Levites killed three thousand individuals among the people,
most likely the initiators and those directly involved in idolatry and resisted being
corrected. Those who committed idolatry but later became sorry for their sin waited to
see the resolution of their case as Moses wanted to intercede for them on the mountain.272
Moses attempted to achieve  כִּ פֶּרthrough his intercession on behalf of the people of the
community. However, God’s response in vv. 33–34 followed by his activity towards the
people in v. 35 suggests that God did not grant כִּ פֶּר, but just suspended the
punishment.273 Even though the verb  סָ לַחis never mentioned in this text, כִּ פֶּר
undoubtedly implied it.274 However, as  כִּ פֶּרwas related to the delay of the punishment, so
was forgiveness a temporary stage.

Cultic Contexts
Lev 9:7. The context of Lev 9:7 is the inauguration of the sanctuary.275 Observing

271

Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1082.

272

Stuart, Exodus, 684; Peter Enns, Exodus, NIVAC (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000), 577;
Durham, Exodus, 432–33.
273

Sarna, Exodus, 210; Stuart, Exodus, 684; Enns, Exodus, 577–78; Durham, Exodus, 432–33.

274

Sarna, Exodus, 209; Stuart, Exodus, 684–85.

275

Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 177.

449

that neither sin276 nor forgiveness277 is mentioned in Lev 9 along with the fact that it is
very unlikely that Aaron’s sin offering is related to his sin with the golden calf in Exod
32,278 Milgrom abandoned the meaning of “to wipe off, purge” for the one in this verse,
and suggested “to atone.” In this context, in Milgrom’s opinion, it refers to the
reconciliation between God and the individual/community.279 He accurately stated that
“the more inclusive rendering is clearly implied here,” suggesting “to atone.”280
Why reconciliation was needed between Aaron and his sons, on one the hand, and
God, on the other, is not indicated in Milgrom’s comments on Lev 9:7 as there is no
comment on the meaning of  כִּ פֶּרin this context. Since this was the eighth day,281 the day
after their 7-day consecration time period began, Aaron and his sons underwent a
complex and rigorous process of consecration; it is very unlikely that  כִּ פֶּרhad to deal
with a sin Aaron or his sons had committed, but rather,  כִּ פֶּרhas a different role, as
Milgrom indicated reconciliation. The intense 7-day consecration process could
theoretically prevent Aaron and his sons from breaking the law, but they were still

The nominal  חַ טָּ אֹותalways refers to the sin offering in 9:2–3, 7–8, 10, 15, 22, while the verbal
form of ( חָ טָ א9:15) does not convey the activity of sinning, but rather, “to offer a sacrifice.” Gane
repeatedly understood that  כִּ פֶּרin Lev 9:7 cleanses Aaron from moral fault/s which finds no support in the
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humans burdened with permanent, ever present GHS282 translated in their tendency to sin
and being mortal. “To atone,” as the meaning of כִּ פֶּר, fits this particular context better
than “to wipe off.” Due to the nature of GHS, it cannot be purified from the humans, but
rather be atoned for in order to be tolerated by God. Metaphorically, “to cover” is also
possible meaning of  כִּ פֶּרin this context so that the GHS is covered and not be seen by
God. The present study prefers “to atone” since it is the verb that in the piel stem conveys
immaterial activity, which better fits the dynamics of the reconciliation between humans
and God that takes place on an immaterial level. In contrast, the meaning, “to cover,” can
be used as referring to a material activity which is not contained in the piel stem, but
rather qal (Gen 6:14) and a limited number of piel contexts (Lev 16:20, 33 and 16:32 via
v. 33, respectively). The figurative meaning “to cover” brings a misconception in the
mind of the reader as if sin can be covered and thereby hidden from God. Rather, God
accepts humans as they are on the basis of the sacrifice they offer. Nothing can preclude
(cover, hide, remove) God from seeing human sinfulness. He chooses to accept it based
on the atonement achieved through a sacrifice.
In addition, the use of the verb כָסָ ה, “to cover,” is frequently used in the rest of
the OT with the figurative meaning in reference to the sins,283 but never in the
Pentateuch. Out of 47 uses of כָסָ ה, only two uses have a figurative meaning (Num 22:5,
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11) and three have the meaning “to hide” (Gen 18:17, 37:26; Deut 13:8), while all the rest
have the literal meaning “to cover” (Gen 7:19–20; 9:23; 24:65; 38:14–15; Exod 8:6; 10:5,
15; 14:28; 15:5, 10; 16:13; 21:33; 24:15–16; 26:13; 28:42; 29:13, 22; 40:34; Lev. 3:3, 9,
14; 4:8; 7:3; 13:12–13; 16:13; 17:13; Num 4:5, 8–9, 11–12, 15; 9:15–16; 16:33, 42; Deut
22:12; 23:13).  כָסָ הis never used in reference to sins in the Pentateuch.

 כִּ פֶּרin this  בַ עַד+  כִּ פֶּרcontext is achieved by the application of the blood obtained
from the priests’ and the people’s sin offerings, burnt offerings, and the people’s peace
offering on the sacrificial altar. The offerers are both the priests and the people. Since
Lev 9 does not mention ritual or moral impurity,  כִּ פֶּרdeals with the GHS of the offerers.
Lev 16:6, 11, 17, 24. Texts in Lev 16 contain a syntactical construction:  בַ ַעד+

 כִּ פֶּרreferring to Aaron and his household in vv. 6, 11, 17, 24 while the people of Israel
are included in vv. 17, 24. The last part of v. 15, “and bring its blood inside the veil and
do with its blood as he did with the blood of the bull, and sprinkle it on the mercy seat
and in front of the mercy seat,” confirms that the blood applied to those items was the
same blood obtained from the people’s and Aarons’ sin offering, as stated in v. 14. It
cleanses the sanctuary.284 Milgrom’s point that  כִּ פֶּרaccompanied by “ʿal can only refer to
persons other than the subject, but when the subject wishes to refer to himself he must
use bĕʿad (e.g., 9:7; 16:6, 11, 24; Ezek 45:22).”285 This is not confirmed by Lev 9:7 and
16:6, 11, 24. Aaron does not refer to himself only, but also to all the whole people, as
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already noticed by Janowski286 and Kiuchi.287
Analogous to the previous ritual in Lev 9, the ritual in Lev 16 does not disclose
that any particular sin is committed by Aaron or the people in the immediate context, but
in contrast to the ritual in Lev 9, the ritual of Lev 16 deals with the cleansing of the
sanctuary compartments from the sins committed by both Aaron and the people (Lev
16:16–20, 33). The  כִּ פֶּרof Aaron and the people was accomplished by the sin offerings
(vv. 6, 11, 17) and burnt offering (v. 24). The preposition  בַ עַדis best translated as “on
behalf of or for.”288 Accordingly, Aaron and the people are offerers—not direct, but
rather, indirect or final recipients of כִּ פֶּר.289
The כִּ פֶּר/cleansing of the sanctuary is, in part, the כִּ פֶּר/atonement of Aaron and
the people because it was their sins from which the sanctuary was כִּ פֶּר, cleansed.
Milgrom’s comment on Lev 16:17 reflects the same conclusion: “The waw introduces the
purpose of the high priest’s rites in the shrine, thereby making it similar in function to
wĕkipper in v 16, which stated the purpose of the high priest’s rites in the adytum.”290
Thus, the following pattern can be detected. When  כִּ פֶּרis associated with Aaron
and/or the people, the texts always use the preposition ( בַ עַד16:6, 11, 17, 24) and the
reference is to the cleansing of the sanctuary on their behalf. The same pattern is detected
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in non-cultic texts, Exod 32:30. The sacrifices from which the blood was obtained do
change. That is, in all other texts except v. 24, the blood is obtained from the sin offering,
while in v. 24, it was obtained from the burnt offering. The blood of the sin offerings was
used to cleanse the sanctuary’s compartments, but the blood of the burnt offering was
offered only on the sacrificial altar. Its blood was not used to cleanse the sanctuary.
However,  כִּ פֶּרis used in all four texts marking Aaron and the people as the indirect
object of this verb.
This means that  כִּ פֶּרin Lev 16 encompasses two distinct, but yet, united goals.
One goal is the cleansing of the sanctuary on behalf of Aaron and the people (16:6, 11,
17, 24) and it is achieved by the application of the blood obtained from Aaron’s and
people’s sin offerings. The other goal is achieved through the offering of Aaron’s and the
people’s burnt offerings (16:24) and does not deal with sins. They were already ( כִּ פֶּרv.
16), and their sins were sent away from the camp on Azazel’s goat (v. 22). The present
study suggests that the second goal of  כִּ פֶּרis to atone for GHS of Aaron and the people of
Israel whom he represents in God’s presence. This exclusive goal of the  כִּ פֶּרis achieved
by the burnt offering. As established above, GHS is an ever-present condition causing
human beings to be in constant need of  כִּ פֶּרin God’s presence. Thus,  כִּ פֶּרaccomplishes
two goals when it is syntactically associated with the preposition בַ עַד: (1) it refers to the
cleansing of the sanctuary from the committed sins which simultaneously bring ultimate

 כִּ פֶּרto those who committed those sins (Aaron, the priests, and the people), and (2) it
atones for Aaron’s and the people’s GHS whom he represents in God’s presence.
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 כִּ פֶּרwith Other Prepositions
There are two more prepositions that are syntactically associated with the verb

 כִּ פֶּרin the Pentateuch, ( בExod 29:33; Lev 5:16; 6:23 [6:30]; 7:7; 16:17, 27; 17:11;
19:22; Num 5:8) and ( לNum 35:33; Deut 21:8x2).

Non-Cultic Contexts
Two texts, Num 35:33 and Deut 21:8, contain the construction  ל+ כִּ פֶּר. Numbers
35:33, in regards to the  כִּ פֶּרof the land, gives no clues as what  כִּ פֶּרmeans in this text. As
discussed on p. 445 of the present study, none of the most frequent meanings, “to wipe
off” or “to cover,” or others fit this context. It seems that  כִּ פֶּרshould be understood here
as Milgrom suggested as “general moral atonement.” The preposition  לmarks the agent
of a passive verb.291
The construction  ל+  כִּ פֶּרis used two times in Deut 21:8, and the context suggests
that  כִּ פֶּרincludes the purging away/elimination of the culpability for murder from the
people of the nearest city to the place the murder took place.292 This can partly be
inferred by the lexical choice for the meaning of the preposition.  לmarks the indirect
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object in this text with a datival goal.293 This text is considered non-cultic, In other words,
the killing of the red heifer is not sacrifice since it is not sacrificed on the sacrificial altar,
nor does the ritual include a gesture in the direction to the sanctuary as the Num 19 ritual
does (v. 4).294 However, the guilt elimination does not seem to include the entire semantic
range of  כִּ פֶּרin this context. Since the people of the closest city provided the animal that
served to reenact the murder and atone for the people’s guilt of murder, the red heifer
served as their ransom. Milgrom summarized  כִּ פֶּרin this context as follows: “In cases in
which the murderer is unknown, the community closest to the corpus delicti must
disavow complicity by breaking a heifer’s neck over a perennial stream so that its blood
is washed away. In this case the heifer serves as the substitute for the slain and a ransom
for the suspected community.” Accordingly,  כִּ פֶּרin Deut 21:8 encompasses two
meanings: (1) it atones the guilt of the people of the city closest to the place of murder
and (2) it ransoms the people of the closest city for their suspected guilt.

Cultic Contexts
The preposition  בin  ב+  כִּ פֶּרconstructions in Exod 29:33; Lev 5:16, 7:7; Lev
17:11b; 19:22 and Num 5:8 is beth instrumenti, conveying the means by which the כִּ פֶּר
has been achieved.295 Exodus 29:33 lays out the details concerning the consecration of
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the sanctuary, altar, and priesthood. This text demonstrates that  כִּ פֶּרis related to the verbs

קָ דַ שׁ, to consecrate and the ordination offering,296 that is, the verb מָ לֵא, to ordain. Kiuchi
suggested, among others, that  כִּ פֶּרincludes the concept of consecration297 and ordination,
based on this text. What  כִּ פֶּרexactly conveys here is analyzed at length under the
subheading, “The Consecration of the Priests: Aaron and His Sons,” on pp. 492–96 of the
present study. The blood in the  כִּ פֶּרof this text was obtained from three sacrifices and
applied differently. Blood from the sin offering was applied on the altar’s horns and
its base. Blood from the burnt offering was applied around the altar. Blood from the
ordination offering was applied to Aaron’s and his sons’ right ears, the thumbs of their
right hands, on the big toes of their right feet, and blood, along with the anointing oil, was
sprinkled on their garments. Finally, the rest of the blood was applied around the altar.
Moses was officiating at the entire ritual and offered all the sacrifices.
Leviticus 5:16 shows that  כִּ פֶּרis achieved by the reparation offering.298 Milgrom
noted that the  כִּ פֶּרachieved by the reparation offering, along with the burnt offering, the
well-being offering, and the ordination offering refers to the general expiation.299 This
text also exhibits a syntactical relationship between the  כִּ פֶּרachieved by the reparation
offering and the verb סָ לַח.300 In this regard, the reparation offering is like the sin
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offering.301 It atones for the offerer since he/she has committed sin. Gane compellingly
noted the abstract nature of this process by stating that this  כִּ פֶּרremoves the hindrance
that prevents the divine-human relationship.302 However, this atonement, removal of the
hindrance, is based on the concept of ransom, as discussed in the analysis of Lev 17:11.
God accepts ransom in the form of the animal’s life-blood instead of the offerer’s lifeblood, and the offerer is atoned for, which includes the removal of the hindrance from
their relationship with God. The reparation offering is offered in the cases of offences
which includes literal/quantifiable debt.303 These offences include misappropriation of the
property belonging to God or another human being and is expressed by the verb מָ עַל.304
The property is restored first, along with a 20% (one fifth) penalty, and then blood from
this offering is applied around the altar (Lev 7:2).
The construction of  ב+  כִּ פֶּרin Lev 6:23 [6:30] and 16:17, 27 is beth loci and
marks the location of the verbal action.305 Like the previous group of texts where ב
functions as beth instrumenti, this group of texts where  בacts as a beth loci also does not
lend much insight into the meaning of כִּ פֶּר.
The construction  ב+  כִּ פֶּרin Lev 7:7 is a part of the regulation regarding the part
of the sacrificial animal that belongs to the priest. The officiating priest who performs the
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ritual that achieves  כִּ פֶּרby the reparation offering keeps the sacrificial portion of it. The
sameness of the reparation and sin offering is limited to which part of the sacrificial
animal belongs to the priest. The phrase, “there is one law for them,” does not imply
generalization306 since the difference between the two sacrifices is implied in the blood
application of the two offerings. With the reparation offering blood is applied around the
altar, while with sin offering, it is applied to the altar’s horns (Lev 7:2). The offerer is not
stated since chapters 6–7 focus on the details regarding the sacrificial process that
concern the priesthood, rather than the laity; this is reversed in chs. 1–5.307
The only new element inferred from Lev 19:22 and Num 5:8 is found in the latter
text which regulates to whom the restitution of the defrauded property will be given if the
person of a defrauded property dies and leaves no kinsman. It belongs to the officiating
priest.308
Finally, the analysis above of the role of  בin Lev 17:11b confirmed that be is beth
essentiae or beth instrumentii. The blood in this text is obtained from all sacrifices, as it is
traditionally believed that this is what the text deals with. This further implies that  כִּ פֶּרin
this text is achieved for situations where sin in the sense of act (sin and reparation
offering) was or was not involved (burnt and well-being offering). The general language
of this text suggests that it is a general statement309 and the offerer and the exact way
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blood is applied to the altar (around the altar or on the altar’s horns) remains unspecified.
This text depends on the previous material in Lev 1–7 for the ritual flow of each sacrifice.

 כִּ פֶּרwith עַל
This grammatical construction of everything analyzed so far is the most
frequently used in the Pentateuch. It occurs 56 times, always in cultic contexts. A detailed
study of all occurrences is not necessary since the current study accepts that  עַלof
advantage is operative in 47 of them310 as scholarly research shows. However, some texts
in particular, Exod 29:36–37; 30:10; Lev 8:15; 14:53; and16:10,16, 18 do require a
detailed analysis since the meaning of the construction in them is debated and affects the
meaning of כִּ פֶּר. The only non-cultic context of these is Lev 14:53.
Milgrom has postulated the following proposition regarding the  כִּ פֶּרfollowed
with  עַלand other prepositions that accompany it:
When the object is nonhuman,  כִּ פֶּרtakes the preposition ʿal or b or a direct object.
For example, all three usages are attested to in the purging of the adytum on the Day
of Purgation (Lev 16:16, 20), and they must be understood literally, for the kipper rite
takes place on (ʿal) the kappōret and on the floor before it, in (b) the adytum, or it can
be said that the entire room (ʾet) is purged (kipper; cf. also 6:23; 16:10, 33; Exod
30:10), (Janowski 1982: 185 n. 5, who claims that kipper ʿal always means “expiate
for,” must entertain the absurd idea that sancta [and the scapegoat, 16:10] are capable
of sinning [see Milgrom 1985d: 302–4].)311
When the object of kipper is a person, however, it is never expressed as a direct
object, but requires the prepositions ʿal or beʿad. Both signify “on behalf of” (16:6,
24, 30, 33; Num 8:12, 21), but they are not entirely synonymous. The difference is
that ʿal can only refer to persons other than the subject, but when the subject wishes
310
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to refer to himself he must use bĕʿad (e.g., 9:7; 16:6, 11, 24; Ezek 45:22). This
distinction is confirmed by Job 42:8: “Offer a burnt offering for yourselves
(bĕʿadkem) and Job, my servant, will intercede on your behalf (ʿălêkem)” (Milgrom
1970b). This means the purgation rite of the ḥaṭṭāʾt is not carried out on the offerer,
but only on his behalf.312 Milgrom translates the former with “to effect purgation for”
and “to effect purgation on” for the latter.313
I first highlight what is correct and then, the assertions that are partially or totally
incorrect. First, Milgrom correctly stated that  אֵ תnever marks the object of  כִּ פֶּרwhen that
object is human. Second, his criticism of Janowski314 is valid since the present study also
maintains the idea that the nature of ’כִּ פֶּרs object affects its meaning, and that that
inanimate object is not capable of committing sin. Third, Milgrom is right that the  עַל+

 כִּ פֶּרconstruction means “on behalf of or for” when the object is human. It refers to  עַלof
advantage.315
First, Milgrom’s claim that the preposition  עַלand the direct object marker אֵ ת
“must be understood literally” is misleading, since his literal meaning of  עַלand  בrefers
only to their spatial, locational sense, which singles out one meaning from their multiple
meanings. The instrumental meaning is a possibility in Lev 16:10, which makes more
sense since the goat for Azazel’s role was to receive the sins on itself and take them away
from the camp, and that was just part of the  כִּ פֶּרprocess. The  כִּ פֶּרprocess includes
crucial blood manipulation in the sanctuary. Accordingly, the instrumental sense of עַל
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would have a more precise meaning and fitting choice in this context, since it would refer
to the specific role of this goat and not the entire process.
More important, some texts with  עַל+  כִּ פֶּרinclude may both a locational sense,
but also mark the direct object of כִּ פֶּר. The fact that the direct object marker  אֵ תand the
preposition  עַלare interchangeable in  כִּ פֶּרcontexts is detected in several texts316 (Exod
29:36=Lev 8:15, Exod 13:19=Lev 5:22, Lev 3:3, 9, 14; 7:3=Lev 4:8, Lev 16:20 =v. 33,
also in Lev 4:14, 5:5, 22, 24, 7:12, 8:9  עַלfunctions as אֵ ת, which disproves Milgrom’s
claim that  עַלshould be understood literally as referring to spatial, locational meaning.
Accepting the fact that these two prepositions are sometimes equivalents removes the
illogical reading of Lev 16:16. If a spatial, locational sense of  עַלis accepted the
beginning of this verse should read, “thus he shall purge on the sanctuary.”317 Taking עַל
in 16:16 to function as the direct object marker of  כִּ פֶּרharmonizes this verse with Lev
16:20 in which  כִּ פֶּרis associated with  אֵ תto the express logical translation, “when he has
finishes purging the sanctuary,” the sense of a direct object. Both texts refer to the
cleansing of the sanctuary. Regardless of claiming that  עַלmust be translated “literally,”
meaning spatially, locationally, Milgrom could not avoid translating  עַלin the  עַל+ כִּ פֶּר
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construction in Lev 16:16 as a direct object marker.318 Texts in Lev 14:53319 and 16:18320
also imply the direct object sense of עַל. The purely spatial, locational sense of  עַלis
definitely found in Exod 30:10 as Milgrom claimed, but not in all other text cited.
Exodus 29:36 and Lev 8:15 use the  עַל+  כִּ פֶּרconstruction in a unique way. That
is, both functions, spatial and locational indicator, and direct object marker, of the
preposition  עַלare found in these two corresponding texts, the former being prescriptive,
and the latter being descriptive. The first clause of v. 36 is a transitional clause. The noun

 הַ כִּ פ ִֻּריםencompasses both the כִּ פֶּר, atoning of the priests and cleansing of the altar. Thus,
the temporal infinitive of the  עַל+  כִּ פֶּרconstruction, ב ַכפֶּרָך ָעלָיו, contains both: כִּ פֶּר,
atoning of the priests, where  עַלfunctions as  עַלof advantage, and כִּ פֶּר, cleansing of the
altar, where  עַלfunctions as the direct object marker.
To confirm his literal locational sense of  בto mean “in,” he cited only one text,
Lev 6:23, which is definitely the correct meaning. He could also have cited 16:17, 27.
However, other texts that have the  ב+  כִּ פֶּרconstruction definitively convey the
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instrumental sense: Exod 29:33;321 Lev 7:7;322 and Num 5:8.323 Thus Milgrom’s postulate
regarding the preposition ’בs spatial, locational sense is not textually proven and excludes
the instrumental sense that is the natural choice in more texts than the spatial, locational.
Second, the distinction that  עַל+  כִּ פֶּרis used when reference is made to persons
other than the subject and that  בַ עַד+  כִּ פֶּרrefers to the subject of the phrase itself is
disproved by Lev 9:7; 16:6; 11; 24 where  בַ עַד+  כִּ פֶּרis used and the texts refers to Aaron
and all the people.324 In addition,  כִּ פֶּרis not mentioned in Job 42:8 at all, but  ָפלַלis.325
The use of a different verb does not mean that certain structural patterns cannot be
established and applied to different contexts that include different verbs, but a passing
note, as Milgrom did, is not sufficient to make a sound case. More texts that contain the
same structural pattern need to be cited with verbs that contain the same verbal type.
Besides these nine occurrences of the  עַל+  כִּ פֶּרconstruction that have these
specific meanings, the rest of the 47 occurrences (Exod 30:15, 16; Lev 1:4; 4:20, 26, 31,
35; 5:6, 10, 13, 16, 18, 26 [6:7]; 8:34; 10:17; 12:7, 8; 14:18, 19, 20, 21, 29, 31; 15:15, 30;
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16:30, 33, 34; 17:11; 19:22; 23:28; Num 5:8; 6:11; 8:12, 19, 21; 15:25, 28; 16:46, 47;
25:13; 28:22, 30; 29:5; 31:50) provide a large variety of ways in which  כִּ פֶּרis
accomplished. There are two points common for all of them: (1)  עַלin  עַל+  כִּ פֶּרmarks
the indirect object that receives the advantage of the verb it is associated with, and (2) the
indirect object of  עַלis always human. An analysis of the ways in which  כִּ פֶּרis
accomplished in  עַל+  כִּ פֶּרdetects seven distinct contexts.
First, in a significant number of texts,  כִּ פֶּרin  עַל+  כִּ פֶּרconstructions is achieved
through a sin offering only, which means that the blood is obtained from this offering
(Lev 4:20, 26, 31; 5:6, 11; 10:17; 12:7, 8; 15:15, 30; 16:10, 16, 18). Most of these texts
imply that the offerer is somehow associated with ritual (Lev 12:7–8; 15:15, 30) or moral
(Lev 4:20, 26, 31) impurity or that  כִּ פֶּרatones for GHS (Lev 10:17). Location of the
blood application in this context is prescribed in Lev 4 and depends on the offerer’s
societal status. In the case of the priest or the entire community, it takes place either in
the first compartment of the sanctuary (blood is sprinkled in front of the veil that
separates the two compartments, applied on the horns of the incense altar, and the rest is
poured out at the base of the sacrificial altar) or on the sacrificial altar (blood is applied
on its horns and the rest is poured out at its base).
Second,  כִּ פֶּרin  עַל+  כִּ פֶּרconstructions is achieved by burnt offering only (Lev
1:4; Num 28:30), implying that the blood is obtained from this offering. These contexts
do not relate any impurity to the offerer and thus,  כִּ פֶּרrefers to atoning for the offerer’s
GHS. The blood is applied around the sacrificial altar regardless of the societal status.
Third,  כִּ פֶּרin  עַל+  כִּ פֶּרconstructions is also achieved by the reparation offering
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only in some texts (Lev 5:13, 18, 26; 19:22; Num 5:8). The procedure of making a
reparation offering was presented in Lev 7:1–7. The blood obtained from this offering is
applied around the altar regardless of societal status, just like the burnt offering. These
texts always relate moral impurity to the offerer who makes this sacrifice. They come to
the sanctuary with the reparation offering in order to achieve  סָ לַחvia כִּ פֶּר.
Fourth, in most of the  עַל+  כִּ פֶּרconstructions,  כִּ פֶּרis accomplished through both
sin and burnt offering (Exod 29:33, 36, 37; Lev 8:15, 34; 10:17, 16:10, 16, 18, 30, 33, 34;
23:28; Num 8:12, 21; Num 15:25, 28; 28:22, 30; 29:5). Based on their contexts, these
texts can be divided into groups: (1) consecration ritual, (2) cleansing ritual, and (3)
forgiveness ritual. All of them are analyzed below under the subheading  כִּ פֶּרand related
concepts, and for that reason, they are not analyzed here.
Fifth, the  כִּ פֶּרin  עַל+  כִּ פֶּרconstructions are sometimes achieved through the triad
of sin, burnt, and reparation offering (Lev 14:18, 19, 20, 21, 29, 31; Num 6:11). These are
also comprehensively analyzed below under the subheading  כִּ פֶּרand related concepts,
and for that reason they are not analyzed here.
Sixth, in some texts, the  כִּ פֶּרin  עַל+  כִּ פֶּרconstruction does not involve making a
sacrificial offering, but rather, (1) bringing the money to the sanctuary (Exod 30:15–16),
(2) Aaron’s mediation with the censer and incense among the people (Num 17:11–12
[16:46–47]), (3) killing an Israelite and Midianite woman (Num 25:13), or (4) bringing
articles of gold and other valuable items (Num 31:50).
Seventh, some texts totally depend on other texts for the ways in which  כִּ פֶּרis
achieved (Exod 30:10).
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 כִּ פֶּרand נָשָׂ א עָֹון: Leviticus 10:17
Eating of the sin offering meat by the officiating priest in the context of offering
the sin offering is an inseparable element of the  כִּ פֶּרon the behalf of the offerer and is
embedded in the relationship between the  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןand כִּ פֶּר. Since several questions that
surround this text, beside the relationship between  כִּ פֶּרand נָשָׂ א עָֹון, are relevant for the
present study, they are all studied here.

The Meaning of Priests’ Eating of Sin Offering Flesh
That is, Lev 6:19 [26], 22 [29] and 7:6 state that an officiating priest receives and
is obligated to eat the remaining flesh of sin offering when he offers it on behalf of
another Israelite. The meaning of this ritual has also generated a significant amount of
attention by scholars.326 Two key questions that permeate the scholarly discussions
concerning the ritual gesture of the priests’ eating of the flesh of the outer altar sin
offering are (1) does this gesture contribute to the expiation process, and (2) if it does,
whether it plays an additional or simultaneous role in the process of expiation?327
Does Eating of the Sin Offering Flesh Contribute ?כִּ פֶּר
As to the first question, the history of the interpretation of the sin offering shows
that the majority of scholars who stripped the priests’ eating of the edible sin offering
flesh of any expiatory significance claim that sin offering flesh is just a priest’s reward
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for his ministry.328 This was Milgrom’s position initially, but an extensive scholarly
dialogue made Milgrom change his position on the meaning of this ritual gesture in the
course of his scholarly career.329
This was irrefutably one of the reasons, but not the only, nor the major one.330 I
trace the change of Milgrom’s understanding of this activity since it includes relevant
arguments for the position that eating of the sin offering is crucial in the  כִּ פֶּרprocess.
He used to follow A. Ehrlich who suggested a different meaning of Lev 10:17b,
namely, “and he has given it to you for bearing the responsibility of the community by
performing purgation rites on their behalf before the Lord.”331 In this case, the phrase עָֹון

 נָשָׂ אwould not refer to the priests’ bearing the sins of the people, but rather, to bearing
the responsibility of the entire community through their performing of expiatory rites on
their behalf before the Lord. The flesh of edible חַ טָּ את, based on such an understanding of
this verse, would be just a reward or wage for the priests’ service.332 Two arguments are
crucial for the change of Milgrom’s opinion on both of these points.
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First, he recognized that the praxis of the elimination of impurity by the means of
ingestion was known in some cultures.333 Yet, the argument streaming out of the
comparison of the two geographically distant cultures is quite methodologically unsound.
Second, a natural next step for Milgrom was to reconsider his understanding of
the function of edible חַ טָּ את, which he used to think was a priestly reward for their
service.334 The change of his opinion on this point seems to be adequately established in
contrast to the first point. He pointed to Rodríguez’s dissertation335 where the following
quotation by Knierim is found as the initial source for his change of opinion:
Eine Übertragung auf denʿāwōn Begriff ist aber kaum möglich; denn
“Verantwortung” ist ein wertneutraler, unqualifizierter Begriff. Das aber ist beiʿāwōn
nie der Fall. ʿāwōn ist immer qualifiziert. In den gennanten Stellen (Numb 18:1. 23;
Ezek 18:19) wird man darum nśʾʿāwōn nicht allgemein mit “verantwortlich sein,”
sondern mit “für die ʿāwōnōt verantwortlich sein, sie zu tragen haben” übersetzen.336
Biblical texts do not give grounds for  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןto be translated as “bear
responsibility” since responsibility is value-neutral and unqualified term. On the contrary,
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 עֲֹונֹ תis always a qualified term and should be translated as “to be responsible for the עֲֹונֹ ת,
to have to carry them.” Thus, it seems that the priests are not merely to bear
“responsibility,” but “responsibility for the sins of the Israelites,” which they would take
upon themselves via ingesting the flesh of the edible sin offering.
Milgrom himself discovered additional and very critical points to support his
newly accepted position. If the flesh of the edible sin offering were just to be a reward for
their ministry, then Moses’s anger at Aaron’s sons would be difficult to explain.
Leviticus 10:17–18 actually encloses the requirement of eating the sin offering flesh,
which would further indicate that there is an expiatory significance in that ritual
gesture.337 He also correctly noted that the frequency of eating of the sin offering flesh by
the priests would be much higher than burning it up outside the camp. Two sets of
stipulations found in the Pentateuch would most likely happen rarely in the life of Israel,
that is, the case of the anointed priest committing a sin that would put the entire
community, including himself, (Lev 4:3–21) and the annual cleansing of the sanctuary on
Yom Kippur (Lev 16:27) in jeopardy. In all other instances the priest would eat the flesh
of the sin offering.338
The priest had to eat, at least a part of, the sin offering flesh and/or by the help of
his fellow priests. Milgrom found that rabbis in their dictum also confirmed this (Sipra,
Shemini 2:4b; Pesah 59b; Yoma 68b; Yebam 40a, 90a). He also rightfully pointed out the
fact that cultic legislation demands that laypersons burn the rest of their sacrifices which
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they were not able to eat for the duration of the holy feasts: the Passover (Exod 12:10a,
12b; 23:18, 34:25; Num 9:12; Deut 16:4), the thanksgiving offering (Lev 7:15; 22:30),
the well-being offering (Lev 7:17; 19:6), the ordination offering (Lev 8:32; Exod 29:34–
the priests were still lay persons here). Absence of such an implicit command in regards
to sin offering flesh points to the fact that the priest had to eat its flesh in order to
complete the process of expiation.339

Incident in Lev 10
The scholars who stripped the priests’ eating of the sin offering flesh of any
expiatory value point to the fact that the priests’ not eating of the sin offering flesh in the
incident in Lev 10 did not invalidate the people’s sin offering.340 However, Lev 10:19
suggests that failure to follow the ritual procedure was not an accident, but rather, a
deliberate decision by Aaron.341
The rationale for the failure to follow the ritual procedure is stated in the text, but
at least two valid responses were suggested, besides others which are not defensible.342
First, Aaron possibly felt that he and his sons were not worthy of ingesting the flesh of
the sin offering since they were the object of severe condemnation by God,343 or the death
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of Nadab and Abihu before the Lord–within the sanctuary,344 contaminated both the sin
offering by severe impurity, making it unsafe for the priests to ingest it, and the entire
sanctuary which needed immediate cleansing.345
Gane added that the sole incident in which the priest did not eat the meat of the
sin offering or in other words, did not follow ritual procedures in exceptional and unique
circumstances, does not give grounds for the claim that eating of the sin offering meat
does not have an expiatory role.346
The Role of  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןin the  כִּ פֶּרProcess?
Regardless of the weaknesses of Ehrlich’s view, he seems to be right in his
understanding of the verb  נשׂאin the sense of “bear” rather than “remove,” since Knierim
noticed that the Hebrew does not make a terminological distinction between bearing
consequences of one’s actions and bearing them for someone else. He claims that “dieser
Wechsel des Trägers wird nicht durch eine andere Begrifflichkeit, sondern nur durch
Subjektwechsel ausgedrückt.”347 Thus, when coupled with עָֹון, it means the bearing of
culpability, and this immediately asks for the response to the question: “What happens to
the priest as a result of bearing the people’s culpability?”348
Schwartz’s work on how the priest is freed from bearing the people’s culpability
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is helpful. That is, as it was presented on p. 197 of the present study, based on his study
of the phrase  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןand its equivalents349 in the Pentateuch, he strongly argued against
the traditional understanding that in the contexts dealing with the consequences or
forgiveness of sin, these phrases do not convey two distinct meanings, that is, suffer
punishment or forgive sin, respectively. Rather, they were employed to express
metaphorically the objective fact of legal guilt in terms of bearing or carrying sin,
conceiving the wrongdoing as an object to be dragged around as a burden.350 The first
usage identified by Schwartz is a sinner who himself bears his own sin, and these phrases
indicate that he/she deserves and may suffer the consequences, if there are any. In this
case, it is a metaphor of sinner liability/culpability. The second usage is associated with
the situations when another party, God or other human being, bears the sinner’s burden;
that is, it does not rest on the sinner’s shoulders anymore. In this case the phrases are a
metaphor for the sinner’s release from his/her liability/culpability. Thus, the phrases do
not have two different meanings, but rather two different uses with only one meaning.351
Schwartz’s study shows that the two uses of these phrases differ not only by their
subject, but also by the sense in which they employ נשׂא. In case of a consequential
bearing of sin, the sinner carries it, which may kill him/her by human or divine agency if
it remains unsolved. If someone else bears the sinner’s sin, the second party does not bear

The two equivalents are  נשׂא פשׁעand נשׂא חטא. Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 8.

349

Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 15; Gane, Cult and Character, 102.

350

Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 9–15.

351

473

it for it disappears. In this case  נשׂאmeans “carry off, take away, remove.”352
Following this pattern and keeping in mind the fact that the carriers of sin in Lev
10:17b are the priests, Schwartz then translates  לָשֵׂ את אֶּ ת־עֲֹון הָ עֵדָ הas “to carry away the
transgressions of the community.”353 The priests take away the culpability of the people
so that the people do not carry it. In spite of the strength of his arguments, Schwartz’s
study fails to explain adequately how culpability, transferred to someone else from the
sinner who is liable for it, simply disappears. The consequences for the secondary sinbearer are not explicitly stated, but that does mean that the secondary sin-bearer does not,
at least temporarily, carry them.354
Koch claims that the priests were to remove  עָֹוןfrom Israel or from the sanctuary,
bear it as God’s representatives, and by virtue of their own inherent quality, render it
harmless (Exod 28:38; Lev 10:17; Num 18:1, 23).355 Koch believed that the priest’s
inherent quality, which makes them immune to culpability of the people, is divinely
derived holiness conferred on the priests and their vestments at their consecration
ceremony.356 Koch also found that the high priest, through confession and laying on of
hands on the head of the scapegoat, transfers the culpability onto it so that the scapegoat
is now the one who bears the culpability (Lev 16:21f).357 Contrary to Schwartz’s
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understanding of the meaning of these phrases based on the points presented by Koch, it
could be argued that these phrases do have distinct meanings, that is, (1) to suffer
punishment or (2) to forgive sin.
W. Zimmerly made a difference between bearing sin with God himself as a
subject, which is found in non-cultic contexts, and cultic usage in which the priests ingest
the sin offering flesh.358 It seems that the fact of God’s bearing sin without an after-effect
on him would potentially pave the path for the possibility of the priest’s bearing another
person’s  עָֹוןin order to achieve expiation that is prerequisite to divine forgiveness.359 The
close linguistic parallel between Exod 34:7 in which God נֹ שֵׂ א עָֹון ָופֶּשַׁ ע וחַ טָּ אָה, “bearing
iniquity and transgression and sin,” and Lev 10:17, in which the priest bears עָֹון, seems to
confirm this possibility. Consequently, the priest’s eating of the sin offering flesh also
conveys his participation in the process of God’s granting forgiveness to the sinner.360

How Is Sin Offering Both Holy and Impure?
A number of scholars have denied any expiatory significance to the ritual of
priestly eating of sin offering meat361 based on the claim that the sin offering is holy (Lev
6:18 [25], 22 [29]; 10:17). They have not accepted the potential impure status of the sin
offering flesh.362 In other words, impurity and holiness cannot coexist in the sin offering.
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Based on Lev 4:20, 26, 31, 35, Dillmann claimed that expiation was achieved
with no further aid by the priest’s eating of sin offering flesh. Eradication of sin is not
needed after forgiveness is granted. Nevertheless, this claim disregards important
supplementary regulations of the sin offering sacrifice found outside of Lev 4, namely in
Lev 6:19 [26], 22 [29]; 10:17; and 16:26–28. Based on these texts, eradication of sin,
after forgiveness has been granted, is a required element of the expiation process and is
accomplished either via eating of the sin offering flesh by a priest or burning it outside of
the camp.363 It has been rightfully argued that sacrificial regulations found in Lev 1–5 are
written from the offerer’s perspective and Lev 6–7 from the priest’s perspective, which
explains why a priest’s eating of the sin offering is not listed among other sin offering
regulations in Lev 4.364 The complete range of the sin offering regulations found in the
OT includes eradication of sin, as well as forgiveness.
In addition, Milgrom pointed out that the priest’s ingestion of sin offering flesh
becomes even more crucial due to the fact that sin offering was associated with impurity.
The priest was the embodiment of holiness, while חַ טָּ את, to the contrary, was the
embodiment of impurity. An occasion of the priest’s consuming the sin offering delivers
an insightful theological statement, that is, “holiness has swallowed impurity, life can
defeat death.”365 The priest’s invulnerability to impurity stands in apparent contrast to the
sanctuary’s vulnerability to any form of it. As long as he is within that same sanctuary,
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the priest is resistant to impurity. As soon as he leaves it, his immunity is revoked. Thus,
Milgrom reasoned: “Impurity pollutes the sanctuary, but it does not pollute the priest as
long as he serves God in the sanctuary.”366
Milgrom finally pointed to the fact that the laws of impurity (Lev 11–15)
intentionally follow the incident of Nadab and Abihu. This speaks about the seriousness
of impurity since the entire tent had to be cleansed after this incident, but at the same
time, it speaks for the fact that, through uninterrupted service of the priests, holiness is
more powerful than impurity.367
Kiuchi also further noted that it would be inadequate to assume that the
congregation somehow defiled the sanctuary in the context of Lev 9 before the sin
offering ritual.368 In addition, he recognized that the plain sense of the preposition  לin

( לשׂאתLev 10:17b) “to bear/remove” is that of purpose,369 conveying that the eating of
sin offering flesh serves as the activity vehicle for priestly נָשָׂ א עָֹון, rather than simply as
a prerequisite for the earlier bearing of officiating responsibility.370 This means that the
sin offering retains its holiness besides the fact that it contains impurity.

Does Sin Offering Refer to the Sin Offering
Flesh or the Entire Sacrifice?
Kiuchi echoed the claim of Kurtz, who agreed with Hoffman that the phrase “he
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has assigned it to you” does not refer to the eating of the sin offering flesh, but to the
entire sin offering.371 He arrived at this conclusion by claiming that Lev 6:19 [26]; 6:23
[30] sin offering refers to the whole offering, not just flesh of it.372 Janowski also claimed
that “to remove iniquity of the community,” clarified by “to effect purgation on their
behalf,” refers to the priestly mediatory role for Israel through effecting expiation for
them via sin offering as a whole.373
However, in this context, it does not refer to the entire sin offering ritual, which
would include blood application, but rather, to the flesh of the sin offering, the remainder
of the sacrificial animal, which can be eaten. Here,  החטאתis accompanied by the direct
object marker which makes it the direct object of the verb  אכלas the Hebrew text shows.
Also, at this point of the event in Lev 10,  נתן לכםcould not refer to God’s assigning the
victim to the priest so they could apply blood to the altar since the animal was already
God’s property by the time of the blood application and he, consequently, assigned the
flesh to the priests Lev 6:10 [17]; 7:32, 34, 36.374 It is not the entire sin offering in
question here, but rather, the flesh portion of it which God allotted to the priest.
Contrary to Kurtz’s understanding, Gane presented a structural analysis of Lev
10:17b where he found that the first part of the bipartite structure begins with the
interrogative ( )מַ דּוּ ַעand the second, with the motive clause particle ()כִּ י, and concludes
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with the parallelism defined by infinitives (...)לָשֵׂ את … ל ַכפֵר, as the Hebrew text
shows.375

ל ֹא־ ֲאכַלתֶּּ ם אֶּ ת־הַ חַ טָּ את
בִּ מקֹום הַ קֹּ דֶּ שׁ
קֹ דֶּ שׁ קָ דָ ִּשׁים הִּ וא
ואֹ תָ הּ נָתַ ן ָלכֶּם
אֶּ ת־עֲֹון הָ עֵדָ ה
עלֵיהֶּ ם לִּ פנֵי יהוָה׃
ֲ
In addition, there is also chiastic correspondence between the two parts of the
structure, namely the verb ( ֲאכַלתֶּּ םA) and the verbal phrase ( נָתַ ן ָלכֶּםA1): both parts
contain a verb and a second-person address referring to the priests, and the noun הַ קֹּ דֶּ שׁ
(B) and the nominal phrase ( קֹ דֶּ שׁ קָ דָ ִּשׁיםB1), a repetition of the terms.376

 ֲאכַלתֶּּ םA
 הַ קֹּ דֶּ שׁB
 קֹ דֶּ שׁ קָ דָ ִּשׁיםB1
 נָתַ ן ָלכֶּםA1
Thus, Gane concluded: “So A1 נָתַ ן ָל ֶּכם, ‘he has assigned it to you,’ serves as the
structural functional equivalent of A  ֲאכַלתֶּּ ם, ‘did you eat.’”377
Finally, Gane found another chiasm in the opening texts of the two parts of the
structure, namely, that the verb  ֲאכַלתֶּּ םis the equivalent of the verbal phrase נָתַ ן ָלכֶּם,
while the direct object marker  ואֹ תָ הּis the antecedent of אֶּ ת־הַ חַ טָּ את.378
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אֶּ ת־הַ חַ טָּ את

ֲאכַלתֶּּ ם

נָתַ ן ָלכֶּם

ואֹ תָ הּ

Thus, it seems plausible that the last part of the verse is related to the eating of the
sin offering flesh. The context of the text makes it clear that the eating of the sin offering
is in question here, so repetition of the verb  אָכַלis not necessary.379
The placement of the particle  כִּ יbefore and not after the phrase קֹ דֶּ שׁ קָ דָ ִּשׁים הִּ וא
does not support the claim that this part of the verse affirms the holy status of the sin
offering due to its contribution to the expiation process. It has been suggested that its holy
status is determined by the place of its ingestion, that is, within the tent of meeting.380
However, it seems that חַ טָּ את, besides other cultic objects that are not inherently holy,381
receive its  קֹ דֶּ שׁ קָ דָ ִּשׁיםstatus through particular ritual procedures or theophany. It also
seems that once they have received their  קֹ דֶּ שׁ קָ דָ ִּשׁיםstatus, these objects increase their
holiness via contact with the holy tabernacle.382
Accordingly, the sin offering did not receive its  קֹ דֶּ שׁ קָ דָ ִּשׁיםstatus by being eaten
in the tent of meeting, but rather, its  קֹ דֶּ שׁ קָ דָ ִּשׁיםstatus was preserved, maintained, and
increased by its being ingested in the tent of meeting. It was considered  קֹ דֶּ שׁ קָ דָ ִּשׁיםas
soon as it was devoted to the Lord; God has assigned it with that status. This is
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particularly emphasized in Exod 30:10383 and Num 18:19. The initial  קדשׁ קדשׁיםstatus
of the sin offering was assigned to it even before the tent of meeting (ritual spatiality)
existed.
This is also true for the outer, sacrificial altar recorded in Exod 29:37: the קֹ דֶּ שׁ

 קָ דָ ִּשׁיםstatus of the outer altar was achieved by the rites of consecration.
The guidelines in Exod 30:22–29 suggest that the tent of meeting itself including
the ark of the covenant, the table and all its utensils, the lampstand and its utensils, the
altar of incense, the altar of burnt offering with all its utensils, and the basin with its
stand, which were all labeled as קֹ דֶּ שׁ קָ דָ ִּשׁים, all received their  קֹ דֶּ שׁ קָ דָ ִּשׁיםstatus through
the consecration service–ritual procedures performed by Moses (Exod 40).
The object within the tabernacle preserved their  קֹ דֶּ שׁ קָ דָ ִּשׁיםby remaining in it
and its courtyard. The initial sanctification of the tabernacle was consummated by God’s
arrival into the most holy place and continuance of the sanctifying effect of the tabernacle
was also conditional on God’s presence in the most holy place.384
The incense, Exod 30:34–38, seems to get  קֹ דֶּ שׁ קָ דָ ִּשׁיםstatus by being produced
following particular procedures God has revealed. The same applies to the bread of
presence, based on ritual procedures for its production found in Lev 24:9.
Consequently, it seems that cultic objects, in this case חַ טָּ את, received קֹ דֶּ שׁ קָ דָ ִּשׁים
status through particular ritual procedures they would undergo directed by God and
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preserved and potentially increased their status by remaining in the holy tabernacle.
Some correctly maintain both elements, that is, the sin offering flesh was a
compensation to the priests for their service, but also essential to the expiation process.385

How Does Eating of the Sin Offering Flesh Contribute to
the  כִּ פֶּרProcess: Simultaneously or
Separately/Additionally?
Besides some scholars who did not see any expiatory significance in the priest’
eating of the sin offering flesh,386 some who accept the expiatory function of the priest’
eating of the sin offering flesh assume, based on the phrase  לָשֵׂ את אֶּ ת־עֲֹון הָ עֵדָ הfound in
Lev 10:17, that this ritual activity actually removed of the evil absorbed in the sin
offering flesh.387
Y. Kaufmann suggested that the priest’s eating and incinerating the sin offering
flesh are alternative ways of eliminating impurities.388 Milgrom followed this, as well,
but suggested that the rationale for the two types of elimination of the sin offering flesh
was due to the amount of impurity accumulated in it as the following quotation shows:
By requiring that the ḥaṭṭāʾt be eaten, Israel’s priests were able to affirm that the
power to purge the sanctuary does not inhere in a ritual but is solely dependent on the
will of God. Moreover, they backed up their conviction by their act: they ate the
ḥaṭṭāʾt and were willing to suffer the consequences if their conviction proved wrong.
385
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Yet their faith was not without its limits: the ḥaṭṭāʾt prescribed for the deep pollution
of the sanctuary, when its blood was brought into the shrine, continued to be burned.
The pollution incurred by Israel’s brazen sins and impurities, which had infested the
very seat of the Godhead in the Holy of Holies … was just to lethal to be ingested.389
The outer altar sin offering contained a low level impurity and was safe for the
priests to ingest it, while the outer sanctum sin offering, which supposedly contained
Israel’s brazen sins and impurities which penetrate to the holy of holies, was too harmful
for the priest to ingest.390 This claim by Milgrom also conveys the change of his opinion
on the transferability of impurity, since he previously held that impurity was not
transferable to the sin offering and that it was just as a reward to the priests for their
ministry.391
However, Gane correctly noted that there is a weakness in the claim that the
reason for not eating the sin offering flesh of a higher-level impurity was because of the
priest’s fear, due to limitations of their faith.392 Based on the principle that the priests
could not benefit from their own expiatory sacrifices,393 the outer sanctum sin offering
flesh could not be eaten even though their blood sometimes was only applied to the outer
altar and not to the outer sanctum (Exod 29:14; Lev 8:17; 9:11).394
Gane also pointed to the fact that the inner-sanctum sin offering on the behalf of
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the community on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16) was not eaten, but burned up outside
of the camp even though the high priest was not included in the offering party, contrary
to the regular outer sanctum sin offering in Lev 4:12–21. The high priest performed a
separate sacrifice for himself and his household. The fact that he did not eat the sin
offering flesh of the community’s sacrifice points to the fact that, potentially, the
“consumption of the purification offering flesh serves to involve the officiating priest in
the process by which Yhwh extends forgiveness to the offerer.”395
Before expanding this proposal, Rodríguez’s unique interpretation of the priest’s
eating of the sin offering flesh should be mentioned here. Rodríguez claimed that the
priest’s eating of the sin offering flesh of the edible sin offering is equivalent to the
sprinkling of the outer sanctum sin offering blood.396 His claim results from the fact that
the outer sanctum sin offering ritual contains a sevenfold sprinkling in front of the veil,
while the priests ingest the outer altar sin offering flesh. Gane stated that Rodríguez’s
understanding that these two ritual activities as equivalent was based on the fact that, in
Lev 9:8–11, the inauguration offering on behalf of Aaron (and his sons) involved only the
application of the blood to the outer altar, but yet, was incinerated outside the camp. Gane
did not provide a reference from Rodríguez’s work for such a claim.397 The blood was not
sprinkled inside the tent of meeting, but the sin offering flesh was properly burned up
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instead of eaten.398 On the other hand, the sin offering of the community was also offered
at the outer altar with no sprinkling in the tent of meeting but, it was Nadab’s and
Abihu’s tragic death that caused it not to be eaten (Lev 10:16–20). Otherwise, the priest
would have eaten it, since Moses expected it to be eaten by the surviving priest.399
Gane claimed that eating or not eating the sin offering flesh was not due to the
presence or absence of sprinkling of the blood in the outer sanctum, but rather, if the
offerer was a priest or layperson. The reason for the incineration rather than eating of the
priest’s inaugural sin offering is based on the principle that a priest who officiates at his
own expiatory sacrifice cannot benefit from it.400 Gane stated that the rule in 6:23[30]
which states that no sin offering of which blood was brought into the Tent of meeting
may be eaten by the priest excludes the priestly ingestion of outer sanctum or inner
sanctum sin offering flesh. It does not, as Rodríguez assumed, say that every outer altar
sin offering must be eaten. According to Gane, the sin offering flesh was not necessarily
to be eaten by the priest according to the regulation in Lev 6:23[30], but because Moses
thought that it should be, as the following quotation shows: “When Moses cites this rule
in 10:18 to assert that the priests should have eaten the inaugural offering of the
community because its blood was not brought inside the sanctuary, he is saying that an
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outer altar (not outer sanctum) purification offering of the community (not of the priests)
should be eaten.”401
These two arguments are unsound. First, one of the crucial differences between
the two types of sin offering is the absence or presence of the blood sprinkling inside of
the sanctuary. The first two cases in Lev 4:2–21, for the high priest and the entire people,
include sprinkling of blood inside of the outer sanctum, and the sacrifice is incinerated
outside the camp, while the last two cases in Lev 4:22–35, the leader or a commoner, do
not include it, and the officiating priest eats the flesh of the sin offering.
Milgrom’s rationale for the comprehensiveness of the regulation in Lev 6:23[30]
and its impact on Lev 10:17 is sound:
Some commentators feel that this rule applies only to the previously mentioned
purification offerings (4:1–21; Ibn Ezra, Ramban), but its generalized formulation
argues for greater comprehensiveness. This rule also explains Moses’ rebuke of
Aaron for not eating the purification-offering goat sacrificed on the day the regular
Tabernacle cult was initiated (10:17): even though the goat was brought by the
community—in a previously cited case the community’s purification offering was not
eaten but was incinerated (4:13–21)—because its blood was daubed on the outer altar
and not taken inside the Tent (9:9 [see the NOTE], 15), it should have been eaten by
the priests.”402
Neither of the two reasons Gane proposed above—(1) that the absence or
presence of blood sprinkling is not the crucial difference between outer altar and outer
sanctum sin offering and (2) that Lev 6:23[30] does not imply that every outer sanctum
sin offering must be eaten—diminishes the principle that the priests do not eat the meat
portion of their sin offerings because they cannot benefit from their own sacrifice. Even
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more, the present study upholds that the priest, by bearing the sin of the leader and the
commoner, is integrated in the process of כִּ פֶּר,403 and of which the final result is divine

 סָ לַחon the behalf of the offerer.
Is Eating of Sin Offering Flesh a Way of Eradication of the ?חַ טָּ את
In his dissertation on the disposal of impurity, Wright pointed to the fact that the
priest’s eating of the edible sin offering cannot be taken as equivalent to the burning of
the outer sanctum ;חַ טָּ את404 he found support for this claim in Lev 10:17, which states
that the purpose of eating the edible sin offering is (1) bearing of the iniquity of the
congregation and (2) doing expiation for them before the Lord.405 Wright suggested that
“had the concession to eat not been given to the priests, the carcass would have been
burned like the sanctuary-priestly ḥaṭṭāʾt.”406
Gane suggested further support for the claim that the priests participate with God
in bearing the culpability of the people. He based his claim on the syntax of Lev 10:17
which discusses the purpose of God’s assigning the sin offering flesh to the priests as the
Hebrew text shows:

לשׂאת את־עון העדה
לכפר עליהם לפני יהוה׃
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That is, the preposition  ל+ infin. cstr. + reference to the community in
(העדה/pron. suff. הם-) strongly conveys the impression that the two ideas are intended, to
be synonymous.407 Thus, the priests’ eating of the sin offering flesh is necessary for the
priests to remove the iniquity from the people in order to effect  כִּ פֶּרon behalf of the
people. Even though the priests’ offering of the sacrifices in Lev 9:7, 15 made a vital
contribution to the overall process of כִּ פֶּר, nothing is said about priests removing iniquity
from the people until Lev 10:17b where this aspect of expiation is accomplished by the
priests’ eating of the sin offering flesh.408
It has to be emphasized that the priests’ eating of the sin offering flesh is not
essential for the achievement of the expiation/atonement in every kind of sacrifice. The
outer altar offerings of the priests and the outer sanctum offerings are incinerated, rather
than eaten, and they also accomplish expiation/atonement of impurity on behalf of the
offerer, while in the sacrifices which the priests offer for the benefit of others, a special
kind of priestly participation by eating the sin offering flesh is added in achieving
expiation/atonement.409
It seems that the phrase  לָשֵׂ את אֶּ ת־עֲֹוןin Lev 10:17 is applicable only to the sin
offering for moral impurity. In cases of outer–altar sin offering for severe ritual
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impurities, where presumably no  עָֹוןwould be involved, the remaining sin offering flesh
would have a function of a priestly reward only.410
Lev 10:17 conveys double identification by the priests. By eating of the sin
offering flesh, the priests serve as a mediatorial bridge between the people and God: 1) by
taking their iniquity, they identify with the people (Lev 5:1), and 2) by removing their
iniquity, they identify with God (Exod 34:7).411 Consequently, Rodríguez’s claim is
textually established that the sprinkling of the blood of the sin offering inside the
sanctuary (Lev 4:2–21) and the priest‘s eating of the sin offering flesh (Lev 4:22–35)
have the same function of transferring sin from the offering to the sanctuary or the
officiating priest, respectively, is textually established.

Summary of Leviticus 10:17
Based on the more comprehensive study of the Pentateuch texts, the eating of the
sin offering flesh does contribute to the  כִּ פֶּרprocess. The moral impurity is transferred
from the offerer to the priest via the sin offering sacrifice.  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןin this context refers to
the priest's bearing of the leader's or commoner's moral impurity, instead of the latter
bearing their own. The sin offering sacrifice has the unique feature of being holy and
impure at the same time. The impurity that it received from the offerer does not nullify its
holy status. The incident in Lev 10 in which the priest did not eat the sin offering of the
people did not annul the basic regulation that eating of the sin offering flesh is imbedded
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in the  כִּ פֶּרprocess. This eating of the sin offering flesh is irrefutably food for the priests,
but also more important, an integral part of the  כִּ פֶּרprocess and, as such, cannot be
understood as a way of eradicating the sin offering animal.
In addition, the relationship between  כִּ פֶּרand  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןin this unique context
suggests that the latter is crucial in achieving כִּ פֶּר. This claim is based, among others, on
the syntactical relation between the two infinitives that introduce both verbs.
Accordingly,  כִּ פֶּרin 10:17 is limited to the people and is achieved by the blood of
the sin, burnt, and peace offerings which were offered by the priest on behalf of the
people (Lev 9:15–16, 18–21). The blood was applied around the altar. The specific
reason why these sacrifices were offered was to conclude the eight-day-long process of
the consecration of the priests and the institution of the sanctuary by offering sacrifices in
it for the first time. Ritual or moral impurity terminology is not found in the chapter,
suggestive of the absence of any of the two possible impurities. I suggest that  כִּ פֶּרin this
context deals with the GHS of the people.

 כִּ פֶּרand Conceptually Related Concepts
There are five other verbs that appear in  כִּ פֶּרcontexts (חָ טָ א, קָ דַ שׁ, טָ הֵ ר, סָ לַח, ) ָרצָ ה
along with one verbal phrase ()נָשָׂ א עָֹון. The following Table 24 lists them along with
references and stems. The analysis begins with the texts in which  כִּ פֶּרis related to two
other verbs, Exod 29:33, 36–37; Lev 8:15; Lev 14:49–53; 16:19, 30; Num 8:21; Lev
12:7–8; 15:13, 28; Num 6:11, and then resumes in the following order Lev 4:20, 26, 31,
35; 5:10, 13, 16, 18, 29 [6:7]; 12:7–8; 19:22; Num 15:25, 26, 28; Lev 1:4; and 10:17.
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Table 24. The verb  כִּ פֶּרand related verbs
 כִּ פֶּר+ ( חָ טָ אpurify)

 כִּ ֶפּר+ קָ דַ שׁ

 כִּ פֶּר+ טָ הר

Exod
29:36 piel +
mashah
Lev
8:15 piel

Exod
29:33 piel

Lev
12:7 qal
8 qal
Lev
14:20, qal
53 qal (v. 48)
Lev
15:13 qal (v. 15)
28 qal (v. 30)
Lev
16:19 piel
30 Piel, qal

Lev
14:49 piel
52 piel
Num
8:21 hithpael
(v. 12, 19, 21)

Exod
29:36 piel
+ mashah
Exod
29:37 piel
Lev
8:15 piel

Lev
16:19 piel
Num
31:19, 20, 23
hithpael,
excluded

Num
6:11 piel

 כִּ פֶּר+ סָ לַח
always niphal
Lev
4:20, 26, 31, 35

 כִּ פֶּר+
ָרצָ ה
Lev
1:4
niphal

 כִּ פֶּר+ נָשָׂ א
עָֹון
Lev
10:17 qal

Lev
5:10, 13, 16, 18,
26 [6:7]
Lev
19:22
Num
15:25, 26, 28

Num
8:21 piel
(v. 12, 19, 21)
Num
31:23, 24
hithpael
excluded

The following pages demonstrate that Hartley’s following statement can be seen
as correct:
Sometimes another verb in the [ ]כפרcontext emphasizes an aspect accomplished by
 כפרor an attending result: טהר, “be clean” (qal 12:7, 8; 14:20, 53; cf. Num 8:21) or
“cleanse” (piel 16:30), נסלח לו, “be forgiven” (4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:10, 13, 16, 18,
26[6:7]; 19:22), ( קִּ דֵ שׁpiel) “sanctify, consecrate” (8:15; 16:18–19; Exod 29:33, 36,
37; Num 6:11), and ( חִּ טֵ אpiel) “purge, de-sin” (8:15; 16:18–19; Exod 29:36).412
In such contexts, ritual activities that achieve  כִּ פֶּרdeal with certain aspects related
to the ritual participants who contribute to the overall goal of those rituals.  כִּ פֶּרin those
cases represents a sub-ritual, that is, is just a part to reach the overall goal expressed by
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the other verbs. These contexts are analyzed below.

 כִּ פֶּרand  חָ טָ אand קָ דַ שׁ: Exodus 29:33, 36
The verbs  חָ טָ אand 413 קָ דַ שׁalong with  כִּ פֶּרappear in Exod 29:33, 36, and כִּ פֶּר
with קָ דַ שׁ, only in v. 37. The context is the consecration of the priests, Aaron and his
sons, and the sacrificial altar.

The Consecration of the Priests: Aaron and His Sons
Exodus 29:1 makes it clear what the main purpose of its ritual is: “Now this is
what you shall do to them to consecrate them to minister as priests to Me.” However, at
the same time, it does not make any mention of ritual or moral impurity in reference to
the priests or the altar. This means that the priests were profane and pure before the ritual
of their sanctification began, which is in accordance with Wright’s assertion that most of
ritual laws deal with such a state of human beings.414 Milgrom also correctly stated that
the priests were profane at this point of the ritual415 and that they did not offer sin
offering to purge themselves, but the altar.416 Only ritually clean people could participate
in public or familial cultic functions.417
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Accordingly,  כִּ פֶּרin v. 33 deals with something other than purifying, cleansing of
the priests to which I return after presenting the flow and certain details of the
consecration ritual. The  כִּ פֶּרof the priests is accomplished in two phases.
As vv. 33–34 state, the first phase of consecration was accomplished through the
ordination offering, not the sin offering, since that is the only sacrificial meat that the
priests ate.418 It is not specified who provided the sacrificial animal, but the text states
that Moses offered the sacrifice with the priests acting as the offerers since they laid their
hands on the sacrificial animal and ate the sacrificial meat. The blood from the ordination
offering was applied “on the lobe of Aaron’s right ear and on the lobes of his sons’ right
ears and on the thumbs of their right hands and on the big toes of their right feet,”419 and
the rest was sprinkled around the altar (vv. 19–20).
Second, Moses was to take blood that was on the altar and anointing oil and
sprinkle the mixture on Aaron and his sons and their garments in order to consecrate
them (v. 21). Two points of difference between the  כִּ פֶּרin phase two from phase one
emerge as the instructions are compared: (1) blood that was sprinkled on the priests and
their garments was obtained from the sin and burnt offering (vv. 10–14, 15–20,
respectively) in contrast to the blood that was obtained from the ordination offering, and
(2) the mixture of blood was applied on the priests and their garments without specifying
the spot on their bodies, in contrast to the blood of the ordination offering whose blood
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was applied on the lobes of the priests’ right ears, the thumbs of their right hands, and on
the big toes of their right feet.
Keeping in mind the fact that the ever-present characteristic of human sinfulness
was also the priests’ disadvantage in God’s presence, the present study essentially agrees
with Hartley who made a general statement regarding the sacrifice of the consecration
ritual in Exod 29: “These sacrifices daily cleansed the priests from the pollution of human
sinfulness. This period of separation brought to completion the consecration of these men
to the priestly task.”420 In the same vein, Kurtz explained the difference between dealing
with sin or GHS:
For the forgiveness of sin, or justification, might be defined in precisely the same
way. And the definition is all the more inappropriate here, from the fact that the sinoffering had regard not to sinfulness in general, or to the sinful habitus, which is the
object exterminated in the case of sanctification, but to certain acts of sin, the
extermination of which is effected not by sanctification, but by justification.421
Based on the four states related to creation and the fifth related to human beings
and the flow of the ritual in Exod 29, the present study adds more nuances to this general
statement. That is, the ordination offering solely served to change the profane and pure
state of the priests into the holy. Holiness is not inherent with creation, but is imparted by
God.422 As regards the ordination offering, that is, in his terms, “the Filling Ram,”
William H. Propp stated: “It seems, therefore, that the rite simply raises one’s state of
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purity, making the impure pure and the already pure super-pure.”423 Wright also came to
the same conclusion regarding the ritual process of the sanctification of the priests in his
ABD article on “Holiness, OT.”424
Milgrom incorrectly stated that the sin offering is not included in the  כִּ פֶּרof the
priests, but was right in suggesting that the meaning of  כִּ פֶּרis more general in this
context and should be translated as “to atone.”425 The blood of the sin and burnt offering,
along with anointing oil, was sprinkled on the priests and their garments (v. 21), which
means that the sin offering was included in the process of consecration. Accordingly, כִּ פֶּר
cannot mean “to purify, to cleanse,” since the priests’ presence in the sanctuary implies
their pure state, and the ordination offering was used to change their pure state into holy.
Only clean people could participate in public or familial cultic functions.426 There is
nothing on the priests that needs to be purified/cleansed. The only element that sin and
burnt offering could deal with is the GHS, as Hartley suggested, but partially erroneously
that it is related to all the sacrifices in the consecration ritual. The present study suggests
that  כִּ פֶּרbrought about by sin and burnt offerings especially has to do with the GHS in
accordance with the  כִּ פֶּרfunction of both of these sacrifices (Lev 1, 4–5). In other words,

 כִּ פֶּרatones for ritual participants, which by being sinful human beings were naturally
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considered unacceptable in God’s presence, protecting them to reside safely and perform
various services in God’s presence. The present study agrees with Milgrom that כִּ פֶּר
should be translated as “to atone for” in this particular context.

 כִּ פֶּרin the consecration ritual is a part of the broader sanctification
process/ritual.427 It is just a phase, a subprocess of a broader consecration process/ritual
within which it, by atoning for the GHS of the participants, enables and protects them to
reside safely and perform other rituals in God’s presence. Accordingly, it is distinct from
consecration. Consecration implies a change of status in terms of the rite of passage.

The Consecration of the Sacrificial Altar

 כִּ פֶּרoverlaps with the  חָ טָ אin v. 36, where it refers to the cleansing of the altar.
The infinitive  כִּ פֶּרshould be understood with the temporal sense when one  כִּ פֶּרon it.428
The consecration of the priests which includes offering of multiple sacrifices depends on
a properly operating sacrificial altar. For that reason, the consecration of the altar is
interwoven in the ritual of priestly consecration. However, based on the flow of the ritual,
the main emphasis is on the consecration of the priests, while the ritual for the
consecration of the altar is briefly stated in vv. 36b and 37.
Assuming that the sin offering purifies/cleanses the altar from sins and impurities
on the behalf of the offerer, that is, the priests, Milgrom and Wright concluded that the
blood of the sin offering applied to the altar purifies/cleanses it in order to prepare it for
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its consecration.429 However, at the same time, both of them understood that the verb חָ טָ א
purifies the altar in v. 36 as a preparation for consecration.430 Milgrom correctly stated
that “purging must precede consecration, not follow it.”431
Thus, two different verbs in the same verse have the same meaning. This tension
that two different verbs are used in the same verse with the identical meaning is relatively
easily resolved by realizing that these two verbs are synonyms.432 It is redundant, but still
possible. However, the claim that the purification of the altar is a preparatory stage before
its consecration is not warranted by the text, and thus, opens room for a different
explanation.
Milgrom and Wright are inconsistent concerning the anointing of the altar. They
held that the anointing of it is effected by the application of the anointing oil on it, which
takes place at the beginning of each day of the 7-day-long ritual.433 The present study
agrees with this since this is the most natural sequence of events related to the altar in
Exod 29 and 40, and Lev 8. However, they also both viewed the altar as impure and in
need of cleansing. The text never labeled the altar as being impure. It is, rather, in the
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basic profane state. As such, it was anointed, which resulted in its consecration (Exod
40:11; Lev 8:11).
Following the four states related to creation, the altar is pure and profane at the
beginning of the ritual, and since it is in this condition, it does not need to be purified. Its
consecration is achieved by applying anointing oil on it, which takes place before the
priests were anointed. However, later in the ritual, Exod 29:36 states that the altar needs
to be cleansed, and the present study agrees with Milgrom and Wright that the altar’s
state changed during the ritual and needs to be purified/cleansed, but disagrees with by
what and how it got defiled.
Milgrom asked valid questions: “Why is it [the altar] singled out, and what is its
purpose?”434 or in another place “… the newly erected altar can hardly have become
polluted; why then need it be purged? And why for seven days?”435 After correctly
refuting several suggestions as to why the altar would need purification/cleansing,
Milgrom suggested that the priests themselves, because of their proximity to it, defiled
the altar by “unavoidable physical impurities (e.g., a nocturnal emission, 15:16–17)” and
subsequently, their laying on of hands on the sin offering meant that they were making
this offering to purify/cleanse the altar from their sin.436 This reasoning is not possible
based on the logic Milgrom himself proposed. Direct contact between impurities, even
minor ones, and the sancta would cause the carrier of impurity to die.437 This translates to
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the immediate death of the priests. In addition, nocturnal emissions in married men,
which Aaron was (Exod 6:23) and his sons438 most likely were,439 are very rare.440
Another assertion that invalidates this interpretation is the fact that Exod 29 does
not mention defilement of the sanctuary, even though the priests were in its proximity as
much as they were in the proximity of the altar. It never actually used any term for ritual
and moral impurity in reference to the priests, altar, or sanctuary. In addition, if the sin of
Aaron and his sons was the issue these sacrifices dealt with, then it would be expected
that the blood of their sin offerings would be applied in the first compartment of the
sanctuary before the veil as the regulations prescribe (Lev 4:3–12), and not on altar.
However, that did not happen in Exod 29. Because of these points, the present study
suggests another interpretation.
The altar needed to be cleansed from the priests’ GHS. That is, vv. 10–12 and vv.
15–16 state that the priests laid their hands on the heads of both sacrificial offerings and
their blood was applied on the altar’s horns and the base in the case of the sin offering
and around the altar in the case of the burnt offering. No ritual or moral impurity that was
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related to the priests is mentioned in this chapter. However, the fifth state of GHS related
to humans remains a disadvantage for the priests in God’s presence even during this
ritual. Both of these sacrifices deal with the status of humans before God. The blood was
offered on the altar to God in order to achieve  כִּ פֶּרon behalf of the priests. The  כִּ פֶּרin
this case cleanses the priests’ GHS that defiled the altar, while at the same time, atoned
for the priests’ GHS, granting them the right to stay safely in God’s presence regardless
of their GHS.
In addition, Milgrom claimed that the blood of the sin offering has a prophylactic
function. It was to protect the altar from future defilement.441 This statement is erroneous
in its totality. The very purpose of the altar was to receive the impurity which is one of its
fundamental functions (Lev 4:22–35), and it was not intended to be protected from it. The
infinitive of  כִּ פֶּרshould be understood as temporal, “when you atone for,” and has a dual
function in v. 36. It encompasses atoning for the priests and simultaneously cleanses the
altar from the impurity.
To conclude, the sequence of the processes related to the priests’ consecration is
the following: (1) the priests were anointed (Exod 29:7) which resulted in (2) their
ordination (Exod 29:9), then (3) the mixture of the blood of all sacrifices and oil was
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sprinkled on them  כִּ פֶּרfor their GHS (Exod 29:10–12, 15–16, 19–21) which resulted in
(4) their consecration (Exod 29:21).442
The blood in this ritual was obtained from three sacrifices: sin, burnt, and
ordination offerings. The offerers of these sacrifices were Aaron and his sons, but since
this was the introduction of the priestly ministry, Moses acted as the officiating priest.
There are two reasons for offering these sacrifices. First, the sin and burnt offerings
atoned for the priests’ GHS and they were applied to the altar. Second, the ordination
offering, along with sin and burnt offerings, ordained/consecrated the priests and was
applied to the lobes of the priests’ right ears, the thumbs of their right hands, and on the
big toes of their right feet.
The chronological sequence of the processes related to the altar during the priests’
consecration is the following: (1) the altar is being anointed (Exod 40:9–10; Lev 8:10–
11), which resulted in (2) the altar’s consecration (Exod 40:9–10; Lev 8:10–11).
The blood for this ritual was obtained from sin, burnt, and ordination offerings.
The offerers are the same as in the previous ritual, the priests. The reason was the
cleansing of the GHS of the priests. The blood of sin and burnt offerings was applied
according to the protocol established in Lev 1, 4, while the blood of the ordination
offering was applied around the altar.
The phrase  ב ַכפֶּרָך ָעלָיוis used in v. 36 to refer back to the כִּ פֶּר, atoning of the
priests, contained in the noun  הַ כִּ פ ִֻּריםin the first clause of v. 36, and the כִּ פֶּר, cleansing
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of the altar in the second clause of v. 36, where  כִּ פֶּרis equivalent to חָ טָ א. The application
of the blood of all sacrifices achieved  כִּ פֶּרfor the priests to protect them in God’s
presence as anointed representatives, while the altar’s  כִּ פֶּרis referred to as cleansing,
since it was defiled by the priests’ GHS. The noun  הַ כִּ פ ִֻּריםencompasses  כִּ פֶּרof both.
First, the cleansing of the altar is expressed by the verb  חָ טָ אin v. 36 and synonymously
by the temporal infinitive of the כִּ פֶּר. Second, the atoning of the priests is contained in the
temporal infinitive of כִּ פֶּר. Consequently, the temporal infinitive of  כִּ פֶּרin v. 36 refers to
the entire  כִּ פֶּרritual that was performed on behalf of the priests and the altar.

 כִּ פֶּרdone on the priests and the altar differs due to their different natures and
status. Humans are sinful and need  כִּ פֶּרto atone for their GHS, thus protecting them in
God’s presence in order to prepare them for holy status.  כִּ פֶּרfor the altar, since it is
inanimate, is different than  כִּ פֶּרfor the priests, and refers to its cleansing.  כִּ פֶּרand חָ טָ א
are synonyms in this case.443 Anointing with oil consecrates the altar, and it functioned as
an authorized altar from the beginning of the ritual. Based on the anointing of the altar
that Lev 8:11 places before the anointing of the priests, it can be assumed with Milgrom
that Lev 8:11 and Exod 40:9–13 assume that this first initial anointing of the altar was
also meant between the sequences of Exod 29:7a and 29:7b.444 The altar in this context

There are other contexts, as shown below, that  כִּ פֶּרand  חָ טָ אare synonyms in certain texts (Lev
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needed  כִּ פֶּרin the sense of purifying/cleansing from the priests’ general human sinfulness
that was transferred to it during the 7-day consecration ritual for the priests.
This is the first time in my analysis of  כִּ פֶּרthat I encountered the phenomenon of
the dual function/meaning of the same ritual activity, in this case, blood manipulation.
This phenomenon is well established in biblical rituals445 and in this case, the GHS of the
priests is transferred to the altar by the blood application and at the same time, the blood
application purifies the altar. This is in agreement with the biblically-based principle that
most of the laws deal with entities that are profane and pure as contrasted to the state of
holiness and impurity.446

 כִּ פֶּרand חָ טָ א: Leviticus 8:15
There are certain differences between the ritual flow in Exod 29 and Lev 8, and
Milgrom conveniently discussed them.447 However, the ritual flow is essentially the
same. The priests were first anointed (Exod 29:7, 21; Lev 8:12)448 in order to be ordained

445
Gorman noticed that through blood application on the Day of Atonement, blood absorbs sins
that were located in the sanctuary and thus, cleanses it (Lev 16:16). The same blood serves to consecrate
the altar in the following ritual sequence (Lev 16:19). Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 82, 87–89; Gane,
Cult and Character, 5. It was emphasized before that the high priest, as a handler of the sin offering blood,
also gets defiled by the sins he absorbed. Accordingly, the sins are carried by both the blood of the sin
offerings and the high priest himself, and are later transferred to the Azazel goat. In the meantime, the same
blood consecrates the altar.
446

See p. 400 in the present study.

447

Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 545–49.
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(Exod 29:19–21; Lev 8:12),449 and sprinkled with the mixture of blood of all offerings
from the altar and oil (Exod 29:21; Lev 8:12, 30)450 in order to be consecrated (Exod
29:21; Lev 8:12, 30).451 Though present, the differences do not seem to affect the basic
ritual processes and their essence. Accordingly, everything that was said regarding the

 כִּ פֶּרand its relation to  חָ טָ אand  קָ דַ שׁin the previous subheading is assumed in relation to
the ritual of Lev 8.
There is a significant difference between Exod 29:36–37 and Lev 8:15 in the use
of prepositions. That is,  חָ טָ אis syntactically related to the preposition  עַלin Exod 29:36,
while  עַלis replaced by the direct object marker in Lev 8:15. As suggested in the analysis
of  עַל+  כִּ פֶּרconstructions above,  עַלfunctions as a direct object marker. This is not
established based on the interchangeability of the two particles in these two texts, but the
same pattern is detected in other texts as shown above.
The sameness of the sequence of ritual processes in Exod 29 and Lev 8 in relation
to the consecration of the priests and the altar suggests the same relationship between
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כִּ פֶּר,  חָ טָ אand  קָ דַ שׁin Lev 8:15.  כִּ פֶּרin the consecration ritual is a part of the broader
sanctification process/ritual.452 Consecration, as a broader process/ritual, includes  כִּ פֶּרas
the phase, subprocess, which atones human participants enabling and protecting them to
reside safely and perform other rituals in God’s presence.  כִּ פֶּרand  חָ טָ אalso overlap in
Lev 8:15 as they did in Exod 29:36453 and they refer to the cleansing of the altar.
The sameness of the ritual also implies the same inferences regarding the origin of
the blood, sacrifices included, the identity of the offerer, location of the blood
application, and its function. It is plausible that through the laying on of hands and the
application of the blood of these two sacrifices, the priests’ GHS was transferred to the
altar from which it later needed to be removed in the sense of purified/cleansed.

 כִּ פֶּרand  חָ טָ אand טָ הֵ ר: Leviticus 14:20, 49–53
There are two sets of stipulations in Lev 14. The first passage presents the ritual
for purification after  צָ ַר ַעתperson is healed, vv. 1–32, whereas the second passage deals
with fungus in houses, vv. 33–53.  כִּ פֶּרis associated with the verb  חָ טָ אand  טָ הֵ רin the
second and  טָ הֵ רin the first one.
Lev 14:1–32. There is a sequence of appearances of  טָ הֵ רon the first, seventh, and
eighth day (vv. 8, 9, 20) that mark various levels of cleanness that the  צָ ַר ַעתperson
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obtains during the ritual in the first passage. כִּ פֶּר, which appears in vv. 18, 19, 20, is
achieved by various means in this ritual. The first syntactical connection between כִּ פֶּר
and  טָ הֵ רis mentioned in v. 20. However, previously in v. 18,  כִּ פֶּרis accomplished by the
application of the blood of the reparation offering and oil on  צָ ַרעַתperson’s lobe of the
right ear, thumb of the right hand, and big toe of the right foot. In v. 19,  כִּ פֶּרis achieved
by the priest’s offering of a sin and burnt offering on behalf of the affected person. The
text does not state that the blood of the sin offering was applied to the  צָ ַרעַתperson, so
accordingly, it was not. Had the blood been applied on the  צָ ַרעַתperson, the text would
indicate that, since it would be a different use of the sin offering blood as it was in the
case of the reparation offering in vv. 12–18. In v. 20, on the eighth day, the priest’s
offering of the burnt and grain offerings finalizes the ritual of cleansing of the צָ ַרעַת
person. Again, the text does not state that the blood of these two offerings was applied to
the  צָ ַרעַתperson. Milgrom correctly noted that the last appearance of  טָ הֵ רin v. 20
“signifies the completion of the process,” which reinstates the healed and now purified

 צָ ַרעַתperson into his community and its worship.454 In contrast to Milgrom who claimed
that the presence of  טָ הֵ רin these verses does not play an essential role, but only refers to
the effects of the sacrifices,455  טָ הֵ רis essential and signifies a newly acquired and
acceptable state of the healed  צָ ַרעַתperson at every new stage of cleanness. It represents
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the pinnacle of the cleansing and restoring process.456
This text presents 3 basic semantic domains of the verb  טָ הֵ רthat are analogous to
the three stages the  צָ ַרעַתperson undergoes. F. Maass correctly classified the semantic
domains of the verb טָ הֵ ר: “In the OT, ṭhr refers to physical, ethical, and religious (cultic)
purity.”457 This text exemplifies all three of them.
A crucial point in regaining the  צָ ַרעַתperson’s  טָ הֵ רstate of the first stage, besides
the two birds’ ritual, is restoration of his physical health (v. 3). The priest examines him
and verifies that his  צָ ַרעַתis healed. Based on this text,  טָ הֵ רof the first stage
includes/refers to physical health. After the priest verifies that he is healthy and performs
the two birds’ ritual, the  צָ ַרעַתperson performs ablutions and is allowed to enter the camp
(vv. 7–8). However, he still remains unclean in the sense that he is not allowed to enter
his tent. In other words, he can still defile other persons or objects by direct touch or by
overhang.458 At this point, the stage of the healed  צָ ַרעַתperson is equivalent to the one of
the new mother when she delivers a son, the זָב/זָבָ ה, the menstruant, and the corpsedefiled person at the beginning of his/her purification period. The  צָ ַרעַתperson still
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contaminates by direct contact and must wait seven days for the next stage of his/her
purification.459
The second stage of  טָ הֵ רrefers to the ritual purity as indicated by the seven-day
period of abstinence from directly touching or overhanging other persons or objects. The
passage of seven days along with shaving of all of his hair, washing his clothes and body
makes the  צָ ַרעַתperson ritually pure (v. 9). At this point he can come into his tent and
does not transmit any defilement any more. He is ritually clean.460
The third stage of  טָ הֵ רrefers to moral/ethical purity. The ablutions that were
present in the ritual of the first and second day are not present in the eight-day ritual, but
the set of sacrifices which guilt, sin, and burnt offering are achieving  כִּ פֶּרfor him (vv.
18–20) are.  כִּ פֶּרis mentioned only in the third stage of ritual and refers to the moral
purity of the  צָ ַרעַתperson. Thus, Milgrom correctly concluded: “The initial ṭāhēr at the
end of the first day admits him to the camp (v 8); the second, to his tent (v. 9); and the
third, to his God (v. 20). The first two are preceded by ablutions that, as pointed out (vv.
8, 9), execute the rites of passage.”461 Even though he did not comment on how, Maass
recognized that some sort of guilt was present in the situations where no fault is explicitly
mentioned in the text, such as Lev 12, 15.462 This element was missed by Milgrom and
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Averbeck who recognized the physical and ritual domain of טָ הֵ ר, but not the moral.

 כִּ פֶּרprecedes  טָ הֵ רin this pericope which refers to the state of a now purified
person as he/she passes from one level of cleanness to the next. This sequence of verbs
leads to the conclusion that  כִּ פֶּרis a means or a part of the process of achieving טָ הֵ ר, that
is, reinstating one into  טָ הֵ רcondition that is acceptable for the community of God’s
people.
As pointed out above,  טָ הֵ רin the final phase of reinstating the healed צָ ַרעַת
person that consists of  כִּ פֶּרthat is achieved by offering the reparation offering, by
application of the oil, and by offering the sin, burnt, and grain offerings. The ritual
instructions in v. 11 which include placing the affected person “before the Lord at the
doorway of the tent of meeting,” that is, inside the tabernacle,463 implies that the person is
not in an impure state anymore because his coming in an impure state to the confines of
the sanctuary would initiate his death as the punishment for making contact between
impure and holy. He is  טָ הֵ רfrom his uncleanness at the point that he is brought to the
sanctuary. The reason for the ritual of the eighth day which results in his restoration into
the community cannot be impurity from צָ ַרעַת, but rather, is comprised of multiple
reasons.
First, the guidelines of ritual in the third pericope present an innovative use of the
blood of the reparation offering. Instead of dashing it on the sides of the altar, as Lev 7:2
prescribes, the priest applied it on the healed  צָ ַרעַתpersons’ lobe of the right ear, thumb
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of the right hand, and big toe of the right foot, which resembles the body parts to which
Moses applied blood from the ram of ordination during the consecration of the priests
(Lev 8:23–24).464 This unique application of the blood of the reparation offering, among
other reasons,465 makes it a key offering in the ritual.466  כִּ פֶּרachieved by it, due to its
similarity with the ordination offering and the change of status of the individuals that are
involved in the ritual, enables the transition from the  צָ ַרעַתperson, outcast, to a clean,
healthy person, full member of his/her community.467 As Hartley noted, “it indicates that
a radical change has taken place in the person’s status before God. Now that this person
is being restored to the community, it is imperative that his whole being be consecrated to
God, his ears to hear God’s word and his hands and feet to do God’s will.”468
Second, the  צָ ַרעַתperson might have done a sin for which he/she was punished by
God with the 469 צָ ַרעַתor he/she might have sinned during the duration of the צָ ַרעַת. Sin
offering in this ritual deals with those sins. An additional reason for making the sin
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offering is found in the fact that all skin disease, characterized by the fact that the body of
a person affected “is wasting away,” and as such, is strongly associated with death in the
OT.470 Because of the processes taking place in the leper’s body, Kurtz stated that a leper
was “a living death, the destruction of all the vital powers, a dissolution and putrefaction
even in the living body, a death before death; so that, as Spencer says, the leper was a
‘walking tomb.’”471 Miriam’s leprosy reflects this idea (Num 12:12).472
The sin offering also had a ransoming role, since the healed  צָ ַרעַתperson was
given a new life and was required to ransom it (Exod 22:28–29; 34:19–20).473 Milgrom
stated:
The bodily impurities enumerated in the impurity table … focus on four phenomena:
death (4, 5, 7, 11), blood (2, 3, 8), semen (3, 10), and scale disease (1). Their common
denominator is death. Vaginal blood and semen represent the forces of life; their
loss—death … In the case of scale disease, this symbolism is made explicit: Aaron
prays for his stricken sister, “Let her not be like a corpse” (Num 12:12). Furthermore,
scale disease is powerful enough to contaminate by overhang, and it is no accident
that it shares this feature with the corpse (Num 19:14). The wasting of the body, the
common characteristic of all biblically impure skin diseases, symbolizes the death
process as much as the loss of blood and semen.474
Even though the set of sacrifices offered on the eighth day all have distinctive
functions, they collectively contribute to a healed  צָ ַרעַתperson’s reconciliation with God
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and his/her full restoration into the community.475 The blood for this ritual was obtained
from reparation, sin, and burnt offerings. The offerer of these sacrifices was the priest (v.
11–20), but they were offered on the behalf of the affected person (v. 10). All the blood
of the other sacrifices was applied to the locations in the previously established
procedures (Lev 1–5), except for the modified blood application of the reparation
offering on a person’s lobe of the right ear, thumb of the right hand, and big toe of the
right foot, instead of around the altar.
Lev 14:33–53. The verb  חָ טָ אis used in vv. 49, 52 to refer to the cleansing of the
house affected by fungus by the ritual of the two birds that resembles the ritual of the first
day for a  צָ ַרעַתperson in the previous passage.476 The verb  כִּ פֶּרis used in v. 53 after the
priest lets the live bird free outside the city into the open field to finalize the ritual of
cleansing. Subsequently, if the house is pronounced clean, טָ הֵ ר.  כִּ פֶּרrefers to the removal
of the fungus from the house477 and is a part of the process of achieving  טָ הֵ רstatus for the
house as was the case in the previous passage in regards to the  צָ ַרעַתperson. No moral
impurity is mentioned nor assumed in this case.
The priest is the officiant in this context. The birds involved in the cleansing
process are not labeled as sacrifice, but the blood obtained from one of them, along with
the water, the other live bird, and other ritual items, was directly sprinkled on the house.
The live bird would then be let go, thus completing the cleansing of the house. The
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function of this ritual was the cleansing of the house from ritual impurity.

 כִּ פֶּרand  טָ הֵ רand קָ דַ שׁ: Leviticus 16:19, 30
The triad of verbs is conceptually related in vv. 18–19 while v. 30 mentions כִּ פֶּר
and טָ הֵ ר.  כִּ פֶּרis introduced at the beginning of the ritual that pertains to the altar in vv.
18–19, which is contrary to the majority of ritual requirements that include כִּ פֶּר, in which

 כִּ פֶּרis mentioned at the end of the ritual procedures. This leads to the conclusion that כִּ פֶּר
is either an overarching process that is comprised of sub-rites of  טָ הֵ רand קָ דַ שׁ, or is
identical to these two sub-rites. That  כִּ פֶּרin vv. 18–19 is the same as these two sub-rites
is supported by the fact that the direct object/beneficiary is the same with כִּ פֶּר, on the one
hand and  טָ הֵ רand קָ דַ שׁ, on the other hand, that is, the sacrificial altar.478 However, it is
very unlikely to equate  כִּ פֶּרand  קָ דַ שׁsince they are separated processes, as was pointed
out on pp. 492–503 of the present study. כִּ פֶּר, in this context, is a sub-rite in the קָ דַ שׁ
process as it was in Exod 29:36–37. The same sequence of ritual activities related to the
sacrificial altar in this pericope is found in Exod 29:36–37, although different verbs are
used,  חָ טָ אto mark purification of the altar, and קָ דַ שׁ, preceded by מָ שַׁ ח.479 Verses 18–19
state that there are two blood applications. The first one, daubing on the altar’s horns, is
recorded in v. 18. The second one, sevenfold sprinkling, is recorded in v. 19. The role of
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the dual blood application was to cleanse and reconsecrate the altar.480  כִּ פֶּרis v. 18 is
equivalent to  טָ הֵ רin v. 19.481 It refers to both blood applications with two different
effects on the altar as was the case with the blood application during the sacrificial altar
consecration in Exod 29:36–37 and Lev 8:15. The first blood application cleanses the
altar in v. 18 and is achieved by daubing the blood of the sin offerings on the altar’s
horns. The second blood application reconsecrates the altar482 by sevenfold sprinkling of
the blood on the altar.483
Verse 30 is less complex since it plainly states that  כִּ פֶּרis the subprocess of טָ הֵ ר
and it results in the latter. In other words, the rite of  כִּ פֶּרprecedes and actualizes the טָ הֵ ר
state of the people.484 It is obvious that this  טָ הֵ רdoes not refer to a literal cleansing, even
though the main purpose of the Day of Atonement ritual was to cleanse the sanctuary.
The sanctuary is polluted by people’s ritual and moral impurities; thus, the people also
are being cleansed morally or spiritually through their self-denial and abstaining from
work. In other words, all the people reconcile with the Lord through the cleansing of the
sanctuary and in participating self-denial and abstaining from work.485

 כִּ פֶּרin Lev 16:18–19, 30 is achieved by the blood of sin offerings of the priests
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and the people. The offerer is exclusively the high-priest. However, one of the sin
offerings was from and for the people. The reason for this ritual was the cleansing of the
sanctuary, including the sacrificial altar that eventually results in the cleansing of the
people. The cleansing and reconsecration of the altar includes the application of the blood
on the altar’s horns and sprinkling on it (vs. 18–19). The cleansing of the people
originated from the cleansing of the sanctuary, as well, which is achieved by the
sprinkling of the blood on and in front of the ark cover.

 כִּ פֶּרand  טָ הֵ רand חָ טָ א: Numbers 8:21
Numbers 8 presents the installation of the Levites so that they can perform
previously assigned duties. The previous texts in Numbers first present the Levites as the
ones who have replaced the Israelite first-born (3:11–13, 40–51) and have been assigned
the duty of guarding (3:14–39) and removing (1:1–33) the tabernacle.486 The verb טָ הֵ ר
expresses the desired state of the Levites (vv. 6, 7, 1, 5, 21). Milgrom noticed that the
repetition of  טָ הֵ רin v. 21, which is the end of the ritual, forms an inclusion with this verb
in v. 6, which marks the beginning of the ritual.487 The installation of the Levites is
essentially different488 from that of the priests in Exod 29, 40 and Lev 8 since the priests
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were sanctified while the Levites were purified. However, the use of  כִּ פֶּרin vv. 12 and 21
adds to the meaning of this purificatory ritual.489
Based on v. 6, the first level of  טָ הֵ רis achieved by three ritual activities: (1)
sprinkling of the water of purification ( )מֵ י חַ טָּ אתonto the Levites, (2) complete shaving
of their bodies, and (3) washing their clothes. On the one hand, some scholars understood
that the water of purification refers to the water of lustration, mei niddah (( )מֵ י נִּ דָּ הNum
19:9) that is used to purify the person who incurred corpse defilement.490 On the other
hand, “other scholars allow uncertainty to remain since no specific ritual of mixing the
water with some other element is delineated in the context of 8:5–22.”491 The current
study agrees with the latter view. Ceremonial cleanness is the goal of the section in
vv. 5–8492 because the Levites themselves were considered as an offering to God.493
Based on the flow of the entire ritual of the Levites’ installation,494 Milgrom was right in
stating that bathing in v. 7 cleansed Levites from minor impurities, but incorrectly
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claimed that the function of the water of purification and the sin offering was to “cleanse
them of severe impurities that impinged on the sanctuary and polluted its altar.”495 This
understanding requires an adjustment since severe ritual impurity required seven days of
time to pass by, and lustration with the water of purification on the third and seventh day
in order to be removed from the person defiled by it (Num 19:11–12). The ritual
portrayed in Num 8:5–26 does not mention or assume seven-day time passage, which
leads to the conclusion that the ritual impurities implied concerning the Levites’ ritual
impurity are not major, but rather minor ones.
Milgrom also understood that the Levites were presented as an elevation offering
to God in v. 11,496 but missed realizing that it would be unlikely that they would have any
kind of ritual impurity on themselves carried over to v. 12 to be purified by the כִּ פֶּר
achieved by the offering of the sin and burnt offerings.497 He was also inconsistent in his
comments on v. 8 that sin offering cleansed severe ritual impurities from the Levites,498
but in commenting on v. 12, he limited the cleansing function of the sin offering to
“moral cleansing” and purging of the sanctuary.499
Based on the ritual flow outlined in v. 21, there are four stages of the Levites’
installation: (1) purification of the Levites, (2) presenting them as an elevation offering,
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(3) performing  כִּ ֶּפרon their behalf which all results in (4) their state of purity.500 Ritual
cleanness is expressed by  טָ הֵ רin v. 7, which is definitely the semantic scope of this term,
and  חָ טָ אin v. 21.501  כִּ פֶּרin v. 12 is interpreted variously. Milgrom, following his theory
that the sin offering cleanses the sanctuary, claimed that it was “to purge the sanctuary of
the impurities caused by any of the Levites’ moral (and physical) lapses.”502 However,
the text does not imply or mention any moral sin committed by the Levites. Budd
suggested a more viable option “to give protection” from divine wrath.503  כִּ פֶּרdoes not
deal with any moral sin of the Levites, which is in accordance with the text and the flow
of the ritual, but rather, atones for the Levites, enabling them to perform certain duties
safely in the sanctuary. In a similar vein, Levine suggested  כִּ ֶּפרto be translated with “to
ransom,” because the phrase  ל ַכפֵר עַלis often associated with the notion of ransom (Exod
30:15; Lev 17:11).504 The complementary suggestions by Budd and Levine fit the ritual
flow since at the point  כִּ פֶּרis performed on the behalf of the Levites in v. 12, they are
ritually clean and no sin is associated with them. The study of the states of creation and
human sinfulness presented in the present study confirms this understanding of כִּ פֶּר.
The sequence of verbs in v. 21 correctly reflects a natural progression of the
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Levites’ state. They are first cleansed ()חָ טָ א, then  כִּ פֶּרis performed on their behalf which
resulted in their becoming טָ הֵ ר. Thus, both  חָ טָ אand  כִּ פֶּרin this ritual are part of a
broader process of becoming טָ הֵ ר.

 כִּ פֶּרis achieved by the offering of the sin and burnt offerings made by the priest.
The offerers were the Levites since they laid hands on the sacrificial animals (v. 12). The
reason for the offerings was installation/enabling of the Levites for the service in the
sanctuary. The blood of the sin and burnt offerings was applied according to the protocol
established in Lev 1, 4.

 כִּ פֶּרand טָ הֵ ר: Leviticus 12:7–8; 15:13, 28
Lev 12:7–8. Leviticus 12 emphasizes the fact that the mother is ritually impure
( )טָ מֵ אfor seven + thirty-three days if she delivers a son (v. 2–4) or fourteen + sixty-six
days if she delivers a daughter (v. 5). For the first seven, in the case of a boy, or fourteen
days, in the case of a daughter, her ritual impurity is of the same force as menstrual
impurity, which means that it is communicable by the contact. The force of her impurity
is being reduced during the last thirty-three or sixty-six days, and it is not communicable,
yet, she is restricted from contacting the holy and entering the sanctuary (v. 4).505 During
this period, the mother is gradually healed from childbirth and totally cleansed, which
means that normal discharge after the childbirth that lasted for two to six weeks had
totally ceased.506 The verb  טָ הֵ רis used two times in vv. 7 and 8 to convey the mother’s
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pure state. Thus, the final goal of the ritual is mother’s reaching the state of purity. The
verb  כִּ פֶּרprecedes the verb  טָ הֵ רin both verses and enables her to reach desired purity.
Scholars have reached a consensus that the mother has regained her ritual purity when
she is able to make her offerings in the sanctuary.507 Milgrom’s comment is explanatory
here: “Now that forty (or eighty) days have elapsed and she has brought her requisite
sacrifices to the sanctuary, she is purified completely and is eligible to make contact with
sacred objects.”508
There is no indication in the text that the mother was involved in any moral
impurity.509 The verb  סָ לַחwhich marks the resolution of moral impurity contexts is not
used in this chapter.510 Thus, the text of Lev 12 indicates that just before offering burnt
and sin sacrifices, the mother has reached a pure state again and was not involved in any
kind of moral impurity. Following Milgrom’s influential hypothesis that the sin offering
purges the sanctuary and its part, scholars have accepted the fact that the  כִּ פֶּרin this verse
purifies the sanctuary/altar from the mother’s impurity which reached the altar from a
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both sacrifices (vv 7a, 8b) indicates that the purpose of the burnt offering, like that of the purification
offering, is expiatory (see the NOTE on “effect expiation,” v 7), but it addresses other matters than
pollution.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 757–58.
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distance.511 Gane, in contrast, claimed that  כִּ פֶּרpurifies the mother from her ritual
impurity: “The goal/meaning of the ritual procedure is to remove physical ritual impurity
from the woman so that she is ritually pure, not to remove moral fault from her in
preparation for divine forgiveness (contrast 4:20, 26, 31, 35). So her ḥaṭṭaʾt is a
‘purification offering.’”512 Gane himself stated that the defiled person would reach the
status of ritual purity before the point he/she comes to the sanctuary to offer the
sacrifice.513 This claim conflicts with an opening statement in v. 6: “When the days of her
purification are completed,”514 she is allowed come to the sanctuary. This implies that she
had fully reached the state of ritual purity as established above. N. H. Snaith and A.
Noordtzij viewed the sin offering as purificatory, but it is unclear whether they refer to
the purification of the sanctuary or the mother.515
Keil suggested that the mother’s burnt and sin offerings purify her from
“uncleanness in which the sin of nature had manifested itself” in the delivery and
prevented her from going to the sanctuary and the fellowship of God. In addition, he said
the main reason for the offerings was the “sin which had been indirectly manifested in
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her bodily condition.”516 Uncleanness from Keil’s first quotation and sin from the second
seem to refer to general human sinful condition and its representation, respectively.
Levine also viewed that this rite handles the sinfulness of the mother since, in his
opinion,  כִּ פֶּרfollowed by the indirect object (preposition  )עַלdoes not purify like כִּ פֶּר
followed by the direct object marker does, but rather removes sinfulness from the
offerer.517 A. Noordtzij, J. R. Porter, and Mark Rooker are more particular in their
understanding that the main concern that  כִּ פֶּרand  טָ הֵ רin vv. 7 and 8 refer to is purity
from “the issuance of blood.”518
Based on the foundational sinful condition of humans that has been explored on
pages 400–14, the present study agrees that the most compelling reason for the mother’s
obligation to offer burnt and sin offering is this severe ritual impurity as a manifestation
of GHS that is associated with the loss of blood that is associated with death. As argued
on page 405, death is the underlying idea and significant expression of GHS. As such, it
interrupted the relationship of the mother with the community and God. Thus, כִּ פֶּר
brought about by the burnt and sin offering is best understood as being comprised of two
elements. The first element is ransom for two reasons. The first reason is that the mother
was involved in the event in which GHS was manifested in the most vivid way. During
the childbirth and period of her ritual impurity, she experienced blood loss and constant
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discharge from her body. Both of these are signs of death and decay. Milgrom was
informative again:
Moreover, in the Israelite mind, blood was the archsymbol of life (17:10–14; Deut
12:23; cf. chap. 11, COMMENT C). Its oozing from the body was no longer the work
of demons, but it was certainly the sign of death. In particular, the loss of seed in
vaginal blood (see the NOTE on “at childbirth,” v. 2) was associated with the loss of
life. Thus it was that Israel—alone among the peoples—restricted impurity solely to
those physical conditions involving the loss of vaginal blood and semen, the forces of
life, and scale disease, which visually manifested the approach of death.519
The second reason is articulated by Levine’s remark that “in ancient times,
concern for the welfare of mother and child was most often expressed as the fear of
destructive, demonic, or antilife forces”520 in ANE texts contemporaneous with biblical
times,521 which testifies to the fact that childbirth was perceived as a threatening and
risky time for both mother and child in the ANE. One or even both could die. Both of
these facts led to the conclusion that the mother was in close contact with death and,
having survived this experience, she was asked to offer burnt and sin offerings in order to
redeem herself.
A second element  כִּ פֶּרachieved was the mother’s official reinstatement to the
community and worship to God. Reinstatement was needed due to the fact that the
mother was, in a way, excluded from society due to her specific experience of child birth
and severe ritual impurity that was associated with it. This element resembles the
experience of the healed  צָ ַרעַתperson.
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 כִּ פֶּרwas achieved by burnt and sin offerings brought by the new mother.
However, the focus of this text was not on the sacrificial procedures and it depends
greatly on the previously established procedures for sacrificial offering in Lev 1, 4. The
reason for the set of offerings was “the issuance of blood” that followed childbirth.
Lev 15:13, 28. These verses stand as conclusions of two passages that deal with
the abnormal discharges from genital organs in men (15:2–15) and women (15:25–30).

 טָ הֵ רis used three times in v. 13522 and two times in v. 28 to convey that the זָב/ זָבָ הperson
achieved the pure state.523 In support of the ownership theory of the sacrificial handleaning, Gane accurately stated that “the contagion of physical ritual impurity is already
removed before sacrificial hand-leaning is performed, which makes it difficult to
maintain that this gesture defiles animals by physical contact in the same way that
persons defile objects and persons while their sources of impurity are active (cf. Lev
15:4–12, 26–27).”524 Milgrom also argued: “Clearly, physical impurity is removed by
ablution: ‘he shall launder his clothes [and] bathe in water’ (15:8 inter alia).”525
The fact that the זָב/ זָבָ הperson achieves the state of purity informs the

The first  טָ הֵ רundeniably refers to the physical health of the zāb person. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–
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statement that the period of the parturient’s severer impurity lasts seven (or fourteen, v. 5) days assumes
that this period is terminated by ablutions. The same holds true for the menstruant (see the NOTE on
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understanding of  כִּ פֶּרin vv. 14 and 28. That is, the  כִּ פֶּרritual chronologically takes place
on the eighth day after the זָב/ זָבָ הperson achieved טָ הֵ ר. Consequently,  כִּ פֶּרdoes not
purify the זָב/ ָזבָ הperson from ritual impurity since they are already ritually pure at this
point of the ritual. Rather,  כִּ פֶּרhas a different role. It atoned for the זָב/ זָבָ הperson’s GHS
and ransoms his/her life. Experiencing constant genital discharge from the body was
perceived as a severe ritual impurity; the זָב/ זָבָ הperson, in a way, experienced death and
decay in a similar way as the new mother.

 כִּ פֶּרwas achieved by burnt and sin offerings brought by the healed זָב/ זָבָ הperson.
Here, also, the focus was not on sacrificial procedures and this text depends greatly on
previously established procedures for sacrificial offering in Lev 1, 4. The priest officiated
the sacrificial offering and the reason for the set of offerings was the זָב/ זָבָ הperson’s
abnormal genital discharge.

 כִּ פֶּרand קָ דַ שׁ: Numbers 6:11
In this context,  כִּ פֶּרis a prerequisite of the  קָ דַ שׁas it has been the case in the
previous cases analyzed above. The text clearly state that the Nazirite has sinned (v. 11,
verb )חָ טָ א. However, the Nazirite is not responsible for his defilement since it was
obtained unintentionally through a person who suddenly died in the Nazirite’s proximity.
Through such incident, the Nazirite becomes ritually defiled (v. 9,  )טָ מֵ אand needs the
usual ritual purification from the corpse defilement of sprinkling by the purification
waters on the third and the seventh days as prescribed in Num 19:11–12, 17–19. On the
same day, the Nazirite also had to shave off his hair (v. 9) as an outward sign of the
525

removal of his Nazirite status.526 After being purified from the ritual impurity through the
lustrations on the third and seventh days, on the eighth day, the Nazirite had (1) to offer
the sin and burn offerings, (2) reconsecrate his hair for a new term, and (3) to offer the
reparation offering.
The fact that the Nazirite had to go through these rituals on the eighth day makes
Milgrom’s inference that “the Nazirite’s contamination is sinful and is to be avoided”527
accurate. The Nazirite’s defilement is sinful for two reasons. First, based on his current
state “he [the Nazirite] is holy (Num 6:5, 8) and contamination of holiness is a serious
sin.”528 Second, his exceptional holy nature stems from the vow by which the Nazirite
entered this temporary state of holiness (vv. 2–8). Through the corpse defilement, this
vow was broken, thus annulling their previous days of Nazirite status (vv. 6–10).

 כִּ פֶּרin this case atones for the Nazirite’s sin as a preparation for his new term of
Nazirite status. The ritual impurity has been removed by the regular sprinkling of the
water of purification on the third and seventh days in addition to shaving the Nazirite’s
head.  כִּ פֶּרis achieved by the offering of the sin offering first, and followed next by the
burnt offering (v. 11). It is then followed by the Nazirite’s reconsecration for the new
term.

 כִּ פֶּרwas achieved by burnt and sin offerings brought by the Nazirite. The text
does not focus on the sacrificial procedure; thus, it wholly depends on previously
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established procedures for sacrificial offering in Lev 1, 4. The priest officiated the
sacrificial offering and כִּ פֶּר, in this context, deals with the moral impurity of the Nazirite.

 כִּ פֶּרand סָ לַח: Leviticus 4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:10, 13, 16, 18,
26 [6:7]; 19:22; Numbers 15:25, 26, 28
The pattern that  כִּ פֶּרchronologically precedes  סָ לַחis evident in all these texts,
except in Lev 5:6 where  כִּ פֶּרis not followed by סָ לַח, but rather, stands on its own.
However, the regulations applying to the same cases in vv. 10 and 13 maintain the usual
order of  כִּ פֶּרchronologically preceding סָ לַח, thus making this inconsistency insignificant.
In order to arrive at a sound understanding of the כִּ ֶּפר- סָ לַחrelationship, the context of all
these texts has to be taken into consideration and the context is coherent and clear; the
human party has sinned and is required to offer a sin or reparation offering.
The most elaborate text of those in the Pentateuch is Lev 4, since it contains the
most detailed description of the sin offering ritual. In the event of moral impurity, the one
who commits it is required to offer a sin offering. This consists of the offerer’s bringing
the sacrificial animal to the doorway of the tent of meeting, laying his/her hand on its
head, and slaughtering it.
Subsequently, the priest would dip his finger in the blood obtained from the
sacrificial animal and apply the blood on various objects of the sanctuary, depending on
the social status of the offerer. In cases 1 (high priest/priest) and 2 (a whole community)
in Lev 4, he would sprinkle some of the blood seven times in front of the veil that
separates the two compartments inside of the tent and apply some of it to the horns of the
altar of incense, located in the first compartment of the tent, and pour out the rest of it at
the base of the sacrificial altar (vv. 6–7, 16–18). The remainder of the sacrificial animal
527

that is not burned on the sacrificial altar (hide, flesh, legs and entrails, vv. 11, 20)529 is
taken out of the camp to a clean place and incinerated (vv. 12, 21).530
The steps are slightly different in cases 3 (a leader) and 4 (a commoner). The
activities are identical up to the point of the blood application, but in these two cases, the
priest applies some of the blood on the horns of the sacrificial altar and pours the rest of it
at the base of the same altar (vv. 25, 30, 34).531 Besides a different location of the blood
application, the regulations for cases 3 and 4 miss stating that the remainder of the
sacrificial animal is incinerated outside the camp. However, further regulations for the sin
offering in Lev 6:19 [26], 22 [29] state that the officiating priest is obliged to eat the
remaining flesh of sin offering.
The stipulations of the sin offering differ in the types of the required animal532 and
that is properly explained by the social status of the offerer.533 Offerings of both types of
sacrificial animal bring about the same effect,  כִּ פֶּרand סָ לַח, for the offerer. However, the
location of the blood application is more substantial difference between the two sets of
instructions. That is, the blood is applied inside the tent in cases 1 and 2 with certain parts
of the animal being incinerated outside the camp, while the blood in cases 3 and 4 is
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applied only outside the tent, on the sacrificial altar, with the priest being required to eat
the meat of the sacrificial animal. Again, the different activities bring about the same
effect,  כִּ פֶּרand  סָ לַחfor the offerer.
The texts from Lev 5:10, 13, 16, 18, 26 [6:7] belong to four distinct pericopes:
5:1–13, 14–16, 17–19 and 5:20–26. Schwartz accurately claimed that “the cases [Lev
5:1–4] aim to counter the notion that duties weaken with time and eventually cease to
exist (“forget it and it will simply go away”).”534 Gane has plausibly proved that 5:1–13
is a continuation of the sin offering regulations, with special emphasis on the sin
offering’s having the function of אָשַׁ ם, some sort of reparation for the sin committed.535
This pericope assumes the offering of a sin offering as prescribed in Lev 4:27–35.536 The
sins in Lev 4:27–35 are expiable/forgivable, regardless of the fact that they were
intentional.
As it was established in the present study, Lev 5:14–16 envisions two alternative
ways of sinning, intentional non-brazen and unintentional, based on the two distinct
classes included in the protasis of this case. In terms of the nature of sin, it envisions sin
against sancta and its sacrificial procedure depends on the ones laid out in Lev 7:1–7, in
addition to the possibility embedded in this pericope, v. 15, to use monetary payment
instead of an actual sacrificial animal.537 The pericope in Lev 7:1–7 introduces a set of
regulations for a reparation offering that was offered in cases when an individual
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committed a sin that would involve some sort of literal, measureable debt that could be
restituted to another party.538 The procedure for the reparation offering in great part
resembles the one for a sin offering with a notable difference in treating the sacrificial
blood that was dashed on the sides of the outer altar, instead of applying it on its horns,
thus resembling the treatment of the blood in burnt or well-being offering.539 Certain
procedural differences are affected by the fact that this set of instructions is placed in the
section of sacrificial procedures that are meant for priests (Lev 6:1 [6:8]–7:7), rather than
the laity (Lev 1–5). Milgrom reasoned plausibly:
If it is indeed the case that the one liable for a reparation offering was expected to
bring its monetary equivalent to the sanctuary, it should occasion no surprise that the
procedure for the sacrifice of the reparation offering should be given here in the
administrative unit addressed to the priests (chaps. 6–7) rather than in the didactic
order addressed to the laity … Once the lay offerer purchases the requisite ʾāšām
animal from the priest, the latter makes certain that the proper sacrificial procedure is
followed.540
Milgrom noted that the expiatory value of this sacrifice does not resemble the one
of the sin offering, “to purge,” but rather refers to general expiation.541 However,
regardless of the different procedures for the two offerings,542 they bring about the same
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result,  כִּ פֶּרthat leads to one’s forgiveness.
It is established in the present study that Lev 5:17–19 involves unintentional sin
either out of ignorance or by accident. Besides certain linguistic differences, especially in
the protasis of the two subcases, 5:17–19 resembles 5:14–16. Accordingly, it depends for
its sacrificial procedure on the ones laid out in Lev 7:1–7.543 In addition, there is the
possibility embedded in this pericope in v. 18, and in the additional clarification in v. 15,
of using a monetary payment instead of an actual sacrificial animal.
Contrary to the previous three pericopes, Lev 5:20–26 implies only intentional,
non-brazen sins. However, since these sins were committed under oath before God,544
they depend for their sacrificial procedure on the ones laid out in Lev 7:1–7.545 Here also,
there is the possibility embedded in this pericope in v. 25, and in the additional
clarification in v. 15, of using a monetary payment instead of an actual sacrificial animal.
The sexual misconduct in Lev 19:22 is undoubtedly intentional, but regardless of
being abhorrent, it is a non-brazen sin. The sinner is allowed to received  כִּ פֶּרand סָ לַח.
The sinner who commits such a sin of adultery would be penalized by the capital
punishment and the same punishment would be implemented to the girl if she consented
rather than was raped (Lev 22:23–27). However, the girl in this law is a slave546 and
because of her non-free status, this sin is not punishable by capital punishment. Gane
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captured the plausible rationale of this sin:

Although violation of a designated slave woman is not a capital offense, it is immoral
activity offensive to God, violating the spirit of the seventh commandment of the
Decalogue, which prohibits adultery (Ex. 20:14). Thus, a man who commits this
wrong must sacrifice a reparation offering (ʾašam, the so-called “guilt offering”) to
the Lord.547
Milgrom’s understanding that the reparation offering was always offered for the
cases of sacrilege either through illicit contact with sancta in 5:14–19 and/or
misappropriation of other’s property under misuse of God’s name in a false oath in
5:20–26548 adds even more gravity to this sin. The requirement for the reparation offering
upholds the sanctity of the marriage covenant and as such, it constitutes a sacrilege even
under the two disrupting conditions which, in this case, are the facts that (1) this is a
marriage of a slave woman, and (2) it is not consummated.549
The pericope in Num 15:22–29 modifies the sin offering procedure in Lev 4:5–
13,550 but the two points are unchanged: (1) the protasis encompasses two alternative
ways of sinning, and (2) the sinner first receives  כִּ פֶּרand is forgiven, implying that they
follow the sacrificial procedure (5:16, 18, 29 [6:7]).
As established under the subheading “Moral Impurity/Sin in the Pentateuch” of
this study, punishments for sin are always included in the contexts when the sinner breaks
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God’s commandments. The punishment for various sins cannot be related to certain
Hebrew terms for sin since they are frequently used as equivalents in the Pentateuch and
OT. Authors of biblical books did not use them in a strict, technical manner, but rather, in
a general one referring to a broad-spectrum of breaking the commandments. It is the
context which often contains punishment that suggests whether a certain sin is
expiable/forgivable or inexpiable/unforgivable. Punishment also cannot be established
based on the sinner’s intention, since both basic types of sin, intentional, but not brazen
sins, and unintentional sins, are expiable/forgivable. I have suggested that
inexpiable/unforgivable sins are those for which the texts stipulate capital punishment in
various forms, death ()מוּת, kārēt, kill ()הָ ַרג, stoning ( ָרגַם, )סָ קַ ל, burning with fire ()שָׂ ַרף,
striking () ָנכָה, and pierce through ()י ָָרה. These sins are brazen sins that express the
sinner’s attitude of breaking with God and are defined as  ביָד ָרמָ הsins. All the other sins
are expiable/forgivable. No capital punishment is associated with the sins enumerated in
Lev 4–5 and Num 15:22–29. In addition, all these texts portray that forgiveness is
available to the sinner. The meaning of  כִּ פֶּרthat was established through the analysis of
Lev 17:11 fits these contexts perfectly since the sinner is guilty before God and yet,
receives forgiveness.  כִּ פֶּרencompasses ransom and substitution in these contexts. Also
implied is the fact that the sin the sinner committed has been transferred to the sanctuary.
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 כִּ פֶּרand  ָרצָ ה: Leviticus 1:4
The verb 551 ָרצָ הis used in vv. 3 and 4, but is syntactically related to  כִּ פֶּרonly in
the latter verse. Milgrom correctly noted a difference between the two uses of  ָרצָ ה:
Whereas the latter is dependent on the unblemished condition of the animal, the
“acceptance” in this verse [v. 4] relates to the hand-leaning rite. The two dative
suffixes attached to this and the following verb, כִּ פֶּר, both mean “for, on behalf of,”
thereby emphasizing the indispensability of the hand-leaning by the offerer himself in
his quest for “acceptance” and “expiation” (see below).552
Verse 4 presents the benefit of  ָרצָ הas a precondition for  כִּ פֶּרthat is conditioned
by the laying on of hands, while v. 3 requires that the sacrifice be a male, without defect,
and offered in the sanctuary (vv. 3, 10).  ָרצָ הthus connects four prerequisites in vv. 3 and
4 that the offerer was required to do in order to receive כִּ פֶּר, (1) the unblemished (2) male
sacrifice (3) offered in the sanctuary and (4) the offerer’s laying on of hands on the head
of the sacrificial animal. Chapter 1 does not relate ritual nor moral impurity to the
offerer.553 However, Levine correctly noticed: “Proximity to God was inherently
dangerous for both the worshiper and the priests, even if there had been no particular
ofference to anger Him. The favorable acceptance of the ʿolah signaled God’s
willingness to be approached and served as a kind of ransom, or redemption, from divine
wrath.”554 It is not clear from Levine’s quotation what would create this danger from God
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for the offerer in the latter’s approach to God. As has been suggested multiple times in
the current study, it is the GHS that generates this danger for the offerer in God’s
presence and thus,  כִּ פֶּרis needed to atone for it and make the relationship between an
inherently sinful human and a holy God possible and safe.555 The foundational principle
behind atonement brought by the  כִּ פֶּרis ransom.556 Some commentators have
misunderstood the meaning of the  כִּ פֶּרin this context since they ascribed to it the role of
purifying from both ritual and moral impurity557 which is not supported by the text. These
scholars have considered, explicitly or implicitly, the two radically different contexts of
Lev 1 and 4 as the same and suggested the same meaning for כִּ פֶּר. The texts simply do
not provide grounds for such inference.

 כִּ פֶּרin this context is achieved by the blood of the burnt offering which was
offered by the priest on behalf of the offerer. The blood was applied around the altar.
There is no specific reason why this sacrifice was offered. Ritual or moral impurity
terminology is not found in the chapter suggestive of the absence of either of the two
possible impurities. The only element that  כִּ פֶּרcould atone for is GHS. Ransom remains
the foundation based on which atoning is possible.
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Milgrom’s translation of these texts accurately reflects what has been
communicated in the Hebrew: “3If his offering is a burnt offering from the herd, he shall
offer a male without blemish. He shall bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, for
acceptance on his behalf before the Lord. 4He shall lean his hand on the head of the burnt
offering, that it may be acceptable [accepted] on his behalf, to expiate [atone] for him.”558
Milgrom’s and Gane’s Understanding of Atonement and
Its Relation to the Hebrew Preposition ִּמן
The most updated debate on the nature of atonement is the one between Milgrom
and Gane.559 Citing just these two studies in a limited way does not intend to disregard
several more theories such as those of Rodríguez,560 Kiuchi,561 and other scholars who
contributed greatly to the understanding of atonement.562 This debate contains elements
that the present study agrees and disagrees with, so for that reason, both are presented and
critiqued in a limited way in order to highlight the differences and similarities between
them. This process portrayed the theory suggested in this study. The preposition  ִּמןis
included here because it emphasizes one of the crucial differences between these two
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theories and helps inform the concept of atonement presented in this study. Milgrom’s
and Gane’s treatments of the preposition  ִּמןare analyzed in a separate subheading after
the basic components of their atonement theories are presented and evaluated.
Milgrom’s Theory of Atonement
Milgrom innovatively suggested that it is not the offerer who benefits from כִּ פֶּר,
but rather, the sanctuary.563 This claim rests on five assumptions. First,  כִּ פֶּרin ritual texts
means “to cleanse, purge.”564 Second, impurity is always removed from sinners before
they offer a sin offering. Ritual impurity is removed by ablutions, whereas moral
impurity is removed by repentance.565 Third, the sanctuary is defiled aerially. A major
impurity defiles the sacrificial altar, while a forgivable moral impurity, depending on the
socio-religious status of the offerer, defiles the holy and the most holy places.
Unforgivable sin, regardless of who commits it, defiles the most holy place and is
cleansed on the Day of Atonement.566 Fourth, the blood of the sin offering was never
applied directly to human beings and therefore, the sin offering never purges the offerers
from their sins, but rather, the sanctuary to which it is applied.567 Fifth, when the object of

 כִּ פֶּרis inanimate, it is accompanied by a direct object marker, and when the object is
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human, then it is modified by the prepositions  עַלor בַ עַד.568
All these claims are erroneous. The general error of Milgrom’s theory is a/the
mechanistic view of atonement expressed through  כִּ פֶּרwhich, in cultic contexts, is
achieved within the limits of physical activities. In other words,  כִּ פֶּרis possible only if
the blood of the sin offering touches entities that need it. A detailed study of the
atonement in the present study demonstrated that Milgrom’s understanding of  כִּ פֶּרwas
not supported by biblical texts and worldview. It also blurs the lines between magic and
biblical faith within which God directly acts to bring change rather than the performance
of certain ritual activities. The benefits of ritual is not achieved by the performance of the
ritual itself, but by God’s involvement and acting based on his commitment/promise that
he will act if the human party follows his guidelines to perform a given ritual.
First, the understanding of the concept of sin, the semantics of  כִּ פֶּרestablished in
the present study, and other inferences derived from biblical texts led to the conclusion
that atonement expressed through  כִּ פֶּרpoints to atonement for the offerers based on the
ransom of sacrificial blood/life and not on cleansing. Second, ritual impurity was usually
remedied by the passage of time and it vanished with no sin offering needed, but in some
cases, a sin offering was needed after the passage of time, which in this case, does not
cleanse the offerers, but rather, atones for them. Moral impurity remained on the offerers
until they received atonement and were forgiven. Forgiveness for sin takes place after the

For a thorough analysis of  כִּ פֶּרconstructions, including  כִּ פֶּר+  בַ עַדor עַל, see chapter four of the
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 כִּ פֶּרritual was performed, signaling that the offerers were still affected with their sin.
Repentance is needed in the process of forgiveness, but it is never said to remove sin
from the sinner. Third, the ADH is extensively disproved in chapter five of the present
study. A part of this hypothesis is disproved by the understanding of sin presented in
chapter two of the present study, while other parts are disproved by a close study of the
grammatical, semantical, and syntactical peculiarities of the passages upon which this
theory rests. Fourth, the blood of the sin offering is infected by the offerers’ sin and
therefore, is not applied onto them, but rather, to the sanctuary where the sin is stored
until the Day of Atonement. It is on this day when the sanctuary, in its totality, would be
cleansed, not at the time when the offerers offer their sacrifice.569 Milgrom’s fifth point is
partially right. That is,  כִּ פֶּרwith inanimate is accompanied by a  אֵ תmarker, while it is
accompanied by the prepositions  ַעלor  בַ עַדwhen the direct object is human. However, to
claim that the offerers do not directly receive the benefits of  כִּ פֶּרbecause of this
overemphasizes the role of the prepositions in the process of forming an understanding
on such a comprehensive concept as atonement. In addition, it opposes the outcome of
the rest of the sin offering ritual where the offerers are forgiven only after they offer a sin
offering and receive atonement. Gane correctly concluded that the benefit of  כִּ פֶּרis direct
in the case of inanimate objects, and indirect in case of human objects.570 Building on
Gane’s point, the present study proposes that the essential difference between the two

Gane convincingly argued for a two-phase atonement, contrary to Milgrom’s one-phase
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constructions of  כִּ פֶּרhas to do with the nature of the respective objects. Inanimate objects
receive cleansing due to their inanimate nature and therefore, are marked with אֵ ת.
Human objects, on the other hand, receive atonement that is based on ransom due to the
constant disadvantage of GHS and sin (understood as a violation of God’s laws). Many
scholars of cult have successfully criticized Milgrom’s theory lately,571 so this study
refrains from analyzing all the points of his theory.
Gane’s Theory of Atonement and Understanding of ִּמן
The critical point of concern of Gane’s theory is the identity of the object who
received כִּ פֶּר. Hasel,572 Rodríguez,573 and Zohar574 already responded to this question in
the same way as Gane, claiming that it is the offerer who was cleansed in the sin offering
ritual, but Gane supplied additional arguments to strengthen this position.
First, Gane adopted the concept that the blood applications in Lev 4 and 16 are
different because they were performed on different occasions and the former cleanses the
offerer, while the latter cleanses the sanctuary, thus forming two phases of atonement,
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daily and yearly.575 In this, Gane’s theory resembles that of Rodríguez576 which was also
accepted by Zohar577 and Hasel.578 Second, Gane adopted limited automatic defilement
only for cases of Molech worship and wanton neglect to purify oneself from corpse
contamination.579 Third, Gane suggested a unique but yet not clearly articulated
defilement of the sanctuary, while Rodríguez, Zohar, and Hasel clearly stated that the
transfer of sin from the offerer to the sin offering happens via laying on of hands.580
Gane’s understanding of this ritual gesture is multifaceted. His basic interpretation of the
laying on of hands is as follows: “When hand-leaning is performed, it identifies the
offerer/owner of the victim, to whom the benefits of the sacrifice accrue, within the
context of transferring the offering material from the offerer to the deity.”581
Gane’s hybrid theory encompasses the meanings of several theories. First, the
ritual gesture expresses ownership of the offerer over the animal. Based on the following
quotation by Gane that both types of laying on of hand/s “signifies a (different) kind of
identification that is involved in transfer,”582 so that two more elements can be derived.
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Second, it represents identification of the offerer and the sacrificial animal. Third, it
contributes to the transfer. However, it is not clear whether the transfer refers to the
transfer of sin to the sacrificial animal or transfer of the animal to the Lord. Thus, the use
of one hand signifies transfer of the animal from the offerer to God, while use of two
hands as, in the case of the scapegoat (with simultaneous confession), transfers moral sins
to the goat.583 However, as stated in the introduction of the present study, Gane’s
understanding of the ritual gesture seems to be identical to the position of Bähr,584 but his
application of the OT offerings to the sacrifice of Jesus Christ in the NT reveals that he
goes beyond Bähr’s position by including the idea of transfer of sin and substitution.585
First, as mentioned previously, this study agrees with the claim that the offerer
receives the benefits of כִּ פֶּר, as well as the sanctuary. The former benefits from כִּ פֶּר
achieved by daily sacrifices (Lev 4–5), while the latter, through yearly sacrifices (Lev
16). Consequently, this study accepts a two-phase atonement, daily and yearly. Second,
based on the study in chapter five of the present study, ADH in is not supported by
biblical texts. Third, the meaning/function of the laying on of hand/s as transfer of sin and
substitution, suggested by Rodríguez, Hasel, Zohar and others,586 deserves to be explored
further. The new idea that the present study suggests is that GHS could have also been
transferred so the ever sinful offerer can be atoned for in the presence of the holy God.
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Milgrom’s and Gane’s Debate on the
Understanding of the Preposition ִּמן
The understanding of the preposition  ִּמןin this debate is important because it is
used by both Milgrom and Gane to confirm their understanding of who receives the
benefits of כִּ פֶּר. Milgrom expressed his understanding of  ִּמןin an article, “Critical Notes:
The Preposition  ִּמןin the  חטאתPericopes,”587 as response to Gane’s which he expressed
in Cult and Character: Purification Offerings, Day of Atonement, and Theodicy and a
subsequent article, “Privative Preposition min in Purification Offering Pericopes and the
Changing Face of ‘Dorian Gray.’”588 This study agrees and disagrees with both theories,
but basically accepts Milgrom’s causative meaning of  ִּמןand consequently, disagrees
with Gane’s privative, but yet, as stated earlier, disagrees with Milgrom’s claim that this
understanding of  ִּמן, along with his understanding of כִּ פֶּר, is insufficient to claim that the
offerer never receives the benefits of כִּ פֶּר. The main question is whether the preposition is
to be taken to have privative, “from, of,” or causative “because of, on account of, for”
meaning.
That is, both Milgrom and Gane held that the role of prepositions in the formation
of their atonement theories was decisive.589 As demonstrated in the study of the כִּ פֶּר
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construction in the present study, Milgrom’s understanding of prepositions is erroneous
on several grounds.590 Milgrom did not include the preposition  ִּמןin his emphasis of
prepositions. Gane, on the other hand, focusing particularly on  ִּמן, overemphasized and
overlooked some basic assertions regarding it which he considered decisive in a pursuit
of his question as to who was the object of כִּ פֶּר.
The present study affirms that Milgrom correctly claimed that the preposition ִּמן
should be understood as causative and thus translated “because of, on account of, for.”
Against Gane’s privative meaning, “from, of,” Milgrom listed 4 arguments. First, he
rightfully stated that  ִּמןcannot be understood as privative in the cases of individuals of
Lev 12, 13–14, and 15 because they are ritually pure when they come to sanctuary. This
argument represents Milgrom’s partly inaccurate reading of Gane, since Gane himself
understood that the ritual impurity is not on them, but rather, that “the sacrificial process
removes residual impurity from her.”591 Because some sort of ritual impurity is on them,
Milgrom’s argument is on point since  כִּ פֶּרremoves it, as Gane proposed. Indeed, the
texts do not mention the concept of residual ritual impurity. Milgrom claimed that Gane’s
privative meaning is not supported by these texts. Second, Milgrom rightfully criticized
Gane’s privative interpretation of  ִּמןin Lev 15:15b because “purgation ( )כפרis not
offered “from,” but “for, because of”—“his flow” (15:15); “her impure flow” (15:30);

See evaluation of Milgrom’s claims on the use of prepositions under the subheading  כִּ פֶּרwith
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“his impurity” (14:19a), which contaminated the altar.” Third, the preposition  ִּמןand עַל
are interchangeable, synonyms which subsequently mean that  ִּמןreceives a causative
meaning from  עַלsince  ַעלis never partitive.592 Fourth, Milgrom criticized Gane for the
claim that “the  חטאתbrought by the bodily impure or the inadvertent sinner absorbs the
impurity; the priest brings the impure blood of the  חטאתto the altar, and the holiness of
the altar wipes out the impurity.593 Milgrom dismissed Gane’s claim for two reasons.
First, the impure blood of the sin offering was not allowed on the altar. This is incorrect
since the high priest in Lev 16:18 applies that same blood by which he cleanses the
sanctuary to the sacrificial altar to cleanse it. Thus, the impurity is on the altar as it is in
the sanctuary, and the high priest cleanses it from both places, Lev 16:16–19. Second,
Milgrom criticized Gane because of the claim that the sin offering blood in Lev 6:27–28
is impure. The fact that the holy is immune to impurity within the sanctuary confines is a
biblically informed conclusion.594 Milgrom himself held that the priests are immune to
impurity, and their immunity to impurity stems from their holiness.595 However,
contradicting himself, Milgrom stated that “the sanctuary itself is not immune to
impurity.”596 It is unknown why he stated that the priesthood is immune to impurity
based on the fact that they are sanctified and the sanctuary is not even though it was
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sanctified before the priests and served as the environment where the priests were
sanctified. Contradicting himself even more, Milgrom stated: “On the contrary, it is the
continuous pollution of the sanctuary by Israel’s moral and physical impurity that
mandates its indispensable purgation by means of the  חטאתoffering.”597 The present
study totally agrees with this quotation of Milgrom. However, the claim that the
sanctuary is not immune to impurities is totally disproved by the Pentateuchal texts since
the impurities are stored in the sanctuary during the entire year. This makes his critique of
Gane contradictory and unacceptable. It has to be added that this immunity of the
sanctuary and priesthood to impurity is temporary and not permanent, since both entities
have to be cleansed of it once a year, on the Day of Atonement. This is exactly assumed
in Milgrom’s last quotation. Thus, this argument is incorrect since the holy objects inside
the sanctuary confines, including sanctuary itself, were immune to impurity, and Gane’s
claim remains valid. Milgrom was right in his claim that super-sanctity cannot eradicate
impurity, so the altar’s sanctity cannot wipe out impurity. Rather, it stays on the altar
until the Day of Atonement when the altar, along with the sanctuary, is cleansed.
Based on his fourth critique, Milgrom’s fifth critique of Gane is incorrect: “Gane
engages in two paradoxes: In his view, not only is the .... blood that is daubed on the most
sacred altar impure (above), but on Yom Kippur the .... blood changes its nature from a
pollutant to a purifier; erstwhile impure blood now purifies the entire sanctuary and its
sancta.”598 As affirmed in the present study, this phenomenon is paradoxical but firmly
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rooted in an all-inclusive and comprehensive reading of the Pentateuchal texts. A slight
correction should be supplied to this quotation that the blood that purifies was not
impure, but rather, pure blood. No hands were laid on the animals from which this blood
was obtained inasmuch as not laying on of hand/s was performed over those sacrificial
animals. Thus, the blood used on the Day of Atonement was pure and thus, able to
cleanse the sanctuary.
The present study proposes that  ִּמןshould always be translated with a causative
sense in the texts where Gane identified a privative sense (Lev 4:26; 5:6, 10; 14:19;
15:15, 30). The most convincing argument for such a proposal is the fact that the offerer,
especially the offerers previously affected by ritual impurity, do not need to be cleansed
from anything. They are ritually clean and do not need removal of ritual impurity or
residual impurity that remain after the ritual impurity is healed. The residual impurity
assumption is never mentioned or discussed in Pentateuchal texts. The offerers loaded
with moral impurity cannot receive cleansing from it since moral impurity is a
conceptual, rather than physical or quasi-physical entity. Such offerers need atonement
based on ransom because they broke God’s law and are in the state of guilt before God
with the punishment lingering. The only potential exception where the present study
would agree with the partitive sense is 16:16, 34 because the object receiving  כִּ פֶּרis
inanimate, the sanctuary. The inanimate entity, being ontologically different than human
entity, can receive cleansing. The human entity needs atonement based on ransom.
An additional reason against a privative sense of the preposition  ִּמןis the fact that
this sense of  ִּמןis related to separation in terms of physical space, temporal, or partitive
uses. Separation is determined by space or time. These two concepts of space and time
547

are unrelated to  ִּמןin the contexts Gane studied. The only major Hebrew Grammar that
defines the privative sense of  ִּמןis Waltke and O’Connor’s grammar, but that definition
does not fit contexts that Gane referred to. They proposed: “The preposition is a privative
marker, that is, it marks what is missing or unavailable (## 22–23).”599 This is not to say
that the privative sense cannot be related to the texts dealing with impurity, but the
privative sense of  ִּמןhas to be established on another basis such as the preposition’s
syntactical relationship with the verb and its meaning.600 The meaning of  כִּ ֶּפרpresented
in the present study does not give grounds that the privative meaning would be assigned
to  ִּמן. The fact that prepositions are usually semantically multifaceted words necessitates
input from the immediate and broader context for a proper meaning. The causative sense,
on the contrary, is well explained in major Hebrew grammars,601 and it correlates with the
meaning of  כִּ פֶּרpresented in the current study.
Milgrom is right to say that atonement is not “from” impurity, the privative sense
of  ִּמן, but rather “because of, on account of, for” impurity, the causative sense of it.
Gane’s privative sense can be maintained if atonement is understood as being cleansing,
an idea of  כִּ פֶּרthat is not supported by the research presented in this study. The offerers
do not need cleansing, but rather atonement for their impurity based on ransom.
As Gane’s tables demonstrate,  ִּמןand  עַלare interchangeable. The use of  ִּמןis not
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consistent as Gane’s tables demonstrate.602 Overall, it is missing in 16/44 formulas that
he identified. 5/8 contexts are related to ritual impurity, 10/17 are related to moral
impurity, and 1/19 contexts is related to both impurities.603 It is also critical to note, as
Gane’s tables604 show that in Lev 4–5, the preposition is consistently interchangeable
with the preposition עַל. The fact that it is missing so many times is not to say that the text
did not assume it, but that it says that the text did not place emphasis on it. These reasons
make it unsafe to rely on one of the multiple meanings of  ִּמןthat are inconsistently and
interchangeably used in critical atonement texts such as Lev 4–5.
Conclusion: כִּ פֶּר

 כִּ פֶּרwas etymologically traced to two cognate roots, the Akkadian D (intensive)
stem from the verb kapāru, kuppuru and Arabic intensive kaffara from the verb kafara.
The meanings established by this comparison are “to cleanse, remove” or “to cover.”
Another frequent meaning of  כִּ פֶּרis “to ransom.” However, a sharp distinction between
meanings established on the comparative evidence is not solid since the Arabic kafara, I
stem, does not correspond to the Hebrew כִּ פֶּר, piel, or the Akkadian kuppuru, D stem.
The Akkadian D stem means “to wipe” and always in the sense “to wipe off, wipe away,”
not “wipe on or smear on.” In addition, the Arabic kafara has the same meaning of “to
expiate” that corresponds to the Akkadian D stem, “to remove, to erase.” This semantic
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overlap of cognate alternatives makes this evidence unsound.
Regardless of the fact that relying on the comparison with Akkadian and Arabic
cognates is unsound, some theologians still believe that “to cover” is the correct meaning
of the Hebrew כִּ פֶּר, while others favor the “to cleanse” meaning. Also, a frequent
meaning is “to ransom.” The key problem related to the "to cover" sin meaning is the fact
that in some contexts, sin is not included at all, but  כִּ פֶּרrefers more to the cleansing.
Proponents of the “to cleanse” meaning realize that this meaning is not applicable to all
contexts and thus, accept the “to atone, expiate” meaning for some contexts. However,
the predominant meaning for the latter group of scholars is “to cleanse.” Baruch A.
Levine, Jacob Milgrom, Jay Sklar, Roy E. Gane, and Yitzhaq Feder have expanded the
research on the meaning of  כִּ פֶּרand all suggested their own proposals for the meaning of
this verb. This study partially agrees with all of them on the point that  כִּ פֶּרencompasses
multiple meanings, but yet differs with all of them in what its meaning is in particular
contexts. The present study, unlike any of the studies mentioned, took into consideration
the fact that the underlying condition of human beings is GHS and the fact that  כִּ פֶּרdeals
with it. The uniqueness of this study is also found in the fact that it suggested the
meaning of  כִּ פֶּרbased on its occurrence in the Pentateuch.
Before analyzing  כִּ פֶּרconstructions, the present study examined the concept of
the GHS of human nature and demonstrated that, surprisingly, this concept is neglected in
the studies of atonement. The present study demonstrated that GHS is a critical human
characteristic in the biblical understanding of human nature. It originated from the fall of
humanity in the Garden of Eden when the first couple disobeyed God’s commandment
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and, since then, affects every human being. Influential scholars have recognized and
accepted the concept of GHS as being inseparably related to human beings in the Bible. It
affects all aspect of human life, including those related to humans’ cognitive, as well as
those related to their physical existence. Surprisingly, critical scholars of ancient Israel
cult did not include this concept in their study of atonement. They simply ignored it and it
does not affect the process of atonement. The present study demonstrates that GHS, like
ritual and moral impurity, is real but at the same time, in the majority of cases, an abstract
entity. General human sinfulness is foundational for both impurities, ritual and moral.
Both of them stem from GHS and ritual impurity in a small number of cases, and is
represented in terms of physical appearance. However, ritual impurity is atoned for only
after the physical aspects of it have disappeared (healed, certain amount of time
elapsed…).
Grammatical and syntactical variations associated with the Hebrew verb  ָכפַרin
the Pentateuch reflect the semantic complexity of the term. There are several points of
difference of  ָכפַרusage in the Pentateuch which were noted in the present study that were
referred to in the study of the occurrences where  כִּ פֶּרis syntactically associated with
various prepositions or where it is not accompanied by any complement. This study also
agreed that Lev 17:11 is a foundational text for the meaning of  כִּ פֶּרand that, in this text,
it means “to ransom,” which is based on the sacrificial blood that is applied onto the altar.
Sacrificial blood represented the life of animal that was terminated on behalf of the
offerers as a ransom for the sin they committed or sinfulness they were affected with as
they relate to God. The inevitable consequence of such an understanding of  כִּ פֶּרin Lev
17:11 is that sacrifice also serves as the offerers’ substitute. Thus,  כִּ פֶּרencompasses these
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two foundational functions; it ransoms the offerers and substitutes for them. In addition,
the present study adopts the concept related to Lev 10:17 that eating of the sin offering
flesh does contribute to the  כִּ פֶּרprocess. Moral impurity is transferred from the offerers
to the priest via the sin offering sacrifice to the priest. נָשָׂ א עָֹון, in this context, refers to
the priests’ bearing the leader’s or commoner’s moral impurity instead of them. The sin
offering sacrifice has the unique feature of being holy and impure at the same time.
The first construction analyzed in this study is  אֵ ת+ כִּ פֶּר, a direct object marker.
There are two contexts within which this construction is found. The verb is used only
once in basic qal stem in the non-cultic context in the Pentateuch and then it conveys the
concrete meaning of ( ָכפַרGen 6:14), where it refers to the literal, concrete applying,
rubbing of the bitumen onto the wood of the ark to make it watertight. This is the only
qal and only concrete use of the term. All the other occurrences are in piel and they
always refer to the abstract effects that  כִּ פֶּרconveys. This construction also occurs in one
cultic context, in Lev 16:20, 32, and it means “to remove,” in the sense of cleansing.
Impurity is involved in these texts, and  כִּ פֶּרconveys removal of it from an inanimate
object, that is, sanctuary.
The constructions where  כִּ פֶּרis not accompanied with a preposition or direct
object marker also appears in cultic and non-cultic contexts. Of the former, two
occurrences convey different meanings. Genesis 32:20 [21] carries the meaning “to
appease,” while Deut 32:43 is best understood as “to atone for, expiate.” The cultic
occurrence in Lev 16:33, due to its syntactical relationship with Lev 16:20, 32, also
conveys the meaning of “to remove,” in the sense of cleansing. Impurity is involved in
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this text, and  כִּ פֶּרexpresses its removal from an inanimate object, that is, the sanctuary.
When  כִּ פֶּרis accompanied by the preposition  בַ עַדin non-cultic contexts, it refers
to atonement, but it was of a temporary nature (Gen 32:30). Impurity is heavily integrated
into this context. In cultic contexts,  כִּ פֶּרconveys two different meanings. In Lev 9:7 and
Lev 16:34, the term is best translated as “to atone for.” Impurity is not involved in these
two texts, but  כִּ פֶּרatones for GHS. In Lev 16:6, 11, 17,  כִּ פֶּרmeans “to remove,” in the
sense of cleansing. Impurity is involved in these texts and  כִּ פֶּרconveys its removal from
an inanimate object, that is, the sanctuary.
The construction  ל+  כִּ פֶּרis found two times, and always in non-cultic texts, Num
35:33 and Deut 21:8. In both of these texts,  כִּ פֶּרmeans “to atone for.” The second text
incorporates the idea of ransom.
Two meanings are detected with  ב+  כִּ פֶּרconstructions and they are both found in
cultic contexts (Exod 29:33, Lev 5:16; 6:23[30]; 7:7; 16:17, 27; 17:11; 19:22; Num 5:8).
All the texts include impurity, either from context or implied, but the function of this
construction is either to communicate instrumental usage, indicating the agent by which
the  כִּ פֶּרwas achieved in Exod 29:33; Lev 5:16; 7:7; 17:11; 19:22; Num 5:8, or indicating
the location where the  כִּ פֶּרwas accomplished in Lev 6:23[30]; 7:7; 16:17, 27.
The most frequent construction is  עַל+  כִּ פֶּרand it occurs in cultic and non-cultic
contexts. In 47/56 of occurrences, the preposition  עַלcarries the meaning of advantage in
Exod 30:15–16; Lev 1:4; 4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:6, 10, 13, 16, 18, 26 [6:7]; 8:34; 10:17; 12:7–
8; 14:18–21, 29, 31; 15:15, 30; 16:30, 33–34; 17:11; 19:22; 23:28; Num. 5:8; 6:11; 8:12,
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19, 21; 15:25, 28; 17:10–11[16:46–47]; 25:13[the only non-cultic context]; 28:22, 30;
29:5; 31:50. In the other 9 occurrences, the preposition  עַלmark either the location of כִּ פֶּר
accomplishment in Exod 29:36; 30:10; Lev 8:15, or the instrument in Lev 16:10, or as a
direct object marker in Exod 29:27; Lev 14:53; 16:16, 18. In Exod 29:36,  ַעלcarries a
double function of direct object marker and location. Of the last 9 occurrences, only Lev
14:53 is a non-cultic context.

 כִּ פֶּרalso appears in context with other concepts such as to cleanse ()חָ טָ א, sanctify
() קָ דַ שׁ, clean ()טָ הֵ ר, forgive ()סָ לַח, and accept () ָרצָ ה. When  כִּ פֶּרappears in the rituals
whose goal is to reach these outcomes,  כִּ פֶּרis a part of a bigger, major ritual. It has
limited function within the major ritual to assist the accomplishment of the major ritual.
Thus, when it appears along with  חָ טָ אand  קָ דַ שׁin Exod 29:33, 36, it atones for
the priests’ GHS in v. 33, and cleanses the altar in v. 36. When it appears in  חָ טָ אcontexts
in Lev 8:15, it also atones for the priests’ GHS. Ritual or moral impurity is not included
in these texts. The basis for this atonement is ransom.
When it appears in the contexts of  חָ טָ אand כִּ פֶּר,  טָ הֵ רis uniquely accomplished by
the reparation offering in Lev 14:20 and refers to the reinstatement of the healed צָ ַרעַת
person into the community and the sin offering which atones for the healed צָ ַרעַת
person’s GHS. Potentially moral impurity might have been included here, but no ritual
impurity. In Lev 14:53, it refers to the removal of ritual impurity in the sense of cleansing
it from the infected house.

 כִּ פֶּרappears in the context with  טָ הֵ רand  קָ דַ שׁin Lev 16:19, 30. Moral impurity is
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definitely included in these contexts and  כִּ פֶּרrefers to its removal in the sense of
cleansing.
When  כִּ פֶּרshares the context with  טָ הֵ רand  חָ טָ אin Num 8:21, which does not
include impurity, it refers to the atonement of the Levites’ GHS. In the context with קָ דַ שׁ
in Num 6:11,  כִּ פֶּרrefers to atonement for the Nazirite’s sin to prepare him for the new
term of Nazirite status. Ransom is again the basis upon which atonement is possible in
this context.
The most frequent contexts in which  כִּ פֶּרis related to some other concepts is
when it is related to  סָ לַחin Lev 4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:10, 13, 16, 18, 26 [6:7];19:22; and
Num 15:25, 26, 28. All these are cultic contexts and all of them involve moral impurity.

 כִּ פֶּרis a prerequisite of סָ לַח. It always precedes סָ לַח. These contexts, better than all
others, show that  כִּ פֶּרconveys atonement and is based on the ransom. The offerer
receives  סָ לַחbased on the sacrifice he/she offers.
Finally,  כִּ פֶּרappears in the contexts where the offerer receives acceptance before
God in Lev 1:4. No impurity is involved in this context, so  כִּ פֶּרatones for GHS. Again
the basis of this atonement is ransom in the form of sacrifice.
The context of the atonement of which  כִּ פֶּרis a part, as was implied by the
discussion on  כִּ פֶּרabove, consists of two elements. The first element is reconciliation,
which implies that a relationship between God and a human party was broken. The
reconciling act is actually a bestowing of God’s grace toward humans, followed by their
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willingness to return to God.605 The second element is expiation, which implies that the
human party feels guilt in the face of the law because of his/her sin and God’s wrath that
follows the act of sin. The human party needs to overcome these. Removal of the feelings
of guilt and God’s wrath is what expiation does. The human party gives up his/her sin
while God gives up his wrath.606 In the actualization of both of these elements,
reconciliation and expiation, God’s initiative is crucial and always precedes the response
of the human party.607 In other words,  כִּ פֶּרremoves this obstacle, whatever that might be.
However, God is never subject nor object of the verb,608 even though the process
involving  כִּ פֶּרis prescribed by God. Completion of the atonement process is sealed by
God’s direct involvement in this process by granting forgiveness,609 or other benefits
such as acceptance, sanctification.
Both cultic and non-cultic contexts in the Pentateuch confirm that  כִּ פֶּרshould be
understood as achieving abstract effects on both human and inanimate entities. Milgrom
allowed for ransom to be foundational for כִּ פֶּר, but only in a limited number of texts that
include averting God’s wrath. כִּ פֶּר, as such, encompasses the substitution, as well. This
study understands that  כִּ פֶּרalways has this function, either in the contexts of moral
impurity, some cases of severe ritual impurity, and in the cases of GHS. The analysis of
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 כִּ פֶּרcontexts showed that some contexts give certain guidelines as to what meaning כִּ ֶּפר
could convey, but some contexts do not provide any guidelines, but only rely on the
already-elaborated meaning. This study agrees that the foundational text that informs
almost all  כִּ פֶּרcontexts is Lev 17:11. There the verb is presented to ransom on the basis
of the sacrificial blood that is applied onto the altar. In addition, based on Lev 10:17, the
present study adopted the fact that eating of the sin offering flesh does contribute to the

 כִּ פֶּרprocess. The moral impurity is transferred from the offerer to the priest via the sin
offering sacrifice.  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןin this context refers to the priest’s bearing of the leader’s or
commoner’s moral impurity instead of them. The sin offering sacrifice has the unique
feature of being holy and impure at the same time.
There is no English word that encompasses the complex semantic and conceptual
range of the Hebrew כִּ פֶּר. Based on the basic understanding of  כִּ פֶּרof ransom established
in the present study with the presence of the constant disadvantage of GHS related to
human beings as they interact with the divine, the English verb to atone and the noun
atonement are proposed in the present study as the best, though far from perfect, choice
to represent the Hebrew כִּ פֶּר. This choice of “atonement” is driven by the fact that the
strict sense of at-one-ment is always present in  כִּ פֶּרas it mends obstructions in the divinehuman relationship due to human sin (ritual and moral) and GHS. The word atonement,
in its conceptual rather than strict sense, is used to include both meanings, atonement and
substitute, of the verb כִּ פֶּר, and also, all its related conceptual outcomes or results, such as
acceptance, sanctification, forgiveness, and sin removal, of which  כִּ פֶּרserves as a
prerequisite.
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Based on the evaluation of limited parts of Milgrom’s and Gane’s atonement
theories, the present study concludes that both theories are informed by the incorrect
understanding of  כִּ פֶּרwhich they interpreted as referring to cleansing in ritual texts. This
understanding reflects a literal sense of the verb which is impossible in the contexts of
impurity that is strictly an abstract conception when it is dealt with in  כִּ פֶּרcontexts. The
present study demonstrated that  כִּ פֶּרis best understood to refer to atonement based on
ransom and to be translated as “to atone for” when the direct/indirect object is human or
“to remove” when the direct/indirect object is inanimate. This understanding of  כִּ פֶּרis in
sharp contrast to the meaning proposed by Milgrom and Gane. The inaccurate and
inappropriate translation of “to cleanse,” but not the understanding behind this
terminology, is also adopted by Rodríguez,610 and occasionally, Hasel.611 Contrary to
both Milgrom and Gane, who held that  כִּ פֶּרrefers to cleansing, the present study
proposes that  כִּ פֶּרrefers to atonement based on ransom. In agreement with Gane and
contrary to Milgrom, the present study affirms that the offerers were atoned for during
the daily offering, while the sanctuary was cleansed during the Day of Atonement by
yearly offerings. Atonement that the offerer received included a transfer of his/her sin
from himself/herself to the sacrificial animal and through the blood application to the
sanctuary. Milgrom’s claim that the offerers are cleansed from their impurity prior their

Ángel Manuel Rodríguez, “Sacrificial Substitution and the Old Testament Sacrifices,” in The
Sanctuary and the Atonement: Theological and Historical Studies, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Silver Springs,
MD: Biblical Research Institute, 1989), 132–33, 137.
610
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coming to the sanctuary is just partially correct. That is, ritual impurity for which one was
required to offer a sacrifice was healed, but the moral impurity, which was also
potentially present with the offerers and demanded offering a sacrifice. This moral
impurity was still on them and needed to be dealt with. Milgrom’s argument that the
blood of the sin offering was never directly applied on human beings, thus affirming that
the sanctuary, rather than the offerer, was cleansed during the offering of the sin offering
does not mean that they were never direct beneficiaries of כִּ פֶּר. This inference is
informed by a certain understanding of כִּ פֶּר, rather than being derived from the texts. Lev
4–5 explicitly states that the offerers are freed from their sin after they offer their
sacrifice and receive כִּ פֶּר. Thus, most of Milgrom's claim is not biblically based, and
therefore, invalid. Consequently, with Gane and contrary to Milgrom, the present study
affirms the understanding that atonement consists of two phases. In the first phase,
impurity is transferred to the sanctuary via the blood of the offering as stated in Lev 4,
while on the Day of Atonement, the impurity was removed from the sanctuary by the
blood of the sacrifice, as stated in Lev 16. Contrary to both Milgrom and Gane, the
present study demonstrated that the ADH is not defensible in the light of Pentateuchal
texts. In opposition to Milgrom and clarifying Gane, this study affirms that the transfer of
impurity into the sanctuary takes place during the daily sacrifice via the laying on of
hand/s on the head of the sacrificial animal. The animal receives the offerer’s impurity,
and the priest, by applying its blood in the sanctuary, in the case of the priest or the entire
community, transfers it to the most holy place. In the case of a leader or a commoner, the
priest applies the blood to the sacrificial altar and eats the flesh of the sin offering,
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receiving it in this way on (in) himself. This direction of impurity transfer is explicitly
stated in Lev 4, where impurity via blood application is stored in the sanctuary, and in
Lev 16, where it is taken outside of the sanctuary. The impurity is on the offerers as they
come to offer sacrifice in Lev 4. They thereby get rid of it and it is present in the
sanctuary as Lev 16 states. Further, the impurity is removed from there on the Day of
Atonement.
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CHAPTER 5

AUTOMATIC DEFILEMENT OF THE SANCTUARY

The second part of the second section of the present study examines the theory
closely related to atonement, that is, ADH. This part consists of the analysis of the piel
stem, the infinitive construct, the perfect, the semantics of טָ מֵ א, along with the literary
structure of related texts. The findings on all these concepts suggest that this theory is not
supported by Pentateuchal texts.

Automatic Defilement: The Hypothesis
The ADH of the sanctuary is based on the interpretation of 3 Pentateuchal texts:
Lev 15:31; 20:3, and Num 19:13, 20. Jacob Milgrom was the first one to introduce it into
main-stream scholarship and since then, this hypothesis has encountered valid opposition
both in his time,1 and afterwards.2 However, it is still, in a slightly refined form, accepted

1

Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 165–81; Hartley, Leviticus, 213; Wenham, The Book of Leviticus,
221; Wenham, Numbers, 145; Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus”; André and Ringgren,
“טמא,” TDOT, 5:337. It must be noted that Baruch A. Levine claimed that ritual defilement of the
sanctuary happened via direct contact of an impure person with the holy entities, based on his interpretation
of Lev 12:4 and 15:31. However, he also believed, based on Lev 15:31, that one can morally defile the
sanctuary by neglecting to follow the purification procedures listed in Lev 15:1–30. In addition, in his
interpretation of Lev 20:3, he was not clear as to whether the installment of the pagan cult objects or
objects within or near the sanctuary defile it ritually or morally, but his pointing to the very act of
disobedience of God’s commands most likely points to the moral defilement of the sanctuary. Levine’s
interpretation of Num 19:13, 20 shows that he principally held that ritual defilement of the sanctuary takes
place via direct contact, but allows for automatic defilement by moral sins by not following the purifying
procedures given by God. Thus, it can be said that Levine differentiated between ritual defilement of the
sanctuary, which takes place via direct contact of the contaminated person and holy entities, and moral
defilement which resembles Milgrom’s automatic defilement hypothesis. Levine, Leviticus, 74, 92, 98, 136,
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and advocated by some of his students3 and other scholars.4 Gane’s defense of a modified
form of this hypothesis is the most recent one.5 The following portion of this study
examines the validity of grammatical, syntactical, and semantical choices utilized by the
proponents of this hypothesis to establish it or still consider it valid.
Each text is peculiar in its own way. Thus, Lev 15:31 utilizes the preposition )ב( ב
followed by the piel infinitive construct ( )טָ מֵ אto express defilement of the sanctuary as
the Hebrew texts demonstrates:
“תֹוכם
ִֽ ָ ֲשׁר ב
ֹ֥ ֶּ ת־משׁכָנִּ ָ֖י א
ִּ ֶּאָתם ו ֶ֤ל ֹא ָי ֻמתוּ בטֻמאָתָ֔ ם בטַ מּאָֹ֥ם א
ָ֑ ָ ”והִּ זַּר ֶּ ֹ֥תּם אֶּ ת־בנֵי־יִּשׂ ָר ֵ ָ֖אל ִּמטֻּמ
Lev 20:3, employs the preposition ( )למעןfollowed by the piel infinitive construct
of the verb  טָ מֵ אto express defilement that affects the sanctuary () ִּמקדָּ שׁ. It is seen in the
following Hebrew text:
“ַוא ִ֞ ֲִּני אֶּ ֵ ֶ֤תּן אֶּ ת־ ָפנַי בָ ִּ ֹ֣אישׁ הַ ֔הוּא והִּ כ ַר ִּ ֹ֥תּי אֹ ָ֖תֹו ִּמ ֶּ ֹ֣קּ ֶּרב ע ַָ֑מֹּו

ת־שׁם קָ דַ שׁ
ֹ֥ ֵ ֶּת־מקדָּ ֔ ִּשׁי וּלחַ לֵּ ָ֖ל א
ִּ ֶּ” ִּ ֶ֤כי ִּמזַּרעֹו נ ַ ָֹ֣תן לַמֹּ֔ לְֶּך ל ֶ֗ ַמעַן טַ מֵּ א א

249; Levine, Numbers 1–20, 457. Milgrom’s ADH, on the other hand, is more restrictive. His interpretation
of Lev 15:31; 20:3; and Num 19:13, 20 avoids allowing any sanctuary defilement via direct contact.
Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 257, 309, 887, 993, 1005; Milgrom, Numbers, 161–62, 445; Jacob Milgrom,
“Impurity is Miasma: A Response to Hyam Maccoby,” JBL 119 (2000): 729.
2

Tidball, The Message of Leviticus, 167–68; Rooker, Leviticus, 206; Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice,
and the Temple, 54, 71.
Wright, The Disposal of Impurity, 19n10; Gane, Cult and Character, 144–62. Wright, “Unclean
and Clean,” 6:732.
3

4

Sklar, Leviticus, 204; Feder, Blood Expiation, 93–96.

5

Gane, Cult and Character, 144–62, especially 156, 160, 162.
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Num 19:13. 20, utilizes the piel perfect of the verb ( )טָ מֵ אto express defilement of
the sanctuary:

ת־משׁכַ ֶ֤ן יהוָה טִּ ֔ ֵמּא
ִּ ֶּאָדם אֲשֶּׁ ר־י ָָ֜מוּת ו ֹ֣ל ֹא יִּ תחַ ֶ֗ ָטּא א
ָ ֨ ָ” ָ ִֽכל־הַ נֹּ ָ֡ ֵג ַע ב ֵ ֹ֣מת ב ֶּנפֶּשׁ ה
“אָתֹו ִֽבֹו
ֹ֥ ונִּ כר ָ ֛תה הַ נֶּּ ֹ֥פֶּשׁ הַ ִּ ָ֖הוא ִּמיִּּשׂ ָר ֵ ָ֑אל כִּ י ֨ ֵמי נִּ ָ֜ ָדּה ל ֹא־זֹ ַ ֶ֤רק ָעלָיו טָ ֵ ֹ֣מא יִּ ה ֶּ֔יה עָ֖ ֹוד טֻמ
However, regardless of their peculiarities, these texts share common features. In
order to analyze the grammatical/syntactical choices that led certain scholars to interpret
these texts to refer to automatic defilement, it is necessary to present relevant particulars
regarding the stem, aspect, and verb ( )טָ מֵ אused in these texts. The following section is
relevant for all three texts since all of them use the same stem, piel and the same verb,

טָ מֵ א. The only difference is the use of a different aspect. The infinitive construct of טָ מֵ א
is used in Lev 15:31 and 20:3, while Num 19:13, 20 use the perfect. I first explore the
stem, aspect, and the semantic range of the verb טָ מֵ א. With the conclusions on these three
points, I address additional specific peculiar issues of each text that will be mentioned as
they are analyzed. These two steps of analysis provide an extensive spectrum of evidence
that all these texts imply defilement of the sanctuary through direct contact, rather than
automatic defilement.
Piel Stem and טָ מֵ א
The research of the piel stem shows that Hebrew linguists greatly debated over
the its meaning/s. Piel Hebrew verbs can fit into a number of legitimately distinct
semantic categories, resulting in the claim that no single notion or semantic category
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underlies all of them.6 Prior to Albercht Goetze’s groundbreaking study on the Akkadian
D stem,7 Hebrew linguists thought that the piel stem principally signified an
intensification of a meaning of a given root.8 In addition, the use of some Hebrew verbs
indicated a causative nuance of the stem with two sub-nuances: (1) declarative, and (2)
estimative. A denominative meaning was also detected with other verbal roots.9 Thus,
key Hebrew grammars list a total of 5 distinct meanings for the piel: (1) intensive, (2)
causative, (3) declarative, (4) estimative, and (5) denominative.10
The most recent influential postulate on the cohesive meaning of the piel has been
suggested by Bruce Waltke and M. O’Connor. They proposed that “Piel tends to signify
causation with a patiency nuance, and hiphil causation notion with an agency nuance.
The two types of causation form differ from one another with reference to the status of
the subject being acted upon by the main verb, that is, the voice associated with the
undersubject or secondary subject.”11 John Beckman, who critiqued Waltke’s and
O’Connor’s proposal, simplified this statement in the following way:
The D stem describes an action with a passive undersubject, meaning that the focus is
on the undersubject (the direct object) being put into a new state, without regard to
the process that the subject is doing to bring about that new state. The undersubject is
6

Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 143–44.
Albrecht Goetze, “The So-called Intensive of the Semitic Languages,” JAOS 62 (1942): 1–8.

7
8

Gesenius, Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, 141.

Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 396; Joüon and Muraoka, A
Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 144–45.
9

Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 396–97; Gesenius, Gesenius'
Hebrew Grammar, 141–43; Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 144–45; Carl
Brockelmann, Hebräische Syntax (Neukirchen: Kreis Moers, 1956), 35–36; Carl Brockelmann, Grundriss
der Vergleichenden Grammatik der Semitischen Sprachen, 2 vols. (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1961), 508–10.
10

Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 355.

11
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passive because it is not described as doing anything; instead, it is passively entering
a new state as a result of the action of the subject.12
Waltke’s and O’Connor’s proposal is built upon the work of Ernst Jenni who
claimed that piel is always factitive or resultative, never intensive. If a qal stem of a given
verb expressed a state (a stative, intransitive verb), then piel of that same verbal root is
factitive. As such, piel brings a totally passive undersubject, without regard to the
process, into the state depicted by a given verb.13 As opposed to the hiphil where the
focus is on causing the progress of an action, piel focuses on causing the change of the
state.14 Jenni lists about 100 verbs of this type.15 For example,  גדלmeaning “to be great”
in qal stem changes to “to cause, declare, or consider to be great” in the piel stem.16 The
qal verbal form is intransitive, which is an additional feature that separates it from the
piel form which is.17
Alternately, if the qal stem of a given verbal root conveys the process (a fientive,
transitive verb), then piel of the same verb is resultative.18 It conveys the idea of causing
the object to be in the state that results from the action indicated by the qal verb.19 For

John Charles Beckman, “Toward the Meaning of the Biblical Hebrew Piel Stem” (PhD diss.,
Harvard University, 2015), 79.
12

Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 398–99, 400–401.

13

14
Ernst Jenni, Das Hebraische Piʻel: Syntaktisch-Semasiologische Untersuchung einer Verbalform
in Alten Testament (Zürich: EVZ-Verlag, 1968), 41.

Jenni, Das Hebraische Piʻel, 20–21.

15

Jenni, Das Hebraische Piʻel, 41.

16

Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 355–58.

17

Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 398–99, 404.

18

19
Jenni, Das Hebraische Piʻel, 126–27; Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew
Syntax, 400.
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instance,  חלקmeans “to divide” in the qal stem and “to cause to be in a divided state” in
piel.20 Piel’s factitive or resultative meanings are identical, and different labels indicate
different meanings of qal stem, not piel. Waltke and O’Connor acknowledged that
detecting the difference between the process meaning of a verb in qal and the
factitive/resultative meaning in piel is difficult, and they did not set any criteria to detect
it.21
Beckman noticed that the main weakness of Waltke’s and O’Connor ‘s theory is
the fact that most occurrences of qal and piel verbs do not provide evidence for the
distinction between verbs that convey process and those that express a factitive meaning.
Also, a process meaning is attached to more piel occurrences than those that are
factitive/resultative.22
Beckman himself concluded that a potentially productive way of coming to the
cohesive meaning of piel stem, along with latest linguistic progresses, may provide the
needed tools to arrive at a viable solution. These progresses are seen in the works of

Jenni, Das Hebraische Piʻel, 126–27.

20

Beckman, “Toward the Meaning,” 80.

21

For additional arguments that dispute Waltke’s and O’Connor’s proposal, see Beckman,
“Toward the Meaning,” 246–48.
22
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Golovko,23 Hopper and Thompson,24 Kulikov,25 and Li,26 all of whom noted that the
same verbal forms are used with multiple meanings such as intensive/pluralic and
factitive/causative in a variety of languages.27 In other words, they all suggest inclusion
of the variety of meanings for certain stems since the majority of verbs utilize them.
Beckman preferred Kouwenberg’s hypothesis28 which is, on one hand, more flexible and
inclusive of the variety of meanings piel conveys, but on the other hand, less
systematic.29 Based on this theory, the presence or absence of intensity along with the
high semantic transitivity laid a foundation for the preferred use of piel over qal for

Golovko V. Evgeniy, “On Non-Causative Effects of Causativity in Aleut,” in Causatives and
Transitivity, ed. Bernard Comrie and Maria Polinsky (Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1993), 385–90.
23

Sandra A. Thompson and Paul J. Hopper, “Transitivity in Grammar and Discourse,” Language
56 (1980), 251–99.
24

25
Leonid I. Kulikov, “Causatives,” in Language Typology and Language Universals: An
International Handbook, ed. Martin Haspelmath, et al., 2 vols., Handbooks of Linguistics and
Communication Science 20 (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), 886–98.

Fengxiang Li, “An Examination of Causative Morphology from a Cross-Linguistic and
Diachronic Perspective,” in Papers from the 27th Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society,
1991, Part 1: The General Session, eds. Lise M. Dobrin, Lynn Nichols, and Rosa M. Rodriguez (Chicago:
Chicago Linguistic Society, 1993), 344–59.
26

Beckman, “Toward the Meaning,” 35.
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Kouwenberg argued that the Semitic D stem began in Proto-Semitic with D-stem verbs derived
from adjectives that indicated intensity (e.g., adjective “very wide” → D “to be/become/make very wide”).
Over time, this developed into a productive mechanism whereby intensive D-stem verbs were formed from
G-stem verbs directly, rather than from intensive adjectives. Since intensity is a component of verbal
plurality, the meaning of the D stem in some verbs broadened to indicate non-intensive types of verbal
plurality, such as action on multiple objects (e.g., ‘to kiss multiple people’). Since intensity is also a
component of high semantic transitivity, the meaning of the D stem in other verbs came to be associated
with high transitivity. Because a factitive meaning connotes high transitivity, the D stem, in particular,
became preferred over the G stem for factitive meanings, so non-intensive factitive meanings (e.g., “to
make wide”) were lost by the G stem and gained by the D stem. Due to the lack of a contrast with a nonintensive factitive G stem, the factitive D-stem lost its original intensive meaning (e.g., D “to make very
wide” → “to make wide”). Beckman, “Toward the Meaning,” 211. See also N. J. C. Kouwenberg,
Gemination in the Akkadian Verb, SSN 32 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1997), 98–100, 445–50; N. J. C.
Kouwenberg, The Akkadian Verb and Its Semitic Background, LANE 2 (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns,
2010), 282–87.
Beckman, “Toward the Meaning,” 251.
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various types of verbal plurality for some verbs or high semantic transitivity for other
verbs.30
Waltke’s and O’Connor’s claim that the stative and process meaning of the verbs
in qal corresponds to the factitive/resultative of the same verbs in piel is examined below.
The evaluation of Waltke’s and O’Connor’s claim that if the verb is stative in qal, then it
is factitive in piel, and Beckman’s claim that this is not accurate follows.
Beckman’s critique of Waltke’s and O’Connor’s work includes an analysis of
seven factitive verbs to investigate whether their stative meaning in qal corresponds to
their factitive meaning in piel.31 Among those seven verbs, the verb  קָ דַ שׁis closest to

טָ מֵ א, and thus the following analysis, deals with only these two verbs.
First, both verbs are metaphorical and abstract in their meaning. They do not refer
to concrete, material processes, but rather, to those that are conceptual, metaphorical, and
abstract.
Second,  טָ מֵ אis always stative in qal and means “to be/become defiled/unclean”
(Lev 5:3; 11:24–28, 31–36, 39–40; 12:2, 5; 13:14, 46; 14:36, 46; 15:4–11, 16–24, 27, 32;
17:15; 18:20, 23, 25, 27; 19:31; 22:5–6, 8; Num 6:12; 19:7–8, 10–11, 14, 16, 20–22). It
never takes a direct object.32 It either conveys that an entity is already in or has entered
the defiled state. In this respect, it behaves, according to Beckman, like the qal of  קָ דַ שׁin

Beckman, “Toward the Meaning,” 248.
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Beckman, “Toward the Meaning,” 89.
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In some  טָ מֵ אcontexts,  אֵ תis present, but is never syntactically related to this, but always to some
other verb (Lev 11:28, 33, 40; 14:36, 46; 15:10, 16; 18:25, 27; Num 6:12; 19:8, 10, 20).
32
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its 11 occurrences,33 which correlates with Waltke’s and O’Connor’s theory of piel. It
always refers to the state.
Third, in all 25 piel occurrences,  טָ מֵ אencompasses a factitive meaning, “to make
defiled/unclean or declare/pronounce somebody/something defiled/unclean” (Gen 34:5,
13, 27; Lev 11:44; 13:3, 8, 11, 15, 20, 22, 25, 27, 30, 44, 59; 15:31; 18:28; 20:3, 25; Num
5:3; 6:9; 19:13, 20; 35:34; Deut 21:23). According to Beckman, 68/75 occurrences of the
piel of קָ דַ שׁ, do not provide evidence for the distinction between a resultative and a
process meaning.34 Therefore, these texts are not helpful in determining the accuracy of
Waltke’s and O’Connor’s theory. Beckman’s claim that the remaining seven occurrences
(Exod 19:10;35 Jer 17:24, 27;36 Ezek 44:19; Job 1:5;37 2 Chr 29:17[2x]) point to process is
accurate because the texts he cited do convey the passage of time related to the process of
sanctification. Ezekiel 44:19 still remains problematic since this text, in contrast to the
other six, does not include nor point to any temporal complement related to the process of
sanctification. However, there is a crucial point regarding the verb  קָ דַ שׁthat also applies
to  טָ מֵ אin their piel contexts, both verbs are always accompanied by other verb/s by
which the  קָ דַ שׁor  טָ מֵ אcondition/activity is actually achieved. That is documented below

Beckman, “Toward the Meaning,” 91.

33

Beckman, “Toward the Meaning,” 92.
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“… as Yadin has correctly noted (1983: 1.223), the three-day purification imposed for the
Temple city is modeled after the Sinaitic purification consisting of ablutions, laundering, and sexual
abstinence (Exod 19:10–15).” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 969.
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The text explicitly mentioned that at least one verbal activity achieves the holiness of the
Sabbath by not carrying a burden through the gates of Jerusalem on the Sabbath day.
Based on this text, Job’s sanctification of his children after their feast days consisted of at least
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37
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for  טָ מֵ אand is factual for these 7/75  קָ דַ שׁtexts that Beckman found to refer to process
meaning, and for the 68/75 texts that, in Beckman’s assessment, do not provide evidence
to distinguish between a resultative and process meaning.38
It is also important to note that these 7 texts that do not follow the pattern
suggested by Waltke and O’Connor are found outside of the Pentateuch, which also
points to the current unproductiveness of the effort to diachronically nor synchronically
come to the unified stem meaning at the level of the entire OT text. The more sound
method utilized in this study is to be aware of the key theories that attempted to find
unified stem meaning and test these theories through the study of verbal roots on a caseby-case study. A potential proposal of a unified stem meaning resembles a root fallacy
where one root meaning is enforced in to all of its occurrences.
Thus, this study agrees with Muraoka’s and Joüon’s statement regarding the piel
stem:
The question how the function of Piel in relation to other conjugations, notably Qal,
should be defined still remains one of the major challenges facing Hebrew and
Semitic linguistics. In the present state of our knowledge, we can only point to a
number of fairly distinct meaning categories into which some verbs seem to fit.
Others, an uncomfortably large number, still defy such categorisation. Nor can we
suggest, without doing violence to all the evidence available, a single notion or
meaning category which can be said to underlie all those “nuances.”39
Subsequently, the part of Waltke’s and O’Connor’s theory that claims that piel is

38

Of the piel texts, 22/40 includes the process of sanctification and all of them contain or are based
on other texts that deal with the same topics and imply other verbal activities to achieve the process of
sanctification (Exod 13:2; 20:8, 11; 28:3, 41; 29:1, 27, 33, 36–37, 44; 30:29–30; 40:9–11, 13; Lev 8:10–12,
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meanings, but rather, to a declarative one (Gen 2:3; Exod 19:10, 14, 23; 31:13; Lev 20:8; 21:15, 23; 22:9,
16, 32; Deut 32:51).
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always factitive if qal of the same verb is stative is valid in the case of  טָ מֵ אwithin the
limits of the Pentateuch, but it is not complete. The study of the uses of  טָ מֵ אin the
Pentateuch demonstrated that certain pattern of uses is consistent with this verb. That is,
it is always accompanied by other verbs through which its meaning onto the direct object
it modifies is achieved. This second point has not been noted by Waltke and O’Connor
and Beckman and is presented below.

Aspect: Grammatical Considerations on the Use of the
Infinitive Construct and the Perfect
The infinitive construct is used in Lev 15:31 and 20:3 but only in the former text
is it preceded by the preposition ב. On the contrary, the perfect is used in Num 19:13, 20.

Infinitive Construct: A Temporal Use
Hebrew grammarians have discovered that in nominal use the infinitive construct
either mainly stands alone or is preceded by the preposition ל.40 Even though a
pronominal suffix is attached to the infinitive construct to express a subject (a nominal
use) in Lev 15:31, it is preceded by the preposition  בwhich is not typical. As stated
above, when  לprecedes the nominal use the infinitive construct, it is not preceded by any
complement. The proponents of ADH took the preposition be in this text to be beth
instrumenti, most likely of human instrument/agent,41 and thus translated with the

Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 601; C. H. J. van der Merwe,
Jackie A. Naudé, and Jan H. Kroeze, A Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar, BLH 3 (Sheffield: Sheffield
Academic Press, 1999), 151; Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 401–2.
40

41
Merwe, Naudé, and Kroeze, A Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar, 286–87; Waltke and
O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 197.
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English preposition “by.” However, a preposition  בwith the meaning of beth instrumenti
is, by rule, attached to a regular noun and not the verb/verbal noun.42
In addition, even though the infinitive construct can be preceded by many
prepositions in BH, it specifically has a temporal sense when it is preceded by  בor כ.
This pattern is frequent and well attested in the BH.43 The difference between the two
constructions, the infinitive construct with  בor כ, has been noted and discussed by
Hebrew grammarians.44 Margaretha Folmer summarized the meaning of both
grammatical constructions in the two following quotations:
Clauses with  כ+ cstr. inf. indicate an immediately preceding time (tight when', 'as
soon as', 'the moment') (instantaneous action; slight anteriority), that is to say the time
of the event referred to by the cstr. inf. is the same as the time of the event referred to
by the main verb. The construction with 3 is relatively frequent with verbs of
perception ('to see', 'to heat' etc.), which often occur in combination with an
instantaneous action ('the moment she heard her brother, she went to the door' or 'the
moment he saw the news, he rang his sister'). Clauses with  ב+ cstr. inf indicate
temporal proximity of the event referred to by the cstr. inf to the event referred to by
the main verb, that is to say the point in time of the event referred to by the main verb
is included in the time of the event referred to by the cstr. inf ('when they were on
holiday, their cat had five kittens').45
42
Merwe, Naudé, and Kroeze, A Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar, 286–87; Waltke and
O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 197.
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Merwe, Naudé, and Kroeze, A Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar, 286; Waltke and
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604.
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Infinitive in Targum Onqelos,” AS 11 (2013): 114–15.
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Folmer, “The Translation of Biblical Hebrew Clauses,” 115. Waltke and O’Connor noticed the
same thing: “The construction occurs with every preposition, but most frequently with  בand כ, especially
with a temporal sense. With the infinitive construct,  בdenotes in general the temporal proximity of one
event to another,  כmore specifically the more immediately preceding time.” Waltke and O’Connor, An
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Folmer stated that the difference between these two constructions cannot at times
be discerned.46 While the difference between the two constructions goes beyond the
scope of, and is not crucial for, this study since only the second one is used in Lev 15:31,
the fact that both of these constructions, especially the second, convey the temporal
meaning of the infinitive construct and not the instrumental is critical. It points to the fact
that Lev 15:31 implies a temporal, rather than an instrumental sense. Analysis of the verb

 טָ מֵ אfurther disputes the validity of an instrumental translation/interpretation.
Infinitive Construct as Finite Verb
No complement precedes the infinitive construct in Lev 20:3; thus, it functions as
a finite verb. As any other transitive finite verb, it governs a noun or a pronoun in the
accusative and the subject of the action conveyed by it is nominative.47 In the majority of
cases, determining whether an action expressed by the infinitive construct is in the
nominative or the genitive is impossible.48 Joüon and Muraoka have suggested that “as a
rule the subject of the action must be considered as being in the nominative: this is the
construction in primitive Semitic, and in some cases the vocalisation indicates the

Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 604. Temporal character of the Infinitive Construct with be was
noted by Gesenius. Gesenius, Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, 347.
Folmer, “The Translation of Biblical Hebrew Clauses,” 115.
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If its subject is in the genitive, the infinitive construct would generally function as a noun in socalled nominal use. Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 402.
Joüon and Muraoka have criticized Waltke and O’Connor for postulating that the distinction
between these two uses of the infinitive construct can be attained by the inferences from two texts only:
“One cannot conclude merely on the strength of two examples (Lv 26.18  ליַסּ ָרה אֶּ תכֶּםto chastise you and
Dt 4.10  ליִּראָה אֹ ִּתיto fear me) that “the shape of the feminine endings reinforces the Masoretic conviction
that such forms are not construct” (WO, Syntax, p. 611, n. 38).” Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of
Biblical Hebrew, 402.
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nominative.”49 Elisha Qimion has postulated that “in BH, the nouns governed by an
infinitive follow it, while in Aramaic and in Qumranic Hebrew the opposite order is
attested for objects.50 This proposal is effective in the Pentateuch (Gen 3:24; 4:2, 11;
8:21; 13:16; 14:17; 19:19; 21:8; 22:10; 24:48; 25:22; 27:30; 31:19; 34:7, 14; 37:12;
40:20; 41:9; 42:9; 44:22; 49:33; 50:2, 7, 14; Exod 2:15; 5:2; 6:13, 27; 10:4, 26; 12:23;
14:12; 16:3; 29:33; 30:15; 33:20; 36:1; 38:27; Lev 7:38; 10:11, 17; 20:3; 21:21; 26:15;
Num 3:7–8; 4:30; 7:5; 8:11, 15, 19, 22; 9:7; 11:11, 14; 13:17; 16:9, 28, 31; 18:6; 20:21;
21:4, 32; 22:18; 24:1, 13; 34:29; 36:2; Deut 2:31; 3:24; 4:2; 5:15, 25, 29; 6:2, 19, 24–25;
8:18; 9:5; 10:8, 12–13; 11:13, 22, 32; 12:5; 13:18; 14:23; 15:5; 17:19; 18:16; 19:9; 21:16;
25:7, 11; 26:12; 28:1, 12, 15, 58; 29:18, 29; 30:6, 16, 20; 31:12–13, 24; 32:45–46). Thus,
the infinitive construct of  טָ מֵ אin Lev 20:3 introduced by  למַ עַןacts as a finite verb in a
resultative clause. This is typical grammatical construction in BH.51

The Perfect
The texts in Num 19:13, 20, to the contrary, use the perfect instead of the
infinitive construct. It is well established by Hebrew grammarians that the perfect
functions to express events or states that are perceived as complete whether they belong
to a determinative past, present, or future time.52 It should not be perplexing that both
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Elisha Qimron, The Hebrew of the Dead Sea Scrolls, HSS 29 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986),
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Grammar, 309–13; Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 485–91.
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verses, vv. 13 and 20, use the perfect form since it has been well established that the
completed action expressed by the perfect of active, fientive verbs53 is frequently used to
refer “to resulting perfect state in future relative to the speaker.” Waltke and O’Connor
labeled it the “future perfect.”54 Gesenius compared this perfect with the Latin futurum
exactum. This perfect represents the action or state “as existing in the future in a
completed state (futurum exactum)…”55 Joüon and Muraoka reminded us that when the
perfect is used in this way, the “domain of the future is indicated by the context, usually
by a previous verb.” They labeled this the perfect “relative preterite.”56 Thus, the defiling
expressed by the perfect of  טָ מֵ אin Num 19:13,57 20 is a future event that is projected as if
it had been completed in the future.
Semantics: The Verb טָ מֵ א
By form and meaning,  טָ מֵ אis, in most cases, a stative verb and in the same way
as participles, one of the standard uses of stative verbs in BH is to describe a state.58
Determining whether a verb is stative or active is a complex task in BH. Some stative
verbs are ambiguous and could be treated as having both an active, inchoative sense (to

Piel of  טָ מֵ אis such type of a verb since, in this text, it takes a direct object.
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enter into a state), or a stative sense, including when they encompass a stative sense (e.g.,
to maintain the state).59 Aaron Koller stated that “sometimes it is difficult to tell if the
ambiguity is present because of the participle form or because of foe semantics of the
verb itself.” However, the third masculine singular for of the verb  טָ מֵ אhas an ā - ē vowel
pattern, which is a consistent characteristic of the stative verbs in BH.60 As such, it refers
to a quality or characteristic of an object.61
The root  טָ מֵ אis used 200 times in the Pentateuch. The fact that  טָ מֵ אderivatives
are found 150/200 times in Leviticus, thus distributing ¼ of occurrences in the rest of the
Pentateuch, confirms the fact that the book of Leviticus is crucial material for students of
this concept. The verbal forms of  טָ מֵ אare analyzed in each book of the Pentateuch
starting with the book with the least number of occurrences and ending with the book
with most. The total number of verbal forms in the Pentateuch is 114.62
The use of  טָ מֵ אin the Pentateuch demonstrates that it is a binary verb. In other
words, in terms of syntactic transitivity,63  טָ מֵ אappears as transitive and intransitive verb.

Aaron Koller, “Diachronic Change and Synchronic Readings: Midrashim on Stative Verbs and
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“Syntactic transitivity is a binary property of a verb as it is used in a particular clause: a verb is
either transitive or intransitive, depending on whether or not it has a direct object. A transitive verb has a
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In all piel occurrences,  טָ מֵ אis transitive, and in the majority of the occurrences, it is
accompanied by ( אֵ תGen 34:5, 13; Lev 11:44; 13:3, 8, 11, 15, 20, 22, 25, 27, 30, 44;
15:31; 18:28; 20:3; Num 5:3; 19:13, 20; 35:34; Deut 21:23), whereas in four texts,  אֵ תis
missing; however,  טָ מֵ אin all occurrences modifies a noun in a given clause (Gen 34:27;
Lev 13:59; 20:25; Num 6:9). In terms of semantic transitivity,  טָ מֵ אalso behaves
variably,64 but, being mainly a stative verb,  טָ מֵ אis generally low in semantic
transitivity.65
Two characteristics related to the verb  טָ מֵ אemerged from the analysis of its uses
in the Pentateuch conducted below: (1) It always depends on the other verb/s (verbal
actions), mentioned or assumed in the given or surrounding texts in order to achieve the
meaning it conveys.  טָ מֵ אis always accompanied by verbs of touching, carrying, sitting,
eating, etc. in order to show the actual manner of how an entity contracts  טָ מֵ אstatus, and
(2) consequently, contracting the state of  טָ מֵ אalways includes some sort of physical
contact between the entity transmitting and contracting impurity.

 טָ מֵ אin Genesis
In the book of Genesis, all 3 verbal forms of  טָ מֵ אalways refer to Dina’s unclean
state caused by Shechem’s sexual intercourse with her (34:5, 13, 27). Dina’s defiled state

“Semantic transitivity refers to the extent to which the subject of the clause affects the direct
object. Whereas syntactic transitivity is binary, semantic transitivity comes in multiple levels. A clause can
have high semantic transitivity (greatly affects the object), low semantic transitivity (little or no effect on
the object), or be somewhere in between.” Beckman, “Toward the Meaning,” 22.
64
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was attained by Shechem’s lying with her, v. 2. Dina’s state expressed by the verb  טָ מֵ אis
actually achieved by the other verbal action, that is, to have intercourse.66 Both
characteristics pointed out above, the use of helping verbs and contact between the two
entities, are present in the affair of Dina’s defilement.

 טָ מֵ אin Deuteronomy
Out of 10 occurrences of the root of  טָ מֵ אin the book of Deuteronomy, only 2
verbal forms67 are found in 21:23 and 24:4. The first text discusses leaving the dead body
on the tree overnight, which consequently defiles the land, while the second discusses the
sending away of a wife, thus forcing her to defile herself by having an intercourse with
another man.68 The same pattern is detected. The defiled status in these two instances is
accomplished by other additional verbal activities which include contact between two
entities.

66
The nature of this defilement is puzzling. Generally, certain moral acts such as various sexual
behaviors (Lev 18:27), eating impure food (Lev 20:22–26), and practicing idolatry (Deut 12:1–4) form a
combination of reasons that can make Gentiles both ritually and morally impure. Jonathan Klawans,
“Notions of Gentile Impurity in Ancient Judaism,” AJSR 20 (1995): 290–91.
67
The 8 remaining adjectival derivatives always refer to the individuals who have/have not
contracted various sorts of defilement (12:15, 22; 15:22; 26:14) or to the animals that are unclean by their
nature (14:7, 8, 10, 19). Accordance Bible.
68
For an in-depth analysis of Deut 24:1-4, see Richard M. Davidson, Flame of Yahweh: Sexuality
in the Old Testament (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2007), 389–405, especially pp. 395–98.
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 טָ מֵ אin Numbers
The term  טָ מֵ אoccurs 37 times in the book of Numbers69 24 of which are verbal
forms. Three distinct uses emerge out of these occurrences.  טָ מֵ אrefers to: (1) the people
who obtained a defiled status and can defile other entities by being in close proximity to
or touching them (5:3; 6:9; 19:7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 20x2, 21, 22x2), (2) people
being/not being defiled by prohibited acts (5:13, 14x2, 20, 27, 28, 29; 6:7, 12), and (3)
land defilement by murder/shedding of blood (35:34).
The first text of Group 1, people who obtained a defiled status and can defile
other entities by being in close proximity to or touching them, is found in 5:3 which is an
extension of God’s command initiated in v. 2. That is, to put outside the camp all who are
leprous, have a discharge, and everyone who is unclean through contact with a corpse so
that they do not defile the camp because God lives among them. In which manner does
the defilement of their camp take place? A logical place to find the answer to this
question is to examine the regulations regarding these 3 potential ways of contracting
defilement. First, the leprosy regulations found in Lev 13–14 are quite vague in this
regard. However, there are at least two convincing and instructive sets of clues that help
to delineate the mode of defilement. The regulations in 13:45–46 would suggest that
defilement by the leper takes place through the contact. That is, it is prescribed, among
other things, for lepers to, cry out “unclean, unclean,” most likely when they encounter an
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Adjectival forms occur in eleven texts and they always refer to individuals (5:2; 9:6, 7, 10;
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undefiled person, clearly to avoid contact with undefiled persons, as understood by noted
scholars of the Hebrew Cult.70 The continuation of the leprosy regulations found in chap.
14, for the case of leprosy on the house also contains a clue about how the actual
defilement takes place. In vv. 46–47, it states that all who enter the house, sleep, or eat in
it while it is quarantined contract the defilement. Scholars call this defilement “the
defilement by overhang,” based on Num 19:14–15.71 However, if the house is considered
as a whole, the floor of the house on which one would undeniably have to step, making
contact with it in order to enter it, could be seen as the source of the defilement for the
one entering the house. The same applies to the door of the house as well.72 Indisputably,
other verbs are present in this way of transmitting defilement, as well as the contact of the
entity transmitting and receiving defilement. Second, the regulations for various
genital/bodily discharges found in Lev 15 convey the same idea. Verses 15:4–12, 18–24,
26–27, through the use of verbs of touching,73 siting upon, spitting by the defiled one on
a clean person, riding in the saddle, emission of semen, lying with a menstruating
woman, lying on the bed, demonstrate that the defilement is transmitted through contact
with the object that was defiled by the impure person. Third, the regulations concerning
defilement by the human corpse found in Num 19:11, 13, 16 are straightforward, since
they state that defilement through the human corpse takes place through contact. Potential
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defilement by overhang is found in 19:14–15. The defilement of the sanctuary mentioned
in vv. 13 and 20 will be analyzed below in a separate subheading.
The verbal form of  טָ מֵ אis also found in procedures for the termination of the
Nazirite vow, v. 6:9. The idea is that his holy status will be interrupted due to contact
between the Nazirite and a human corpse74 or if they find themselves in a house with a
person who suddenly dies.75 The adverbial use of the prepositional phrase  עַל+ personal
pronoun (3ms, referring to the Nazirite) suggests the existence of contact between the
person who suddenly dies and the Nazirite disputing the defilement of overhang.
The account of the cleansing water which involves slaughtering the red heifer
includes multiple action verbs to describe the priest’s76 and his assistants’77 involvement
in the ritual process which defiles all of them (19:7, 8, 10). There are opposite opinions as
to the subject of the verbs “to deliver,” “to take out,” and “to slaughter.” Some claim that
the subject of all these verbs is someone else than Eleazar, the officiating priest,78 while
some consider Eleazar as the subject of the verbs “to deliver” and “to take out,” or the
subject of the verb “to slaughter” is elliptical.79 However, even if Eleazar is not the
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subject of any of these verbs, and even if the priest mentioned in v. 6 is not Eleazar,80
based on v. 4, he is indisputably the one who takes and sprinkles the red heifer’s blood. In
other words, taking and sprinkling the red heifer’s blood renders him defiled. Thus,
regardless of who performs the activities expressed by “to deliver,” “to take out,” and “to
slaughter,” the text declared the priest and his assistant/s, defiled. The text is also clear
that all the participants get in touch with in various ways with the red heifer during the
process of preparing the water of cleansing.
The rest of the red heifer account, vv. 11, 13, 14, 16, 20x2, 21, 22x2, where טָ מֵ א
occurs, shows that contact between the entities transmitting and receiving defilement
always exists. The verb  ָנגַע, “to touch,” always supplements  טָ מֵ אin order to show how
the defilement takes place (vv. 11, 13, 16, 21, 22). The text of v. 22 is very
straightforward in stating that defilement takes place through contact. The potential
defilement of overhang is found in v. 14, which was discussed above. Verse 20 is a
general statement and does not mention the way one contracts defilement, most likely
because the manners of defilement were explained multiple times before and after it, that
is, through contact. In two verses of this section, vv. 13 and 20,  טָ מֵ אaffects the sanctuary.
Those who do not purify themselves after being defiled through contact with the dead
defile the tabernacle of the Lord. These verses will be analyzed in greater detail later.
The texts of Group 2, people being/not being defiled by prohibited acts, are found
in chaps. 5 and 6. Chapter 5 deals with the law of a suspected adulteress, and  טָ מֵ אin this
text refers to the potentially defiled condition contracted from intercourse outside
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marriage (5:13, 14x2, 20, 27, 28, 29). The nominal derivative of the root שָׁ כַב, שׁכָבָ ה, is
used in vv. 13, 20, and 29 to indicate the sexual act, in this case outside of marriage
boundaries, which causes the defilement of the woman. The verbal derivative of the root

 שָׁ כַבis also found in v. 13 and in addition, in v. 19. Both nominal and verbal derivatives
of the root מָ עַל, which also refers to marital infidelity, appear in v. 12 to introduce the
issue the law deals with. The root also appears in v. 27 in the conclusion of the law. A
woman contracts impurity through illicit sexual intercourse which includes contact
between the two involved in the act.
The Nazirite vow regulations prohibit individuals who take the vow from going to
dead members of their family (6:7. 12). Scholars settled that the phrase “go near the
dead” refers to contact between the Nazirite and his dead family member.81
The only text in Group 3, the defilement of the land by murder/shedding of blood,
is found in 35:34. This text is a part of the concluding remarks, vv. 30–34, on the
homicide law imbedded in the law of the cities of refuge found in Numbers 35:6–34. This
law states that the presence of the murderer in the land defiles it. A murderer becomes the
source of defilement by the fact that he kills, sheds the blood of another human being,
and was in contact with the dead. In addition, v. 33 states that the shedding of blood
defiles the land. The only way the land could be kept holy is by eliminating, shedding the
blood of the murderer. If the community is neglectful in not eliminating the murderer (v.
30) or accepting a ransom for the murderer (v. 31) or approving a manslaughterer who
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leaves the city of refuge (v. 32), he also is responsible for the defilement of the land by
allowing the defilement to spread in the land. In addition to mutual contact between the
murderer, the victim’s blood, and the victim’s dead body and the land, defilement is also
transmitted by people’s sins in regards to the crime of murder, that is, by not eliminating
the murderer (v. 30) or accepting a ransom for the murderer (v. 31) or by having a
manslaughterer leave the city of refuge (v. 32).82 The analysis of the  טָ מֵ אtexts in
Numbers, including all the 3 categories delineated in this book, confirms the fact that
defilement is achieved by some other verbal activities which always include some sort of
contact between the entity which transmits and the entity receiving defilement.

 טָ מֵ אin Leviticus
Leviticus uses  טָ מֵ אthe most frequently.83 The verbal forms are used 85 times out
of 150 occurrences and they refer to various manners by which the defilement is
contracted. Unlikely to the 3 groups identified in the book of Numbers, the book of
Leviticus contains the 2 following groups: (1) the entities that obtained a defiled status
and can defile other entities by being in close proximity to or touching them (5:3; 12:2x2,
5; 13:3, 8, 11, 14, 15, 20, 22, 25, 27, 30, 44x2, 46, 59; 14:36, 46; 15:4x2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10x2, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20x2, 21, 22, 23, 24x2, 27x2, 31, 32;), (2) people being defiled
by prohibited acts (11:24x2, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32x2, 33, 34x2, 35, 36, 39, 40x2, 43x2,
44; 17:15; 18:20, 23, 24x2, 25, 27, 28, 30; 19:31; 20:3, 25; 21:1, 3, 4, 11; 22:5x2, 6, 8).

For a more detailed analysis of the law of homicide see Janković, “The Rationale,” 79–104.
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The pattern attested in the books of Genesis, Deuteronomy, and Numbers is also attested
in the book of Leviticus. Exceptions do exist, but there is substantial explanation for each
of them.
Based on the present research, of all these 85 occurrences of  טָ מֵ אin Leviticus,
there are few instances where  טָ מֵ אis not accompanied by other verb/s to convey the
manner by which defilement took place. However, the inclusion of other verbs to
accomplish defilement is implied.
The text of Lev 11:43, 18:25, 28 do not contain the verb/s which would convey
the manner of defilement, but it should be remembered that many verbs in the previous
verses of these two chapters (touch, carry, fall [corpse on some other entity], and eat)
indisputably convey the manner by which defilement takes place (Lev 11:31–36—
swarming things, 18:6–24, 27, 30—various sexual acts).
There are two issues in Lev 20:25. First, the verb  טָ מֵ אrefers to the distinction
which should be kept by the Israelites between clean and unclean animals. A detailed
explanation of this distinction is found in chap. 11. Second, the verb  טָ מֵ אis used in this
text to describe defilement by various unclean animals by which Israelites should not be
infected. It has been recognized that  שָׁ קַ ץand  טָ מֵ אare synonymous in this context,84 and
the way one gets defiled by these animals is also explained in chap. 11 in details.
Leviticus 21:1. 3–4 does not state the manner of defilement (i.e., the process of
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defiling), but it is anticipated that defilement by the corpse would assume various
contacts with it.85
Leviticus 15:31 and 20:3 will also be commented on later in this study under
separate subheadings.
Semantics of טָ מֵ א: Summary
The foregoing analysis of the uses of  טָ מֵ אin the Pentateuch demonstrates that the
two claims proposed regarding this verb are accurate. First,  טָ מֵ אalways depends on the
other verb/s mentioned or assumed in the given or surrounding texts to achieve the
condition it conveys. These verbs are verbs of touching, carrying, sitting, eating, etc., in
order to show the manner by which an entity contracts  טָ מֵ אstatus. Second, building on
the first finding, contracting the state of  טָ מֵ אalways includes some sort of contact
between the entities transmitting and contracting impurity or a defiling process takes
place if both the source and recipient of impurity are inside the same, enclosed space.
The concept of delay is one of the unavoidable concepts to be addressed when one
studies the ADH. Therefore, this concept will be presented and analyzed below.

The Concept of Ellipsis
The so-called concept of delay fashioned by Milgrom was another point of debate
among scholars and rests upon another concept, that is, the concept of ellipsis. Elliptical
interpretation refers to the absence of essential clauses in the biblical text, in this case
cultic legislation, which were well established and known within this body of biblical
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texts. Maccoby’s ellipsis, an essential but yet missing clause in Lev 15:31, 20:2 and Num
19:13, 20, is “if impure person touches sancta”;86 he claims that this ellipsis streams out
of texts like Lev 7:20–21, 12:4, and 22:3–7, which undoubtedly convey the fact that the
defilement of the holy entity takes place through direct contact with the impure entity.87
Outside of these texts, Maccoby also cited Lev 5:4 as an obvious example of ellipsis, in
this case, “if he breaks his vow.”88
Milgrom claimed that this is not a real ellipsis, and his critique of Maccoby on
this particular text89 is highly controversial due to his claim that the legist (the author)
was bound by structural constraints, that is, they repeated the phrase ונֶּעלַם ִּממֶּּ נּוּ והוּא יָדַ ע
in v. 4 as they did in vv. 2–3. If, as Milgrom agreed with many other scholars, Lev 5:1–4
is comprised of a unit of 4 cases of apodosis, then the legists’ striving to follow structural
consistency would lead them to use the same phrase in v. 1 as well, which they did not. In
addition, it would also have led them to the same phrase in all three verses, 2, 3, and 4,
which they did not. The phrases are identical in the vv. 3 and 4, ונֶּעלַם ִּממֶּּ נּוּ והוּא יָדַ ע,
while the verb  יָדַ עis left out in v. 2, ונֶּעלַם ִּממֶּּ נּוּ והוּ. Milgrom’s claim is even more
controversial due to the fact that vv. 2 and 3 refer to the similar topic, defilement, in v. 2,
by carcass, and in v. 3, by human. Thus, it would be natural to have the same phrase in
vv. 2 and 3 and perhaps allow for a small modification, leaving out יָדַ ע, in v. 4 which
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deals with a new topic, a rush oath. Thus, it seems that the legists were not bound by
structural constraints when it came to this phrase because they left out the phrase in v. 1
and used it in vv. 4, which is the structural and thematic counterpart of v. 1, and they used
different phrases in vv. 2 and 3 which are structural and thematic counterparts.
In addition, Milgrom’s assertion that the phrase  והוּא יָדַ עis “entirely
superfluous”90 is also not substantial since repetition, even though not desired as much in
conventional writing, was essential in Ancient Near Eastern written materials in order to
emphasize certain facts.91 Milgrom made an accurate comment when he stated that the
phrase והוּא יָדַ ע, translated as “though he has known [it],” was self-evident. It was
therefore eliminated.”92 That is exactly what Maccoby was also pointing out, but referred
to it as an ellipsis. This study does not deal with the structure of Lev 5:1–4, but rather,
notes the flaws of Milgrom’s comment on the structure related to the use of the phrase
mentioned above by the legist. Milgrom’s own suggestions of ellipsis in Lev 11:27–28,
31, 32, 39, and 40 regarding the ablutions are convincing,93 while those in Lev 9:8, 12,
15, 18 and 16:11, 15 are a matter of unsettled debate among scholars, and are informed
by Milgrom’s theory of atonement. It is obvious that although the concept of ellipsis is
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common and present in biblical cultic/legal material, the potential elliptical claims have
to be confirmed by and clearly stated in other biblical texts. In this case, biblical
cultic/legal material favors Maccoby’s understanding.

The Concept of Delay
Milgrom assumed that a lapse of time, a delay between the actual moment of
defilement of a person and the time he/she becomes aware of his/her defiled status makes
the impurities grow from a non-sinful, minor one into a major, sinful one, thus defiling
the sanctuary from afar. Normally, simple day ablutions would eliminate non-sinful
defilements, but since there is a delay in dealing with them, the impurities grow into
major ones requiring the sacrifice (5:6–13).94 Maccoby already noted that the text which
would verify this concept of delay as a deciding factor, whether the defilement is sinful or
not, is nonexistent in biblical cultic legislation.95 I agree with Milgrom that the concept of
delay is a valid concept, as I agree with Maccoby concerning elliptical interpretation.
However, the consequence of the delay is different in my understanding, namely, the
requirement of the sacrifice might be for the unintentionality of the person who initially
contracted impurity and did not immediately handle it properly. In that way, the
defilement would have grown, not due to a delay itself, but because it would be
transmitted and spread in the camp, thus increasing the risk of a defiled person’s,
unaware of his/her status, entering the sanctuary and defiling it. The transmission of
impurity could continue uncontrollably until ultimately, the entire camp becomes
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defiled.96 Thus, delay does not make minor defilements grow from small ones into major
ones, but gives room for neglected defilement to be transmitted uncontrollably in the
camp via contact and finally, to defile the sanctuary and the entire camp. In addition, a
simple neglect to purify constitutes violation of divine commandments.
In his response to Maccoby’s remarks, Milgrom stated that the concept of delay
can be derived from other references, but he cited one single text, Lev 17:16, based on
which he claimed that delay is dangerous, not because the defiled person can enter the
sanctuary in his/her impure state, but because neglect to purify himself/herself is sinful
and punishable.97 It is true that disobedience to be purified falls into the domain of moral
impurity, as Milgrom claimed, but on the other hand, it is also true that during the delay,
the defiled person could unintentionally, and unaware of his/her defiled state, enter the
sanctuary and defile it through direct contact. Thus, one could accept both scenarios,
moral impurity of neglecting to follow God’s procedure for dealing with the defilement
and entering the sanctuary in a defiled state, since they are both possible and not mutually
exclusive. Texts where individuals in their defiled state came into the direct contact with
the holy entities and consequently died do exist in the Pentateuch (Lev 10:1–2; Num
16:16ff, etc.) or were forbidden to come in contact with holy entities (Lev 7:20; 12:4,
etc.), while there is not a single text that clearly supports ADH.

Leviticus 15:31
Leviticus 15:31 is a conclusion to the laws on genital impurities found in Lev
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15:1–30 and can be translated/interpreted in two distinct ways as the following translation
shows: “Thus you shall keep the people of Israel separate from their uncleanness, so that
they do not die in their uncleanness 1. by defiling my tabernacle that is in their midst or
2. when they defile my tabernacle that is in their midst.” The interpretational and
grammatical crux of this verse is the meaning of the infinitive construct preceded by the
preposition ב. The first translation assumes an instrumental sense of the infinitive
construct and is favored by automatic defilement proponents. The second translation
conveys a temporal one and it disputes this hypothesis. Both options, respectively, will be
discussed below.
Instrumental Sense: “by Defiling My Tabernacle
That Is in Their Midst”
Based on the first possible translation, the proponents of the ADH believe that it
is the negligence of the Israelites to implement procedures found in Lev 15:1–30 or
chaps. 11–15,98 prescribed to handle genital (chap. 15) or all impurities listed in chs. 11–
15, which cause defilement of the sanctuary from a distance. In this case, the death
penalty is triggered by moral fault.99 In other words, the sin represented in this case is
intentional disobedience to the divine laws for purification listed in chap. 15 or chaps.
11–15. An individual affected by these impurities does not need to come to the sanctuary,
in other words to come into a direct contact with it, in order to defile it for they defile it
from the distance. Their punishment is not based on potentially bringing their ritual
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impurities into a direct contact with the holy entities, sanctuary in this case, but rather,
their punishment is initiated by their neglect to undergo divinely prescribed purification
rituals.
This interpretation agrees with the first translation of the third clause in 15:31
mentioned above, where the infinitive construct of the Hebrew verb טָ מֵ א, preceded by the
preposition ב, is taken to function as a noun in the so-called nominal use of the infinitive
construct. The logical subject in this grammatical construction is expressed by the
pronominal suffix attached to a given noun or a personal name.100
Temporal Sense: “When They Defile My
Tabernacle That Is in Their Midst”
Based on the second possible translation of the third clause in Lev 15:31, it has
been argued that the individual comes in their impure state to the sanctuary and via direct
contact with the holy entities, in this case, the sanctuary, defiles them. The exact source
of defilement is a matter of an ongoing debate. Some scholars believe that this text warns
against ritual defilement of the sanctuary,101 while some believe that defilement
originates out of moral impurity,102 that is, the neglect to follow procedures for ritual
purification. In any case, this interpretation is based upon the second, temporal translation
which seems more plausible from the grammatical, syntactical, and semantic standpoint.

Folmer, “The Translation of Biblical Hebrew Clauses,” 116.

100
101

Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 1:430; Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 170; Rodríguez,
“Transfer of Sin in Leviticus,” 173–76; Hannah K. Harrington, The Purity Texts, CQS 5 (New York: T & T
Clark International, 2004), 71–72, 78; Kazen, Issues of Impurity in Early Judaism, 57; Charlotte Elisheva
Fonrobert, Menstrual Purity: Rabbinic and Christian Reconstructions of Biblical Gender, Contraversions
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 19; Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 403.
Brichto, “On Slaughter and Sacrifice,” 33; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 61.

102

592

As noted above, the first translation translates the third clause of this text with “by
defiling my tabernacle,” indicating an instrumental nuance of the clause, while the second
as “when they defile my tabernacle” points to the temporal, conditional sense. The
second translation gives room for the other consequential meaning of this clause,
entrance of the impure person into the sanctuary and defiling it via direct contact. This
interpretation is preferred by some theologians.103 As shown above, a number of the
Pentateuchal texts explicitly confirm the notion that the defilement of the sanctuary
happens through direct contact (Lev 7:20; 10:1–2; 12:4).
This claim is further verified by the analysis of all 22 constructions of the
infinitive construct, preceded by ב, found in Leviticus (4:27; 10:9; 12:6; 15:23, 31; 16:1,
17, 23; 18:28; 19:9; 20:4; 22:16; 23:22, 39, 43; 24:16; 26:26, 35, 43, 44; 27:21). That is,
all of them convey a temporal sense (Lev 4:27; 10:9; 12:6; 15:23, 31; 16:1, 17, 23; 18:28;
19:9; 20:4; 22:16; 23:22, 39, 43; 24:16; 26:26, 35, 43, 44; 27:21). In addition, all
occurrences of the infinitive construct preceded by  בwhen it is syntactically related to the
noun that refer to the sanctuary ( )משכןretain a temporal sense (Exod 40:36; Lev 15:31;
Num 1:51; 9:19, 22). To scrutinize this statistics more, the exact same grammatical
construction as it is in this text,  ב+ infinitive construct + אֵ ת, is found in 17 texts in
Leviticus (6:13[20]; 7:16, 36, 38; 15:23[ בacting as direct object marker], 31; 16:30;
18:28; 19:9; 20:4; 22:16; 23:12, 22[x2], 39, 43; 24:16[no direct object marker]) and these
texts express temporal sense, too.
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Leviticus 20:3
A law of Lev 20:1–5 prescribes the procedure for an individual who offers any of
their children to Moloch as a sacrifice. Verse 3 crucially states that “I myself [God] will
set my face against them, and will cut them off from the people, because they have given
of their offspring to Moloch, defiling my sanctuary and profaning my holy name.”
According to ADH, defilement of the sanctuary in this case also takes place from
distance, and the mere act of offering one’s offspring to Moloch defiles the sanctuary.
Again, a practitioner of this prohibited worship does not need to come to the sanctuary,
that is, come in contact with it, in order to defile it.
As mentioned above, Lev 20:3 also utilizes the infinitive construct, but preceded
by the separable preposition למען. With knowledge concerning the piel stem, the
infinitive construct aspect, and the semantics concerning the verb טָ מֵ א, I specifically
focus on the two particulars of this text: the meaning and function of the preposition למַ עַן
and the structure of the law. These two items are included in the analysis of this text since
they contribute greatly to its proper understanding.
The Form, Meaning, and Function of למַ עַן
Form: The prepositional phrase  למַ עַןconsists of the preposition  לand the noun

 מַ ַעןand is considered to be one of the so-called “frozen prepositions”104 since  מַ עַןnever
occurs without ( ל270 times).105 Meaning: Scholars have reached a consensus on the
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meaning of this phrase. It is usually translated as “for the sake of, on account of, to the
intent or in order that,” conveying both purpose and intention, but without the sense of
causation.106
Function: In BH, “the main clause expresses a situation, and the subordinate
clause either a purpose (final or telic clause) or a consequence (result clause),”107 and
both of these types of clauses, normally including the infinitive construct, are governed
by למען.108 H. A. Brongers has done the most detailed study on  למַ עַןand suggested that
syntactically, it governs a result clause in a few cases (Lev 20:3; 2 Kgs 22:17; Amos 2:7).
He noted that the particle is sometimes elliptical in sense and a paraphrase is necessary:
“the consequence of which will be.”109 It has to be highlighted that the level of certainty
in classifying purpose and consequence is sometimes low. The context is critical for the
precise sense of given grammatical constructions and particles.110
Brongers’ and Joüon and Muraoka’s insights are crucial regarding the function of

 למַ עַןin Lev 20:3. First, commenting on its function in this text, Brongers emphasized that

Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 91, 511, 637–41, 694; Allan
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Meaning: Studies in Hebrew Syntax and Biblical Exegesis, eds. C. J. Labuschagne, et al., OtSt 18 (Leiden:
Brill, 1973), 84–96; Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 91; Joüon and
Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 357. Via Johannes F. Diehl, Die Fortführung des Imperativs im
Biblischen Hebräisch, AOAT 286 (Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 2004), 342–60.
108

Brongers, “Die Partikel למַ עַן,” 89. Gane has interpreted this phrase in telic, causative, and
resultative senses. He stated: “It is this effect on the sanctuary, which does not depend upon the sinner’s
direct contact with sacred places or things, for which he/she receives punishment.” Gane, Cult and
Character, 148.
109

Brongers, “Die Partikel למַ עַן,” 88–89; Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical
Hebrew Syntax, 91, 637; Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 357, 595.
110

595

es ist klar, dass es sich in diesen Stellen nicht um die Absiht, sonders um di Folge des
Verfahrens handelt. Es ist z.b. fraglich, ob die Israeliten, als sie darangingen ihre
Kinder dem Moloch zu opfern, dabei bewusst die Absicht hatten das Heiligtum
Jahwes zu verunreiningen und seinen Namen zu entweihen. So eit werden sie ihre
Überlegungen bestimmt nicht getrieben haben. Andererseits ist es auch keine Frage,
dass infolge dieser Verfehlung Jahwe aufs tiefste gekränkt wurde.111
Second, Joüon and Muraoka have noted that  למַ עַןconveys a consequential or
resultative sense in the context that discusses “the effect of a punishable act which is an
offence against God rather than about its aim.”112 They have cited Lev 20:3; Num 25:4;
Deut 4:25; 30:12–14 to show consequential or resultative sense.113 Thus, in this particular
text, the sense of  למַ עַןis consequential or resultative, not that of purpose. The causative
sense is never included in the preposition למען.

Literary Structure of the Law
According to the majority of modern scholars, the law consists of two scenarios.
The first is contained in vv. 2–3 which implies that the idolater’s act is known and both
the community and God punish them. This case includes a double punishment, death by
stoning and divine kārēt. With the fact that the idolater experiences premature death by
human agency in v. 2, the divine punishment is taken to mean either extinction of the

“It is clear that these verses are not about intention, but rather, about the results of the process.
For example, it is questionable whether the Israelites, as they began to sacrifice their own children to
Moloch, consciously intended to defile the sanctuary of Yahweh and to desecrate his name. They would not
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lineage114 or punishment in the afterlife.115 Otherwise, v. 3 is understood as an
explanation of v. 2 in the sense that the stoning to death by human agency represents
God’s opposition to this act.116 In the second scenario, vv. 4–5, the idolater’s act is also
known, but the community fails to punish him/her so consequently, God punishes them.
It can be said that this is a standard, scholarly understanding of this law.117 Gane’s
explanation of divine punishment in a potential double punishment in the first scenario is
eloquent and profound:
Divinely administered “cutting off” goes beyond capital punishment. When someone
deserves more than one death penalty, human justice is stymied. It makes no
difference whether an individual murders one or six million; the malefactor has but
one life to give for his crime(s). But God can do plenty more: He can make the
punishment fit the crime by seeing to it that the sinner’s line of descendants, from
which he has contributed to another deity, becomes extinct so that he is not even
history. It is terrifying to face the prospect of being forgotten and unmissed. God can
also deny the offender a positive afterlife. Either way, he is “cut off from his
people.”118
This explanation was also accepted by Milgrom119 and is based on Donald Wold’s
dissertation research which is analyzed in the subheading “Donald Wold on the Kārēt
Punishment” of this study. This explanation is not accepted here due to numerous
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methodological and conceptual fallacies of Wold’s work.
Alfred Cholewinski has proposed a notable literary structure (see Table 25) which
reflects the two scenarios type of the law.120

Table 25. Literary structure of Lev 20:2–5
Aβ
Γ
Γ
B

יִשׂ ָראל
ְ ְוּמן־הַ גּר הַ גָּר בּ
ִ יִשׂ ָראל
ְ  ִאישׁ ִאישׁ ִמבְּ ני2b
אֲשֶׁ ר יִ ּתן ִמזּ ְַרעֹו לַמֹּ לְֶך
מֹות יוּמָ ת
אָרץ יִ ְרגְּ מֻהוּ בָ אָבֶ ן׃
ֶ ָעַם ה

B

Aα
Β

 ַואֲנִי אֶ ּתן אֶ ת־ ָפּנַי בָּ ִאישׁ הַ הוּא3
וְ הִ כְ ַר ִּתי אֹ תֹו ִמקֶּ ֶרב עַמֹּו

C

bα
β-δ

כִּ י ִמזּ ְַרעֹו נָתַ ן לַמֹּ לְֶך
ת־מקְ דָּ ִשׁי וּלְ חַ לּל אֶ ת־שׁם קָ ְד ִשׁי׃
ִ ֶלְ מַ עַן טַ מּא א

A1

aα
β
b

אָרץ אֶ ת־עיניהֶ ם ִמן־הָ ִאישׁ הַ הוּא
ֶ ָוְ ִאם הַ עְ לם יַעְ לִ ימוּ עַם ה4
בְּ ִתּתֹו ִמזּ ְַרעֹו לַמֹּ לְֶך
לְ בִ לְ ִּתי הָ ִמית אֹ תֹו׃

5a
Bα
Β

וְ שַׂ ְמ ִּתי אֲנִי אֶ ת־ ָפּנַי בָּ ִאישׁ הַ הוּא וּבְ ִמ ְשׁפַּחְ ּתֹו5
וְ הִ כְ ַר ִּתי אֹ תֹו וְ את כָּל־הַ זֹּ נִים אַח ֲָריו
לִ זְנֹות אַחֲרי הַ מֹּ לְֶך ִמקֶּ ֶרב עַמָּ ם׃

A

B1

However, this understanding of the law runs into internal conceptual
inconsistencies. First, v. 2 states that the punishment for the act of idolatry is premature
death. It is administered by the people who stone the idolater. This is well-established
punishment for idolatry in Pentateuchal narratives (Exod 32:27) and legal texts
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(Deut 13:5, 9, 10, 15; 17:5–6). If the punishment for idolatry in v. 2 stipulated by God is
premature death by stoning, then the same punishment should be imposed in v. 5. The
only difference in vv. 4–5 and v. 2 is the attitude of the people which affects the mode of
execution, but the nature of sin remains the same, implying that the nature of punishment
should be the same as well: a premature death. The copulative  וthat connects the opening
verb in v. 5 with v. 4 also suggests that the punishment implied in v. 4 coordinates with
the punishment implied in v. 5.121 Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the same
punishment is in view in the people’s punishing the idolater in v. 2, and God’s punishing
the idolater in v. 5—premature death.
Second, based on vv. 4–5, God administers punishment himself when people
refuse to punish the idolater which points to the possibility that in v. 3 people do not
punish the idolater. Keeping in mind the fact that vv. 4–5 discuss the people’s refusal to
impose punishment, a valid alternative is that they do not know about the act of idolatry
in v. 3 and consequently are not able to punish idolater.
Third, the fact that the idolater is also punished by God himself in v. 3 and
experiences premature death makes the subcase in vv. 4–5 superfluous. The people
cannot disregard or fail to punish the idolater, even if they considered it, since they are
already punished by God in v. 3.
Fourth, taking v. 3 to be additional punishment to the one in v. 2 makes vv. 4–5
redundant and superfluous. The punishments in vv. 2 and 3 were also puzzling for Julius

Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 540.
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Wellhausen.122 It is very unlikely that God’s punishment for idolatry in v. 3 did not mean
premature death because this is a standard punishment for this sin. It would also be very
unlikely that this law focused on punishment that did not affect the idolater immediately,
premature death, but rather, implied afterlife punishment.
On the other hand, some scholars have proposed convincingly that this law
actually consists of three scenarios. In v. 2, the people know about the idolatrous act and
punish the idolater; in v. 3, they do not know about it and are not able to punish him/her
so God does it, and in v. 4, the people refuse to punish the idolater and again, God does it.
Thus, v. 3 is taken to refer to a separate subcase, not as an explanation of v. 2 or
additional punishment to the one in v. 2. In this case v. 2, is the basic casuistic statement,
while vv. 3 and 4–5 are the subcases, additional alternatives to the basic law. Thus, in v. 3
the idolater and his/her act is secret, and since nobody knows it and is thus not able to be
sanctioned, God himself intervenes to punish him/her. This interpretation is not new since
it was already known in rabbinic literature,123 as well as among some modern scholars.124
Ibn Ezra stated already:
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This statement implies the ellipsis, “if he does it secretly,” in v. 3 in order to avoid
the inconsistencies listed above. The alternative sense of v. 3 may be hinted at if the
opening  וwhich can legitimately be understood as a coordinative particle “or,” as
explained on p. 602 of the present study, thus introducing an alternative to the previously
stated rule. This alternative reading of  וis also noted in the works of Yosef Isaak Bekhor
Shor.126 The assumption that v. 3 addresses that the act of idolatry could have been
committed secretly is a well-established alternative in other BLs regarding idolatry. The
same phrase that Ibn Ezra suggested in his reading of v. 3, the preposition  בfollowed by
the noun סֵ תֶּ ר,127 is explicitly utilized in Deut 13:6 and 27:15, adverbially presenting a
secret act of idolatry. Thus, it is already introduced in the BL that idolatry can be open,
public, and secret in its nature.
Wells’ detailed treatment of the law of testimony in Exod 22:6–8 demonstrate that
not all details of the potential situation are explicitly spelled out in biblical legal texts.
Sometimes even the crucially important details are not mentioned. For instance, the law
of testimony in Exod 22:6–8 is missing crucial details that should precede v. 8. Two
scenarios are implied in the second subcase, v. 7, if the thief is not found: (1) the receiver
illegally appropriated some of the belongings and perhaps falsely alleged that there were
stolen, or (2) the receiver claims that the purported owner never deposited his/her
belongings with the receiver or not in the amount/s claimed. The guilty party in the first
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scenario is the receiver, whereas the purported owner is liable in the second.128 However,
none of that is spelled out in the law, but the law simply focuses on the first of the two
scenarios, namely that the receiver misappropriated the belongings of the owner.129
Keeping in mind the crucial importance of the missing parts in Exod 22:6–8, it is
not atypical that Lev 20:3 does not contain, but still implies ellipsis “if he does it
secretly.” Biblical laws do not always provide all the background and sometimes, crucial
details regarding the particular law, but they are to be assumed in order for the law to
make sense.
The next illuminative point is the use and the meaning of the phrase, “from the
midst of one’s people,” that is used in vv. 3 and 5. As in these two verses, the phrase is
syntactically related to the punishment of kārēt. This grammatical construct is used 11
times in the Pentateuch (Exod 31:14; Lev 17:4, 10; 18:29; 20:3, 5, 6, 18; 23:30; Num
15:30; Deut 2:16). The phrase is syntactically related to the verb  כ ַָרתin 9 out of 11
occurrences (Exod 31:14; Lev 17:4, 10; 18:29; 20:3, 5, 6, 18; Num 15:30), whereas in 2
of them, the verbs ( אָבַ דLev 23:30) and ( מוּתDeut 2:16) are used. In at least 7 of 11 of
these texts, the phrase refers to premature death (Exod 31:14; Lev 17:4, 20:3, 5, 6; 23:30;
Deut 2:16). This claim in relation to Exod 31:14 rests on the fact that breaking the
Sabbath in Num 15:32–36 is punished by premature death, stoning. Idolatry in Lev 17:4
is also punishable by death based both on Pentateuchal narratives (Exod 32:27) and legal
texts (Deut 13:5, 9, 10, 15; 17:5–6). As explained above, based on Lev 20:2, 4, idolatry in
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20:3, 5 is also punishable by premature death. Necromancy dealt with in Lev 20:6 is also
punishable by premature death (Exod 22:18; Lev 20:27). Two times the verb  כ ַָרתis
replaced by other verbs and combined with the phrase, “from one’s people.” The verb

 אָבַ דis used in Lev 23:30, while  מוּתis used in Deut 2:16. Both of these verbs clearly
convey premature death.130 All these texts unanimously present premature death as an
immediate and primary punishment. All these sins are intentional and epitomize direct
opposition to God’s will expressed in covenantal laws. In addition, only Exod 31:14
(Sabbath breaking) and Lev 20:2–5 (Molech worship) may be detectable by the public,
while all the others are secret. These two are punished by premature death. Thus it is
reasonable to assume that all texts that use the phrase, “from the midst of one’s people”
along with verbs כ ַָרת,  מוּתor  אָבַ דimply premature death as punishment for the sins they
refer to. It would be logical that individuals who committed these sins would be
eliminated from the covenantal community since doing all these sins negate core values
and policies that the covenant with God includes.131 Since the sins listed in those 7 texts
are punishable by premature death, it is reasonable to expect that this punishment is
envisioned for the sins in the 4 remaining texts for which other texts do not prescribe
premature death (Lev 17:10; 18:29; 20:18; Num 15:30).
The analysis of the texts that contain a shorter phrase, “cut off from one’s people”
(without “the midst”), show the same results (Gen 17:14; Exod 30:33, 38; Lev. 7:20, 21,
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25, 27; 17:9; 19:8; 23:29; Num 9:13). They all utilize the same niphal stem pointing that
this could be the so-called “divine passive.” In other words, God administers premature
death in cases like this. All these sins are intentional and secret and negate core values
and regulations that a covenant with God includes. It is reasonable to expect that those
who commit them would also be punished by premature death. Keeping in mind the
gravity of these sins, it is also reasonable to include punishment that goes beyond
premature death like some scholars suggest,132 but premature death remains the primary
punishment.
Finally, kārēt and  מוּתare presented as equivalents in Exod 31:14=Num 15:32–
36; Lev 20:3=Lev 20:2, 4; Num 4:18=4:19–20, which further confirms the fact that kārēt
in the first place refers to premature death. Wold, followed by Milgrom, Schwartz, and
Gane, believed that this law consists of only one case and is interpreted in v. 3 to convey
punishment that would go beyond mere death, but was referring to annihilation of one’s
line of descendants.133 Attractive as it is and potentially possible, this interpretation
cannot be based on this text.
With this reading of the law, it is logical that only v. 3 expresses fear for
sanctuary defilement since being undetected, the idolater can freely come to the sanctuary
and defile it. In that case, the idolater’s death would be immediate. Verses 2 and 4–5 do
not express such fear since in v. 2, the idolater is punished and subsequently prevented
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Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 346–48.
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Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” 251–55; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 457–60;
Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 13; Gane, Cult and Character, 145, 201.
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from defiling the sanctuary, whereas in vv. 4–5, God punishes them and prevents
defilement.
Gane has recently proposed that the phrase  בָ ִּאישׁ הַ הוּאin v. 3 refers to the same
person in v. 2, and thus, forms one case, vv. 2–3. However, the same phrase is also used
in v. 5 and by this logic, the case in vv. 4–5 should also be considered as belonging to the
case presented in vv. 2–3. That is highly unlikely since v. 4 undeniably introduces a new
subcase. Thus, the claim that the phrase, בָ ִּאישׁ הַ הוּא, ties vv. 2 and 3 into one case is
unlikely, but rather, the phrase, בָ ִּאישׁ הַ הוּא, refers to the indefinite person,134 an
impersonal subject,135 any man. This is further confirmed by the prescriptive nature of
this law136 and the fact that the prescriptive texts are goal-oriented.137 Prescriptive texts
do not imply any particular individual, but rather, any or every individual of the covenant
community. The definite article does not modify the nominal phrase,  ִּאישׁ ִּאישׁ, that
introduces an implied subject of this law. In addition, Gesenius stated that the repetition
of a single word, in this case  ִּאישׁ ִּאישׁ, expressed the entirety or the distributive sense,
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Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 664.
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Gane, Old Testament Law for Christians, 89.

Gane, Cult and Character, 22; Baruch A. Levine, “Ugaritic Descriptive Rituals,” JCS 17
(1963): 105–11; Baruch A. Levine, “The Descriptive Tabernacle Texts of the Pentateuch,” JAOS 85
(1965): 307–18; William W. Hallo, “Offerings to the Temple Gates at Ur,” HUCA 38 (1967): 17–58; David
W. Baker, “Leviticus 1–7 and the Punic Tariffs: A Form Critical Comparison,” ZAW 99 (1987): 193; A.
Rainey, “The Order of Sacrifices in Old Testament Ritual Texts,” Biblica 51 (1970): 485–98. Interestingly,
Rainey classified Lev 1–7 as descriptive. See Rainey, “The Order of Sacrifices,” 486–87.
136
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Knierim, Text and Concept in Leviticus 1:1–9, 64–67, 90; Robert E. Longacre, An Anatomy of
Speech Notions, PPPT 3 (Lisse, Netherlands: Peter de Ridder Press, 1976), 199–206; Baker, “Leviticus 1–
7,” 192–93.
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thus it includes every man138 who offers his children to Moloch as introduced in v. 2. The
implied person in this law is not a particular man, but rather any or every man, and הָ ִּאישׁ

 הַ הוּאdoes not convey that the person in vv. 2 and 3 were the same, but rather, points to
any person who offers his/her children to Moloch as introduced in v. 2. Waltke and
O’Connor noticed that the sameness of a person is expressed in a different way, namely,
“ הואprecedes a personal name only in the post-exilic books and has the force of ‘the
same’ without special emphasis.”139
This reading of the law, the inclusion of the implied phrase בַ סֵּ תֶּ ר, does not negate
Cholewinski’s literary structure.

Numbers 19:13, 20
These two texts belong to two different pericopes. The first pericope, vv. 1–13, is
primarily concerned with the preparation of a mixture for purifying human beings and
other objects defiled by the human corpse, while the second, vv. 14–22, provides more
details and introduces the specific conditions of defilement through direct contact and
through the proximity of human beings and other objects to the human corpse.140 Similar
to Lev 15:31, these texts also point out that the neglect of utilizing the procedures to treat
ritual impurity causes defilement of the sanctuary based on the stative nature of the root

 טָ מֵ אthat I suggested above. Num 19:13, 20 do not refer to the action of contracting ritual
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Gesenius, Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, 395.
Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 301.
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Levine, Numbers 1–20, 457; Milgrom, Numbers, 161–62.
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impurity by the sanctuary, but rather, just state that the sanctuary will be defiled. In other
words, these texts do not convey the mode or the way in which the sanctuary would be
defiled, but just conveys that it will be defiled.
These texts do not contain issues that have not been studied and resolved above.
That is, the initial study of stem and aspect along with the semantic and usage patterns of
the verb  טָ מֵ אsuggest that these texts do not support ADH. First, the piel stem of the verb

 טָ מֵ אbrings a totally passive undersubject, without regard to the process, into a certain
state. The verb  טָ מֵ אis always accompanied with other verbs through which its meaning
in relation to the undersubject/direct object is achieved.
In addition, the use of the perfect aspect might appear confusing since the perfect
is used to convey a future event. Still, it is well established by Hebrew grammarians that
the perfect aspect is frequently utilized to convey a result in a future time as a completed
event or state. However, it is possible that the qatal form in the flow of other wayiqtol
forms could refer to the activity that took place before the initial wayiqtol form. The qatal
form would, in this case, function as a pluperfect tense, referring to an action that took
place at a time earlier than the time in the past already referred to. In that case, the
immediate context ultimately assists in arriving at a correct decision on the sense of a
given qatal form. In the case of Num 19:13, 20, the context favors the former alternative.

Summary: Automatic Defilement Hypothesis
Based on the findings in the area of stem, aspect, and the semantics and patterns
of use of the verb  טָ מֵ אused in Lev 15:31; 20:3 and Num 19:13, 20, this study suggests
that ADH is not justifiable.
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First, the part of Waltke’s and O’Connor’s theory that piel is always factitive if
qal of the same verb is stative is valid in the case of  טָ מֵ אwithin the limits of the
Pentateuch. In other words, piel brings a totally passive undersubject, without regard to
the process, into the state depicted by an adjective. By utilizing a method specifically
developed to examine Waltke’s and O’Connor’s theory of piel, Beckman’s research did
not provide sufficient evidence to disprove it when applied to the verbs that convey
abstract, conceptual, or metaphorical meanings like  טָ מֵ אor קָ דַ שׁ. However, this postulate
regarding piel is not complete. Second, building on this, the present study has detected a
twofold pattern of  טָ מֵ אuses in the Pentateuch. This verb is always accompanied with
other verbs through which its meaning onto the undersubject/direct object it modifies is
achieved, and physical contact between the entity transmitting and contacting impurity is
always included. Third, the verbal aspects of  טָ מֵ אin the contexts of Lev 15:31; 20:3 and
Num 19:13, 20 contain nuances that do not lend support for the ADH. All these three
points are reinforced as I focus on the issues pertaining to each of these texts and propose
their interpretation.

Interpretation of Leviticus 15:31
Building on the arguments just presented, the present study focuses on the more
subtle grammatical, syntactic, and semantic irregularities. The seriousness of these
oversights showed that the instrumental sense “by defiling my tabernacle that is in their
midst” is not justifiable, consequently making ADH unsustainable.
First, ADH disregards established grammatical rules related to the Infinitive
construct. It takes the infinitive construct of  טָ מֵ אpreceded by the preposition ב, to
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function as a noun which is not typical. Rather, the preposition  בis attached to the
infinitive construct when it is used nominally. In addition, the preposition  בwith the
meaning of beth instrumenti, is by rule attached to a regular noun and not the verb/verbal
noun. Finally, when used nominally, the infinitive construct either stands alone or is
preceded by the preposition ל.
Second, ADH takes the infinitive construct of the verb  טָ מֵ אas a finite, active
verb. Based on the analysis of the  טָ מֵ אoccurrences in the Pentateuch presented in this
study, this is problematic due to the fact that  טָ מֵ אis a stative verb when intransitive.
Statistics on טָ מֵ א, as demonstrated above, showed that  טָ מֵ אis a binary verb in terms of
syntactic and semantic transitivity. However, it was also established that when
intransitive,  טָ מֵ אis stative, not a finite, active verb.
Third, defilement expressed by  טָ מֵ אis never an action encapsulated within the
semantic range of the verb  טָ מֵ אitself. It conveys a defiled state of a particular entity
which is achieved by the use of some other verb/s or is its inherited state. It always
depends on the other verbal actions, found along with  טָ מֵ אor in the surrounding texts, to
achieve the meaning it conveys. Some of the verbs, like to touch, to carry, to sit, to eat,
and so on, are used in order to convey the actual manner of how an entity contracted טָ מֵ א
status.
Fourth, contracting the state of  טָ מֵ אalways includes some sort of physical contact
between the defiled and profane entity in order to transmit defilement from the former to
the latter or both entities, source and recipient of the impurity, are inside a closed space.
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Fifth, the concept of ellipsis, as a foundational concept for the concept of delay,
does exist in the biblical cultic and legal texts. This fact is well recognized by both camps
of the ADH. The same applies to the concept of delay. However, the delay to undergo
prescribed procedures to handle impurity does not enable it to grow from minor into
major, but rather causes the defilement of the entire camp and the tent of meeting via an
uncontrollable transmission within the covenant community.
In light of these grammatical, syntactical particularities found in Lev 15:31 and
the semantics along with the patterns of use of the verb טָ מֵ א, the instrumental translation
followed by the proponents of this hypothesis contains significant grammatical
irregularities. These substantial oversights imbedded in the process of forming the
instrumental translation of this text make this translation highly unconvincing, which
subsequently discredits the entire hypothesis.
In addition, this translation/interpretation is in sharp contrast with the rabbinic
understanding of these texts. That is, as noted by both camps of modern interpreters,
rabbis viewed that the defilement of the sanctuary occurs via direct contact between the
impure and profane entity.141 Interestingly, it was demonstrated that the preference for the
instrumental142 or the temporal translation/interpretation143 is distributed equally among
English translations of the Bible.
On the other hand, the temporal sense “when they defile my tabernacle that is in

Milgrom, Numbers, 445; Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 167; Rodríguez, “Transfer of Sin in
Leviticus,” 173–74n7.
141
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ESV, NASB, NET, NRSV.

143

ASV, KJV, NKJV.
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their midst,” does not conflict with grammatical, syntactic, and semantic rules.
First, the temporal interpretation considers that the infinitive construct +
preposition  בconstruction conveys temporal sense which is well established by Hebrew
grammarians. Second, the piel of the verb  טָ מֵ אis considered as a stative verb in this text
since it is intransitive. In addition to the factitive understanding of piel with this particular
verb, the temporal interpretation agrees with the pattern of uses of  טָ מֵ אestablished in this
study. Third, the present study demonstrated that  טָ מֵ אstrictly follows a certain pattern of
use in the Pentateuch. That is, it is always accompanied with other helping verbs that
convey the exact mode of how  טָ מֵ אachieves its meaning. Fourth, achieving a  טָ מֵ אstate
always includes contact between the defiling and profane entities. Fifth, the concept of
ellipsis and delay that are part of the debate of defilement transmission do not override
the temporal sense. These two concepts do exist in the Pentateuch. When they are
interpreted within the Pentateuchal corpus without imposing preconceived ideas upon the
texts that imply elliptical statements, they support the temporal sense. Based on the
patterns of use of טָ מֵ א, the ellipsis “if impure person touches sancta” is implied in this
text. Also, delay does not mean that a minor impurity grows into a major one if there is
the case of delay in handling them, but rather, makes room for the defilement of the entire
camp and the tent of meeting via uncontrollable transmission of impurity among the
covenantal community. Finally, as showed above, the temporal sense is accepted in
rabbinic literature.
This study showed that Hebrew grammarians have proposed well-established
rules in the area of grammar and syntax as well as the semantics of the verb טָ מֵ א, which
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are highly helpful to determine the most plausible meaning of Lev 15:31. The present
study attempted to incorporate these rules onto Lev 15:31 and arrived at the conclusion
that the instrumental sense is less plausible than the temporal. It actually results from
significant grammatical, syntactic, and semantical irregularities. The temporal sense in
Lev 15:31, on the other hand, does not collide with grammatical or syntactical rules or
the semantic sense of the verb טָ מֵ א. It has to be admitted that the temporal sense in Lev
15:31 does not provide the way the defilement actually takes place, but just proposes a
potential defiled state of the sanctuary in the future. However, the manner by which the
sanctuary gets defiled is very explicitly specified in the Pentateuch (Lev 10:1–2; 12:4). In
other words, defilement takes place through direct contact as a part of  טָ מֵ אpatterns of use
in the Pentateuch, as demonstrated in the present study.

Interpretation of Leviticus 20:3
Besides the understanding of stem, aspect, and semantic features of טָ מֵ א, two
issues challenge ADH in this text: (1) the meaning and function of the preposition למַ עַן
that connects the first two and last clause, and (2) the structural and conceptual
inconsistencies under the assumption that this law consists of two, instead of three cases.
First, of two possible senses, purpose and intention, the preposition  למַ עַןconveys
the resultative sense in this text. It never conveys the causative sense in order to provide
grounds for the interpretation that offering one's children to Moloch itself defiles the
sanctuary, as the proponents of ADH imply. Rather, this preposition conveys the fact that
offering one's children to Moloch results in defiling the sanctuary. As Brongers
suggested, the best translation of it would be “the consequence of which will be.” This
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understanding is in accordance with the understanding of piel stem, the aspect of the
infinitive construct, and patterns of uses of  טָ מֵ אin the Pentateuch. As established above,
piel brings a totally passive undersubject, without regard to the process, into a certain
state. The infinitive construct acts as a finite verb in this text because it is transitive in a
resultative clause. The infinitive construct is frequently used in resultative clauses in BH
and, in that case, it is introduced by the preposition למַ עַן. Finally, the well-established
pattern of  טָ מֵ אuses in the Pentateuch points to the fact that this verb always requires
another helping verb to achieve its meaning. All these insights suggest that an additional
activity is implied between the first two and the third clause of this text as the preposition
introducing the third clause points to. Based on the established pattern of uses of  טָ מֵ אin
the Pentateuch, that additional activity would imply direct contact between the idolater
and the sanctuary through his/her coming to the sanctuary.
Second, the structure of the law in Lev 20:1–5 faces significant internal
conceptual inconsistencies if it is assumed that it consists of two cases, vv. 2–3, and vv.
4–5. Cholewinski suggested the most detailed structure of this passage that assumes two
cases. In that case, v. 3 represents the additional punishment to death by stoning in v. 2,
understood to be either extinction of the lineage or punishment in the afterlife. Staying
within the limits of this text only, the first inconsistency is the disparity of punishments
for the same sin. That is, in v. 2, the punishment for idolatry is death by stoning, while in
v. 4, it is either extinction of the lineage or punishment in the afterlife. Death by stoning
is standard punishment for idolatry. A second inconsistency is that the people cannot
disregard the idolater in v. 4–5, if they experience premature death in v. 3 as a part of
God’s administering punishment upon them. Verses 4–5 are superfluous in this case.
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Finally, if God punishes the idolater only when the covenant community does not, as was
evident in vv. 4–5, then this fact points to the claim that God in v. 3, punishes because
people do not know that the act of idolatry took place amongst them. These
inconsistencies led scholars to propose that v. 3 represent the separate subcase of the law,
implying the ellipsis, “if he does it secretly.” In that case,  וis not used as a conjunctive
“and,” but coordinative particle “or.” As Wells’ work on the law of testimony shows, in
some BLs, significant details are left out, but yet assumed. In addition, the use of the
phrase, “from the midst of one’s people,” as well as “from one’s people,” accompanied
mainly with the verb  כ ַָרתand in one case, the verb  אָבַ דand another  מוּתin the Pentateuch
convincingly prove that premature death is an implied punishment in those contexts. The
phrase  בָ ִּאישׁ הַ הוּאin vv. 3 does not designate the exact person mentioned in v. 2, thus
connecting these two verses into one unit, but rather, it refers to any person who commits
idolatry. This phrase is also mentioned in vv. 4 and 5, and it is impossible that the very
same person is implied since v. 4 indisputably introduces a new subcase. Thus, בָ ִּאישׁ הַ הוּא
refers to an impersonal, indefinite individual who commits idolatry. Cholewinski’s
persuasive literary structure is not affected by the inclusion of the implied elliptical
phrase בַ סֵּ תֶּ ר.
Accordingly, the understanding of the stem, aspect, and semantic influences of

טָ מֵ א, along with the meaning and function of the preposition  למַ עַןand structural and
conceptual inconsistencies under the assumption that this law consists of two, rather than
three cases does not support ADH. Verse 3 is a separate case in which implied ellipsis, “if
he does it secretly,” resolves internal conceptual inconsistencies of a two-subcase, literary
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structure, thus allowing the idolater to come to the sanctuary and defile it through direct
contact since the covenant community does not know it and is not able to prevent it.

Interpretation of Numbers 19:13, 20
Building on the findings regarding the stem, aspect, and semantic of  טָ מֵ אalong
with established patterns of its use in the Pentateuch, this study suggests that an
interpretation that more carefully understands the grammatical, syntactical, and semantic
insights related to the texts in Num 19:13, 20 indicates that ADH is not textually
supported.
The piel stem of the verb  טָ מֵ אis factitive. It brings a totally passive direct object
into the certain state without regard to the process. The perfect aspect is frequently
utilized to convey result in future times as a completed state. The verb  טָ מֵ אis always
accompanied by other verbs through which its meaning onto the direct object it modifies
is achieved. Accordingly, these insights regarding stem and aspect utilized in Num 19:13,
20 along with the semantics and patterns of uses of  טָ מֵ אin the Pentateuch do not support
ADH. Rather, these texts speak of the result that will take place in the future. The exact
mode of how this result is achieved in indicated by the pattern uses of טָ מֵ א, namely via
direct contact.
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CHAPTER 6

LAYING ON OF HAND/S: A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH

The third section of the present study explores the ritual theory that would
correlate with findings on the meaning/function of the ritual activity of laying on of
hand/s. This theory was primarily needed to offer a vocabulary, and to some extent, a
conceptual framework that is necessary for interpreting ritual activity such as laying on of
hands. The second part of the third section and this chapter is an evaluation of the
arguments against the Transfer and/or Substitution Theory and suggestions of the
arguments from the present study for its validity.

Ritual Theory
Establishing a conceptual framework based on approaches of the most often
consulted scientific disciplines in ritual studies1 in order to apply them to the biblical
ritual texts is not the goal of the present study. The trend just explained is articulated by
Wright, currently one of the most influential scholars of biblical ritual texts, who

1

Since ritual is imbedded in the larger concept of human existence, the study of ritual is
interdisciplinary in its nature and often encompasses multiple scientific disciplines such as sociology,
anthropology, study of religion, literary criticism, study of theatrical performance, and psychology.
Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 8; Frank H. Gorman, “Ritual Studies and Biblical Studies: Assessment of
the Past, Prospects for the Future,” Semeia 67 (1994): 13, 20. Klingbeil added philosophy, the study of
intellectual history, history of religion later renamed to comparative religions, and sociobiology. Klingbeil,
Bridging the Gap, 23; David P. Wright, “The Study of Ritual in the Hebrew Bible,” in The Hebrew Bible:
New Insights and Scholarship, ed. Frederick E. Greenspahn, JSTFC 4 (New York: New York University
Press, 2008), 120.
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correctly described the present trend in biblical studies, including the study of biblical
ritual texts, in their quest for the conceptual framework: “Biblical studies thrives on the
application of models and methods developed outside the discipline, especially those
from the social sciences. This is particularly true in the study of ritual.”2 On the one hand,
scholars of biblical ritual texts use the scientific disciplines that study ritual which are
undeniably closely related to the study of human experience of ritual and as such can
shed light on the topic. On the other hand, these scientific disciplines are established on
the presuppositions that are opposite to the presuppositions found in biblical texts.3
Accordingly, the biblical text is a safeguard from incorporating elements that collide with
the claims found in biblical ritual texts, as well as with their broader literary context into
the ritual theory of biblical ritual.
Being totally opposite in its approach, the intention of this study was to identify
data from the biblical texts that would inform ritual theory and recommend the meaning
of cultic rituals in the Pentateuch. Biblical scholars usually create a conceptual
framework based on some combination of multiple disciplines and then apply it to
biblical texts.4 By establishing a conceptual framework based solely on biblical texts,

Wright, “Ritual Theory, Ritual Texts,” 195. Wright listed some of the most recent works that
used the socio-theoretical approach that mainly focuses on the application of this approach to cultic ritual,
specifically sacrifice. These are Gane, Cult and Character; Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible;
Gruenwald, Rituals and Ritual Theory in Ancient Israel; Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple;
Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap; Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement.
2

3

Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap, 23–44, especially 43.

4
Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual; Gruenwald, Rituals and Ritual Theory in Ancient Israel; Gane,
Cult and Character; Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap, 23.
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ritual texts for the particular mechanics of the ritual, and others texts for broader elements
of a conceptual framework, the possibility of importing conceptual components that are
foreign to the biblical texts or world view is decreased.
The two ritual theories that the present research finds to be in concurrence with
the method utilized here are those of Gorman and Gane. In his quest for the meaning of
ritual texts in the OT, Gorman placed emphasis on the conceptual, ideological, and
theological framework of Pentateuchal rituals. The present study also contributed in that
direction, especially in regard to the concept of sin and atonement. Gane emphasized the
sufficiency of biblical texts to provide meaning for rituals introduced in the Pentateuch.
Both theories are based on Gorman’s and Gane’s doctoral research.
In his doctoral dissertation, Ritual Dynamic Structure, Gane eloquently succeeded
in preserving the biblical text as ultimate and decisive data for the elements of the
conceptual framework for his ritual theory, regardless of a considerable inclusion of the
insights from the comparatives studies5 and systems science.6 Two postulates of Gane’s
ritual theory are that (1) ritual, as performed by human beings, consists of human activity
and, as such, should be viewed as a human activity system7 and that (2) the texts, in this
case biblical ritual texts, are the only and sufficient access to biblical rituals in order to
retrieve their function/meaning.8 These two points are simple, but yet, foundational for

5

Gane, Ritual Dynamic Structure, 13–114, 199–326.

6
Gane adapted the General Systems Theory of Brian Wilson for examining human activity
systems. B. Wilson, Systems: Concepts, Methodologies, and Applications (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley,
1984); Gane, Cult and Character, 7–9. For more details on systems of science, see George E. Mobus and
Michael C. Kalton, Principles of Systems Science (New York: Springer, 2015).
7

Gane, Ritual Dynamic Structure, 26–35.

8

Gane, Cult and Character, 4.

618

the analysis of biblical ritual texts. The second point generated considerable debate and is
presented in the following subheading before presenting Gane’s ritual theory.
Wright, on the other hand, has recently articulated the three main issues that
prevent the application of socio-theoretical approaches to biblical rituals. All of them are
based on the fact that biblical ritual is not observable, but rather, can only be examined
based on their textual representation. It is important to note that the basis for Wright’s
conclusions regarding the ritual are cultic rituals in the Pentateuch which he clearly
delineated from non-cultic rituals.9 However, the majority of the general claims that he
made regarding ritual in the Bible cannot be applied to Pentateuchal cultic ritual which is
explained below. These three issues are (1) insufficiency of the text to communicate the
meaning of the ritual, (2) genre of the text, and (3) redactional work of the text.

Insufficiency of Ritual Texts
Wright claimed that the necessity for the data source for biblical ritual to be a text
is philosophically and phenomenologically problematic because it includes the equivocal
use of the term ritual in relation to its source, that is, the text. The term ritual is used to
refer to both prescriptive and descriptive ritual texts. He pointed out that none of these
two types of ritual texts is equivalent to the actual performance of the ritual itself, but that
instead, they describe or prescribe the ritual.10

9
Wright stated: “It should be kept in mind that cultic ritual (as found in PH) is a sub-category of
ritual. The cult includes practices and phenomena associated with temples or sanctuaries, such as sacrifice,
holiness, purity, priesthood, and festivals. A student interested in ritual in the Bible broadly should look
beyond the cult and beyond PH.” Wright, “Ritual Theory, Ritual Texts,” 196. However, he significantly
resorted to the non-cultic ritual to establish his claims, such as Gen 4, 29; Deut 16; Job 29–30; Ezek 44:9–
17, rather than studying cultic rituals. Wright, “Ritual Theory, Ritual Texts,” 199, 213.

Wright, “Ritual Theory, Ritual Texts,” 197.

10
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Building on this inference, Wright further postulated that “these texts, even the
most detailed of them, do not contain enough information for a reconstruction of
performances.” However, Wright himself responded to the unsustainability of this claim:
Nonetheless, prescriptions for actual ritual performances (e.g., Hittite, Akkadian, or
Ugaritic ritual texts) often assume and depend on the background knowledge of
performers. They prescribe only enough detail to activate this background knowledge.
But this is exactly the problem with real prescriptive texts. The more they seek to
prescribe actual practice, the less detail they may contain, rendering them almost
impenetrable in terms of sociological analysis.
The fact that ritual texts assume a certain acquaintance of the ritual performers to
the ritual points to the fact that the emphasis of the biblical ritual texts was not on the
ritual performance, but rather, these texts were designed to carry out certain goal/s as is
usually stated in biblical cultic ritual texts. Both types of biblical ritual texts, prescriptive
or descriptive, sometimes lack essential details, but they rarely lack goal formulas. A
considerable number of performance elements of which the performance act consists,
beyond the prescribed or described account of them, rest on the participants/performers
themselves of the performance act. In other words, they are not written down, but rather,
uniquely involved and played out as properties of the performers/participants themselves.
However, the prescribed or described account of the performance act conveys and
contains the basic notion/message/lesson/goal.
The same issue informed Knierim’s understandable doubt regarding the
soundness of applying Victor Turner’s ritual theory to the biblical text: “Turner’s
interpretations are the result of field studies of actually observed ritual performances. His
text describes and interprets those performances. But while a prescriptive text about a
ritual [i.e., like a PH text] will probably also reveal its hermeneutical system to a certain
extent, it must not e silentio be presumed to be descriptive of actual performance, not
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only because there is-as in our biblical texts-no evidence for it but also because even such
description represents an interpretive distancing vis-à-vis the performance.”11 Also, …
“the prescription of a ritual in a text is not identical with the description of an observed
ritual, let alone with a performed ritual itself.”12
Thus, Wright’s concern that “the distance of text, phenomenologically and
practically, from actual performance is almost enough to thwart sociological analysis” is
totally accurate. However, realization of this fact does not detain one from studying the
ritual, since biblical cultic ritual texts were ideologically shaped to provide data for a
theological analysis, rather than a sociological one. Thus, the texts, prescriptive and
descriptive, remain the primary analytical sources from which a researcher obtains
insights into the meaning and purposes of a given biblical cultic ritual. Instead of
realizing this, Wright considered this as an insufficiency for extrapolating a full meaning
of ritual texts: “In these cases, extracting or modulating aspects of theoretical approaches
and application to biblical ritual texts becomes more the study of a literary motif in the
text than of real-world social phenomena.”13
Constructing his own theory upon B. Wilson’s profound study of human activity
systems,14 Gane endorsed an apparent fact that ritual is “an activity system.”15 As Wilson
pointed out, “the goal/raison d'être defining such a system is to accomplish a particular
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transformation through an activity process.”16 Thus, it is not the activities themselves that
define the system, since they themselves are meaningless and prone to various or multiple
meanings,17 but it is the goal that determines which actions are vital for accomplishing a
desired change and how are they performed.18 These insights confirm that a sociological
interpretation of the biblical ritual texts should be taken as a secondary tool in order to
shed additional light on the meaning of the ritual, since these texts are not written from a
sociological perspective with emphasis on the performance, but rather, are goal-informed
and goal-shaped. The primary approach remains the theological one.19 In other words,
God instituted rituals with certain goal imbedded in their textual representation.
The claims Wright pointed to disclose that his goal in studying biblical cultic
ritual texts is a reconstruction of the ritual performance which is a valid enterprise, but
totally neglects the fact that biblical ritual texts were not written to be a “script” for ritual
performance. The fact that insight into a given biblical cultic ritual is conveyed by the

16
Wilson, Systems, 16, 26; Gane, Cult and Character, 12. Gane found that this claim is in
agreement with what is found in many biblical ritual texts. He pointed to one of them: “We found earlier
that Lev 16:16 expresses the goal of special purification offerings: to purge the inner sanctum from ritual
impurities and moral faults. The goal is to effect transformation (purging) through activities, namely, by
sprinkling blood (vv. 14–15).” Gane, Cult and Character, 12.
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text itself is an advantage since it preserves the critical function of a given ritual which is
its goal, rather than all the absent secondary elements which are prone to modifications.
Thus, Wright’s point that both prescriptive and descriptive ritual texts in the OT do not
provide a full explanation of the ritual performance and are not subject to sociological
analysis is well noted and undeniably accurate. However, this accurate assessment is out
of context, since none of these two points stands in the ideological fabric of the
production and the purpose of these texts.

Genre Is an Impediment in Ritual Texts
Wright also pointed to another issue that makes prescriptive and descriptive
biblical ritual texts insufficient for sociological analysis: the fact that ritual is featured in
various genres in the OT. He stated the following regarding the Pentateuchal rituals:
As for the Priestly-Holiness writings in particular, the corpus has generally been
understood to encode actual cultic practice at some particular point in Israelite or
Jewish history or directly prescribe practice that is to be performed. This may
misapprehend the genre. There are a number of indications that the portrayals of ritual
in P H are academic abstractions or idealizations that significantly transcend practice.
However, Pentateuchal ritual texts still retain emphasis on the ritual goal in
various genres, rather than presenting themselves for sociological analysis and
performance. Historical peculiarities do not necessarily include a significant amount of
“hermeneutically transforming sources, creatively filling in gaps, and inventing events
and details. In doing this, the writers no doubt built on the customs prevailing at the time
of their writing,” as Wright assumed.20 Wright’s quotation raises the question of what
ritual he had in mind. There is not a single ritual text from the OT he referred to that

Wright, “Ritual Theory, Ritual Texts,” 200–201.
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demonstrates this source transformation, gaps filling, or events or details inventing.21
Lester L. Grabbe correctly noted that the book of Leviticus does not provide full
prescriptive/descriptive descriptions for a ritual performance in the smallest detail.22
However, Knierim has proven that biblical ritual prescriptions are composed, in a way as
to regulate the essential steps of valid performance so that the rituals can accomplish their
intended purposes/goals.23
Knierim delineated 4 points that expose the incompleteness of biblical ritual
texts:24
1. They do not include all actions that must, of practical necessity, be performed.
The text’s presentation is selective and serves its interpretation of activities
according to its perspective.
2. They control activities at various levels of detail, often sketching flows of
activities with broad strokes, without providing finer points of performance at
the lowest hierarchical levels.
3. The order in which activities are presented in a ritual prescription does not
always indicate the chronological sequence of their performance.
4. A ritual activity paradigm may be subject to adaptation in different contexts.25
Gane subsequently importantly concluded the following:
When the biblical text provides the overall goal of a ritual (e.g., Lev 4:31b), gaps
in our knowledge regarding details of physical actions, such as the precise manner of
slaughter or removal of suet, do not pose a serious problem for the interpretation of the

Wright, “Ritual Theory, Ritual Texts,” 199–202. He did describe Lev 25 and Num 35 as
examples of “highly idealized, utopian, and impractical practices.”
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overall function/meaning of the ritual, provided that we are content with the meaning
supplied by the text.26
Knierim recognized the difference of ritual interpretation when one studies a
prescriptive text which differs significantly from the descriptive text of the same ritual
and the fact that both texts differ from the interpretation of a performed ritual.27 Not
realizing these limitations, modern interpreters of ritual text are prone to the danger of
importing elements from their own world view into the interpretation of a given ritual
that are not based on the actual experience of a given ritual.28

Textual Redaction Is an Impediment in Ritual Texts
This argument rests on two points. First, the presence of redaction strata in the
Pentateuch presents its own way of how concepts and topics are portrayed. This issue is
heavily informed by historical-critical presuppositions, and thus, it is more a matter of
interpretation, than a valid argument. Second, the extent of redactional work in
Pentateuchal texts is a subject of extensive debate and does not necessarily include a
conflicting stance or direction on a given concept as Wright assumed.29
The recent works of Yoel Elitzur, Ian Young, Robert Rezetko, and Martin
Ehrensvärd have suggested that a sharp distinction between Classical/Standard BH and
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Late BH suggested by Avi Hurvitz30 is not well argued and consequently, cannot be a
solid basis for dating the biblical books.31 It has to be taken into account that this sharp
distinction between two language strata within the biblical canon is foundational for
understanding that the Pentateuch consists of various literary sources,32 and being subject
to a totally opposite view, it cannot be taken as a valid argument. Young’s overall
conclusion is that the different language strata suggested by Hurvitz were a coexisting
style of language.33 Overall, the five pillars of Documentary Hypothesis and the
hypothesis in totality have been heavily disputed in the past and continue to be disputed
in the present, as well as.34 Thus, these two issues are rather a matter of interpretation
affected by certain presuppositions than real textual issues. As soon as one understands
that biblical ritual texts are created with a specific goal and first lend themselves to
theological interpretation rather than sociological or any other, these issues vanish.

30
Avi Hurvitz, A Linguistic Study of the Relationship between the Priestly Source and the Book of
Ezekiel: A New Approach to an Old Problem, CahRB 20 (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1982); Avi Hurvitz, “The
Language of the Priestly Source and Its Historical Setting: The Case for an Early Date” in Proceedings of
the Eighth World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, August 16–21, 1981 (Jerusalem: World Union of
Jewish Studies, 1983), 5:83–94; Avi Hurvitz, “Dating the Priestly Source in Light of the Historical Study of
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Frank Gorman
Frank Gorman has accurately noticed the lack of research regarding the
conceptual, ideological, and theological framework of Pentateuchal ritual texts in earlier
studies. In the past, these studies focused on the analysis of the texts by employing
various approaches, such as literary criticism, form criticism, and tradition historical
criticism, rather than on the meaning of the ritual. Gorman also noticed that these studies
did not try to reconstruct the ritual system.35 In contrast, the work of Jacob Milgrom,
Baruch Levine, Menahem Haran, and Gordon Wenham attempted to explicate the larger
conceptual framework of the ritual system in order to understand it better. Their goal was
to uncover the meaning of the ritual.36
With a similar goal in mind and in order to contribute towards a fuller
understanding of the ritual system as described in the Pentateuch, the present study
focuses on two neglected yet critical components of the Pentateuchal ritual system: sin
and atonement. This is not to say that scholars have not researched these two concepts.
On the contrary, scholars have made significant efforts to understand them, as the present
work demonstrates, but they often overlooked important nuances in regard to both sin and
atonement. In addition, the scholars used methods that have been questioned of late, and
for valid reasons. Therefore, this work attempts to pinpoint the weaknesses of previous
studies on sin and atonement, especially in relation to method and interpretation, and to
identify their impact on certain meanings attached to the laying on of hands.
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In addition to Gane’s ritual theory, which deals with a variety of technical
elements in an attempt to identify the meaning of ritual that the present work adopts, I
also find Gorman’s work helpful in decoding biblical ritual. That is, Gorman emphasized
the importance of the social context of the ritual, and thus attempted to form a system of
beliefs that are helpful in identifying what the ritual achieves or what it communicates.
Gorman affirmed that ritual is a form of communication. He stated:
Ritual is viewed as a symbol system and rituals are viewed as symbolic statements or
encoded performances that act out or dramatize an already existing social message.
Ritual symbols have a referential quality that points to a meaning that exists outside
the rituals themselves. In order to understand rituals, one must break their symbolic
code and determine their linguistic message. Generally, this means translating the
non-verbal into the verbal, the irrational into the rational, activity into language.37
He identified four key characteristics of communication in biblical ritual. The
basic postulate of Gorman’s ritual theory is that ritual “brings about a change in the state
of being or status of one or more of these areas and/or to make a declaration about the
state of being or status in one or more of these areas.”38 First, ritual affects the state of
being or status of an individual involved in it, such as transition from one state of being
or status to another. Second, rituals affect the entire society, not just an individual, and
they are performed in order to preserve the well-being of the entire society. This point is
reflected in the fact that there are two basic types of rituals in the Pentateuch that have the
role of preserving or maintaining social well-being and reestablishing it when it is
broken. The ultimate goal of the ritual is to prevent the breakdown of social order and
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well-being.39 Third, biblical ritual affects the state of the natural world God created and
its order, or in Gorman’s words, the cosmos. Through ritual, humans participate in
maintaining the divinely created order. Fourth, ritual communicates how a certain social
group perceives divine-human interaction. For example, the most developed ritual of
sacrificial offerings always takes place “before God” or “at the door of the tent of
meeting.” Therefore, sacrificial ritual processes are performed in the presence of God, in
relation to deity. Gorman accurately emphasized that all four of these areas are
interrelated and interdependent.40Moreover, Gorman noticed that sin and defilement are
crucial in biblical ritual. Rituals are often enacted in order to maintain or restore
situations disturbed by sin or defilement.41
According to many scholars, Milgrom has produced the most significant work on
biblical rituals in the twentieth century.42 In his analysis, he extensively used insights
from comparative ANE texts, biblical texts, and Judaic sources. In addition, he has made
significant progress towards a better understanding of the biblical ritual system in both its
details and its larger conceptual structures and categories. However, his research did not
focus on theoretical issues involving ritual.43 In contrast, Klawans has demonstrated
various theoretical and methodological questions in relation to Milgrom’s work on ritual
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and moral purity, and sacrifice.44 Consequently, although Milgrom’s work will continue
to be valuable, it does not lack possibilities for refinement.
Regardless of the recent advancements in the study of biblical ritual, no study,
including Milgrom’s, has conducted a systematic analysis of sin, which is a basic concept
embedded in ancient Israel’s religion. Furthermore, the topic of atonement has raised
more interest among scholars but, as stated in chapter five of the present study, their
research is mostly informed by insights from ANE texts. The present study offers an indepth study of both sin and atonement based primarily on biblical texts.
The present study is essentially attempting to identify the meaning/function of
laying on of hand/s on the sacrificial animal in the Pentateuch. This ritual gesture is a part
of a broader religious context of biblical religion. As was established in the introduction,
the present study focuses on two specific components of this broader religious context of
biblical religion, sin and/or GHS which is human disadvantage in divine-human
interaction and atonement. The former precedes the laying on of hands, while the latter
follows it in the sacrifices defined in Lev 1–5:26 [6:7].
Therefore, the Pentateuch portrays human beings as inherently sinful, which this
study refers to as GHS, and at times ritually and morally impure. All three features that
the Pentateuch associates with humans are discussed above on pages 400–14 in the
present work. In contrast, God is holy and dwells in the tabernacle.45 He is the one who
shaped all aspects of ancient Israel with his laws.46 Consequently, such a disparity
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between God and humans necessitates some sort of mediation in order to provide a
context for safe divine-human interaction. Biblical texts assign this mediatory role to the
ritual of offering various sacrifices.
The offerer offers his/her sacrifice for different reasons to provide a context for
safe divine-human interaction. For example, if a burnt or grain offering is presented, the
offerer seeks acceptance. A well-being offering was offered for multiple reasons, such as
thanksgiving (Lev 7:12–15), fulfilment of a vow (Lev 7:16), or freewill/voluntary
offering (Lev 7:16). In the case of a sin or reparation offering, the offerer seeks
forgiveness. In any of these cases, the offerer is always in an underprivileged state
because of his/her GHS; therefore he/she needs to be atoned before God. The offerer's
underprivileged state becomes even more deteriorated if he/she has violated any of God’s
commandments. In order to identify the meaning/function of laying on of hands, the
present study conducted a detailed study of both of these components of biblical religion,
sin/GHS, and atonement.

Roy Gane
Gane further singled out 7 basic premises of his theory. He found solid textual
support for each of these presuppositions. The guiding principle in Gane’s analysis was
this question: Where does the meaning of a given ritual reside? Two potential domains
are (1) prescribed or described physical activity or (2) the interpretation of these activities
as found in the texts.47 The development of Gane’s theory showed that the
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function/meaning is to be found in the latter.48

Ritual Actions and Substances Do Not Have Inherent Meaning
Gane has recognized that Pentateuchal ritual texts confirm the fact that ritual
actions do not have a fixed, inherent meaning. He relied on Staal’s work where he
demonstrated that “a given ritual can have more than one meaning.”49 Pentateuchal cultic
texts confirm this semantic multifacetedness of ritual activities.50 Gane detected multiple
examples:
In the outer sanctum of the Israelite sanctuary, the high priest sprinkles blood seven
times “before the veil” as part of purification ( )חטאתofferings on behalf of himself
and of the community, respectively (Lev 4:6, 17). During the special Day of
Atonement purification offerings he sprinkles blood seven times in the inner sanctum
(16:14–15), the outer sanctum (v. 16b—abbreviated), and on the altar in the courtyard
(v. 19). Although 4:6, 17 does not state the meaning of its sevenfold sprinklings,
16:16a explains such aspersions in the inner sanctum as effecting purgation (rpk) of
this area from the impurities and moral faults of the Israelites. Later in the same
ritual, however, v. 19 attributes another meaning to the sevenfold sprinkling on the
outer altar: to (re)consecrate (vdq) it. Thus, the same activity carries two related, but
distinct functions in the same ritual.51
Thus, the same ritual activity in Lev 16:16 and 19 have different meanings. The
seven-fold sprinkling cleansed the sanctuary and reconsecrated the altar, respectively.
Gane did not assign any particular meaning in this quotation to the first activity,
the high priest’s sprinkling before the veil in Lev 4:6, 17, since it is not stated. However,
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based on the fact that the sinner in both cases left the sanctuary forgiven and that the
sanctuary in Lev 16:16 is cleansed “from the impurities of the sons of Israel and because
of their transgressions in regard to all their sins,” (וּמפִּ שׁעֵיהֶּ ם לכָל־
ִּ ִּמטֻּמאֹ ת בנֵי יִּשׂ ָראֵ ל

)חַ טּ ֹאתָ ם, one can conclude that in Lev 4, the sprinkling had a function of transferring the
sins involved in the atonement process to the most holy place. This would expand even
more the semantic multifacetedness of a single ritual activity. I begin to introduce here
and highlight later on the fact that the context of ritual activity also plays a role in
determining the meaning of a given ritual activity which was also emphasized by Gane.
Gane endorsed Staal’s insight that the meaning of the ritual activity is assigned to
it from sources like culture or religious authority52 and made a profound statement:
“Recognizing that ritual actions have no inherent meaning aids ritual analysis by sparing
us the trouble of searching for some ‘holy grail’ of essential meaning and by keeping us
from unjustifiably importing meaning from one context to another because we incorrectly
assume that the function of identical actions must be the same.”53

Ritual Consists of Activity and Attached Meaning
Gane did not follow Staal completely in his understanding of the ritual activity
meaning. Gane’s critique of Staal is directed towards Staal’s claim that, based on the fact
that activities are intrinsically meaningless, rituals are meaningless, too.54 Gane proposed
that “physical activities alone do not constitute ritual or set it apart from nonritual

52

Gane, Cult and Character, 5.

53

Gane, Cult and Character, 6.

54

Staal, Rules Without Meaning, 433.

633

activity.”55 He correctly insisted that there has to be some kind of meaning attached to the
ritual that sets it apart from other non-ritual activities.
Even if a ritual is “fossilized” in the sense that its meaning has been lost, the tradition
of performing it as a ritual is remembered because at some time in the past it was
believed to do something over and above the physical cause and effect of its
activities. If an activity system was never believed to have any kind of “efficacy,”
whether religious, magical, social, or otherwise, I would not regard it as a “ritual,” at
least not in the full sense of the word.56
Accordingly, physical activities and meaning attached to them are two basic and
essential components of a ritual57 which necessitates that a ritual be symbolic in its
nature.58 This symbolic nature of rituals was emphasized already in the first century BC
by Rabbi Hillel.59 Gane correctly concluded that “in ritual a nonmaterial entity (e.g., sin)
can be treated as if it belongs to the material domain so that it can be subject to physical
interaction and manipulation.”
The attached meaning for Pentateuchal ritual texts where one finds otherwise
incoherent and meaningless ritual activities is found in the Israelite religious system.
Gane delineated 3 basic inferences stemming from the Israelite religion as it attaches
meaning to cultic rituals: (1) “the religious system can assign different meanings to a
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given activity…,”60 (2) “a given activity can carry more than one meaning at the same
time…,”61 (3) “different activities can carry the same meaning…,”62 and (4) “we are as
dependent on a ritual tradition to provide us with meanings at every stage of development
as we must rely on that tradition for rules governing performance of activities.”63
In the context of an Ancient Israelite system of rituals, the only asset one can use
to potentially retrieve a meaning of a given ritual is the biblical text. Pentateuchal cultic
ritual texts themselves present God as the authority who prescribes ritual activities and
assigns meanings to them.64 For instance, applying blood to the altar had no inherent
efficacy and itself could be understood as an incoherent and meaningless activity.
However, in the context of Pentateuchal cultic ritual texts, this becomes a ritual activity
and the activity that is said to achieve atonement exclusively prescribed by God.65 In
Pentateuchal cultic ritual texts, God prescribes various ritual roles to various physical
objects which otherwise would not necessarily have them. God designated the outer altar

“For example, aside from the different functions of blood aspersions in Lev 16:14–16, 19 (see
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as the place where the priests would apply sacrificial blood (Lev 17:11).66 The same but
more limited function was assigned to the incense altar (Exod 30:10).

Inadequacy of a Structural Approach in
Identifying Ritual Meaning
Two significant approaches of interpreting rituals are dynamistic and structural.
The former “approach attributes the effectiveness of a ritual to the power of the particular
symbols and actions of which it is comprised. The symbols themselves are understood to
convey power and bring about result.”67 This approach does not correlate with the ritual
ideology presented in the Pentateuchal cultic ritual texts. It tends to isolate the symbols
from the larger context of a given ritual and diminished variety, richness, and
ambivalence of many common symbols.68
The latter is proposed by Jenson who found the dynamistic approach
unsatisfactory. He stated the strengths of this approach:
Instead of an atomistic approach, it is preferable to begin with the movement and
structure of the sacrificial ritual as a whole, since this larger context should determine
the primary significance of the individual symbols. symbols. The value of a structural
approach is that it looks for patterns at the level of the complete ritual.69
Gane agreed that “the advantage of such a structural methodology is that it takes
into account the fact that rituals are hierarchical systems of activity in which individual
activities are included and shaped by higher level goals to which they are intended to
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contribute.”70 However, the major strength of this structural approach over the dynamic
one becomes its weakness in light of the fact that activities do not have an inherent
meaning, as Staal established. Taking the ritual as a whole or certain part of it as a
starting point for deriving its meaning does not make a difference. Gane provided an
excellent example to represent this dynamic.71 The activities themselves do possess an
inherent meaning. As established above, ritual system is an activity system, it is defined
by its goal. It is the goal that separates a ritual system from other activity systems.72
Jenson himself recognized that a structural approach cannot provide a full explanation of
a ritual and a historical approach may be more appropriate when anomalies occur since
“there is a conservative tendency in the cult to preserve actions and symbols when their
original function has ceased.”73 In addition, symbols can gain a different meaning in a
new context or the meaning of the individual symbol may transcendent the specific
purposes of a ritual.74
Gane claimed that the historical approach cannot overcome the weaknesses of a
structural approach since diachronic information does not assist in setting the boundaries
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of the activity and its symbolic meaning. In other words, a diachronic approach would be
effective only if the researcher were able to talk to the ritual participants, which in the
case of ancient rituals, is impossible. The time element itself does not warrant a more
complete interpretation of the activity system. Another structuralist, Douglas Davis,
suggested that certain ritual forms provide meaning within a given context. He stated that
“by contrast we presuppose that the form the rites took, their symbolic patterning, itself
gives the meaning, though it is necessary to view the rites within the wider context of the
idea of covenant as already indicated above.”75 Accordingly, the covenant is undeniably a
conceptual element that provides a worldview of the Ancient Israelites. The covenant
conditioned God’s presence among Israelites by the observance of his laws, especially
those related to cult that regulated the ritual system. However, Gane rightfully noted that
unless functions/meaning of ritual forms are not explained or understood, at least to a
certain degree, a principal covenant context generally supplies a satisfactory
interpretation of a ritual that conveys specific meaning.76

The Meaning/Function of a Ritual Is the
Goal Assigned to Its Activity System
It is obvious that a ritual is “an activity system.”77 As mentioned in the context of
Wright’s claim that the textual nature of a biblical ritual reflects its inadequacy as a
source for sociological analysis, a ritual, as an activity system, is a goal-informed system.
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In other words, it is the goal, rather than the activities themselves,78 that determines the
meaning of such a system along with the choice of activities needed to accomplish this
goal. Gane accurately captured this point: “The goal defines the activities that are
included and the way they are performed.”79 The hierarchical structure that is
characteristic for any activity system is apparent in ritual, as well. A biblical cultic ritual
consists of smaller systems that constitute components that compose larger, more
complex systems.80 The prime importance of the goal is reflected at each hierarchical
level of ritual activity.
“In B. Wilson’s study of nonritual human activity systems, he points out that the
goal/raison d’être defining such a system is to accomplish a particular transformation
through an activity process. So, it is not the activities that define the system, but rather,
the goal determines which activities are necessary to achieve the desired change.”81 That
which sets ritual apart is the fact that it is “action believed to be efficacious” through
“symbolic relationship” to some supposed transcendental reality. The goal defines the
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activities that are included and the way that they are performed.82
A “Ritual” Is an Activity System with a Special Kind of Goal
Scholars, biblical83 and from other scientific disciplines,84 have offered numerous
definitions of ritual. The question of if and how a ritual should be separated from other
human activity is still unsettled.85 The present study, with Gane, accepts that a difference
between ritual and non-ritual activity does exist. Monica Wilson noticed that non-ritual
activity, also called ceremony, “is an appropriate and elaborate form of expression of
feeling, but ritual is believed to be efficacious.”86 Regardless of the fact that ritual is
situated in a ceremony, the latter is not crucial for ritual’s effectiveness. Wilson also
emphasized even more on the further difference between ritual and ceremony: “Both
ritual and ceremonial have a function in rousing and canalizing emotion, but ritual, by
relating its symbols to some supposed transcendental reality, affects people more deeply
than a ceremony, which some will describe as ‘mere play-acting.’”87 Turner and E. M.
Zeusse also affirmed these two characteristics of ritual: (1) belief that it is efficacious
through (2) symbolic association “to some supposed transcendental reality,”
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differentiat[ing] it from non-ritual activity or ceremony.88 Gorman also affirmed that
ritual consists of symbolic actions and added that ritual symbolism derives its meaning
from the cultural system of a particular human group or nation.89 Distinguishing ritual
from a kind of sign language, Gane emphasized another element that separates ritual and
non-ritual activity. That is, a ritual “is believed to do something that changes reality in a
way that goes beyond the constraints of cause and effect that operate in activities
belonging to the mundane physical world that are susceptible to manipulation by the
performers.”90 Since the ritual dealt with in the present work is religious, as such, it
includes a belief in a deity. God sought to be reached and communicated with in the
Pentateuch, and the rest of the Bible is inaccessible unless he chooses to make himself
accessible. Therefore, M. Douglas emphasized the necessity of incorporating so-called
“non-Newtonian physics” in the scientific analysis scholars utilize to study biblical cultic
ritual. This is needed due to the fact that God is presented as spiritual and thus noncorporeal, which assumes that he is omnipresent, invisible, and possessing the knowledge
of the future. These powers or attributes are not available to the human creature, but God
can bestow some of them to certain humans.91
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Gane eloquently noticed another dimension of biblical cultic ritual. Regardless of
the interrelated and complex relationship between biblical ritual texts and their system of
beliefs articulated in the Bible to the extent that it may be believed that a ritual enactment
affects states of individual, society, cosmos, and deity, as Gorman proposed,92 Gane
emphasized that ritual effects result from the interaction with the otherworldly. He stated
that “not only is its meaning acted out as potent dramatic expression, it is also believed to
result in transformation that nonritual activity cannot achieve.”93 As an example of this,
Gane referred to the sin offering that purges the Pentateuchal sanctuary. The ritual goal in
this context is not achieved by the natural physical result of its activities. More precisely,
applying the blood to the parts of the sanctuary physically does not cleanse it, but on the
contrary, makes it physically dirtier. Gane put it as follows:
Non-physical pollution, consisting of ritual impurities and moral faults, is purged
from the sanctuary of supramundane YHWH on behalf of the Israelites (vv. 16, 18–
19, 33). While the activities themselves do not produce this goal through physical
cause and effect as they would be expected to in ordinary life, they serve as a vehicle
for transformation that takes place on the level of symbolic meaning.94
Thus, the symbolism of these activities that achieved the goal of the sin offering
was integrated in the conceptual system that required belief. The effectiveness of ritual
and its rules assumed a belief in God’s existence, the fact that the pollution that needed to
be removed was real, and that prescribed ritual actions do carry out the desired
transformation.95
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The Aid of Systems Theory Concepts in the
Interpretation of Israelite Rituals
In his doctoral research, Christopher E. Queen explored the period of the history
of religious studies when it was believed that the “’science of religion,’
Religionwissenschaft, as Max Miller and his early disciples chose to call it,”96 would
emerge with its own distinctive methodology and establish theoretical principles. He
noted that these unrealistic expectations started to fade away during the 1970s. The major
agreement recognized among the scholars of the time was that “the study of religion is an
interdisciplinary enterprise which cannot afford to exclude contributions from any
quarter.”97 This agreement originated from the fact that religion itself is a complex
phenomenon as Ninian Smith accurately described it:
[T]he study of religions is in principle multi-dimensional — dealing not just with
doctrines and myths, but also with rituals, experiences, institutions, ethics,
iconography and so on. Maybe a major focus will be on texts, though this has been an
exaggerated emphasis in the past. A consequence of all this is the need to study the
dimensions of religion via various disciplines — history, philology, sociology,
anthropology, history of ideas, art history, psychology of religion, and so on. Thus the
study of religion is in principle multi-disciplinary.98
Since then, various methods and theoretical principles were employed in the study
of religion and always with their own deficiencies. Queen delineated four major methods:
(1) personalism, (2) functionalism, (3) historicism, and (4) reductionism.99 Queen found
that the general system theory, which Gane modified to suit his project of studying the
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rituals, transcends disciplinary boundaries via its thematization by the four principles, the
principle of integration, adaptation, emergence, and hierarchy. He concluded that
each of these principles — Integration, Adaptation, Emergence, and Hierarchy — has
been interpreted as an “invariant” characteristic of open systems at all levels of the
natural-cognitive hierarchy. Each of these principles may be applied, with valuable
results, we have argued, to the resolution of methodological problems which bedevil
the social sciences, the humanities, and religious studies: personalism, functionalism,
historicism, and reductionism. Each of the systems principles may be seen as a
theoretical foundation or context for certain specialties which constitute the
interdisciplinary field of religious studies and theology: phenomenology and
hermeneutics (Integration), the social sciences as they are applied to religion
(Adaptation), the comparative history of religions (Emergence), and the philosophy of
religion and systematic theology (Hierarchy).100
However, Queen warned “that each of the systems principles—and by
implication, each of the respective subdisciplines of religious studies and theology—is
susceptible to distortion by overemphasis.”101 Thus, grounding one’s methodological
approach and theoretical principles upon the general systems theory, as Gane did, with
the awareness of potential distortions caused by overemphasis, should supplement
understanding of biblical cultic ritual preserved in the limited textual form. Queen’s final
remark regarding the role of systems theory in religious studies favors its responsible use:
The contribution of systems theory in religious studies, both in its experiments and
applications to date, and in its heuristic potential for future development, lies in its
unique ability to integrate the findings of many disciplines, to respect the worlds of
meaning which they purvey, and to place all of this in a non-dogmatic, but irreducible
Context that is the source of religious experience.102
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Gane’s extensive use of the general systems theory in his dissertation project
shows a careful and responsible use of this theory in his quest to understand the biblical
cultic ritual. Gane delineated 6 prominent properties of ritual activity systems as a result
of his utilization of the general systems theory in his analysis of ritual: (1) a function or a
ritual is equal to its meaning and is achieved by carrying out its goal of transformation.
Both the goal and the function/meaning of the ritual are supplied by the text. This is the
basic function of biblical cultic ritual, even though others like the social are certainly
involved. As I emphasized above, this is the key one;103 (2) by being its driving force, the
goal defines the ritual and its boundaries since the ritual activities contributed to its
goal;104 (3) ritual brings out a physical transformation which supersedes the natural
physical results, but rather, is a vehicle for achieving a higher level of transformation;105
(4) ritual efficacy and rules assume the acceptance of religious belief into which a ritual
is integrated. The ritual system of Ancient Israel interacts with the wider conceptual and
cultural environment of Israel’s society. Thus, biblical cultic ritual is a part of Israelite
religion instituted by God;106 (5) ritual is hierarchically structured, encompassing smaller
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systems that constitute it.107 These smaller systems are distinct108 and the ritual as a
whole achieves its goal only if performed in its entirety in a proper order:109 and (6) The
importance of the goal is translated into the smaller systems which also bring about
transformation.110
Some of them were identified prior to Gane’s work, while some were introduced
by him.111 Gane used a potential problematic statement112 in Lev 16:25 to show the
presence of these properties in one ritual sequence. That is, it states that the high priest is
to burn the suet of the sin offering, expressed in the singular, regardless of the fact that
two sin offerings are assumed in this text. The collective nature of the noun “suet” refers
to the complex of actions consisting of both sacrifices, separate and smaller ritual system
activities, that are interwoven and subsequently merged when their blood was
simultaneously applied to the sacrificial altar (vv. 18–19). Thus, “the singular simply
acknowledges the unity at a higher level of systems hierarchy.”113
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The Biblical Text Provides Instructions for Physical
Performance and Interpretations of Activities
Since scholars began studying biblical ritual texts more intensively after the
1950s, some crucial characteristics of these texts emerged. David W. Baker compared
Lev 1–7 to the Punic Marseille and Carthage Tariffs114 and suggested that ritual texts in
general belong to the universal genre of procedural texts previously established by Robert
E. Longacre.115 Longacre established the fact that the two key characteristics of these
texts are (1) prescription, and (2) a chronological framework, and as a result, these texts
are goal-oriented.116 I agree with Gane, who suggested that all biblical ritual texts are
goal-oriented. Baruch Levine and William W. Hallo have delineated two basic ritual text
types in the OT, prescriptive and descriptive, the former telling how rituals ought to be
done, and the latter, how ritual performances were actually performed.117 The prescriptive
texts generally begin with conditional clause followed by clauses governed by the verbs
in perfect consecutive or imperfect aspect. The descriptive texts usually begin with the
verbs in imperfect consecutive or perfect aspect, referring to the sequence of activities
performed at one point in time.118
Building on the previous works, Knierim showed a more precise literary
classification of biblical ritual texts by identifying a subgenre of procedural law, namely
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“case law.” He also suggested that the purpose of the texts that utilized case law genre is
to standardize the vital steps of ritual performance in order to achieve the intended
purpose/s.119 Again, Knierim is one more scholar who noticed that the key component of
biblical ritual text is the goal which is so important that it determines the structure of
these texts.120
Gary Anderson affirmed that biblical ritual texts contain the instructions for
physical performance of activities,121 but also noticed that they also contain the
interpreted goals of these activities.122 Knierim accurately suggested that “we speak about
the writers’ transformation of a concept into a text, not into an action, and interpret the
concept of an observed text, not of an observed performance.”123 He made a difference
between the textual representation of a prescribed ritual and a description of an observed
ritual which increases even more as one is involved in a ritual performance.124 Gane’s
warning that not realizing these limits in a ritual analysis increases the possibility of
importing “a priori elements from our own world view into our interpretation of ritual
meaning” is well taken. The interpretation of a given ritual, represented by either
prescriptive or descriptive text, by a ritual text is crucial in order to determine its
meaning.
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Gaps: The Peculiarity of Ritual Texts
Scholars noted that biblical ritual texts contain conceptual “gaps.”125 In the
context of biblical ritual texts, the conceptual “gaps” refer to the lack/silence of texts
regarding the meaning of certain ritual activities expressed in them or omission/s of
certain ritual activities that should be included in certain rituals. Gilders especially
emphasized and dealt with this peculiarity of biblical ritual texts and suggested a simple,
but yet not precisely defined solution. He stated that when a reader encounters gaps, “the
interpreter must fill gaps with information derived from other sources in order to make
sense of them.”126
He, being himself a reader-response criticism proponent,127 followed a known
reader-response literary critic, Wolfgang Iser, who claimed that readers inevitably
experiences “gaps” in the text they read and variously fill those gaps in order to arrive at
a coherent understanding of the meaning of the text. Assigning this role to the readers
assumes that they play a vital role in constituting the meaning of any text.128 The critical
question is defining the scope of the term “source/s.” Most of the time, the source/s in
Gilders’ work is limited to the biblical canon, assuming various traditions and sources in
the biblical text, or even biblical texts in its entirety.129
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This correlates with the approach in this study with two modifications. First, the
present study does not accept the presence of various and multiple traditions/sources that
biblical texts are comprised of. Second, this study set limits to the books of the
Pentateuch in its quest to understand the laying on of hands. However, Gilders’ work
shows that the term “source/s” also includes text outside the biblical canon, as he laid out
that the situatedness of the reader of his “interpretative community” which consists of the
works of biblical scholars who apply modern critical-historical methods to the biblical
text.130 Rabbinic tradition is clearly one of the sources Gilders used.131 This part of his
gap-filling methodology does not correlate with the presuppositions of the present study,
since it attributes the biblical texts greater authority than all other useful sources to
understand biblical topics.

Laying on of Hands: Texts
The gesture of laying on of hands was common in the ANE and Mediterranean
context, including Ancient Israel, as a part of that milieu.132 The study of Egyptian,
Mesopotamian, Greco-Roman, and post-exilic Jewish and rabbinic sources unanimously
demonstrates that laying on of hands was used in various contexts with various meanings.
Egyptian sources use laying on of hands to convey purification, resurrection,
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deification, empowerment, transfer, or sometimes, just as a method to transpose an
entity.133 Mesopotamian sources contain multiple uses of laying on of hands.134 Ras
Shamra Texts contain The Legend of King Keret, Plate 7, which points to the transfer
meaning of this ritual gesture.135 In the myth of Inanna’s Descent, Enlil and Ninlil both
contain the idea of transfer of sickness or misfortune to another entity.136 Laying on of
hands is not included in these two texts, but transfer and substitution are. James Moyer’s
dissertation demonstrated that the Hittite texts also contain multiple references to the idea
of transfer137 and substitution.138 Some of the texts like the Substitute King rituals, the
Ritual of Mastigga, and several healing rituals do not include laying on of hands.
However, some rituals include laying on of hands that convey symbolical transfer, like
the Ritual of Askhella. Moyer’s and Wright’s dissertation research demonstrated that

González, “Laying-on of Hands in Luke and Acts,” 31–40; Robinson, “The Laying on of
Hands,” 56–61.
133

González, “Laying-on of Hands in Luke and Acts,” 40–43.

134
135

D. Winton Thomas, ed., Documents from Old Testament Times, HTB 85 (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1961), 118–21; González, “Laying-on of Hands in Luke and Acts,” 42–43.
For a more extended treatment of these texts and references, see Rodríguez, “Substitution in the
Hebrew Cultus,” 21–4.
136

James Carroll Moyer, “The Concept of Ritual Purity among the Hittites” (PhD diss., Brandeis
University, 1969), 56, 66, 86, 96–97, 127, 129, 133, 136–37, 140, 144. See also Wright, The Disposal of
Impurity, 32–34.
137

Moyer, “The Concept of Ritual Purity among the Hittites,” 34, 36, 66–67, 86, 119, 135.

138

651

transfer and substitution were dominant ideas in Hittite and Mesopotamian texts.139
Ugaritic literature contains examples of the Royal Substitution rituals.140 The concept of
substitution was also spread in Babylonian and Assyrian religion.141
In Classical Greco-Roman sources, laying on of hands was employed in healing
rites, conveying a blessing, giving a charge, or stating a curse, in sacrificial rites, as well
as in a few other contexts.142 In post-exilic Jewish and rabbinic sources, laying on of
hands was used to convey ordination, transfer, blessing, and healing.143
As indicated in the introduction, the focus of the present study is to identify the
meaning/function of this gesture in the Pentateuch. The phrase  סָ מַ ְך יָדappears twentytwo times in the Pentateuch,144 mainly in cultic contexts. Being performed in the cultic
context does not imply the same meaning of this gesture. Table 26 shows twenty-two
occurrences of the laying on of hands.
It is inevitable that some sort of relationship is envisaged in the gesture of laying
on of hands. Kiuchi has correctly stated that “it appears natural to assume that the
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gesture expresses some relationship between the offerer and the sacrificial animal.”145
However, the specific explanation of its meaning is found only in Lev 1:4 and 16:21. In
part, Gilder was right when he stated that “the great variety of explanations of the handpressing gesture again indicate the problem of trying to interpret an uninterpreted
gesture.146 Various interpretations have been associated with Lev 1:4 and the latter was
often excluded from the discussion due to its irrelevancy with the fact that the Azazel
goat was not considered a sacrifice.147
Two issues are embedded in identifying the meaning/function of this gesture.
First, it seems that laying on of hand/s is missing in at least 5 texts where it is expected to
be included (Lev 1:10–11; Lev 9, 16, 23; and Num 28–29). The second issue is the form
of the gesture and its impact on the meaning/function of this gesture. Was it performed
with one or both hands? Both issues, respectively, are dealt with below.

Leviticus 1:3–4
This text was analyzed in the context of  כִּ פֶּרwith a different goal. Here this text is
juxtaposed with the texts that utilize the same topical, syntactical, and grammatical
constructions in order to identify pointers that assist the meaning laying on of hand/s.
Kiuchi affirmed Milgrom’s inference concerning the datival sense of the pronominal
suffix attached to the noun  ָרצֹוןin v. 3. This is based on the valid analogy with Lev
22:19–20 where it is stated that the same grammatical construction was used to highlight
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the same points. That is, the burnt offering will be accepted if it is a male and without
blemish, לִּ רצֹ נכֶּם תָּ ִּמים ָזכָר, in v. 19, or it should not be offered if it has blemish since it
will not be accepted on the behalf of the offerer, כִּ י־ל ֹא ל ָרצֹון יִּ היֶּה ָלכֶּם, in v. 20. The noun
accompanied with the pronominal suffix refers to the offerer in these texts, as well as in
Lev 1:3.148
He also noted that the verbal forms of  ָרצָ הare used in Lev 22:25 and in Lev 1:4.
In addition to this, two additional points that connect these two passages are similar.
First, both of them discuss the acceptance or rejection of the sacrificial animal. Second,
both utilize the same grammatical pattern. Thus, based on the context of 22:19–25, it can
be inferred that the meaning of the phrase  ל ֹא י ֵָרצוּ ָלכֶּםin v. 25 is the same as the one in
v. 20, כִּ י־ל ֹא ל ָרצֹון יִּ היֶּה ָלכֶּם, and due to exactly the similar grammatical construction,
except that the verbal negation accompanies the verbs in Lev 22:20, 25, Kiuchi correctly
suggested that the same meaning is implied in Lev 1:4.149
Based on the contexts of Lev 1:3–4 and 22:19–25, Kiuchi’s proposal that ָרצֹון
connotes the idea of substitution of the offerer with his/her sacrifice receives substantial
textual support. The offerer and his/her sacrifice are considered as one. In other words,
acceptance of the offerer is conditioned by the acceptance of his/her animal. The
inference is that the animal acts as the offerers substitute. Both Milgrom’s and Kiuchi’s
translation point to the organic and conceptual unity of Lev 1:3–4 via term  ָרצֹון/ ָרצָ ה. In
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v. 3, the emphasis is on the offerer who will be accepted if his/her sacrifice is a male,
without blemish, and offered in the sanctuary whereas in v. 4, the emphasis is placed on
the sacrificial animal that will not be accepted if the offerer does not lay his/her hands on
its head.
The rejection of the offerer and the sacrifice are perceived as identical in these
two verses. The substitutionary function of the sacrifice is confirmed by Lev 7:18 which
states that “if any meat from a peace offering is eaten on the third day, the man who
offered it will not be accepted ()ל ֹא י ֵָרצֶּ ה הַ מַּ ק ִּריב אֹ תֹו.”150 Again, the acceptance of the
sacrificial animal is tightly related to the acceptance of the offerer. If the offerer violates
the rules regarding the well-being offering, he/she will not be accepted and as a result,
he/she invalidates the sacrifice itself so the sacrifice is not accepted.151 The sacrifice is
invalidated and consequently, rejected retroactively.
Consequently, Kiuchi concluded: “Then the fact that the imposition of a hand in
Lev 1:4a is mentioned between the bringing of the sacrifice (v .3b) for acceptance on
behalf of the offerer and the declaration that the sacrifice will be accepted on his behalf
shows that the meaning of the imposition of a hand is implied in ‘ ונִּ רצָ ה לֹוit will be
accepted on his behalf’.”152
Thus, the laying on of hand/s in regard to the burnt offering consists of two
foundational components: 1) it facilitates the substitutionary relationship between the
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offerer and the sacrificial animal and 2) it is a prerequisite for the offerer’s atonement.

Omission or Abbreviation
Some biblical ritual texts omit certain ritual activities. In the case of the laying on
of hands in cultic contexts, it is consistently mentioned in the majority of contexts (Exod
29:10, 15 ,19; Lev 1:4; 3:2, 8, 13; 4:4, 15, 24, 29, 33; 8:14, 18, 22; 16:21; 24:14; Num
8:10,12; 27:18, 23; Deut 34:9), but not all (Lev 1:10; 7:1–7; 9:8, 12, 15, 16, 18; 16:6, 9,
11, 15, 24; 23:8, 12, 18, 19, 27, 36, 37, 38; and Num 28–29). This calls for the
explanation of its absence from these texts. One explanation would be that these texts
purposely omitted laying on of hands because it was not needed in those contexts, while
another would be that the texts rely on the previous established regulations of these ritual
activities. The present study seeks to find a rationale for the omissions of laying on of
hand/s in the texts listed above on case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the wider
religious context of the Ancient Israel faith.
Grounding his arguments on the understanding that laying on of hands/s has
different meanings/functions—one hand conveys the ownership of the offerer over their
animal, and both hands has a different meaning/function—Milgrom proposed that this
gesture was not prescribed/performed in regards to public/communal calendric sacrifices
because it was unnecessary. In other words, the owner was obvious, the whole
community or the offerer holds the offering in their hands.153 The two exceptions are Lev
4:15 and 16:21.154 In order to provide a rationale for these exceptions, Milgrom stated
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that the latter is not even an exception since the laying on of hands was included in the
ritual155 inasmuch as the laying on of both hands on the Azazel, which meant transfer,
was included.156 The former is not a public/communal sacrifice, but was offered for the
sins of “individual members of the community.”157 Milgrom’s classification of the sin
offering in Lev 4:14–21 as not a public/communal one contradicts a realistic reason why
it could have been offered, which would classify it as public/communal. That is, Milgrom
himself envisioned that the priest’s sin in Lev 4:3–12 could affect the entire
community,158 in which case, both the priest as the initiator of sin and the community as
participants in sin were expected to offer a sin offering. On this matter, Gane rightfully
questioned Milgrom’s division of sacrifices into private non-calendric sacrifices such as
Lev 1–5 and public/communal calendric sacrifice such as Lev 16, 23; 16:21, 23, and
Num 28–29. He suggested a simpler, but yet questionable solution of keeping the
distinction between non-calendric sacrifices that require laying on of hand/s, in which
case there would be only one, Lev 4:14–21, and public/communal calendric sacrifices
that do not require this gesture (Num 28–29). This division compromises the clear
distinction between private non-calendric and public/communal calendric sacrifices.
However, Gane’s observations of the flaws of Milgrom’s division of sacrifices into
private non-calendric and public/communal calendric are also not consistent. The current

“The hand-leaning rite is also missing from the Yom Kippur ceremonies (see 16:11, 15) and
must be similarly taken for granted. Perhaps its absence there is to accentuate the special and different
function of the hand-leaning performed on the live goat (see the NOTE on “he shall slaughter,” 16:11).”
Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 579. Emphasis mine.
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study suggests that the laying on of hands was performed in both private and public
sacrifices which include (Lev 1:10, 9, 23; Num 28–29), but it was not performed in Lev
16 for specific reasons which are discussed below.

Leviticus 1:10–11
The absence of the laying on of hands in this text never attracted the attention of
scholars since it is obvious that Lev 1:10–13 is an abbreviated pericope and included this
gesture. Milgrom’s reasoning regarding this pericope is in this direction. It is sufficient
and well taken.
The sacrificial procedure is repeated, but in an abbreviated form. The omissions are
expendable or can be otherwise accounted for. The hand-leaning and flaying can be
omitted because in the bovine pericope their prescriptions contain the word ʿōlâ (vv
4a, 6a), thereby indicating that these rites apply to all burnt offerings and not just to
the bull (Abravanel; cf. Sipra, Nedaba 4:6). The priest’s presentation, hiqrîb (v 5), has
been incorporated into a new clause that has been added to the text (see at v 13).
Finally, v 7 is deleted in its entirety lest one conclude that each new animal required
additional wood and stoking.159

Lev 1:14; 5:7–10, 14:22, 1
Laying on of hands is never prescribed when a sacrificial animal was a bird ()עֹוף,
either turtledove ( )תֹּורor pigeon ()יֹונָה, (Lev 1:14, 5:7, 12:6, 8; 14:22, 15:14, 29; Num
6:10). The question arises whether this is an omission, abbreviation, or something else. A
bird was an option for offering in case of burnt (Lev 1:14), sin (Lev 12:6, 8, 14:22, 30–
31; 15:14, 29; Num 6:10), and reparation offering (Lev 5:7, 11). The fact that GHS is
human constant disadvantage in God’s presence which was dealt with by the burnt
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offering, and that sin was the primary problem that was resolved by the sin and reparation
offering helps clarify whether the absence of laying on of hands in relation to the bird
sacrifice was an omission, abbreviation, or something else. The most logical explanation
was offered by Milgrom in his following quotations:
“Finally, the absence of hand-leaning in the procedure for the ʿōlâ of birds may also
be due to the same circumstance: the bird is carried in the offerer’s hands, so handleaning occurs automatically (see the COMMENT on vv 14–17). Thus the handleaning rite seems not to be required whenever the offering could be carried by hand,
as in the cases of the ʾāšām money, the cereal offering, and the burnt offering of
birds.160
Milgrom’s explanation, also followed by Wright, assumes that the absence of
laying on of hand/s in relation to a bird offering was not due to an omission or
abbreviation, but rather, the offerer would hold the animal in his/her hand, thus perform
laying on of his/her hand on it automatically. The present study accepts such an
explanation as valid since on all three occasions when a bird offering was allowed, the
reason was either GHS or sin and the bird sacrifice accomplished the same goal as when
any other prescribed sacrificial animal was offered. Milgrom also noticed that “if a
declaration accompanied the hand-leaning to specify the purpose of the sacrifice, it was a
discrete, independent act (contra Péter 1977).”161
Some crucial regulations that would normally apply to sin offering are missing if
a sin offering was a bird, such as (1) requirement of an unblemished shape, (2) animal
gender regulation,162 (3) the exact place of offering, (4) acceptance statement is missing,
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and (5) atonement statement is missing. Of all of these points, only point 2 requires
further explanation while all the other points are not questioned. They are assumed to be
binding in the sacrificial process regardless of the type of sacrificial animal.

Leviticus 9:8, 12, 15, 16, 18
It is significant to note with Milgrom that the eighth day of priestly consecration
is not like the previous seven days, which served “as millūʾîm, the investiture of the
priesthood (chap. 8), and the consecration of the sanctuary (8:10–12) whereas the eighth
day serves an entirely different purpose—the inauguration of the public cult conducted by
its newly invested priesthood.”163
The sacrificial altar had a special place in the ritual of the eighth day. Milgrom’s
insights are again valid. He noticed that the emphasis in this chapter is on the procedures
that are directly related to the sacrificial altar:
The concentration of the entire chapter is upon the altar, as demonstrated by the
curtailed description of the sacrificial procedure, which omits nearly every rite that is
unrelated to the altar (e.g., the hand-leaning) but includes every rite involving the
altar, even the most minute (e.g., the disposition of the suet pieces, vv 19–20),
climaxed by the unique theophany upon the altar (vv 23–24).164
Based on these insights that are derived from the texts, the present study believes,
with Milgrom, that the laying on of hands was performed in this ritual. Milgrom
rightfully ascribed its omission in the text, as well as the omission of all other rites
unrelated to the altar, to the intention of the writer to stress the sacrificial altar that
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ultimately culminated in God’s theophany on it.165 Gane’s attempt to find support for the
absence of laying on of hand/s in the calendric sacrifices in 2 Chr 29:22166 is challenged
by the fact that this chapter is descriptive, rather than prescriptive text. In addition, like
Lev 23 and Num 28–29, it is very abbreviated.
This emphasis in Lev 9 is placed on the altar, which correlates with the
interpretation of the consecration of the priest in Exod 29 and Lev 8, as seen in the
present study, where the emphasis was placed on the priests. Like in Exod 29:36–37, the
verb  כִּ פֶּרin this context would refer to the cleansing and consecration of the altar and the
atoning of the priests and people from their GHS (Lev 9:7).167

Leviticus 16:6, 9, 11, 15, 24
Gane proposed two reasons why the laying on of hands was not performed in the
Lev 16:6, 9, 11, 15, 24 ritual. First, Gane built upon a valid observation that this text is
prescriptive and not abbreviated as other passages and yet omits the laying on of hands
on the burnt and sin offerings offered on the Day of Atonement. Second, Gane claimed
that the laying on of hand/s is not needed since there is no ambiguity regarding the
identity of the offerer in public/communal calendric sacrifices. The latter argument is
based on the division of sacrifices into private non-calendric and public/communal
calendric ones, placing the ritual of Lev 16 into the latter group.
The present study agrees with Gane’s first argument and holds it sufficient for the
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claim that the laying on of hands on the burnt and sin offerings before the sending away
of the goat for Azazel was not performed nor needed. The second argument is not solid
since it rests on the division of sacrifices that is unsustainable, as shown above in the
subheading Omission or Abbreviation and discussed below under the subheading,
Leviticus 23:8, 12, 18, 19, 27, 36, 37, 38 and Numbers 28–29.
Milgrom, on the other hand, believed that the laying on of hands was performed
on the Day of Atonement and “must be similarly taken for granted.” He justifies its
absence from the text by the intention of the writer to emphasize “special and different
function of the hand-leaning performed on the live goat.”168 The fact that the regulations
of Lev 16 are prescriptive and detailed overrules Milgrom’s argument.
It is important to note that the burnt and sin offering of the priests and people
before the sending away of the goat for Azazel had a totally different function than
regular, daily burnt and sin offerings, including the burnt offerings offered right after the
goat for Azazel was sent away from the camp. It is clearly indicated in Lev 16:16 that this
combination of offerings was primarily to remove sin from the sanctuary, which is never
said for any other regular, daily offerings. Thus, having a totally different goal from other
regular, daily sacrifices, this set of sacrifices on the Day of Atonement did not need
laying on of hands in contrast to others that did.

Leviticus 23:8, 12, 18, 19, 27, 36, 37, 38
and Numbers 28–29
Milgrom and Gane followed Tannaites’ claim (Sipra, Nedaba 4:2; m. Menaḥ.
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9:8–9; t. Menaḥ. 10:9–10; b. Menaḥ. 92b) that laying on of hands was not performed on
the calendric sacrifices offered at communal public feasts such as Lev 23 and Num 28–
29.169 Milgrom stated:
The Tannaites exempt the public sacrifices from hand-leaning except for the bull
brought by the ʿēdâ (4:15) and the scapegoat (16:21) (m. Menaḥ. 9:7). The latter, as
noted above, falls into a different category of hand-leaning, and the former can hardly
be called public: it is brought for the aggregate sins committed by the individual
members of the community.170
Gane’s two arguments for the absence of laying on of hands in Lev 16:6, 9, 11,
15, 24 ritual, as discussed in the previous section, are also applied to the
public/communal sacrifices of Lev 23: 8, 12, 18, 19, 27, 36, 37, 38 and Num 28–29.
Regardless of Gane’s remark that laying on of hands could have been performed on
sacrifices during the public communal feasts,171 he favored the possibility that it was
not.172 First, Gane based his position on the fact that the gesture was not prescribed in
relation to burnt and sin offerings offered on the Day of Atonement.173 Gane’s second
argument stems from the understanding that the laying on of hands conveys ownership.
The first argument is well taken and valid for the context of Lev 16, but is not
methodologically sound to be used as an argument for Lev 23 because the Day of
Atonement had a special and unique role within the sacrificial system. The second
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argument is based on the interpretation of laying on of hands.
However, the omission of the laying on of hand/s in the extremely abbreviated
sacrificial regulations in Lev 23 and Num 28–29 does not necessarily confirm that the
gesture was omitted. It is actually reasonable that the gesture was performed in both of
these texts since the priests were the representatives of the people in public communal
feasts. However, being prescriptive in nature, these texts rely on the previously
established regulations in Lev 1–7 and thus, would include laying on of hands.
Gyung-Yul Kim noted that other crucial ritual activities, such as blood
application, skinning of the animal, and so on were not mentioned in these two texts, but
it is impossible that they were omitted. In addition, Kim also noted that these texts focus
on the sacrificial items in a very limited way and omit instructions for the sacrificial
procedures.174 His arguments correlate with the proposal of this study that these texts
relied on Lev 1–7 for their sacrificial procedures in regards to both offerer and priest.
Based on the principles identified in the analysis of these texts in which the laying
on of hand/s is omitted, I suggest that the laying on of hand/s was also implied in Lev 5:6,
15–16, 18, 25 [6:6], 12: 6–7, 14; 15:13, 19, 25; 19:20–22; Num 6:16; 15:24, 27.

Leviticus 7:1–7—Reparation Offering
One would also expect that the laying on of hand/s would be included in the
prescription for the reparation offering in Lev 7:1–7, but it is not. The exclusion of the
laying on of hand/s in this sacrifice is because the reparation offering of a ram could be
converted into a money payment (5:15, 18, 25 [Engl. 6:6]), which would be further
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handed directly to the priest.175 In addition, the absence of the laying on of hands in this
text is justified by the point of view. That is, the regulations in Lev 1–5 are written from
the point of view of the donor, while the regulations in Lev 6–7 are written from the point
of view of the priest.176 The laying on of hands is not mentioned in any of the regulations
in Lev 6–7. If, however, a ram were offered, the laying on of hand/s would have been
performed.177

Form of Laying on of Hands: Singular vs Plural
vs Dual and Pressure or No Pressure
Along with the meaning/function, the form of the gesture has been a matter of
extensive debate. One of the first attempts to establish the form of it is credited to René
Péter who suggested that there were two forms of this gesture and that the form affected
the meaning of the gesture.178 Péter understood that laying on of one hand that occurs
only in sacrificial contexts refers to “identification of the offerer with the animal,” while
the laying on of two hands appears in non-sacrificial contexts (Lev 16:21; 24:14; Num
8:10 (?); 27:18 (LXX), 23; Deut 34:9) and signifies transfer.179 Subsequently, Wright
produced the next significant study of the gesture with the inclusion and support of
insights from ANE literature. He accepted Péter’s division of the gesture to the two forms
that imply two different meanings, but he suggested different meanings for both forms:

175

Gane, Cult and Character, 54.

176

Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 117.

177

Gane, Cult and Character, 63.
Péter, “L'imposition des mains,” 48–55.

178

Péter, “L'imposition des mains,” 52.

179

666

This one-handed form of the gesture in sacrifices is best explained as ritually
attributing the animal to the offerer; it indicates that the entire sacrificial rite pertains
to him or her, even though others (priests and other auxiliaries) participate in making
the offering later in the rite.180
The gesture performed with only one hand conveys the offerer’s ownership of a
sacrificial animal. It highlights the offerer’s ownership of the sacrificial animal over the
other assisting participants.181 The two-hand gesture demonstrates who or what is the
result of the ritual action.182
Examining the sacrificial contexts, Péter and Wright noticed that the texts are
consistent in using the singular, יָדֹו, which led them to conclude that only one hand is
used in sacrificial contexts. They considered the forms where the subject is plural as a
distributive plural, which means that each individual included in the subject lays one
hand on the animal’s head.
Recently, Calabro has challenged this theory and suggested that “the gesture
uniformly employed both hands in the period before the Babylonian exile as well as in
the Second Temple period.”183 Calabro found that this proposal is well confirmed by
postbiblical sources184 which always used the plural of the noun “hand” in sacrificial
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contexts.185 In proposing his hypothesis, besides the MT, he took into consideration the
readings of the DSS and the LXX. The former witness contains texts of Lev 1:4; 3:2; 4:4;
16:21; 24:14, and Num 8:10; 27:18. Regardless of being fragmentary, the possible
nominal reconstructions follow the MT reading.186 The latter witness consistently follows
the MT except in Lev 3:2, 8, 13 and Num 27:18, where instead of the singular, the LXX
utilizes the plural of the noun “hands.”
Based on this difference between the LXX and the MT in Lev 3:2, 8, 13 and Num
27:18, Calabro suggested that the LXX variant reflects an earlier plural reading. This is
how he explained this divergence of the LXX witness: “This textual variant in the LXX is
not consistently carried through, and it could be explained as a sporadic attempt to
harmonize the text with such passages as Lev 16:21; Num 27:23; and Deut 34:9, where
the gesture is definitely two-handed. But it is also possible that the LXX variant reflects
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an earlier plural reading.”187 Textual critics agree that the Pentateuch was the first portion
of the OT that was translated into Greek sometime between the middle of the third and
second centuries BCE. As such, it predates the Masoretic vocalization on the MT which
took place roughly in 7th century CE. Accordingly, Calabro arrived at the conclusion that
the LXX variant of Lev 3 which used plural hands represents the faithful transmission of
the original reading.
However, he dismissed the fact that all the other texts, 6/10 plus the LXX’s
addition of “καὶ ἐπιθήσει τὴν χεῖρα ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ” in Lev 1:10 (Lev 1:4; 4:4, 24,
29, 33; Num 27:18), use the singular by arguing that “the fact that other portions of the
Pentateuch have the singular ‘hand’ does not represent a challenge to this theory, since
our current LXX text is most likely a composite of the efforts of many translators, even
within individual books.”188 However, a potential of the presence of multiple translators
calls for equal treatment of all of them. In that case, there are more LXX translators who
consistently followed the MT in using the singular of the noun “hand” than those who did
not: 6+1/11. This includes instances that are distributed in the same chapter, like Lev 4, in
the same manner as the instances where the LXX translator/s changed the singular into
the plural are distributed within one chapter, Lev 3. The equation of 7/11 instances where
the LXX translator/s consistently and exactly followed the MT nominal number strongly
opposes Calabro’s suggestion. If all 24 texts that contain the laying on of hands are
considered, the LXX’s consistency in following the MT number of the noun “hand” is
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even greater. Accordingly, this argument is self-contradictory since even with the
acceptance of multiple translators, within one book, the LXX translators still followed the
MT in 20/24 places. In other words, the LXX translators followed the MT pointing in
83.3% and did not follow it in 17.7%. The weight of the argument seems obvious in this
case. Consequently, arguments to support Calabro’s theory that the LXX in Lev 3:2, 8, 13
and Num 27:18 reflects original reading are insufficient.
In 12 other texts where the verb with a plural subject refers to “hand” in dual (Gen
27:23; 49:24;189 Exod 15:17; 17:12;190 30:19,191 21; 35:25; 40:31;192 7:30; Deut 21:6,
7;193 34:9), the two readings never differ in the number of the noun, that is, hand is
always plural/dual. There is a disagreement with the number of subjects in the verbal
forms in 3 texts (Gen 49:24; Exod 17:12; 30:19) and in Deut 21:7, ketiv of the MT has a
singular verbal subject, but qere has the plural subject. The difference in the number of
the verbal subject gives room for further research, as some rationale was suggested in the
footnote of the listed texts but the nominal number is always consistent. In analyzing the
nominal forms of “hand,” when they are syntactically related to the verb ( סָ מַ ְך13 texts) as
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“hand” in the plural/dual. For the second, the LXX has a plural for the verb’s subject, contrary to the MT’s
singular, but “hands” are plural/dual in both variants. It is possible that the MT’s singular was not meant to
refer to “hands” as its subject, but rather, to introduce a verbless clause, יָדָ יו אֱמוּנָה עַד־ב ֹא הַ שָּׁ מֶּ שׁ, that
states what happened after Aaron and Hur supported Moses’s hands.
190

The LXX used the singular for the verb’s subject, whereas the MT used the plural, but “hands”
is plural/dual in both variants.
191

192

The LXX is missing the translation of this text.

The LXX used the plural for the verb’s subject, whereas the MT used the singular (q're suggests
a plural reading), but the hands are plural/dual in both variants.
193

670

well as other verbs (12 texts), it becomes obvious that the LXX is meticulously consistent
with the MT.
Emanuel Tov noticed that number inconsistencies in the LXX can hardly be
considered as the sign of an original reading because they can be explained as the
presence of a variant or a non-variant.194 He added that distinguishing between the two is
uncertain even if the retroversion is possible. A correct retroversion should not be
confused with the originality of the readings themselves.195 Tov also concluded:
Many of the changes in number in the translation derived from adaptations to the
rules of the Greek language. Greek does not like combinations of a (collective) noun
in singular with a plural verb nor, in fact, any incongruity of plural and singular
forms. However, many harmonizations which were made in the LXX were also found
in Hebrew manuscripts.196
However, the comparison of the LXX and the MT in 53 other texts (Table 27),
ranging from Exodus to Numbers, that contain the singular of the noun “hand” shows
deviations by the LXX that does not fit into Tov’s description of LXX translational
tendencies.
As the table above demonstrates, the LXX totally omitted 11/53 instances where
the MT used the noun “hand.” In the majority of those texts, the MT used “hand”
idiomatically, as part of a phrase, so the LXX’s omissions in those texts are not a concern
(Exod 2:5, 16; 10:25; 16:3; 24:11; 35:29; 38:21; Lev 25:14; Num 2:17; 31:49; 35:25). Of
the remaining 42 texts, the LXX changed the singular into the plural 16 times, including
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Table 27. LXX and MT singular agreement of
the noun “hand”
Reference

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Exod 2:5
Exod 2:19
Exod 3:20
Exod 5:21
Exod 7:5
Exod 7:17
Exod 7:19
Exod 8:17
Exod 10:25
Exod 12:11
Exod 13:3
Exod 14:8
Exod 14:16
Exod 14:21
Exod 14:26
Exod 14:27
Exod 14:31
Exod 15:20
Exod 16:3
Exod 19:13
Exod 23:31
Exod 24:11
Exod 28:41
Exod 29:29
Exod 29:33
Exod 32:4
Exod 32:15
Exod 32:29
Exod 35:29
Exod 38:21
Lev 3:2
Lev 3:8
Lev 3:13
Lev 8:33
Lev 22:25
Lev 25:14
Lev 26:25
Num 2:17
Num 3:3
Num 4:37
Num 4:45
Num 4:49
Num 5:18
Num 9:23
Num 10:13
Num 14:30
Num 20:11

verb

MT
hand

x
x
s
p
s
x
s
s
s
x
s
x
s
s
s
s
x
s
x
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
x
p
x
x
s
s
s
s
x
p
x
p
s
x
x
x
p
x
x
s
s

S
S
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s

pron.
suff.
x
p
s
p
s
s
s
s
p
p
x
x
s
s
s
s
x
s
x
x
p
s
p
p
p
p
s
p
s
x
s
s
s
p
x
x
x
s
p
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s

LXX
hand

verb
x
x
s
p
s
s
s
s
s
x
s
x
s
s
s
s
x
s
x
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
x
p
x
x
s
s
s
s
x
s
x
p
p
x
x
x
s
x
x
s
s

omitted
omitted
S
P
S
S
S
S
omitted
P
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
omitted
S
P
omitted
P
P
P
P
P
P
omitted
omitted
P
P
P
P
S
omitted
P
omitted
P
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
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pron.
suff.
omitted
omitted
omitted
P
omitted
S
S
omitted
omitted
P
omitted
omitted
S
omitted
S
S
X
S
omitted
omitted
P
omitted
P
P
P
P
S
P
omitted
omitted
omitted
omitted
omitted
P
X
X
X
omitted
P
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S

Table 27—Continued.
48
49
50
51
52
53

Num 22:7
Num 24:24
Num 31:49
Num 33:1
Num 33:3
Num 35:25

x
x
x
x
p
x

s
s
s
s
s
s

p
p
p
p
x
x

x
x
x
p
x

P
S
omitted
S
S
omitted

P
P
P
P
X
X

Lev 3 texts (Exod 5:21; 12:11; 23:31; 28:41; 29:29, 33; 32:4, 15, 29; Lev 3:2, 8, 13; 8:33;
26:25; Num 3:3; 22:7). This is 38% of the occurrences. The LXX precisely follows the
MT in the rest of 26 texts, 62%. The verbal subject changed along with the noun in Exod
5:21 and 32:29, 2/42 or 4.7%. Contrary to the Tov’s description, the LXX followed the
MT once in Num 33:3 even though the “Greek does not like combinations of a
(collective) noun in singular with a plural verb.”197 Having proven that the incongruity of
plural and singular forms in the LXX is even bigger than Tov presented, this adds even
more: “As a result of these uncertainties, it is almost impossible to evaluate deviations in
the LXX in many grammatical categories. Because many aspects of the translation
techniques cannot be analyzed satisfactorily, no reliable variants can be reconstructed in
these areas.”198
Thus, Calabro’s proposal that the LXX reading of Lev 3:2, 8, 13 represents an
“original reading” is dismissed in the present study for two reasons. First, of 11 singular
uses of the noun “hand” in texts where this noun is syntactically related to the verb סָ מַ ְך,
the LXX and the MT agree in 6/11. In addition, the singular “hand” is used in a clause
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included in the LXX and not in the MT (Lev 1:14), which is a total of 7/11 times (i.e.,
63%).
Second, when the singular of the noun “hand” is analyzed, the LXX follows the
MT in 26/42 occurrences, 62% (the MT contains 11 more occurrences which are
excluded, since the LXX omitted the singular of the noun “hand,” in the process of
translating the phrases). The LXX changed the singular to the plural in 16/42
occurrences, 38%.
Third, the LXX and the MT are in total agreement in their use of the plural of the
noun “hand.” This agreement is present in all 13 texts where the verb  סָ מַ ְךis syntactically
related to the plural of the noun “hand.” It also translates to 12 more texts where verbs
other than  סָ מַ ְךare syntactically related to the plural of the noun “hand,” that is, the LXX
and the MT agree in all texts.
Calabro stated that “of course, neither of these observations constitutes proof that
hand placement in the biblical period always involved two hands and not one.”199 This
statement is confirmed by the analysis presented in the present study. The three points
above show that Calabro’s proposal is not sustainable in the present form. Based on the
nature of its inadequacies the present study reasons that further research will not change
this.
Going beyond the textual criticism arguments, Calabro further suggested that
biblical data provide three further arguments to support his proposal of the “two hands”
gesture. Calabro’s first argument deals with the defective plural of the noun “hand” and
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the second and third arguments deal with the number of the noun “hand” when the 3mp
pronominal suffix is attached to it.
First, Calabro pointed out that the only text in which the noun “hand” is plural is
Lev 16:21 and that it has defective writing of this noun,  ידוinstead of ידיו. He stated that
“if it were not for the explicit mention of ‘two hands,’ one would easily read the
consonantal text’s  ידוas a reference to one hand.” That led him to suggest that “this
raises the possibility that  ידוin the other passages is also a defective writing (such
defective writings are actually quite common in this part of the Pentateuch) and that the
vocalization as a singular in these passages is simply based on an ad hoc reading of the
consonantal text.”200 Consequently, this defective writing points to the plural of “hand.”
To support this, he listed two more texts where the MT has defective writing. The
first text is Num 27:18, where “hand” is in singular, but in v. 23, the MT changes it to a
dual. The LXX translated the noun “hand” in both verses with the plural. Calabro might
well be right on this point. In other words, the LXX’s harmonization might point to the
MT’s haplography or an accidental mistake,201 and the LXX should be preferred reading.
The second text is Lev 9:22, where again, the consonantal text points to the
singular, but the pointing to the dual. In the latter case, one י, either of the nominal plural
ending or the initial consonant of the pronominal suffix, is missing. Calabro found the
support for the two hands gesture in blessings to be well established “from the synagogue
service at the time when the vowel points were added to the Hebrew text (around
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700 CE).”202 However, the pointing Calabro referred to is totally different from the
potential pointing that the MT would have if it used plural. The plural of hands in never
expressed by addition of masculine plural ending, as the form Calabro referred to used,
but rather feminine plural ending, ֹות. Again, this disagreement of the MT and the LXX
might be the MT’s haplography or an accidental mistake, as in the case of Num 27:18.
Calabro’s arguments are partially correct and they do not lend solid ground for the
claim that LXX reading points to the MT’s pattern in which its defective writing of the
singular noun “hand” was its way to express dual of this noun. First, defective writing is
clearly indicated at the time pointing was introduced and the inclusion of qere for all
these texts which Calabro cited (Lev 9:22, 16:21 and Num 27:18) suggests dual form of
the noun. However, all other 18 occurrences of the dual of noun “hand” are properly
spelled, ידיו. So, this represent 18/21 examples of properly spelled dual of the noun
“hand,” which is 85.7 %, and 3/21 with defective writing for which Masoretic pointing
supplies that they should have spelled as dual, which is 14.3 %. It is not impossible to
claim that defective writing that includes the omission of such small letter like  יcan be
the basis for the intent of the translator/s to convey certain pattern or interpretation203 but
being a very minor and regular deviation204 it requires more thorough analysis and more
solid arguments. This study totally disagrees with Calabro’s suggestion that the defective
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use of plural of the noun “hand” point to the regular expression of the dual in the MT. He
stated that “the usual method in pointing defectively written examples of the word יָד
"hand" in ritual hand gestures was to go with the singular in every case, except in specific
instances where the dual was obvious.”
Calabro’s second and third points are well taken. In his second point he noted that
the form  ידיהםdefinitely presupposes the existence of plural form of “hands”  ידיםwhich
does not exist in OT. BH always used יָדֹות. A probability that the second  יin the form

 ידיהםmight be the MT’s mistake is refuted by Calabro’s third point, namely, the plural
form of body parts conflicts with the grammatical expression of the body parts in BH.
Body parts are usually expressed by dual. Calabro stated: “It is a lesser known, but
nevertheless firmly established, aspect of Hebrew grammar that the words for body parts
and other ‘inalienably possessed’ things, when bound to a plural genitive, tend to remain
grammatically singular or dual, depending on whether the possessor is using one or two
of them.”205 This practically means that BH makes a reference to one hand of each
participant, the pattern is to use a singular noun with a plural suffix attached to it, יָדָ ם.
This would literally mean “their hand.”
This study recognizes the complexity of the LXX and the MT number disparity
concerning the noun “hand” which is complicated even more by the fact that grammatical
patterns of uses of only one hand or both are sometimes overruled by the sameness of the
context. For instance, this study claims that one hand is used in Lev. 1:4; 3:2, 8, 13; 4:4,
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24, 29, 33 based on a consistent and explicit MT reading, and that potentially two hands
of one person were involved in Exod 29:10, 15, 19; Lev 4:15; 8:14, 18, 22; 16:21; 24:14;
Num 8:10, 12; 27:18, 23; Deut 34:9 based on the patterns of use of the plural of the noun
“hand” conducted on pp. 670–71. However, this delineation is potentially overruled in at
least one text, Lev 4:15, since, based on the grammatical pattern, two hands were
potentially used in this text, but Lev 4 in all other instances, vv. 4, 24, 29, and 33, used
only one hand. Grammatical ambiguity related to the last set of texts where potentially
two hands as well as one could have been used. The conclusion of the present study is
that the form of gesture is insignificant and does not affect its meaning/function. This
understanding of the form answers the valid question Kiuchi raised as to whether a
difference in form implies a difference in symbolic meaning.206 The answer is “no.” The
biblical text confirms that there were two forms, but no different meanings. At this point,
the presence of different forms remains a matter of further research in terms of
discovering new manuscripts that contain the texts in question.
Calabro’s reliance on post-biblical texts is highly questionable since these texts
can hardly be used to reconstruct the form of the gesture that was introduced and
prescribed several centuries before their time. These texts should, rather, be taken as an
interpretation of Pentateuch material, rather than its equal. The interaction between these
two materials should also be in the context of a precisely established method that would
explicitly define interaction between them.
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Techniques of the Sacrifice of Animals in Ancient Israel and Ancient Mesopotamia: New Insights through
Comparison, Part 1,” AUSS 44 (2006): 25.
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Pressure or No Pressure
Rabbis commonly understood that the verb סָ מַ ְך, when associated with hands,
referred to the activity that includes pressure on the recipient of the action.207 Daube
sustained this understanding by comparing the gesture of laying on of hands expressed by

 סָ מַ ְךto the one expressed by “ ִּשׂיםto put, place.” He suggested that the former involves
“vigorous leaning,” whereas the latter is gentler in nature.208 However, Wright correctly
argued that  סָ מַ ְךmight be idiomatic, without any indication that pressure is involved. The
evidence to claim that  סָ מַ ְך יָדimplies pressure is insufficient.209 This study also affirms
this claim.

The Function/Meaning of Laying on of Hand/s
As presented in the introduction of the current study, there are five major theories
on the function/meaning of laying on of hand/s in the Pentateuch: (1) transfer/substitution
theory, (2) identification/substitution theory, (3) consecration/dedication/presentation
theory, (4) appropriation-ownership/designation theory, and (5) manumission theory. As
their names disclose and as demonstrated in the introduction, there is a lot of overlap
among them.
The quest for the function/meaning of this gesture is severely obscured by the
fluidity and imprecision of terminology used, along with inaccurate conclusions resulting
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from selective and incomprehensive reading of the texts. Transfer, substitution, and
identification are often mutually paired and/or related to other theories. Transfer includes
transmission of various elements such as evil, sin, authority, power, identity, and
personality. Transfer of personality was associated with several slight modifications.210

Critique of Theories
This subsection deals with all other theories except the transfer/substitution and
the appropriation-ownership/designation theory since they, as the most debated ones, are
discussed separately below. The manumission theory is also not analyzed, since its only
point of difference with the appropriation-ownership/designation theory is that in the
former, the offerers renounced the right of property over the sacrifice,211 while in the
latter, the offerers communicated ownership over their sacrifice.

Identification/Substitution Theory
Robinson proposed that the laying on of hand/s represents total and ontological
identification of the offerers and their sacrificial animal. The animal, in a way, literally
becomes the offerer. This nuance of identification/substitution theory is alien to the OT.
The meaning/function of this ritual gesture is, rather, found in its symbolic
interpretation.212 Rowley included symbolism in his interpretation of this gesture and
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proposed that the offerers identify with their sacrificial animal in order that the death of
the animal might symbolically remove any obstacle that separate them from God.213
Milgrom criticized this theory on the basis that it is magical and that a belief that death
brings one closer to God is embedded in it.214 However, regardless of these non-biblically
confirmed conceptions related to the identification theory, one can think that the offerers
could symbolically perceive their offering as their own representative and/or substitute
before God. The laying on of hand/s on the Levite had that meaning.215 This
identification should not be understood as “identifying of,” but rather, “identified
with.”216 However, this meaning/function cannot be the primary one due to the lack of
explicit support from texts, especially in prevailing sacrificial contexts. It denies a crucial
element of the sacrificial process which is sin/GHS that needs to be dealt with. No
transfer is involved.

Consecration-Separation/Dedication/Presentation Theory
Rodríguez identified a valid weakness of this theory. He claimed that it would be
more substantial if a priest performed a laying on of hand/s. He noted that the sinners
come to the sanctuary to obtain forgiveness via their sacrifice and is not in the position to
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consecrate/dedicate/present anything to God prior to being forgiven.217 His primary goal
is to change his unfavorable status before God.
Mattingly incorrectly criticized Rodríguez on this point, arguing from the nonbiblical theory of sacrifice where a sacrifice is an offering or giving over of something to
the realm of holy, God in this case. Mattingly argued that consecration had to be
completed before the ritual ended and was a prerequisite to forgiveness. On this basis, he
also criticized Rodríguez’s point that the offerer cannot consecrate anything to God
before obtaining forgiveness.218
First, Rodríguez’s argument that the offerers first need to obtain forgiveness prior
to being able to consecrate/dedicate/present something to God might be limiting the
contexts of sacrificial offering only to those where the offerers make a sin or reparation
offering. Leviticus 1–3 portrays situations of sacrificial offering in which sin was not
included, yet all included a laying on of hand/s. However, the offerers would at all times
bear their GHS that would put them in an unfavorable status before God which needed to
be altered. This understanding of human nature and its constant unfavorable status before
God negates the gift theory of sacrifice. If the offerers’ sin was not dealt with by a
sacrificial offering, then the sacrifice addressed their GHS. The offerer would admit their
GHS and through the laying on of hand/s, transfer it to the animal that would, through its
death, enable them to live and freely commune with God. Thus, Mattingly’s critique of
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Rodríguez was based on a partially valid and unsustainable argument if all sacrificial
contexts are taken into consideration.
Second, the process of consecration or sanctification is never in the domain of an
ordinary individual in biblical legislation. It is always priests or Moses who sanctified the
priests, who are involved in this process and never ordinary individual/s.
Third, it is God himself who consecrate/sanctifies in the OT. That fact is
emphasized in any ritual which culminates in consecration/sanctification of an entity. The
separation nuance of this theory is even less sustainable. Just the fact that a sacrificial
animal is brought to the sacrificial altar is testament of the fact that it separated/set apart
from the larger group for a special purpose. Laying on of hand/s would be redundant and
as such, not needed.
Finally, Pentateuch legislation never uses the verbs of dedication with the offerer
as a subject and sacrifice as a direct object in Lev 1–7. The only text where it is explicitly
stated that sacrifices are dedicated to God is Lev 22:2–3. However, “holy gifts” refer to
well-being offering219 of which the offerers would keep the most and give a thigh to the
priest. The dedication theory is unsustainable.
Henry Preserved Smith argued that sacrifice itself is sacred based on the fact that
its blood had cleansing power emanating from its sacredness. Thus, the offerers would
partake of the sanctity of the sacrificial animal.220 The offerers would be purified via
contact with the animal. Rodríguez noted a significant weakness of this proposal. The
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sacrificial animal is never sacred. It should be without blemish (Lev 1:3) to be
acceptable,221 but it becomes holy after it is offered, not before. The cleansing power of
blood does not stem out of the animal’s sacredness, but out of divine regulation (Lev
17:11).

Key Misconceptions in Laying on of Hand/s Debate
Calabro identified at least three reasons that prevent a correct interpretation of this
gesture in scholarly debate concerning the laying on of hands. The current study fully
agrees on the first, but disagrees with the second and third reasons.
First, previous researchers shared the assumption that the form of this gesture
consistently correlate with its meaning/function. Foundational to this assumption is that
there are two forms, one and two hands gestures, each of which has a distinct meaning.
The one hand gesture conveyed the ownership or identification of the offerer, whereas the
two hands gesture meant transfer or identification of its route, designation, partaking of
sanctity of animal, substitution, designation. However, the emphasis on the two separate
forms did not prevent overlaps between their meaning/function.222 Thus, the emphasis of
some scholars on the form of the gesture did not bring clarity to its meaning/function.
Second, scholars usually assume that meanings/functions are mutually exclusive,
which might not be the case. This is true since the history of interpretation shows that
interpreters usually focus only on one or two, as in the case of two forms of gesture or
interpretations and apply all others to them. However, this study disagrees with the
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Calabro’s background of this reason. That is, he followed Propp223 and Robertson
Smith224 who proposed that there were two different understandings of the laying on of
hands, the priestly author’s one and the popular one. Calabro went on to state that
“different people in the society likely held different interpretations of the same gesture.
Some of those interpretations may have aligned with different social strata, religious
viewpoints, and locations in space and time.” OT texts do not support such a claim. On
the contrary, sacrificial regulations in Lev 1–5 in chap. 1–3 do not refer to any specific
social group within community, but rather, imply anyone in the society. An individual is
given freedom within his/her financial means to choose the type of sacrificial animal.
However, sacrifices had the same purpose in any case, acceptance and/or atonement.
Thus, based on the texts, the presence of societal classes does not imply different
interpretations of the same ritual. There are certain modifications of the sacrificial animal
in Lev 4–6:7 based on social status, but the sacrifices always had the same meaning,
forgiveness. In addition, given the fact that the two sets of sacrificial regulations were
written for different audiences, Lev 6:8–7 also does not contain any hints that would
indicate various interpretations of the sacrificial ritual. As stated above, they just clarify
details that pertain to the priest personnel. Therefore, being unsupported by OT text, this
background is rejected but the reason proposed based on this background is confirmed by
the history of interpretation and is valid.
Third, Calabro stated that “many try to fit ancient practice within a framework of
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logical relationships that is characteristic of modern Western philosophy.” These logical
relationships of Western philosophy are concepts like identification, designation, and
attribution. However, it is questionable whether these concepts are exclusively constructs
of Western philosophy. As Calabro stated, these constructs naturally emanate out of the
logic of the sacrificial process.
The function of designation, for example, arises naturally from the direct contact
involved in hand placement (which unambiguously points out the recipient) and from
the fact that the gesture immediately precedes further ritual performance on the
recipient. Likewise, since the protocol of sacrifice assumes that the animal receiving
hand placement belongs to the one making the offering and is to be accepted on his
behalf (Lev 1:2–4), the gesture would tend to carry an attributive function.225
The fact that they were not defined or stated in these texts does not mean that they
were not present in people’s perception of certain parts of the sacrificial offering process.
It is true that the English verb “to identify,” the noun “identification,” and the adjective
“identifiable” emerge in the time of modern Western philosophy in the English
language, but at least a verb with the identical semantic range with which it is used in
modern Western philosophy was in use as early as 350 AD.226 The verbs “to
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designate”227 and “to attribute”228 also originate from Latin or French, languages that
were in use since the 4th century. This basic data proves that the use of these words
predates the dialogue of modern Western Philosophy. Calabro’s assessment that terms
like identification, designation, and attribution are constructs of modern Western
Philosophy seems not to be correct, perhaps leaving this part of his research without
relevant references that would confirm this.
Building on these mainly inaccurate claims, Calabro suggested a methodology
that this study completely supports. “A close reading of the Hebrew texts, with careful
attention to words and phrases that are structurally aligned with descriptions of the

The English verb “to designate” was formed either (1) as a back-formation from the noun
“designation,” (2) from the adjective “designate, ” or (3) from the Latin designatus. The first record with
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mark out or indicate” was noted in 1818. Etymonline, s.v. “Designate (v.),” released 17 Feb 2019,
https://www.etymonline.com/word/designate#etymonline_v_46758. The English noun “designation”
originated either from the Old French designacioun or directly from the Latin designationem (nominative
designatio), “a marking out, specification,” noun of action from past participle stem of designare “mark
out, devise, choose, designate, appoint,” and was noted in the 16th century and on. Etymonline, s.v.
“Designation (n.),” released 17 Feb 2019, https://www.etymonline.com/word/designation#etymonline
_v_29918. The English adjective “marked out, indicated” was formed from the Latin desegnatus, the past
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Dictionary, s.v. “Designation (n.),” released 17 Feb 2019, https://en.oxforddictionaries
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gesture, offers the most accurate method for disclosing ancient understandings of hand
placement.” In addition, taking into careful consideration the micro reading of the texts, I
broaden the context of this gesture to a macro reading of the texts. In other words, I
placed the laying on of hands in the context of the most common outcome of the
sacrificial offering process, the atonement, and related it to the foundational background
of any sacrificial offering, GHS or/and sin, as a constant human disadvantage before God.
Calabro fell short in systematically following the methodology he suggested.
His starting point suggested a totally new meaning of the laying on of hands in
Lev 1:4, “that it may be accepted for him to make atonement on his behalf.” He stated
that the way in which the animal mediates for the offerer is not a crucial point in this text.
In other words, the focus is not on what the gesture does to the animal, but rather, the
emphasis is on the fact that “the gesture’s form is a similitude of atonement.” He also
adopted the meaning of “to cover” for the Hebrew verb  כִּ פֶּרto propose that the laying on
of hands on the animal’s head is an “iconic symbol of “cover over” the sins of” the
offerer.229
This proposal is based on a subjective and selective reading of this verse. First,
the act of atonement, as suggested in the present study, includes two basic parts which are
the offerers’ letting go of their sin by placing their hands on the sacrificial animal, and
God’s acceptance of that sin into his sanctuary and granting forgiveness to the offerers.
The first part of it is represented by the animal’s “recovering” of the offerers’ sin. In
other words, contrary to Calabro, the text does emphasize what the gesture does to the
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sacrificial animal. The transfer of the offerers’ sin onto the animal is crucial and thus,
becomes an integral part of the atonement process. This does not diminish the emphasis
on the atonement itself, but rather, explains it even more. Second, scholars rightfully
refuted and largely abandoned the view that the Hebrew verb  כִּ פֶּרmeans “to cover.”
Third, the context in Lev 1–3 is completely different from the one in Lev 4–6:7, since in
the former, no sinful act was involved, whereas in the latter it was. Finally, this phrase is
not mentioned in relation to any other sacrifice but burnt offering, which requires further
investigation if it should be applied to all other sacrifices.
Building on the grammatical and syntactical parallels between “ וסָ מַ כתָּ אֶּ ת־יָדָך

( ָעלָיוyou shall lay your hands on him)” in v. 18 and “( ונָתַ תָּ ה מֵ הֹודָך ָעלָיוyou shall put
some of your power on him)” in v. 20 of Num 27, Calabro noticed that the transfer theory
fits these contexts the best. He concluded that “the phrase  נתן עלcontributes a distinctive
nuance to the concept of transfer, indicating that what is transferred becomes like a
material possession that one can wear (like a crown), rather than something that
permeates the soul or the blood (the verb ‘ מלאfill’ in Deut 34:9, of course, carries a
different nuance).”230
Calabro, then, proposed the interpretation of laying on of hands that nobody, to
his knowledge, had previously the following: “On the basis of the passages from
Numbers mentioned above, one could posit that hand placement is the ‘gesture of פקד,’ a
way of appointing a person or animal to a particular status or role. This function could
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apply to all of the biblical attestations of hand placement.” He came to this conclusion by
noting that in Num 27:16, Moses asked God “to appoint,  ”פקדa man over the sons of
Israel. Calabro stated that this sequence suggests that at least one function of the laying
on of hands ritual was “to appoint” a person or a thing. He also cited Num 1:50; 3:10;
8:10; and Neh 7:1, where laying on of hands was performed on the Levites who were
“appointed,  ”פקדto their offices. Finally, Calabro referred to Creason’s work on the verb

פקד, where Creason defined its meaning as follows: “The verb’s basic meaning is ‘to
assign a person or a thing to what the subject believes is its proper or appropriate status or
position in an organizational order,’ or more succinctly, ‘to put some thing where it is
supposed to be in the overall scheme of things.’”231
First, Calabro’s proposal is not new by any means. It is virtually identical to the
theory of consecration-separation/dedication/presentation that is presented in the history
of interpretation in this study (see pp. 9, 11). Second in developing his proposal he
ignored a basic step of a sound interpretation: root distribution. The verb  פקדis found
144 times in the Pentateuch, plus 237 in the rest of the OT. The most significant use of
the root occurs in the book of Numbers, 108/144. The occurrences and uses in other
books are insignificant (Genesis, 11 times; Exodus, 18; Leviticus, 5; and Deuteronomy,
2) when compared to the one in Numbers. This statistic is not a warrant of any firm
conclusions about the meaning of the root, but it does indicate that  פקדdid not play a
significant role in any other books but Numbers. Since most of the occurrences of the
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laying on of hands occur in the book of Leviticus (15 times in 6 events), in contrast to
Numbers (4 times in 2 events), Exodus (3 times in a single event), and Deuteronomy (1
time), it would be reasonable to examine Leviticus texts, rather than Numbers in order to
find its meaning. This method is confirmed further by the fact that the only time  פקדis
found in the book of Numbers in the context of the laying on of hands is in 27:16. In this
context, the verb conveys the result or outcome of the laying on of hand/s, rather than the
meaning/function of this ritual gesture which Moses will perform over Joshua. The verb
is not mentioned in relation to the laying on of hands in Exod 29, Num 8, and Deut 34,
which leave its only relation to this gesture in Num 27. It would be questionable to
establish the meaning of the laying on of hands based on the connection of the verb פקד,
and this gesture in one context, and not consider the other 22 contexts. Third, the verb

 פקדis never used in Exodus and Leviticus with the meaning “to appoint.” The meanings
of  פקדimplied in Exodus are “to carefully watch over” (3:16), “to be concerned” (4:31),
“to take care of” (13:19), “to punish” (20:5; 32:34; 34:7, ), and “to count, number”
(30:12, 13, 14; 38:21, 25).232 The two meanings found in Leviticus are “to entrust” (Lev
5:23 [6:4])233 and “to bring” (Lev 18:25;234 26:16).235 Thus, the meaning of פקד, “to
appoint” does not appear at all in the books of Exodus and Leviticus that contain 18/23
laying-on-of-hands contexts. This statistic strongly demonstrates the flaws of Calabro’s
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analysis which is considered unsound in this study.

Transfer/Substitution
For the sake of clarity in the process of examining scholarly arguments on the
meaning/function of the laying on of hands, I state here that the laying on of hand/s is
best understood to convey transfer and/or substitution, and name my theory in accordance
with its meaning/function, transfer, and/or substitution theory.
This is the most debated236 and the most frequent meaning of the laying on of
hand/s in the oldest and recent studies.237 It is applicable to all contexts as long as the
context is taken into consideration to determine what is being transferred to the sacrificial
animal.238

Evaluation of the Points of Critique of the
Transfer/Substitution Theory
The total of 10 arguments against the transfer/substitution theory is presented in
the introduction of the present study. Paterson recognized 5 at the beginning of the 20th
century, while Wright collected 5 more at the end of the same century. All of them are
evaluated below. Regardless of whether these arguments look impressive, they are the
result of a selective reading of the texts. Scholars place an emphasis on some texts at the
cost of disregarding others, which caused them to derive partially accurate inferences
regarding the meaning/function of the gesture. Since some of them supplement each

Mattingly, “The Laying on of Hands on Joshua,” 148.

236

Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 1:84; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 113; Calabro, “A
Reexamination,” 117.
237

Calabro, “A Reexamination,” 117.

238

692

other, those collected by Paterson are combined with the ones gathered by Wright in
order to avoid repetitions as they are critically analyzed.

The Death of the Victim
Cannot be Vicarious
The death of the victim could not have been vicarious, since sacrifice was not
allowed for sins which merited death (Num 15:30), only for venial transgressions. This
argument reflects a selective reading of texts.239 Scholars widely and rightfully
recognized that the life of an individual Israelite who experiences sin or impurity and
disregards the regulations mandated by God himself is terminated (Lev 15:31; Num
19:13, 20). Other texts also implied this, such as Lev 5:1–4.240 Instead of bearing his/her
own sin and ultimately suffering its consequence of death, the Ancient Israelite was
advised to transfer his/her sin/s to the sin and/or reparation offering and receive
forgiveness. Sins for which biblical legislation prescribes death are unforgivable/
inexpiable and the one who commits them is barred from the advantage of sacrificial
atonement/forgiveness. Individuals liable for such sins would not get a chance to transfer
their sin to appropriate offerings and receive forgiveness.

Sacrifice Cannot be Holy and Impure
The assumption that the imposition of hands involved a transmission of guilt is
inconsistent, not only with other references to this practice, but also with the fact that the
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sacrificial flesh was treated as most holy, and might be eaten by the priest.241
J. C. Matthes criticism that this theory on the basis that the imposition of hands
involved a transmission of guilt is inconsistent, not only with other references to this
practice, but also with the fact that the sacrificial flesh was treated as most holy, and
might be eaten by the priest.242 Rodríguez established the fact that holiness and sin, and I
add GHS, can coexist in the same place at the same time.243 However, the inference that
coexistence of sanctity and defilement is present in biblical texts was noted before by
Rodríguez244 and later by Milgrom and Gane.245 Sin offering in Lev 4–5:13 that
specifically deals with sin is also considered holy.246 Kiuchi’s critique of Rodríguez’s and
the view of other scholars who believed this is not well taken. That is, he stated that
“although it may be naturally envisaged that the  חַ טָּ אתhas something to do with the guilt,
it is the priests who bear it, and not the חַ טָּ את.”247 First, based on the regulation
concerning the sin offering in Lev 6:24–30 which states that the priest is to eat the flesh
of the sin offering he officiates, it is accurate that the priest bears a sin that the sin
offering dealt with in the third and fourth subcase in Lev 4, vv. 22–26 and 27–35. Yet,
the same regulation also specifically states that the priest is not to eat the meat of the sin
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offering that dealt with sin in the case of the first and second subcase in Lev 4, vv. 3–12
and 13–21. In this case, sin is transferred to the sanctuary directly through the blood.248
This seems to be a common notion in ANE context.249 Kiuchi totally disregarded the fact
that sometimes the priest bears the sin, while sometimes the sin is transferred directly
onto the sanctuary. Second, Kiuchi stated that the priest bore guilt rather than sin, but
admitted that “the confusion of terms such as ‘sin,’ ‘guilt,’ and ‘uncleanness’ has
obscured the whole issue of ‘transference of sin/guilt.’”250 As it was established earlier,
the terms for sin refer to all three stages of a sinful situation, an act, guilt, and its
punishment. Metaphorical interpretation, which is undeniable in these contexts, would
confirm that any of the three could be “borne” by the priest and refer to the obstacle
between the offerer and God. In other words, the priest would carry all three of them.
None of the two points of critique Kiuchi proposed against Rodríguez’s work is
substantial.
This is indeed validated by the texts which unanimously present these two entities
coexisting in the physical place (sanctuary, Exod 29:44; 40:9–10 = Lev 16:16), human
(priests/Nazirite, Exod 29:33, 44; 40:13; Lev 8; Num 6 = Lev 10:17), and animal bodies
(sacrificial animals Lev 6:10 [6:17]; 6:18 [6:25] = 6:20 [6:27]). This point of critique
seems to reflect selective, rather than careful and comprehensive reading of the texts.
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Those three entities could coexist without affecting the holiness of the sanctuary, priests,
Nazirite, or sacrificial animal.
Based on Lev 4:12, 6:23 [30], Rodríguez rightfully concluded: “The fact that the
place where the burning occurred was a ‘clean place’ suggests that the flesh of the animal
was holy. The flesh was also considered at the same time source of contamination (Lev
16:18)251 since the person who burned it was ‘to wash his clothes and bathe his body in
water’ before returning to the camp.”252 He was anticipated by Milgrom who also
affirmed the paradox that the flesh of a sin offering animal is both holy and impure.
Namely, it was deposited in a pure, clean place (Lev 4:12), as Rodríguez cited, and it was
eaten by the priest and because its holy status is explicitly stated (Lev 6:19, 22, 10:17).253
Thus, the animal was both holy and impure at the same time.
This perplexing reality presented in biblical texts is possible only because God
allowed it by delegating regulations that conveyed the coexistence of these three entities.
Thus, the conclusion emerges that sin/impurity/sinfulness is not a threat or stronger than
holiness, but rather, is under the control of holiness.254 Thus, transfer of sin/sinfulness to
the sacrificial animal does not annul the holiness of the sacrifice.
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Blood Manipulation Versus Slaughter
The essence of this claim is that the central act of the sacrifice was not the act of
slaughtering, but the manipulation of the blood which was presented to God.255 However,
accepting this proposal does not diminish the fact that the sacrificial animal symbolically
and substitutionally represents the offerer. Actually, the laying on of hands facilitates this
understanding, since the sins were transferred onto the sacrificial animal via this gesture.
Thus, this argument is an attempt to emphasize one ritual activity over other activities,
which goes against the ritual theory accepted in the present study. Gane convincingly
proved that ritual in its totality achieves its purpose.256 The transfer/substitution theory
actually upholds the critical role of blood application in the sacrificial offering ritual
since through it, the sin/s that were carried by the offerer are transported to the sanctuary
from where they are removed on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16:16, 21). The animal is
symbolically the offerer’s substitute that suffers punishment for his/her sin. Thus, the
transfer/substitution theory organically correlates with and upholds the importance of
blood application. It adds more importance and meaning to it.

Substitution Theory Is Untenable
Wright stated that the transfer/substitution theory as an explanation for the laying
on of hands is informed by the substitution theory of sacrifice which, in his opinion, is
untenable.257 This claim echoes the subjective and poorly supported claim. In order to
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dismiss such an important and widely accepted theory of sacrifice, one would need to
rely on extensive studies. Wright cited sources that do not provide in-depth research on
the topic, along with two that do.258 However, scholars have proven and continue to
prove that substitution was widely present in the ANE and in Ancient Israel.259 Thus,
Wright’s argument that the laying on of hand/s cannot mean transfer/substitution is
refuted by the overwhelming amount of research that proved that this concept was firmly
embedded in Ancient Israel and ANE texts. In addition, the study of the verb  כִּ פֶּרin the
present study strongly supports the idea that substitution was an integral part of the
atonement conveyed via this verb in the Pentateuch.260

Transfer/Substitution Theory
Is Based on Lev 16:21
Wright noticed that the main support of the transfer/substitution theory is the
hand-laying in Lev 16:21. He was anticipated by Janowski who marshaled this argument
in the second half of the twentieth century based on the three differences between laying
on of hand in Lev 16:21 and other texts: (1) imposition of both hands on the head of the
goat, (2) transference of materia peccans to the evil bearer, and (3) sending off of the
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goat to the wilderness, are missing in sacrificial contexts. He concluded that the
Scapegoat is not a sacrifice.261 These points are rightfully critiqued by Kiuchi262 and
throughout the present work.
Wright assumed that hand placement in Lev 16:21, performed with two hands, is
different from hand placement with one hand which is the procedure for other offerings.
Hence, a difference in form suggests, a priori, a possible different meaning. He also
claimed that the scapegoat is not a sacrifice; it is merely a rite of elimination and
therefore, cannot be used to interpret the gesture of hand placement in sacrifices.263 This
argument is refuted through extensive analysis of the form of this gesture under the
subheading, “Form of Laying on of Hands: Singular vs Plural vs Dual” and “Pressure or
No Pressure,” of the present study and is not repeated here.264
Based on the inadequacy of the argument that the form affects the
meaning/function of this gesture; this study accepts the proposition that Lev 16:21 can be
taken as a model for the meaning in sacrifices. In addition, this text is not the only text
that explicitly supports the transfer of sin via laying on of hands. Lev 4 clearly states that
the sinner comes to offer his/her sacrifice “loaded” with his/her sin and goes away
forgiven. It does not state what happens with sin borne by the sinner, but Lev 16:16
explicitly states that the sins are in the sanctuary, that is, in the most holy place. Having
demonstrated that ADH is not textually supported, the transfer of sin is the logical

261

Janowski, Sühne als Heilsgeschehen, 209–16, especially 215.

262

Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 114–16.
Wright, “The Gesture of Hand Placement,” 437–38.

263
264

See pp. 666–79 of the present study.

699

meaning/function of the laying on of hands in light of Lev 16:16, which attributes the sins
in the sanctuary as the sins of the sons of Israel. Laying on of hands is the only ritual
gesture that is performed in the constraints of the sanctuary that may indicate that the
nature of the contact between the offerer and sacrificial animal is that of a transfer. All
other contacts that the offerer makes with his/her sacrifice are conditioned by the cause
and effect principle of the sacrificial process as set forth in the following paragraph.
Gane provided two slightly different lists of ritual activities related to burnt and
sin offering, both of which contain two sets of sacrificial procedures: (1) the ones
explicitly mentioned in the texts, and (2) the implicit ones.265 Regardless of which class a
ritual activity belongs to, some of them can be viewed as pre-requisite or post-requisite
activities.266 Gane was anticipated by Hubert and Mauss, and Turner, who termed these
activities preliminary ones.267 Thus, the offerer’s ritual purity, selecting268 and bringing
the animal to the sanctuary,269 are necessary prerequisite activities for the sacrificial ritual
to take place and are performed outside of the sanctuary. These ritual activities precede
the laying on of hands. The cultic ritual law does not assign symbolic meaning to them,
and it is unlikely that they had any symbolic meaning because they are necessary
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activities for the ritual proper. They are conditioned by the cause and effect principle
necessary for sacrificial procedure.
The ritual activities performed that follow the laying on of hands include slaying
the animal; collecting the blood; presenting the blood to the outer altar; dashing the blood
against the altar or applying it on the sacrificial altar’s horns; pouring the remaining
blood at the base of the sacrificial altar; dismembering the carcass; removing, presenting,
and burning the suet or arranging the body pieces; washing, presenting, and burning the
entrails and shins; and eating the meat. Gane suggested that of these, only laying on of
hands and application of blood and suet to the sacrificial altar have no practical function
in the ritual proper.270 Gane insightfully noted:
In terms of mere physical cause and effect, the collection of activities just listed is an
inefficient way to feed a priest: leaning one hand on the head of an animal and
applying its blood and suet to an altar have no practical function in the mundane
sphere. Such “impracticality” is common in ritual because the goal of a ritual
transcends what can be achieved through ordinary physical means alone. There is an
important sense in which a ritual goal may be regarded as practical, but this involves
a higher level of practicality, such as reestablishing good relations with a deity in
order to receive his blessings instead of punishment.271
The principle of higher goals than those conditioned by the mere cause and effect
principle is certainly true for both of these ritual activities. That is, the two activities
referred to in the quotation are not necessary in the mundane sphere. They symbolically
achieve goals that exceed the goals conditioned by the cause and effect principle.
Therefore, it is expected and unavoidable that they are loaded with symbolic meaning.
Limiting the laying on of hand/s to the meaning of ownership represents significantly
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diminishing the symbolic meaning of this activity and undermines the contexts of sin or
GHS that is associated in an unadvantageous way to sacrificial offering ritual. The
meaning of transfer encounters well the fact that the sinner leaves the sanctuary free of
his/her sin, in the case of the sin and reparation offering, and the fact that the sin is stored
in the sanctuary and removed from there on the Day of Atonement. In the case of other
sacrifices, laying on of hands symbolically facilitates transfer of GHS, thus enabling safe
interaction between God and humans.
Scholars have already recognized that transfer is a valid meaning of this gesture
regardless of the different contexts in which it was performed, such as the ordination of
Joshua or the installation of the Levites or the incident of blasphemy (Lev 24:10–16;
Num 8:10, 12; 27:18, 23; Deut 34:9).272 If transfer is an upheld meaning/function in two
different contexts such as ordination and sin removal via the goat for Azazel, there is no
reason that it would not be accepted in sacrificial contexts. The context remains the final
determinant of what has been transferred and what the ultimate goal of a given ritual is as
a whole. Rodríguez explained the interconnectedness and distinctiveness of sacrificial
and goat-for-Azazel contexts in which the laying on of hands was practiced:
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The only difference between the two cases [sacrificial and elimination contexts] is to
be found in the nature of the relation which the laying on of hands produces. In the
case of the scapegoat the relation is not one of sacrificial substitution in the sense that
the animal bears the sin and penalty of the sinner. In the latter case we can speak
about sacrificial substitution. This means that the way the scapegoat bears ( )נָשָׁ אthe
sin of the people is essentially different from the way the expiatory sacrifices bear the
sin of the offerer. This is precisely what Lev 16:22 states: “The goat shall bear all
their iniquities upon him to a solitary land.” ( ונָשָׂ א הַ שָּׂ עִּ יר ָע ָליו אֶּ ת־כָל־עֲֹונֹ תָ ם אֶּ ל־אֶּ ֶּרץ
)גּז ֵָרה.273

Well-Being Offering Is Not
an Expiatory Offering
Wright stated that it is difficult to apply the idea of transfer of guilt in the case of
the well-being offering since it is not an expiatory offering like sin and reparation
offerings, and to a certain extent, the burnt offering.274 This inference reflects arguments
based on selective reading of texts. Regulations in Lev 1 clearly state that the burnt
offering, besides others, possesses an expiatory function which has been widely
recognized (Lev 1:4).275 Thus, his argument then rests on the regulations of only wellbeing offerings. The expiatory function of the well-being offering was extensively
analyzed in the current study as a part of the analysis of Lev 17:10–12 and is not repeated
here.276 Since Lev 17:11 implies all animal sacrifices, they all have an expiatory
function.277 Some of them are exclusively expiatory (sin and reparation offering), while
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others, besides being expiatory, also have other functions (burnt, grain, and well-being
offerings). In addition, even though cultic legislation never required an offerer
specifically to offer one of these two sacrifices for committing sin, the rituals that
included these two sacrifices also represented a way of interaction with God278 and as
such, these two sacrifices were expiatory as well, in a restricted way, but still expiatory.
The foundational element that these two sacrifices of restricted expiatory function dealt
with, besides the fact that they were primarily offered for reasons such as acceptance
(Lev 1) or thanksgiving, vows, free-will (Lev 7:12, 16), is GHS, which presents a
constant problem in divine-human interaction, but at the same time, is less complex than
when an offerer commits sin.

Laying on of Hand/s in Relation to Bird,
Cereal Offering and the Identity
of the Slayer
Wright stated that if the laying on of hands means the transfer of guilt, it is then
difficult to understand why it was not practiced on the purification or burnt offering
commuted to a bird (Lev 1:14–17; 5:7–11).279 This claim was augmented by claims that a
cereal offering also atones (Lev 5:11–13), but the cultic legislation never requires the
laying on of hand/s on it, which then further implies there could be no idea of a penal
substitution in this case.280
Second, in order to strengthen his proposal that the laying on of hand/s means
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ownership and not transfer, Wright rightfully observed that in some cases, the sacrificial
process would involve other participants than the offerer. Gane adopted this argument to
confirm the fact that the laying on of hands means ownership of the offerer over the
animal.281 This argument is augmented by the claim that the victim was slain by the
offerer, but in order to support the transfer/substitution theory, the sacrificial animal
should have been put to death by the priest as God’s representative.
Wright’s First Argument
These two claims are actually Wright’s first argument for the ownership theory of
the laying on of hand/s. He stated that “this interpretation is confirmed by the fact that it
makes sense of the lack of the gesture with birds and cereal offerings (Lev 1:14–17; 2;
5:7–13).”282 Wright contributed the lack of laying on of hand in relation to the bird and
cereal offering to the fact that they are small and carried by the offerers only, in their
hands.283 Wright’s arguments expressed in this quotation are partially correct, since the
laying on of hands was never prescribed to be performed on the cereal offering in the OT
and is missing in sacrifices that are reduced to a bird; turtledove, or pigeon. Wright found
that in other ANE religions, the laying on of hands was performed over sacrifices that are
not live animals, such as bread, cheese, grain products, wine, and other drinks,

281
“The ‘ownership’ view of sacrificial hand-leaning is supported by the wording of Lev 1:4, the
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slaughtered animals, meats, livers, and tray or baskets with food,284 but this practice is
alien to the OT sacrificial system.
It should be emphasized that the absence of the laying on of hands in burnt, sin,
and reparation offerings is missing only when the sacrificial animal is a bird due to
practical reasons. Wright observed one reason why birds cannot be handled as
quadrupeds: they are too small. In addition, it can be assumed that sacrificial birds,
domesticated or not, would fly away if placed before the sacrificial altar to receive the
laying on of hands. It could be argued that the offerer could have held a bird by the feet
with one of his/her hands while performing laying on of hands with the other one. This
method would leave the bird’s wings free, allowing it to desperately flap. It can be argued
that the offerer could have held his/her bird sacrifice in one hand and perform laying on
of hands with the other one. However, cultic legislation does not prescribe that, but
rather, omits this gesture.
Another inconsistency is found in Wright’s argument regarding the size of the
animal. That is, the bird would not be the only animal for which the offerer would not
need assistance to bring it to the sanctuary. The only animal that the offerer would need
help to bring it to the sanctuary would be a bull, since any adult should be able to bring a
lamb or goat to the sanctuary.
However, Wright rightfully reasoned, similarly to Milgrom, that the same
meaning is implied for the laying on of hands on sacrificial animals, quadrupeds, or
carrying of the sacrificial bird. For Wright, this gesture conveys ownership. However, as
argued in the present study, if the laying on of hands means transfer/substitution of
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sin/s/GHS, then that meaning could be ascribed to the bird offering in whatever capacity
the bird was offered.
Wright’s Second Argument for Ownership
Theory and the Role of the Offerer
The argument that the laying on of hands removes any doubt in identifying the
owner of the sacrificial animal is highly controversial for two reasons. First, no
Pentateuch text mentions this scenario so it is an argument from silence. Nevertheless, it
is totally logical to think that for practical reasons, other person/s besides or instead of the
offerer could lead and bring the animal to the sanctuary. Yet, this argument is highly
controversial since it is founded on exceptional cases. For instance, an animal could have
been big and strong from the herd and an adult not be able to control it. Why would the
offerer not be able to control it? In this case, it must be assumed that a domestic animal
would strongly resist to being led by humans, something that is highly improbable. It
could have happened that the offerer is physically weak, perhaps sick; he/she might not
be able to lead such a strong animal. In that case, the offerer could wait to get well and
then lead and bring the sacrifice animal to be offered in the sanctuary. It also could have
happened that the offerer is physically weak due to age, not sickness. Supposedly, BL
addressed fully grown, healthy adults in the first place. Contrary to this, an adult should
be able to lead a young bull to the sanctuary, knowing that priestly personnel would be
available there to assist further in holding, controlling the animal during the sacrificial
process. In addition, it is highly improbable that such big animals would often be offered
by an individual offerer. Also, one could also wonder why the offerer would not simply
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orally reveal that he/she is the offerer.285 These are just some of the scenarios, but I admit
that all these arguments like Wright’s, are from silence. The fact is that one could always
argue in both directions. The gesture of the laying on of hands is not the only potential
indicator of ownership. Cultic legislation concerning sacrifices provides much stronger
indications in determining the owner and the beneficiary of the sacrifice.
Leviticus 1–5 portrays a distinction between the activities which the offerer
performs and the ones performed by the priest. Leviticus 1:1–9 can be used as an
example. The subject is clearly the offerer since simple 3ms verbal forms are used in 1:2
(to bring), 3 (to offer 2x, he might be accepted), 4 (to lay his hand), 5 (to slay), and 6 (to
skin and cut into pieces) to highlight the involvement of the offerer. The antecedent of
3ms is introduced in v. 2 and it is אָדָ ם, “any man.”286 The priestly roles are also
expressed by 3ms verbal forms but they are augmented by the nouns “Aaron’s sons” or
simply “the priest” in is v. 5 (to offer up, to sprinkle), v. 7 (to put fire on altar and arrange
wood on fire), v. 8 (to arrange pieces of an animal), and v. 9 (to offer up in smoke).287
Some of the activities that are performed by the offerer still do not provide a clear
indication as to who the offerer is, to whom the animal belongs, such as “to bring” (1:2)
or “to offer” (1:3), but other activities besides the laying on of hands (1:4), such as to slay
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(1:5)288 and to skin and cut into pieces (1:6) certainly denote who the owner was.
Furthermore, the very next ritual step after the laying on of hands is slitting the sacrificial
animal’s throat.
It was claimed that the victim was slain by the offerer, but critiques of the
transfer/substitution theory proposed that the sacrificial animal should have been put to
death by the priest as God’s representative.289 However, a much stronger rationale stands
behind the cultic legislation that requires the offerer to slay his/her sacrificial animal.
Rooker also stated that “the worshiper had the responsibility of slaughtering the
animal, apparently by cutting its throat.”290 In addition, he recognized that “the worshiper
was also responsible for skinning the animal and cutting it into pieces (1:6).291 The laws
explicitly state that the offerer was to do that292 which would undoubtedly eliminate any
confusion as to who the offerer was, and would do it in a much more meaningful way,
especially in contexts that include moral impurity. Rooker’s insights were anticipated by
Rodríguez, who emphasized that the key reason for the assumption that the offerers were

288
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to slaughter the sacrificial animal is found in the fact that they transferred their sin onto it
and therefore had to kill it.293 In that case, the sacrificial offering process would include
at least two ritual activities that have exactly the same meaning and which would be
highly questionable. Suggesting that the laying-on-of-hands function was to identify the
owner of the sacrifice is unnecessarily limiting this crucial ritual activity and overlaps
with other ritual activities included in the ritual process.
Thus, Wright’s arguments are unsatisfactory because of (1) considering the cereal
and the bird offering to belong to the same category in order to reason that the laying on
of hands was not performed on these offerings because of their size, and (2) the sacrificial
process contains stronger indicators of who the offerer of the sacrifice was other than the
laying on of hands.

Laying on of Hand/s and Confession
Wright stated that the view of the transfer of sin or penalty by hand placement is
usually accompanied by the view that a confession of guilt took place at the time of hand
placement. There is no evidence, however, that confession took place at that time. The
few examples of confession with a sacrifice placed the confession before the sacrifice is
even brought (Lev 5:5; Num 5:7).294 This is an argument from silence. Cultic legislation
does not include confession of sin in Lev 4 where one would expect it, but it does include
it in Lev 5:5, which is a type of sin offering. Wright’s suggestion that, in Lev 5:5 and
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Num 5:7, confession did not take place at the time of the laying on of hands is not
supported by the text.295
Legislation in Lev 5:5 is significantly abbreviated in comparison to Lev 4, where
the sacrificial process is explained in a temporal, chronological, and significantly more
detailed manner. Regulations in Lev 5 perhaps emphasize confession and rely on Lev 4
for the exact sacrificial order, because the sins in vv. 1 and 4 are public and intentional,
including certain damage to a fellow man, and as such, require public confession.296
Leviticus 4 does not contain hints that would point to their public and intentional nature,
so perhaps they are private and the decision to offer sacrifice and receive forgiveness
remains in the realm of the sinners’ decision. If they decide to offer the sacrifice, the
sacrificial process itself is a sort of confession, since they are moved to follow a divinely
instituted mechanism to solve the problem of sin in their lives.
Gane suggested that the laying on of hands or handing the bird or grain offering to
the priest served as an implicit confession. The priest did not need to know the exact
nature of the offerer’s sin. It is a matter between the offerer and God, so oral confession
is not needed.297 In this vein, it is also reasonable to understand scholars who claim that
making a sin offering would also include oral confession.298 Perhaps the confession
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would not take place in the priest’s presence, but would precede the sin and reparation
offerings.
The regulation in Num 5:7 is also heavily abbreviated. It does not even mention a
sacrificial animal,299 so it is logical that it would not mention the laying on of hands.
Confession is explicitly mentioned for the same reason as it is mentioned in Lev 5:5—the
public, intentional nature of the sins, including certain damage to a fellow man.
Any input from Lev 16:21 to rituals that are classified as sacrificial is disputed
due to the belief that the goat for Azazel is not a sacrifice. However, having proven that
the number of hands used in the laying on of hand/s gesture or its form essentially does
not change its meaning/function, the present study points to the fact that the laying on of
hands in this ritual can lend indications to the meaning of the laying on of hands in other
contexts, especially those that are expiatory sacrifices. The fact that some scholars made
a sharp distinction between Lev 16:21 and expiatory sacrifices, which Lev 5:5 and Num
5:7 definitely are, denying any sameness or correlation of meanings of common ritual
activities between these two rites, shows their ignorance of the fact that the meaning of
confession in Lev 16:21, nonsacrificial, and Lev 5:5 and Num 5:7, sacrificial, contexts is
the same. Therefore, based on the fact that both of these supposedly different contexts
contain the same ritual activities, the laying on of hand/s and confession, the present
study accepts that the undisputed association of the confession of sins and the laying on
of hands over the head of the goat for Azazel should be used a model for all expiatory
sacrifices.
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Milgrom restricted the confession of sins only to intentional sins.300 However, this
claim faces serious problems in light of the fact that the high priest makes confession of
the sins of the sons of Israel over the goat for Azazel on the Day of Atonement, and these
sins are defined as “all the sins of the sons of Israel” (Lev 16:21, 30, 34). Confession does
not seem to be limited to public, unintentional sins only, but rather, extends to all sins.
This claim is strengthened even more by a more explicit presence of the
confession of sins in the rest of the OT (Ps 32:5; Prov 28:13; Dan 9:4, 20; Ezra 10:1, 11;
Neh 1:6; 9:2–3). With the majority of scholars, I, believe that confession was an assumed
element of sin and reparation offering ritual,301 however not in the presence of the priest
or any other human being except when a human being incurred damage/loss because of
the sin that the offerer committed. Milgrom, followed by many influential scholars,302
provided strong evidence from ANE literature and rabbinic texts for the presence of the
confession of sins.303 Extrabiblical texts convincingly suggest that confession of sins was
an integral part of the sin and reparation sacrifices.
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Arguments from Current Research
Besides the points raised in the subheading, “Evaluation of the Claims against
Transfer/Substitution Theory,” that demonstrate that arguments against this theory reflect
selective and uncomprehensive reading of the text, this study suggests additional
arguments that support its validity. These arguments stem from the analysis of two
concepts that are integrated in a broader context of Ancient Israel faith, as expressed in
the Pentateuchal texts.

Insight from Hamartiology
The first section of this study demonstrated certain specifics of the concept of sin.
First, three Hebrew terms for sin, ַע ֶפּשׁ, חָ טָ א, and עָֹון, are not reliable in determining
whether the sin is intentional or unintentional and expiable or inexpiable. They often
semantically overlap and are used as synonyms. As such, these terms are not reliable for
giving much insight into the nature of sin in terms of presence/absence of intent and
expiability/inexpiability. Thus, context remains the decisive factor to this end.
Second, the first point is critical because scholars usually consider  פֶּשַׁ עas
intentional, brazen, and inexpiable sin. However, a terminological analysis of the three
Hebrew terms for sin, ַע ֶפּשׁ, חָ טָ א, and עָֹון, demonstrated that  פֶּשַׁ עcannot be restricted to
intentional, brazen, inexpiable/unforgivable sin. The present study demonstrates through
the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach that  פֶּשַׁ עis mainly intentional and
potentially also unintentional, but yet always expiable/forgivable sin.
Third, this point disproves the foundational assumption of ADH that פֶּשַׁ ע, as
inexpiable/unforgivable sin, uniquely defiles the sanctuary from a distance through the
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air. Being expiable,  פֶּשַׁ עis dealt with as other sins, denoted by  עָֹוןand חָ טָ א, through the
sin or reparation offering. Consequently,  פֶּשַׁ עsin was transferred into the sanctuary in the
same way as other sins via the sacrificial offering process.
Fourth, in addition to the claim from a terminological study of the term פֶּשַׁ ע, that
it refers to intentional and potentially unintentional sin, the presence or absence of intent
is not a reliable element to determine whether the sin is expiable or inexpiable. It is
demonstrated in the present study that some intentional sins are expiable/forgivable as are
unintentional ones, and expiable sins can invoke punishment if divine regulations to deal
with a given sin are not followed. However, a terminological study of  פֶּשַׁ עitself does not
provide grounds for establishing whether it conveys intentional inexpiable sin. Thus, it is
the context, rather than the use of the term  פֶּשַׁ עor any other term for sin, that determines
whether the sin is expiable or inexpiable.
Fifth, the proposed understanding of terms gave room for the unique
interpretation of Lev 16:16, 21. Shea proposed certain arguments, some of which were
disproved and some strengthened in the present study that the חַ טָּ אֹות, the closing term of
both lists of sins in these two texts, actually refers to sin offerings rather than to sins. The
first two terms in the list refers to sins that were dealt with by the sin offerings.
Consequently, at least four facts invalidate basic and critical assumptions of
ADH: 1) three Hebrew terms for sin, פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and עָֹון, are interchangeable and
unreliable in defining sin, 2)  פֶּשַׁ עcannot be restricted to intentional brazen and
inexpiable/unforgivable sins which consequently challenges the key presumption of ADH
that  פֶּשַׁ עis intentional brazen and inexpiable/unforgivable sin, 3) intent is not a crucial
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element in proclaiming a sinful activity inexpiable/unforgivable and  פֶּשַׁ עcontexts do not
provide ground to be classified as such sin, and finally 4) interpretation that nominal חָ טָ א
in Lev 16:16, 21 refers to the sin offering, rather than sin. These insights remove the most
challenging critiques against transfer/substitution meaning/function of laying on of hands.

Insights from the Concept of Atonement
First, the understanding that  פֶּשַׁ עrepresents intentional inexpiable sin is a crucial
element of the commonly believed atonement theory that assumes AD of the sanctuary.
The sinner of  פֶּשַׁ עsin is not allowed to offer sacrifice and obtain forgiveness, but rather,
experience capital punishment. This is not supported by biblical texts. The claim that
there are sins for which forgiveness via sacrifice is not possible is correct, but these sins
are never conveyed via the  פֶּשַׁ עterm. The intentional brazen sins expressed through the
phrase  ביָד ָרמָ הare related to עָֹון, but not to פֶּשַׁ ע. Thus, the ADH, as a part of the classical
atonement theory, was redefined.
Second, scholars believe that  פֶּשַׁ עsin, as some sort of miasma, not dealt with
through sacrifice, travels through the air and attaches itself to the sanctuary, particularly
the most holy place. It is inescapable that  פֶּשַׁ עsin, supposedly behaves in that way,
possesses some kind of intelligence in order to land exactly where it is supposed to land,
the most holy place. The present study understands that the concept of atonement is
expressed by a highly abstract language that it also includes symbolism, but assigning
these kinds of abilities to only a certain type of sin would be crossing the limits of the
definition that biblical faith does not contain magic. In the atonement theory and
understanding of sin presented in the present study, the movement of sin is highly
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controlled and limited. That is, the sin was transferred from the offerers to their sin
offering and then through the blood of the offering into the sanctuary or through the
blood onto the sacrificial altar in addition to the officiating priest via the eating of the
sacrificial meat. The ADH assumes that  פֶּשַׁ עsin, being unknown to anybody but the
offerer, glides through the camp and lands exactly in the sanctuary. If  פֶּשַׁ עsin were
public, and presumably the sinner is deserving of capital punishment, as the proponent of
ADH believes,  פֶּשַׁ עsin’s entrance into the sanctuary does not make any sense. The sinner
of  פֶּשַׁ עsin does not receive forgiveness. The incident of a blasphemer does not show any
fear of his sin’s being a threat for the sanctuary.
Upon closer analysis of crucial texts used to support the AD theory, the present
study demonstrates that this theory is untenable for multiple reasons. These reasons
pertain to the areas of grammar lapses, the semantics of the verb טָ מֵ א, and inconsistencies
in the literary structure of related texts.
Third, the present study demonstrates that the foundational meaning of  כִּ פֶּרis
ransom, not cleansing. Even though the understanding of ransom defined in this study
and the common understanding of this concept as defined in English dictionaries304 are
similar to some extent, it has to be stressed that ransom in this study does not include
legally negative connotations, but rather, the one that is informed by biblical texts. Thus,

For instance, a bribe is defined as “a sum of money or something valuable that you give or offer
to somebody to persuade them to help you, especially by doing something dishonest.” Oxford Advanced
Learner’s Dictionary, s.v. “bribe,” released 30 July 2015, http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/
us/definition/american_english/bribe_1. For similar definitions see Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “Bribe,”
released 9 April 2019, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/bribe; BLD, 8th ed., s.v. “Bribe”; A
Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, 2nd ed., s.v. “Briber; bribee; bribe-giver; bribe-taker”; Burton, BLT
(1998), s.v. “Bribe.”
304
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ransom refers to a reconciliation of an interrupted relationship between a sinner
(offending party), who broke God’s law, and God (offended party), whose law has been
violated. This reconciliation is achieved by God’s acceptance of the ransom in the form
of the life of the animal, instead of the sinner’s life. In this case, the animal’s life serves
as a ransom for human life. A metaphor of removal, of sin with its punishment,
encounters this part of the atonement process better than the metaphor of cleansing
because the latter refers to total absence of the substance, an item that is being cleansed
from the object that it resided on/in. This cannot be said of the connection of the sinner
and their sin. Thus, the biblically informed understanding of ransom resembles the
common definition of ransom in MLSs in the fact that there is some sort of payment to a
law jurisdiction entity, which has not necessarily established a law, to help a law-breaker
mend his/her situation that includes violating established law without considering the
offended party. It differs in the fact that a biblical ransom fixes the relationship between a
sinner and God which is defined by (1) laws that are given and enforced by God himself,
and (2) God as the offended party who accepts a ransom in order for the reconciliation to
take place.
The latter is possible in a very limited number of texts that separate themselves
from other uses by a specific grammatical pattern:  כִּ פֶּרis followed by the direct object
marker and the noun is modified by the direct object marker.
Fourth, the meaning of  כִּ פֶּרas “to ransom” and the choice of English “to atone
for” or “atonement” for it removes misleading connotations or senses of the two most
common scholarly suggestions, “to cover” or “to cleanse,” for  כִּ פֶּרthat stems from
concrete meaning of this verb which is not supported by biblical texts. In light of the
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ever-present and underlying GHS and a particular sin, the meaning, “to ransom,” is
supported in some context by rigorous examination of  כִּ פֶּרuses in the Pentateuch and by
the overall interpretative framework found in the Pentateuch, which places emphasis on
the symbolic, abstract meaning of atonement.
Fifth, the fact that  כִּ פֶּרis often a subprocess or prerequisite of a broader process
such as acceptance, forgiveness, sanctification, or cleansing it always ransoms either the
offerer’s GHS or a particular sin that is transferred to the animal. The laying on of hand/s
is a distinct ritual activity that facilitates this transfer to the sacrificial animal that
eventually dies in the offerer’s place.
In summary, the following facts established through the study of  כִּ פֶּרform an
interpretative framework in which transfers/substitution is necessary and constitutes the
logical meaning/function of laying on of hand/s: 1)  פֶּשַׁ עsin can be expiated/forgiven via
sacrifice; 2)  פֶּשַׁ עsin is dealt with via sacrifice just like any other sin and it does not
possess faculties of an intelligent being such as traveling from the spot where it was
generated to another specific spot; 3)  כִּ פֶּרrefers to ransom and not cleansing; 4)  כִּ פֶּרis
portrayed as a symbolic, abstract process for which the English word “atonement” is the
most appropriate; and 5)  כִּ פֶּרis often a prerequisite for broader processes that regulate
divine-human relationships.
The arguments from hamartiology and atonement do not eliminate the fact that
secondary functions of the laying on of hands could have been to express identification or
convey the ownership of the animal. However, in light of the arguments mentioned
above, the transfer/substitution remains the primary meaning/function for the laying on of
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hand/s. Transfer remains unspecified, since the element transferred is determined by a
given context. However, the interpretative framework and a given context should also be
taken into consideration to control the elements that are transferred, since in light of some
contexts, some transfers are superfluous and redundant.
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CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The foundation of this study was the interrelatedness of the concepts of sin and
atonement with the ritual gesture of the laying on of hands as presented in the sacrificial
offering regulations. Regardless of the long history of opposition to transfer/substitution
as a suggested meaning/function of the laying on of hand/s, the research presented in the
present study suggests that this theory still possesses valid—and overwhelming—biblical
support. The present research consisted of three major parts.

The First Part
The first part of the study included chapters two and three. Chapter two includes a
general study of impurity in the OT including its key approach and weaknesses and
ending in a more focused study of moral impurity, including specific Hebrew terms.
Chapter three offers terminological definitions based on the MLS in order to examine the
role of intent in the event of sin in the Pentateuch.

Chapter 2
Approaches and Obstacles in the
Study of Impurity
I demonstrated in this chapter that OT hamartiology is perplexed with the fact that
sin is often presented through (1) multiple metaphors, (2) an extensive plethora of
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Hebrew terms, and (3) the tendency of the OT to present it as a conceptual representation.
A major weakness of all key approaches developed in OT hamartiology is root fallacy, a
belief that the original, etymological meaning, which rests on the earliest use of the
term/s, is a normative meaning for subsequent uses. The terminological approach is the
most basic and needed element in OT hamartiology, but if it suffers from limiting sin to
some terms, and all or the majority are included, then the study becomes superficial and
literary insensitive. In addition, the contexts are usually insufficiently considered. The
biblical-theological approach is also valuable since it tends to consider the historicalliteral element of biblical texts and organize the findings into a systematic/topical
teaching. The key weakness of this approach is the immense number of imbalance
definitions and text selectiveness. The metaphorical approach views impurity as just one
term to denote the concept of sin and the meaning of “metaphor/metaphorical” is never
defined by scholars. It does not seek to define the concept of sin, but rather, to find the
metaphors by which impurity/sin is expressed. As such, it is the least utilized approach in
scholarly debate. All these key approaches are not mutually exclusive and do overlap to
some extent.
The approach utilized in the present study is named the
terminological/contextual/intertextual approach and represents the way to avoid root
fallacy and the weaknesses of key approaches and to incorporate their strengths. It
attempts to collect statements on sin in the Pentateuchal texts paying attention to the
context and literary particulars of the texts analyzed. In order to perform a thorough
analysis of the texts, it set the limits on the number of terms being analyzed.
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Impurity in Scholarly Debates
This first part of the second chapter demonstrated that the division of impurity in
the OT into ritual and moral is understood from the early beginnings of the study of this
concept. Key scholars on the topic such as David Hoffmann, Alfred Büchler, Mary
Douglas, Hyam Maccoby, Jacob Milgrom, Tikva Frymer-Kensky, David P. Wright, and
Jonathan Klawans all confirmed the division into these two impurities. This bipartite
division was articulated in early Jewish sources, spanning Talmudic and medieval
rabbinic literature, Philo, and the early rabbinic sages. The two key proponents who
viewed impurity as a single nature concept are Jacob Neusner and Thomas Kazen.
However, Neusner was unsuccessful in preserving the two ways (metaphorical elsewhere
in the Bible and literal in relation to Cult) of interpreting texts that speak of impurity,
while Kazen’s application of the bio-psychological approach onto moral and ritual texts
is highly questionable. The history of research showed that moral impurity originates
from sinful behavior, while ritual impurity originates from human corpses, certain animal
carcasses, bodily flows, and leprosy, and as such, it symbolizes sin. It is unknown why
they symbolize sin from the scholarly debate. The present study connects ritual impurities
to sin via the potential of death that ritual impurities carry in themselves. The work of
Frymer-Kensky, Wright, and Klawans are the most detailed and educational. Building on
the bipartite division of impurity to ritual and moral impurity, Kensky-Frymer divided
ritual impurity into minor and major, and concluded that these impurities are contagious,
but yet, not sinful. Major impurities are caused by death, leprosy, bodily discharges and
childbirth, while minor impurities result in contact with impure things, things that are
defiled by persons under major impurity and persons under major impurity. Moral
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impurity refers to activities forbidden by God. She also believed that pollution of the
sanctuary takes place in two ways, via direct contact and aerially. Wright’s work is
imbedded in Frymer-Kensky’s study. He introduced a new terminology, tolerated for
ritual and prohibited for moral impurity, which is heavily but yet, rightly criticized by
Klawans. Finally, Klawans’ work is the most up-to-date work on the topic and upholds
the classical bipartite division. Along with the previous scholarly research, Klawans
agreed that ritual impurity (1) arises from natural and unavoidable conditions, (2) is not
sin, and (3) conveys impermanent contagion via direct contact. Moral impurity, on the
other hand, (1) arises from grave sin, (2) is not defiled by direct contact, (3) leads to longlasting, if not permanent, contagion, and (4) unlike ritual impurity which can be
addressed and remedied via purification ritual, is rectified by atonement, punishment, or
refraining from committing it. He highlighted the fact that purity/impurity terminology
also confirms the traditional division into ritual and moral impurity since  טָ מֵ אis used for
both impurities, but  תֹּועֵבָ הand  חָ נֵףare used exclusively for moral impurity. Moral
impurity defiles the one who performs it, the sanctuary, and the land. Ritual impurity
never defiles the land, nor is derived from the land, but defiles the sanctuary and humans.
Klawans innovatively introduced the fact that both impurities, ritual and moral, are real.
In addition, he endorsed the metaphorical use of purity/impurity language in biblical
texts, but not to the extent that scholars usually think of, claiming that use of
metaphorical or figurative interpretation of certain texts brings more confusion than
clarity to the discussion due to various theories on metaphor itself.
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Further Insights on Impurity
from the Present Study
In expanding the works of these scholars, some other insights are present in the
Pentateuch that further confirm the bipartite division between the two impurities.
Removal of negative effects of ritual impurity never results in forgiveness ()סָ לַח, but
predominantly, in 24/25 contexts, it does result in purification ()טָ הֵ ר. In the Pentateuch,
in 3/4 contexts, in Lev 12:7–8 and 14:20, purification is just potentially present, while in
Lev 16:19,  טָ הֵ רdeals with the ritual impurity. Thus, Lev 16:30 remains the only
exception. The purity verb  חָ נֵףnever refers to ritual impurity, but always, to moral. טָ מֵ א
expresses both impurities and predominantly expresses defilement of humans and
insignificantly, of the sanctuary and the entire camp.  חָ לַלis even more flexible than טָ מֵ א
in its preference to transfer both ritual and moral defilement to humans and the sanctuary.
Based on the results of the search of all three verbs, טָ מֵ א, חָ נֵף, and חָ לַל, the land never
contracts ritual defilement, but always, moral.  תֹּועֵבָ הnever refers to ritual, but always to
moral impurity. Thus, a terminological analysis of purity verbs favors the bipartite
division of impurity more than a single impurity approach.
Having established the division between ritual and moral impurity, the present
study focuses on moral impurity expressed by פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןas the key reason for
atonement, especially in Lev 4–5; 16:16, 21. The present study established that
Schwartz's proposal that the phrase חָ טָ א, or פֶּשַׁ ע,  נָשָׂ א עָֹוןrefers to the state of guilt, thus
representing consequential bearing of sin, is an eloquent attempt to suggest a fresh
meaning to the phrase. However, weaknesses embedded in it make it incapable of
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replacing the traditional understanding of the phrase consisting of two meanings, “to
forgive” and “punishment.”
By applying the terminological/contextual/intertextual method in studying the
terms  פֶּשַׁ ע,חָ טָ א, and עָֹון, the present study establishes that all of them, in terms of intent,
refer to unintentional and intentional sins. In terms of expiability, they all refer to
expiable and inexpiable sins. The uses of these terms reveal that the emphasis of each
term’s preference to denote intentional or unintentional and expiable or inexpiable sin
vary, but all of them at least sometimes refer to all these types of sin. Finally, these three
terms are often used as synonyms and semantically overlap.

Chapter 3
Legal Terminology
In chapter three, this study consults MLS terminology in order to clarify its use in
biblical studies. Consequently, it is demonstrated that biblical scholars usually
misunderstood essential meaning of the terminology. The prime example is Jacob
Milgrom who was followed by other biblical scholars. Contrary to Milgrom, it is
negligence that encompasses wrongs done inadvertently or ignorantly, and not
inadvertence that encompasses wrongs done negligently or ignorantly. Besides
similarities to ANE law collections and certain unique characteristics of BL, its key
uniqueness is crucial for the present study. That is, BL has its origin in God himself and
consequently, breaking any regulation of BL assumes liability of the one doing it and
accountability to God himself.
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Intent in Legal and Cultic Texts
Establishing intent, though difficult, is possible in legal texts, as well as in cultic
texts. Homicide laws are an example of the most comprehensive display of various levels
of intent in the former, while the latter is portrayed in Lev 4–5 and Num 15. Milgrom, in
a way, determined how scholars perceive intent in cultic laws. He proposed that  אָשַׁ םhas
consequential meanings like other terms that deal with sin, such as  עָֹוןand חָ טָ א, that
express both, sin and its punishment. אָשַׁ ם, being an intransitive verb, is best understood
if translated as “to feel guilty,” which Milgrom supported by the use of the noun שׁ ָגגָה,
which he understood to mean “inadvertence.” A closer reading of his work reveals that

 שׁ ָגגָהis limited to accident only, which is only partially true, and is applied to all cases of
שׁ ָגגָה. Thus, unconsciousness of the sin and consciousness of the act is common for any
breaking of the law in Milgrom’s opinion and it impacted the role of intent in the process
of breaking the law. Such an understanding of sin excludes the major class of sin which is
sin committed out of GHS and weakness.
By examining the uses of אָשַׁ ם, it is established that both aspects, subjectivephysiological-consequential and objective, are contained in the verb אָשַׁ ם. The context is
the determining factor if both or one particular sense is to be a preferred meaning. The
inclusion of both these factors, subjective-psychological-consequential and objective
senses of the verb  אָשַׁ םis expressed in the four ways of translating it, and the literary and
grammatical flow of the texts provide the most satisfactory and consistent reading of Lev
4–5. “To be/become guilty” remains the least misleading translation since it embodies all
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the others and remains the most basic meaning of the term in the context of legal/moral
standing.
This understanding, אָשַׁ ם, reconciles all conceptual and literary difficulties if just
one of the suggested understanding/translations of  אָשַׁ םis accepted. First, it
chronologically places the sinners’ recognition of the sinfulness of their sin before they
offer a sacrifice or make confession in Lev 5:1–5, 17 which is obvious in Lev 4:3, 13–14,
23–24, and 27–28. Sinners are always fully aware of their sin before offering a sacrifice.
Second, it provides the rationale of how the sinners, who are aware of their sin, are
motivated to rectify their sin in Lev 5:23. Besides being objectively and subjectively
aware of their sin, the sinners also experience the consequential aspect of ( אָשַׁ םpangs of
their consciousness), and their objective and subjective experience of guilt is placed in
the right context, and they fully understand their sin. Third, this chronology of activities
where sinners’ awareness of their sin before they begin to rectify it is preserved and
upheld by the recognition of the temporal sequence of activities in Lev 4–5 expressed by
wayiqtol and weqatal verbs, and of the pluperfect sense of qatal verbs. Fourth, it
recognizes two different ways by which sinners become aware of their sin which is
obvious in Lev 4:23–24, 27–28 and in all other transitions in Lev 4:3, 13–14 by
understanding that the Hebrew particle  אֹוin the most natural way as “or” and
understanding the Hebrew conjunction  וto mean “or,” as one of its frequent meanings in
the Pentateuch and the Hebrew Bible. Fifth, the presence of two different ways of the
sinners’ recognition of their sin also explains why both אָשׁמוּ
ִֽ ֵ  וand  ונִֽ ֹודעָהin, Lev 4:12–
13, 22–23, 27–28, are accompanied by additional clauses that basically communicate that
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the sinner has committed sin. This is not the case in Lev 5:5, 17, 23, where only אָשַׁ ם
occurs, with no additional clauses to communicate the act of sinning. The only exception
is a short reference, והָ יָה ִּ ִֽכי־ ֶּיח ֱָטֹ֣א, in v. 23.
The study of  בִּ שׁ ָגגָהrevealed that this term refers to the non-brazen nature of the
sin (Num 15:22–29) and activities committed accidentally, with no intentionality
included on the sinner’s part. If the immediate context of the phrase does not provide
arguments for a different nuance of meaning, this is the one that should be assumed.
The use of the verbs  יָדַ עand  ָעלַםin Lev 5:1–4 suggests that the person involved
had knowledge of his sin, was aware of it, but consequently lost knowledge of it. Still,
this understanding of sin in Lev 5:1–4 rests on the grammar utilized in the passage. These
verbs are used in Lev 4:13, but the grammar does not support the understanding that is
conveyed in Lev 5:1–4.
The verb שָׁ גַג/שָׁ גָה, like the verb חָ טָ א, with the exception of brazen sinning,
expresses all types of sinning in the OT. The immediate and wider context of each use
clarifies whether the verb is used as a generic way, or whether it conveys some specific
way of sinning.

Leviticus 4–5: A Fresh Proposal
The four subcases in Lev 4 all assume two alternative ways of sinning,
unintentional accidental and potentially out of ignorance, and intentional, but non-brazen.
The next four subcases in Lev 5:1–4 are intentional but non-brazen sins that were
forgotten and eventually remembered. The pericope of Lev 5:14–16 is unique, and for
that reason, is separated from the subcases in Lev 4 because it deals with the sins against
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the sancta. However, in terms of the nature of sinning, due to the use of a general verb

 חָ טָ אand a theoretical potential, the pericope assumes the same types of sins as are in Lev
4, unintentional accidental or out of ignorance, and intentional but non-brazen. Leviticus
5:17–19 is another unique type of sinning that is only well established here, and that is
the sin of ignorance. The final pericope in Leviticus, 5:20–26 [6:1–7], encompasses the
exclusively intentional, but non-brazen sins. Numbers 15:22–31 deals with two types of
sinning. The first is described in vv. 22–29 and are non-brazen sins which may include all
types of non-brazen sins defined in Lev 4–5. The second, vv. 30–31, is brazen sin that
includes the full intention of the sinner along with the attitude of rejecting God’s
personality and authority.

Fresh Sin Classification
As a result of such an understanding of terms and crucial texts concerning the
intent related to sinful activities, the present study suggests that the death/capital
punishment prescribed for sin makes it intentional, brazen sin, while all other sins to
which other non-capital punishments are associated is unintentional or intentional, nonbrazen, and possibly, expiable. The former one is defined in the Pentateuch as “”ביָד ָרמָ ה
sin and it is always done in the sinner’s full awareness of the activity and consciousness
of the activity’s being sinful. The latter can be done unintentionally and intentionally.
The unintentional one is by accident or through ignorance, which implies awareness of
the activity, but unconsciousness of the activity’s being sinful. Intentional, non-brazen sin
stems from GHS/weakness, where the sinner is fully aware of the activity of sinning and
conscious of the activity’s being sinful.
The research on moral impurity provides the following three points: First, Hebrew
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terms for moral impurity semantically overlap. Second, all of them, in terms of intent,
refer to unintentional and intentional sins and in terms of expiability, refer to expiable
and inexpiable sins. Third, these three terms are often used as synonyms. Fourth, Hebrew
terms are consequently not helpful in determining the nature of sins but the context is.
These points enable a plausible interpretation of Lev 16:16, 21. Some scholars have
interpreted ַע ֶפּשׁ, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןas a triad that represents sin in a comprehensive way.
Others assigned specific meaning to each term. Gane produced the most comprehensive
work concerning the two interpretative cruxes in these two texts in following the latter
method. However, this study demonstrates that Gane's interpretation is not sound. In
regard to the first crux, lekol does not introduce a new item in the list, but rather,
encompasses the first two terms. Regarding the second crux, Hebrew terms cannot be
taken as referring to specific sins for the above-mentioned reasons, that is, their semantic
overlap and synonymous uses. Thus, besides conveying a comprehensiveness of sin
which is confirmed by the present study, these terms could be understood to refer to the
sins that could potentially be found in the sanctuary and are atoned for by the sin
offerings which are always taken to be the meaning of the last term in the list, חַ טָּ אֹות.

The Second Part
This part also consisted of two chapters, four and five. A detailed and extensive
study of the Hebrew verb כִּ פֶּר, as a crucial component of the sacrificial process that
includes the laying on of hand/s, is dealt with in chapter 4. An evaluation of the ADH,
including critical grammatical issues involved in the text upon which this theory rests, is
presented in chapter 5.
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Chapter 4

 כִּ פֶּרin Scholarly Debates
It has been established that widespread insight from comparative studies on the
origin and meaning of the Hebrew verb כִּ פֶּר, such as the Arabic kaffara or the Akkadian
kuppuru, proved to be misleading, contrary to what was believed in the mid-20th century.
First, stems in various languages do not correspond, but also overlap. The Hebrew כִּ פֶּר
and Arabic kaffara or Akkadian kuppuru have different meanings in the base and
intensive stem. Yet, some uses show that sometimes they do semantically overlap.
Second, scholars have proposed at least 4 ways  כִּ פֶּרshould be understood: (1) to cover,
(2) to ransom, (3) to purify, purge, and (4) to atone, expiate. Confronted with the variety
of uses, Levine proposed that there are two separate  ָכפַרroots in BH,  ָכפַרI, “to purify,”
and  ָכפַרII, “to expiate,” but his work reflected that he himself was not able to preserve
this distinction as he interpreted texts. Milgrom was firm that  כִּ פֶּרpredominantly means
“to effect purgation” in a sin offering context. Less prominent meanings are “to cover,”
“to ransom,” and “to atone, expiate.” Sklar proposed that the verb encompasses both
ideas, purging and ransom. Following previous scholarship, such as Driver, Gane moved
the debate of  כִּ פֶּרonto more solid ground. He emphasized that  כִּ פֶּרdoes not focus on the
physical activity such as purging, which is emphasized in the Akkadian kuppuru context,
but rather its goal, since the former is rare in biblical texts. He also insightfully noted that

 כִּ פֶּרtakes place before forgiveness, which is the very final goal of offering a sin offering.
Thus,  כִּ פֶּרhas something to do with the obstacle in divine-human relationships. Finally,
he proposed that the nature of  כִּ פֶּרin a given sacrifice is identified by the goal of that
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ritual. Feder’s work is the most recent on the topic, and he proved that favored
comparative input on the meaning of  כִּ פֶּרis wrong for (1) concrete and abstract meanings
of the verb, and (2)  כִּ פֶּרhas a wide range of semantic meanings in BH. He proposed, like
Gane, that the meaning of  כִּ פֶּרshould be determined based on the context.

Foundational Meaning of כִּ פֶּר
The present study shows that major scholars of  כִּ פֶּרshowed little or no
consideration for the fact of GHS of human beings in their formation of the meaning of
this verb. GHS is a constant disadvantage of human beings when they interact with the
divine, whether actual sin is involved or not, and as such, should be included in the
formation of the understanding of  ;כִּ פֶּרthe present study does exactly that. The
foundational text for the meaning of  כִּ פֶּרis the only text that explicitly explains it by
detailing the role of blood in the sacrificial process, Lev 17:11.
First, examining the meaning of כִּ פֶּר, the present study realizes that animal’s
blood serves as a  כֹ פֶּרof human life and that the foundation of the  כִּ פֶּרis the concept of

כֹ פֶּר, ransom. The broken relationship between God, as an injured party, and the sinner, as
a wrong party, is resolved by God’s acceptance of the animal’s blood-life as ransom for
the offerer’s blood-life. The decision of whether to accept the ransom or not rests solely
on the wronged party, God. It is inescapable that the sacrificial animal serves as a
substitute in the place of the offerer.
Second, asking to which sacrifices the regulations in Lev 17 refer in the present
study affirmed that a general prohibition against blood eating in v. 10 is not limited to
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well-being offering but refers to burnt, sin and reparation sacrifice that all have atoning
function.
Third, although all three alternatives, beth pretii, beth essentiae, or beth
instrumentii, are valid for the meaning of the second  בpreposition attached to the noun

 ֶּנפֶּשׁby which  כִּ פֶּרis accomplished, beth essentiae and beth instrumentii are favored since
they agree with the understanding that the referent of  ֶּנפֶּשׁin 11b is the life of the
sacrificial animal and has stronger grammatical and intertextual support. Fourth, the fact
that  כִּ פֶּרin itself includes the idea of substitution and because the sacrificial animal is
slaughtered at the altar in the sanctuary instead of the offerer, the idea of substitution is
implied in Lev 17:11. This analysis and understanding of  כִּ פֶּרgreatly helped in
identifying the meaning of  כִּ פֶּרin some vague contexts below.

Insights on  כִּ פֶּרfrom the Present Research
The comprehensive analysis of the uses of  כִּ פֶּרalong with modifiers or no
modifiers in the present study brought the following results.
First,  כִּ פֶּרhas a concrete, literal meaning “to rub on, apply” only once in Gen
6:14, and then it is preceded by the direct object marker. This is also the only qal use of

 ָכפַרand non-cultic context in the Pentateuch. The same meaning is reflected in cultic
contexts, even though  כִּ פֶּרappears in piel, Lev 16:20, 32.
Second, when  כִּ פֶּרappears with no modifiers in cultic and non-cultic contexts, it
has various meanings such as “to appease, or atone, remove” that are derived from the
contexts.
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Third, when  כִּ פֶּרis accompanied by the preposition  בַ עַדin non-cultic contexts, it
refers to atonement, but it was of a temporary nature (Gen 32:30). In cultic contexts, כִּ פֶּר
conveys two different meanings of “to atone for” and “to remove,” in the sense of
cleansing.
Fourth,  ל+  כִּ פֶּרis found two times and always in non-cultic texts with the
meaning of “to atone for” and with the idea of ransom included.
Fifth, two meanings are detected with  ב+  כִּ פֶּרconstructions, and they are all
found in cultic contexts. All texts include impurity, either from context or implied, but
the function of this construction is either to communicate the instrumental in the sense by
which the  כִּ פֶּרwas achieved or the location where the  כִּ פֶּרwas accomplished.
Sixth, the most frequent construction is  עַל+  כִּ פֶּרand it occurs in cultic and noncultic contexts. In 47/56 of occurrences, the preposition  עַלcarries the meaning of
advantage, with only one non-cultic text. In the other 9 occurrences, the preposition עַל
marks either the location of  כִּ פֶּרaccomplishment, instrument, or direct object marker. In
Exod 29:36,  עַלcarries double function of marking the direct object marker and the
location. Of the last 9 occurrences, only Lev 14:53 is a non-cultic context.
The present study also analyzed the use of  כִּ פֶּרin context with related concepts
such as to cleanse ()חָ טָ א, to sanctify ))קָ דַ שׁ, to clean ()טָ הֵ ר, to forgive ()סָ לַח, and to
accept () ָרצָ ה. When  כִּ פֶּרappears in the rituals whose goal is to reach these outcomes, כִּ פֶּר
is a part of a bigger, major ritual. It has a limited function within the major ritual of
assisting in the accomplishment of the major ritual.
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First, when it appears along with  חָ טָ אand  קָ דַ שׁin Exod 29:33, 36, it atones for the
priests’ GHS in v. 33, and cleanses the altar in v. 36. When it appears in  חָ טָ אcontexts in
Lev 8:15, it also atones for the priests’ GHS. Ritual or moral impurity is not included in
these texts. The basis for this atonement is ransom.
Second, when it appears in the contexts of חָ טָ א, כִּ פֶּר, and  טָ הֵ רis uniquely
accomplished by the reparation offering in Lev 14:20 and refers to the reinstatement of
the healed  צָ ַרעַתperson into the community and to the sin offering which atones for the
healed  צָ ַרעַתperson’s GHS. It is possible that moral impurity might have been included
here, but not ritual impurity. In Lev 14:53, it refers to the removal of ritual impurity in the
sense of cleansing it from the infected house.
Third, when  כִּ פֶּרappears in the context with  טָ הֵ רand  קָ דַ שׁin Lev 16:19, 30,
moral impurity is definitely included, and  כִּ פֶּרrefers to its removal in the sense of
cleansing.
Fourth,  כִּ פֶּרshares the context with  טָ הֵ רand  חָ טָ אin Num 8:21, which does not
include impurity, and then refers to the atonement of the Levites’ GHS. In the context
with  קָ דַ שׁin Num 6:11,  כִּ פֶּרrefers to atonement for the Nazirite’s sin to prepare him for
the new term of Nazirite status. Ransom is again the basis upon which atonement is
possible in this context.
Fifth, the most frequent contexts in which  כִּ פֶּרappears is  סָ לַחin Lev 4:20, 26, 31,
35; 5:10, 13, 16, 18, 26 [6:7]; 19:22; and Num 15:25, 26, 28. All these are cultic contexts
and they all involve moral impurity.  כִּ פֶּרis a prerequisite for סָ לַח. It always precedes

סָ לַח. These contexts, better than all others, show that  כִּ פֶּרconveys atonement and is
736

based on the ransom. The offerer receives  סָ לַחbased on the sacrifice he/she offers.
Sixth,  כִּ פֶּרappears in the contexts where the offerer receives acceptance before
God in Lev 1:4. This context implies the presence of GHS. Again, the basis of this
atonement is ransom in the form of sacrifice.
Based on the contexts of the atonement of which  כִּ פֶּרis a part, it consists of two
elements. The first element is reconciliation which implies that a relationship between
God and a human party was broken. The reconciling act is actually an encounter of God’s
grace toward humans, followed by their willingness to return to God. The second element
is expiation which implies that the human party feels guilt in the face of law because of
his/her sin, and God’s wrath that follows the act of sin. The human party needs to
overcome these. Removal of the feelings of guilt and God’s wrath is what expiation does.
The human party gives up his/her sin while God gives up his wrath. In the actualization
of both of these elements, reconciliation and expiation, God’s initiative is crucial and
always precedes the response of the human party. In other words,  כִּ פֶּרremoves this
obstacle, whatever that might be.
However, God is never the subject or object of כִּ פֶּר, even though the process
involving  כִּ פֶּרis prescribed by God. Completion of the atonement process is sealed by
God’s direct involvement in this process by granting forgiveness.
Both cultic and non-cultic contexts in the Pentateuch confirm that  כִּ פֶּרshould be
understood as achieving abstract effects on both human and inanimate entities. Milgrom
allowed for ransom to be foundational for כִּ פֶּר, but only in a limited number of texts that
include averting God’s wrath.  כִּ פֶּרas such encompasses substitution as well. This study
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understands that  כִּ פֶּרalways has this function, either in the contexts of moral impurity,
some cases of severe ritual impurity, and in the cases of GHS. The analysis of כִּ פֶּר
contexts showed that some contexts give certain guidelines as to what the meaning כִּ פֶּר
could convey, but some contexts do not provide any guidelines, but solely rely on the
already elaborated meaning. This study agrees that the foundational text that informs of
almost all  כִּ פֶּרcontexts is Lev 17:11. There, the verb is presented as “ransom” on the
basis of the sacrificial blood that is applied on the altar. The choice of a precise English
word to translate the complex semantic range of the Hebrew  כִּ פֶּרdoes not exist. The
present study proposed the English “to atone for” as the closest representation of what

 כִּ פֶּרis, which includes the meaning of  כִּ פֶּרand the various results it achieves in various
contexts.

Chapter 5
Automatic Defilement Hypothesis
The second part of the second section of the present study dealt with ADH. Based
on the findings in the area of stem, aspect, and the semantics and patterns of use of the
verb  טָ מֵ אused in Lev 15:31; 20:3; and Num 19:13, 20, this study suggests that ADH is
not supported by the Pentateuchal texts.
First, the part of Waltke’s and O’Connor’s theory that piel is always factitive if
qal of the same verb is stative is valid in the case of  טָ מֵ אwithin the limits of the
Pentateuch. In other words, piel brings a totally passive undersubject, without regard to
the process, into the state depicted by an adjective. By utilizing the method specifically
developed to examine Waltke’s and O’Connor’s theory of piel, Beckman’s research did
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not provide sufficient evidence for disproving it when applied to the verbs that convey
abstract, conceptual, or metaphorical meanings like טָ מֵ א,  קָ דַ שׁand so on. However, this
postulate regarding piel is not complete. Second, building on this, the present study
detected a twofold pattern of  טָ מֵ אuses in the Pentateuch. This verb is always
accompanied with other verbs, through which its meaning onto the undersubject/direct
object it modifies is achieved, and physical contact between the entities transmitting and
contacting impurity is always included. Third, the verbal aspects of  טָ מֵ אin the contexts
of Lev 15:31; 20:3; and Num 19:13, 20 contain nuances that do not lend support for the
ADH. All these three points are reinforced as I focus on the issues pertaining to each of
these texts and propose their interpretation.

Leviticus 15:31
Building on these three arguments just presented, the present study focuses on the
more subtle grammatical, syntactic, and semantic irregularities found in Lev 15:31. It
was demonstrated that the instrumental sense, “by defiling my tabernacle that is in their
midst,” is not justifiable, which consequently, makes ADH unsustainable.
First, the temporal interpretation considers that the infinitive construct +
preposition  בconstruction conveys a temporal sense, which is well established by
Hebrew grammarians. Second, the piel of the verb  טָ מֵ אis considered as a stative verb in
this text since it is intransitive. In addition to the factitive understanding of piel with this
particular verb, the temporal interpretation agrees with the pattern of uses of טָ מֵ א
established in this study. Third, the present study demonstrates that  טָ מֵ אstrictly follows a
certain pattern of uses in the Pentateuch. That is, it is always accompanied with other
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helping verbs that convey the exact mode of how  טָ מֵ אachieves its meaning. Fourth,
achieving  טָ מֵ אstate always includes contact between the defiling and profane entity.
Fifth, the concept of ellipsis and delay that are part of the debate of defilement
transmission do not override the temporal sense. These two concepts do exist in the
Pentateuch. When they are interpreted within the Pentateuchal corpus without imposing
preconceived ideas upon the texts that imply elliptical statements, they support a
temporal sense. Based on the patterns of use of טָ מֵ א, the ellipsis, “if an impure person
touches sancta,” is implied in this text. Also, a delay does not mean that a minor impurity
grows into a major one if there in a case of delay to handle them, but rather, gives room
for the defilement of the entire camp and the tent of meeting via the uncontrollable
transmission of impurity among the covenantal community. Finally, as shown above, the
temporal sense is accepted in rabbinic literature.
This study shows that Hebrew grammarians have proposed well-established rules
in the area of grammar and syntax, as well as the semantics of the verb  טָ מֵ אwhich are
very helpful in determining the most plausible meaning of Lev 15:31. The present study
attempts to incorporate these rules into Lev 15:31 and arrives at the conclusion that the
instrumental sense is less plausible than the temporal. It actually results out of significant
grammatical, syntactic, and semantical irregularities. The temporal sense in Lev 15:31,
on the other hand, does not collide with grammatical, syntactical rules or the semantic
sense of the verb טָ מֵ א. It has to be admitted that the temporal sense in Lev 15:31 does not
provide the way defilement actually takes place, but just proposes a potentially defiled
state of the sanctuary in the future. However, the manner of how the sanctuary gets
defiled is very explicitly specified in the Pentateuch (Lev 10:1–2; 12:4). In other words,
740

defilement takes place through direct contact as a part of  טָ מֵ אpatterns of use in the
Pentateuch as demonstrated in the present study.

Leviticus 20:3
An analysis of Lev 20:3 gave insights into an additional argument against the
ADH. First, the meaning and function of the preposition  למַ עַןthat connects the first two
and the last clause. Through two possible senses, purpose and intention, the preposition

 למַ עַןconveys a resultative sense in this text. It never conveys the causative sense in order
to provide grounds for the interpretation that offering one’s children to Moloch itself
defiles the sanctuary, as the proponents of ADH imply. Rather, this preposition conveys
that offering one's children to Moloch results in defiling the sanctuary. The translation,
“the consequence of which will be,” rightfully conveys its meaning. This understanding
is in accordance with the understanding of the piel stem, the aspect of the infinitive
construct, and the patterns of use of  טָ מֵ אin the Pentateuch. As established above, piel
brings a totally passive undersubject, without regard to the process, into a certain state.
The infinitive construct acts as a finite verb in this text because it is transitive in a
resultative clause. Infinitive Construct is frequently used in resultative clauses in BH and,
in that case, it is introduced by the preposition למַ עַן. Finally, the well-established pattern
of  טָ מֵ אuses in the Pentateuch points to the fact that this verb always requires another
helping verb to achieve its meaning. All these insights suggest that an additional activity
is implied between the first two and the third clause of this text as the preposition
introducing the third clause indicates. Based on the established pattern of the uses of טָ מֵ א
in the Pentateuch, that additional activity would imply direct contact between the idolater
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and the sanctuary through his/her coming to the sanctuary.
Second, Lev 20:1–5 faces significant internal structural and conceptual
inconsistencies if it is assumed that it consists of two cases, vv. 2–3, and vv. 4–5. Staying
within the limits of this text, the first inconsistency is a disparity of punishments for the
same sin. That is, in v. 2, the punishment for idolatry is death by stoning, while in v. 4, it
is either annihilation of the lineage or punishment in the afterlife. Death by stoning is
standard punishment for idolatry. The second inconsistency is that the people cannot
disregard the idolater in vv. 4–5 if they experience premature death in v. 3 as part of
God’s administering punishment upon them. Verses 4–5 are superfluous in this case.
Third, if God punishes the idolater only when the covenant community does not, as it was
evident in vv. 4–5, then this fact points to the claim that God, in v. 3, punishes because
people do not know that the act of idolatry took place among them. These inconsistencies
led scholars to propose that v. 3 represents the separate subcase of the law implying the
ellipsis, “if he does it secretly.” In that case,  וis not used as a conjunctive “and,” but a
coordinative particle “or.” In addition, the use of the phrase, “from the midst of one’s
people,” as well as “from one’s people,” accompanied mainly with the verb  כ ַָרתand in
one case verb  אָבַ דand another  מוּתin the Pentateuch, convincingly prove that premature
death is implied punishment in those contexts. The phrase  בָ ִּאישׁ הַ הוּאin v. 3 does not
designate the exact person mentioned in v. 2, thus connecting these two verses into one
unit, but rather, it refers to any person who commits idolatry. This phrase is also
mentioned in vv. 4 and 5, and it is impossible that the very same person is implied, since
v. 4 indisputably introduces a new subcase. Thus,  בָ ִּאישׁ הַ הוּאrefers to an impersonal,
indefinite individual who commits idolatry. Cholewinski’s persuasive literary structure is
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not affected by the inclusion of the implied elliptical phrase, בַ סֵּ תֶּ ר.
Accordingly, the understanding of stem, aspect, and semantic sense of טָ מֵ א, along
with the meaning and function of the preposition למַ עַן, and structural and conceptual
inconsistencies under the assumption that this law consists of two, rather than three cases
does not support ADH. Verse 3 is a separate case in which the implied ellipsis, “if he
does it secretly,” resolves the internal conceptual inconsistencies of a two-subcase literary
structure, thus allowing the idolater to come to the sanctuary and defile it through direct
contact with it, since the covenant community does not know and is not able to prevent it.
Again, arguments upon which ADH is proposed in regards to this text vanished.

Numbers 19:13, 20
Besides the already mentioned arguments, Num 19:13, 20 adds more arguments
against the ADH. First, the piel stem of the verb  טָ מֵ אis factitive. It brings a totally
passive direct object into the certain state without regard to the process. Second, the
perfect aspect is frequently utilized to convey a result in the future as a completed state.
Third, the verb  טָ מֵ אis always accompanied by other verbs through which its meaning on
the direct object it modifies is achieved. Accordingly, these insights regarding the stem
and aspect utilized in Num 19:13, 20, along with the semantics and patterns of use of טָ מֵ א
in the Pentateuch, do not support ADH. Rather, these texts speak of the result that will
take place in the future. The exact mode of how this result is achieved is indicated by the
patterns of use of טָ מֵ א, namely via direct contact.
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The Third Part
The last part of the present study is presented in chapter 6. This chapter
encompasses the presentation of the ritual theory that would respect the data about the
concept of sin and atonement suggested in the present study. In addition, it includes the
evaluation of the critiques of transfer/substitution theory of the laying on of hand/s, along
with arguments from the present study to confirm this theory.

Chapter 6
Ritual Theory
The present study has not focused on developing a ritual theory that would be
based on the methods established by other disciplines such as sociology, anthropology,
study of religion, literary criticism, study of theatrical performance, and psychology.
Instead, this study looked for the ritual theory that correlates with the findings in the
present study that were derived from biblical texts in order to provide a framework for
the interpretation of the laying on of hand/s. The intention was to learn what the biblical
texts have to offer about the laying on of hand/s. Such a ritual theory was found in the
work of Roy Gane, who focused on the biblical text as the final and decisive factor in
forming a conceptual and interpretative framework. Even though, Gane's and my
interpretations on certain biblical texts, and ultimately the meaning of laying on of hands,
significantly differ, the majority of my findings agree with his ritual theory and method
he used to form it.
Led by sociological and anthropological methods, David P. Wright focused on the
questions concerning ritual that are not dealt with in biblical texts. None of the three
points he proposed are fully accurate. First, the claim that the texts do not lend sufficient
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data for proper interpretation assumes that ritual has to be observed in order to be
interpreted properly. The point that both prescriptive and descriptive ritual texts in the OT
do not provide a full explanation of the ritual performance and are not subject to
sociological analysis is well noted and undeniably accurate, but still, his accurate
assessment is out of context, since none of these two points stands in the ideological
fabric of the production and purpose of these texts. Second, his point that the variety of
genres enables a proper ritual interpretation is also misleading since the Pentateuchal
ritual texts still retain emphasis on the ritual goal in various genres, rather than presenting
themselves for a sociological analysis and performance. Third, a sharp conceptual
distinction in the Pentateuch is not solidly established. Furthermore, recent research
points to the unsustainability of establishing various literary strata within the Pentateuch
based on literary features. Thus, Wright's arguments are not sustainable. Gane's ritual
theory that also negates Wright's assumptions regarding the ritual interpretation was
found to be in better agreement with biblical texts and therefore accepted in this study.
The main postulates of Gane's ritual theory are the following: (1) ritual actions
and substances do not have an inherent meaning, but their meaning is established from
sources like culture, religion, and immediate context; (2) ritual consists of activity and
meaning that is attached to them in the text; (3) based on the second point, Gane was able
to avoid weaknesses of structural, dynamistic, or historical approach, and focus on the
meaning provided in the texts themselves, since these approaches are inadequate for
identifying ritual meaning; (4) the meaning/function corresponding to the goal of a ritual
is the goal, assigned to it by the activity system, that is, broader religious context of
Ancient Israel; (5) a “ritual” is an activity system with a special kind of goal that is not
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subject to a physical cause and effect reaction, but rather, is symbolic, conveying that
God intervenes through certain ritual physical processes; (6) systems theory concepts can
aid in the interpretation of Israelite rituals because ritual in the Pentateuch, like in system
theory, consists of sub-rituals; and (7) the biblical text, prescriptive or descriptive,
provides instructions for physical performance and interpretations of activities, and
remains foundational for determining a ritual's meaning/function. All these points of
Gane's ritual theory are well supported by biblical texts, as demonstrated.
Conceptual gaps in the biblical ritual text are real. Some tried to solved by giving
the reader freedom to fill them in based on other sources which, in the mind of the
proponents of this approach, are even extra-biblical sources that are not affirmed by the
present study. However, limiting the sources to biblical texts only, in this case, especially
the Pentateuchal texts, provides a sound approach.

Biblical Data Regarding Laying on of Hands
Data from comparative studies confirms the fact that laying on of hand/s is found
in a variety of contexts and meanings. The laying on of hand/s is recorded in 22 texts in
the Pentateuch (Exod 29:10, 15 ,19; Lev 1:4; 3:2, 8, 13; 4: 4, 15, 24, 29, 33; 8:14, 18, 22;
16:21; 24:14; Num 8:10,12; 27:18, 23; Deut 34:9) and 21 of them are performed in a
cultic setting. It is widely accepted that this ritual gesture conveys the fact that some kind
of relationship is established between the offerer and his/her sacrifice.
Besides these 22 texts where the laying on of hand/s is mentioned, there are at
least 6 texts (Lev 1:10; 7:1–7; 9:8, 12, 15, 16, 18; 16:6, 9, 11, 15, 24; 23:8, 12, 18, 19, 27,
36, 37, 38, and Num 28–29) where it is missing. The present study suggests that in Lev
1:10; 7:1–7; 9:8, 12, 15, 16, 18; 23:8, 12, 18, 19, 27, 36, 37, 38, and Num 28–29) the
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ritual gesture was performed and was omitted for valid reasons. An abbreviation is the
reason for its absence in Lev 1:10 and 23:8, 12, 18, 19, 27, 36, 37, 38, and Num 28–29,
where the focus is on the sacrificial altar, instead of on the priests in Lev 9:8, 12, 15, 16,
18, or because of the point of view of the text, and allowance for converting the sacrifice
into money that was handed to the priest. On the other hand, the present study recognizes
that some texts contain hints that the laying on of hand/s was not performed in some
contexts such as Lev 16:6, 9, 11, 15, 24 because Lev 16 is prescriptive and detailed text
and as such, does not mention the laying on of hands on the burnt and sin offerings. In
addition, the uniqueness of the sin and burnt sacrifices' function also points to the fact
that the laying on of hand/s was not needed in this context.
Calabro correctly dismissed the presence of two forms of laying on of hand/s and
proposed that the laying on of hand/s was always performed with both hands. However,
his proposal was proven to be unsustainable upon closer study of his arguments and
biblical texts. His argument relied on the partial and one-sided reading of other and later
readings such as the LXX and the DSS. However, the review of his arguments shows
multiple lapses at the level of statistics on the agreement and disagreement of the number
of the noun “hand” in the MT, on one the hand, and the LXX and the DSS, on the other.
In the context of unconvincing statistics, the claim of textual criticism that number
disagreement can hardly be considered as a sign of an original reading does not stand.
Except for some random cases within which hand disagreement is found in Lev 3:2, 8,
13, there is no pattern that could be established to support Calabro’s proposal when the
number of the noun hand is compared in the MT and the LXX. The two readings are
more consistent than not.
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The present study fully recognizes the complexity of the number of the noun
“hand” in the context of the laying on of hand/s and proposes that one hand is used in Lev
1:4; 3:2, 8, 13; 4:4, 24, 29, 33 based on consistent the MT readings, and that two hands of
one person were involved in Exod 29:10, 15, 19; Lev 4:15; 8:14, 18, 22; 16:21; 24:14;
Num 8:10, 12; 27:18, 23; and Deut 34:9 based on the patterns of use of the plural of the
noun “hand.” This delineation is overruled in at least one text, Lev 4:15, since based on
the grammatical pattern, two hands were used in this text, but in Lev 4, in all other
instances, vv. 4, 24, 29, and 33, only one hand was used. Consequently, the conclusion of
the present study is that the form of gesture is insignificant and does not affect its
meaning/function since the texts do not provide enough evidence for a solid conclusion
of the number of hands used. The same applies to the question of the presence of pressure
during the hand leaning or not.
Calabro proposed that the laying on of hand/s appoints a person or animal to a
particular status or role. However, his arguments were not solid. That is, the claim that
the focus of the phrase “that it may be accepted for him to make atonement on his behalf"
in Lev 1:4 is not on what the gesture does to the animal, but rather, the emphasis on the
fact that “the gesture’s form is a similitude of atonement” is supported by abandoned
understanding of  כִּ פֶּרas a cover. It is demonstrated in the present study that this is not a
valid meaning of כִּ פֶּר. Second, he confused contexts, since the set of sacrifices in Lev 1–3
is different from those in Lev 4–6:7. Finally, this phrase is related to the burnt offering
only, and never to sin or reparation offerings. Building on the grammatical and
syntactical parallels between “( ”וסָ מַ כתָּ אֶּ ת־יָדָך ָעלָיוyou shall lay your hands on him) in v.
18 and “( ”ונָתַ תָּ ה מֵ הֹודָך ָעלָיוyou shall put some of your power on him) in v. 20 of Num
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27, Calabro noticed that the transfer theory fits these contexts best, and then the material
being transferred becomes the possession of the person to whom it was transferred. His
reference point is the use of the verb  פָּקַ דin Num 27:16. However, Calabro disregarded
the basic step in biblical interpretation, the use of the root. This root is used
insignificantly outside of the book of Numbers. The only time  פָּקַ דis related to the laying
on of hand/s is in Num 27:16. The verb never means “to appoint” in Exodus and
Leviticus. These points demonstrate that Calabro's proposal is not sustainable.
A closer analysis of theories scholars have suggested showed that some of them
are possible and some are not against the totality of the biblical text. Thus, identification
is acknowledged that it does not happen at the ontological, but rather, the symbolic level
is a possible meaning/function of this gesture. The consecrationseparation/dedication/presentation theory is not possible for several reasons. First, the
offerers in most cases needed forgiveness in the first place or are ransomed before God
because of their GHS. Second, common individuals cannot consecrate anything since this
is in the domain of the priesthood. The separation nuance of this theory is even less
sustainable because the fact that a sacrificial animal is brought to the sacrificial altar is
testament of the fact that it is separated/set apart from the larger group for a special
purpose. The laying on of hand/s was not needed for that purpose. Third, it is ultimately
God himself who sanctifies in the OT. Finally, the Pentateuch legislation never uses the
verbs of dedication with the offerer as a subject and sacrifice as a direct object in Lev 1–
7. The only text where it is explicitly stated that sacrifices are dedicated to God is Lev
22:2–3. However, “holy gifts” refer to a well-being offering of which the offerer would
keep the larger part and give a thigh to the priest. The consecration749

separation/dedication/presentation theory does not provide enough evidence to be
included as a viable meaning/function for the laying on of hand/s.
The possibility that the laying on of hand/s could encompass primary and
secondary meanings/functions is possible. Identification does not seem to be a concept
that emerged out of modern Western philosophy since it was noticed at the beginning of
the Middle Ages and even in the times of the Church Fathers.

Critique of Arguments against the
Transfer/Substitution Theory
Scholars have suggested ten arguments that invalidate the transfer/substitution
theory, and each of them was analyzed in the present study. A general critique that
applies to all of these arguments is that they are based on selective reading of texts. First,
the fact that ignoring the divinely instituted regulations that deal with ritual or moral
impurity results in capital punishment invalidates the claim that the death of the animal
cannot have been vicarious, since a sacrifice was not allowed for sins which merited
death (Num 15:30), only for venial transgressions. Instead of bearing their own sin and
ultimately suffering the consequence of death, offerers could transfer their sin/s to the sin
and/or reparation offering and receive forgiveness. Second, biblical texts undeniably
claim that the sin offering is holy, even though it receives the offerers’ sins, which negate
the critique that the sin cannot be transferred to a sacrificial animal since it was described
as holy. Third, the fact that blood application was a critical ritual activity in the sacrificial
offering process does not undermine the importance that the sacrificial animal
symbolically and substitutionarily represents the offer. The transfer that takes place from
the offerer to the sacrificial animal gives more importance to blood application, since the
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sin is transferred to the sanctuary in that way. Fourth, the substitution theory of sacrifice
is a well-established phenomenon in ANE context and a part of the atonement theory
proposed in the present study which refutes the claim that the transfer and/or substitution
theory is based on a substitution theory of sacrifice that is untenable. Fifth, the claim that
the transfer and/or substitution theory is based on Lev 16:21 assumes that (1) the form of
ritual is different, and (2) the scapegoat is not a sacrifice. It was established that form
does not affect the meaning/form of the gesture. In addition, transfer is implied in Lev 4,
where offerers come to the sanctuary loaded with their sin and leave from it forgiven.
Leviticus 16:16 explicitly states that the sins are in the sanctuary. Sixth, Lev 17:10–12
describes the well-being offering as an expiatory sacrifice that eliminates the critique that
the well-being offering is not expiatory. Seventh, the fact that a bird would fly away if let
go nullifies the argument that transfer is not possible, since the laying on of hand/s was
not performed in relation to the bird offering. In addition, the laying on of hand/s was
never prescribed for cereal offering, even though it has expiatory function. Regardless of
this, it is expiatory, but at the same time, it is the last possible choice for atonement.
Eighth, there are multiple activities within the ritual process that undeniably reveal the
identity of the offerer, making the understanding that that was the role of this gesture
redundant. Ninth, confessions are a well-established ritual activity imbedded in the
sacrificial offering ritual, and it is reasonable to assume that confession was performed on
the sacrifices that would deal with sin.
The ten arguments identified in the scholarly debate regarding the
meaning/function of this ritual gesture reflect a selective, subjective, and noncomprehensive reading of the Pentateuch texts and the present study demonstrates their
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weaknesses. Not being solid, these arguments cannot discredit the transfer/substitution
theory, but were the chance to refine and strengthen this theory. After identifying
weaknesses of these arguments, the present study pointed to certain additional arguments
coming from the research done here.

Further Arguments Supporting the
Transfer/Substitution Theory
First, the three Hebrew terms for sin, ַע ֶפּשׁ, חָ טָ א, and עָֹון, are not reliable in
determining whether the sin is intentional or unintentional and expiable or inexpiable
because they often semantically overlap and are used as synonyms. Second,  פֶּשַׁ עcannot
be restricted to intentional inexpiable/unforgivable sin as most scholars understand this
term. It is mainly intentional and potentially, also unintentional, but still, always expiable
sin. Third,  פֶּשַׁ עsin was consequently transferred into the sanctuary in the same way as
other sins that were there, via the sacrificial offering process. Fourth, the presence or
absence of intent is not a reliable element to determine whether the sin is expiable or
inexpiable. Some intentional sins are expiable/forgivable, as unintentional and expiable
sins can invoke punishment if divine regulations to deal with that sin are not followed.
Fifth, חַ טָּ אֹות, the closing term of both lists of sins in Lev 16:16, 21 actually refers to sin
offerings rather than sins. Such an understanding of  חַ טָּ אֹותdisagrees with the
understanding that  פֶּשַׁ עrepresents intentional inexpiable sin which is a crucial element of
the commonly believed atonement theory that assumes ADH of the sanctuary. The sinner
of  פֶּשַׁ עsin is not allowed to offer sacrifice and obtain forgiveness, but rather, experience
capital punishment. The modification to this is that the Pentateuch does not provide the
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evidence that  ֶּפשַׁ עrefers to such sin, which negates the ADH. In addition, acceptance of
the ADH assumes that  פֶּשַׁ עsin possesses some kind of intelligence that enables it to land
exactly where it is supposed to land, the most holy place. Closer analysis of crucial texts
used to support the ADH shows multiple grammatical and semantic lapses of the verb

 טָ מֵ אand inconsistencies in the literary structure of related texts. Also, the foundational
meaning of  כִּ פֶּרis ransom, not cleansing.
Fourth, the meaning of  כִּ פֶּרas “to ransom” and the choice of the English “to atone
for” or “atonement” to translate  כִּ פֶּרremoves misleading connotations or senses from the
two most common scholarly suggestions, “to cover” or “to cleanse” for  כִּ פֶּרthat comes
from the concrete meaning of this verb which is not supported by biblical texts.
Finally, because  כִּ פֶּרis often a subprocess or prerequisite of a broader process
such as acceptance, forgiveness, sanctification, and cleansing, it always ransoms either
GHS or a particular sin that is transferred to the animal. The laying on of hand/s is a
distinct ritual activity that facilitates this transfer to the sacrificial animal that eventually
dies in the offerer’s place.

Final Synthesis
Because it is part of the sacrificial process, the laying on of hands is organically
related to human sin or sinfulness and atonement as a prerequisite for broader concepts
such as acceptance, forgiveness, sanctification, and cleansing. Identifying the
meaning/function of laying on of hands depends directly on the understanding of sin and
atonement.
First, sin is represented as a concept in the Pentateuch. It is ontologically
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perceived as an abstract reality in the cultic context. In the initial phases of some ritual
impurity, it is portrayed as a physical entity to some extent, while moral impurity never
possesses physical qualities. It is purely an abstract entity. Determining the
presence/absence of intent related to an act of sinning cannot be established on the basis
of the three Hebrew terms for sin ַע ֶפּשׁ, חָ טָ א, and  ;עָֹוןsince they often semantically
overlap, they are often used as synonyms. Thus, these terms refer to sin, in general,
without conveying the presence or absence of intent on the part of the sinner, nor do they
convey whether the sin they refer to is expiable or inexpiable. Thus, whether an act of
committing sin was performed intentionally (brazen or non-brazen sin) or unintentionally
(non-brazen sin) solely depends on the sinful activity itself or the immediate context of a
given situation that includes that act of sinning. Some contexts provide insights
concerning these elements; others do not. The corollary of such an understanding of sin is
that in many cases, if one is not involved directly in the situation that includes the sin,
he/she is not able to determine whether the sin was intentional/unintentional and
expiable/inexpiable. This is also confirmed by the reading of Lev 4–6 suggested in the
present study. It is the sinner, without anyone's involvement, who decides and chooses to
offer a sacrifice and select an appropriate type of sacrifice. The priest is informed to assist
in offering the sacrifice, but it is the sinner who decides to bring the sacrifice and which
type of sacrifice in his/her interaction with God. The priest was never said to investigate
or interrogate the offerer concerning the reason that made him/her offer the sacrifice.
That remained within the limits of the interaction with the offerer and God himself.
The Pentateuch uses a variety of metaphors to express sin and presents it in terms
of physical appearance. This, however, does not ontologically or intrinsically change the
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abstract nature of sin into a physical/quasi-physical or material in a cultic context, but
rather, just aids in human comprehension. Sin remains an ontologically and intrinsically
abstract entity in the cultic context. The sin itself and its context are decisive factors
concerning the presence/absence of intent related to a given act of sinning or its
expiability/inexpiability. These two points aid in identifying the meaning/function of the
laying on of hands. Leviticus 16:16, 21 state that all three terms for moral impurity, , חָ טָ א

פֶּשַׁ ע, and עָֹון, and ritual impurity, טָ מֵ א, are present in the sanctuary, not physically, but in
a real and yet abstract way. The offerer affected by these impurities brings them
symbolically to the sanctuary (in the case of ritual impurity that requires sacrifice, the
offerer needs to wait for a certain time elapse) and offer his/her sacrifice to deal with
them as God prescribed in the cultic law texts. The conceptual understanding of sin and
the recognition that פֶּשַׁ ע, חָ טָ א, and  עָֹוןare synonyms allow that the laying on of hand/s,
as the only activity in the ritual of animal sacrifice that is not necessary for the execution
(performance) of the sacrificial offering, actually facilitates the transfer of both impurities
into the sanctuary or on the priesthood. Identification can be implied as a secondary
meanings of this ritual, but transfer is the only meaning/function that explains the two
facts explicitly stated in the cultic legislation: (1) the fact that the offerer comes to the
sanctuary with his/her impurity and leaves without it (forgiven, accepted, sanctified) and
(2) the fact that the impurity is in the sanctuary on the Day of Atonement, because the
offerer had brought such impurities to the sanctuary on a daily basis and obtained
atonement concerning them. In this understanding of the defilement of the sanctuary the
critical term  פֶּשַׁ עis equated with two other terms, thus avoiding an unsound and
biblically unsupported understanding that sins expressed through it cannot be
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expiated/forgiven through cult. It also eliminates an unsound understanding of  פֶּשַׁ עthat it
behaves like a living and intelligent entity.  פֶּשַׁ עis never portrayed as having such
qualities in the metaphor and, even less so, conceptually or intrinsically. As such, the
laying on of hands is a theologically crucial ritual gesture in the process of atonement
because it serves to transfer impurity symbolically from the offerer to the sanctuary.
This interpretation of impurity negates the belief that an inevitable and
unavoidable reaction of contact between the holy, such as God, sanctuary, or holy things,
and the impurity, the human being, is death of the latter as a source and/or carrier of
impurity. Embedded in this belief is the postulate that God is not able to cope with the
effects of impurity, but rather, is subjected to them. He is forced to leave the sanctuary
because of the high accumulation of impurity in the sanctuary. Instead, Pentateuchal texts
prove that God chooses to tolerate impurity by storing it in the sanctuary or on the
priesthood until the Day of Atonement when it is removed from both. This is conditioned
by following procedures which Good revealed for dealing with impurity by human party.
Both impurities are in the sanctuary and on the priests, but that does not disqualify these
two entities from retaining their holiness or residing safely in the realm of the holy. God
chooses to leave his sanctuary at the time when he realizes that the sacrificial procedures
do not fulfill the purpose for which they had been established: to atone for sinners.
Second, the analysis of  כִּ פֶּרconstructions led to the conclusion that  כִּ פֶּרalways
refers to abstract processes. A literal, concrete meaning of  כִּ פֶּרappears only in one
instance and that is at the same time as the only qal stem of the verb, Gen 6:14. All the
other occurrences, whether in cultic or non-cultic contexts, are in piel and have an
abstract meaning. In a few texts where the direct object of  כִּ פֶּרis an inanimate object, that
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is, the sanctuary or its parts, the text uses the metaphor of “carrying away” or “removing”
sin, which results in cleansing those objects. Nevertheless, the use of the metaphor does
not make the sin or the process of  כִּ פֶּרontologically material and/or concrete. It remains
an abstract process that includes real, yet abstract, elements, such as sin and removal that
results in cleansing. This study affirms that the foundational meaning of  כִּ פֶּרshould be
sought in Lev 17:11 and that it is “to ransom,” which consequently encompasses the idea
of substitution, that is, the sacrificial animal functions as the offerer’s substitute. Both of
these two elements, ransom and substitute, are foundational for atonement. In this, the
concept of atonement follows the conceptual and abstract understanding of sin that has
been suggested in the present study.
The abstract understanding of  כִּ פֶּרis further supported by the concept of GHS that
is embedded in the biblical portrayal of human nature, but still neglected in the study of
atonement. The present study demonstrates that GHS is a critical and ever-present human
characteristic and, as such, made atonement in divine-human interactions necessary. It
originated from the fall of humanity in the Garden of Eden when the first couple
disobeyed God's commandment and since then, affects every human being. Influential
scholars have recognized and accepted GHS as inseparably related to human beings.
Disciplines outside of biblical studies, such as classical philosophy, moral philosophy,
and philosophy of action, have also noted that human beings exercise weakness of will,
that is, intentionally doing something that is known to be wrong. General human
sinfulness affects all aspects of human life, including those related to human cognition, as
well as those related to physical existence. Surprisingly, critical scholars of the cult of
Ancient Israel cult have not included this concept in their study of atonement. They
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simply ignored it and it did not play a part in their studies of atonement. The present
study demonstrates that GHS, like ritual and moral impurity, is a real, but at the same
time, an abstract entity. General human sinfulness is foundational for both impurities,
ritual and moral. Both of them come from GHS, and ritual impurity, in a small number of
cases, is related to physical appearance. However, ritual impurity is atoned for only after
the physical aspects of it have disappeared (healed and/or a certain amount of time has
elapsed, etc.). Impurity, be it ritual or moral, or GHS were atoned for as abstract entities.

 כִּ פֶּרdeals with physical impurity, the only one that is associated with physical
representation, but only after physical stage of it has disappeared.
This abstract understanding of  כִּ פֶּרbased on ransom, that is constantly needed in
divine-human interactions when a human being experiences any possible source of
disruptions such as sinfulness, ritual, or moral impurity, is in stark contrast with the
understanding “to cleanse, purify” the sanctuary suggested by Milgrom, or “to cleanse
from” proposed by Gane. Milgrom's and Gane's understandings of atonement are
informed by the biblically unsupported notion of  כִּ פֶּרas cleansing. In Milgrom’s case, it
is not the offerer who is cleansed, but rather, the sanctuary, while in Gane's case, it is the
offerer who is cleansed from these impurities. To the contrary, God chooses to accept
human beings such as they are through atonement based on ransom. However, in order to
control impurity, God prescribed the sacrificial system that would enable human beings
to commune with him regardless of the disruptions inherent in them. The goal of such a
system was to control and deal with the experiences of impurity in human life and to
stress the significance of a holy life that is totally opposite to any experience of impurity.
Within such an understanding of atonement, the laying on of hands symbolically serves
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to transfer those impurities from the offerer to the sanctuary at the time when human
beings experience them. They are stored there until the Day of Atonement, when they are
removed and taken away from the camp into the wilderness.
These arguments do not eliminate the fact that secondary meanings/functions of
the laying on of hands could have been used to express identification or convey the
ownership of the animal. However, in the light of the arguments mentioned above, the
transfer/substitution remains the primary meaning/function for the laying on of hand/s.
Transfer remains unspecified since the element transferred is determined by a given
context. However, the interpretative framework and a given context should also be taken
into consideration to control the elements that are transferred since in light of some
contexts, some transfers are superfluous and redundant.
As it became obvious from the literature review presented in the introduction of
the present study, the transfer/substitution has been the primary interpretation of laying
on of hands with the longest history, but scholars began to challenge it since the end of
the nineteenth century until now. The challenges posed by scholars during this time
period are not textually defensible. They stream out of imposed assumptions about
concepts from ANE contexts; adoption of methodologies foreign to biblical texts; and
discriminatory, selective, rather than inclusive, comprehensive reading of biblical texts.
Thus, the meaning/function of the laying on of hand/s is best understood to
convey a symbolic transfer of various qualities to the sacrificial animal which further
serves as the offerer’s substitute due to the human’s constant unfavorable state that is
described in the present study as GHS before God, even if no sin is committed.
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This meaning is never explicitly stated in biblical texts. The present research
attempted to provide a biblically-informed interpretative context that helped identify the
meaning/function of the laying on of hands. In the process of researching this ritual
gesture, the present research noticed three tendencies imbedded in scholarly dialogue as it
addresses the meaning/function of laying on of hands. First, scholarly proposals on the
meaning/function of laying on of hands are laden with certain preconceived
interpretations of selected texts. Second, they import these interpretations from a broad
ANE context and relate them to biblical texts without the use of a consistent, comparative
method. Third, these studies adopt ritual theories that do not arise from the biblical text,
but rather, from social, philosophical, and literary disciplines, such as sociology,
philosophy, anthropology, literary criticism, and the study of religion. Unfortunately,
none of these disciplines is founded upon biblical postulates. Consequently, the results of
these studies regarding this ritual gesture have been inordinately influenced by such
disciplines. Therefore, the present research sought to base its conclusions on biblical texts
alone and eliminate elements and interpretations informed by these disciplines that do not
comport with biblical data.
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Sigvartsen, Jan Åge. “The Afterlife Views and the Use of the Tanakh in Support of the
Resurrection Concept in the Literature of Second Temple Period Judaism: The
Apocrypha and the Pseudepigrapha.” PhD diss., Andrews University, 2016.
Silva, Moisés. Biblical Words and Their Meaning: An Introduction to Lexical Semantics.
Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1983.
Simons, Kenneth W. “The Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and Normative
Perspectives.” WLJ 17 (2008): 719–32.
792

———. “Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime.” BULR 273 (1996): 273–99.
———. “When is Negligent Inadvertence Culpable?: Introduction to Symposium,
Negligence in Criminal Law and Morality.” CLP 5.2 (2011): 97–114.
Sklar, Jay. Leviticus: An Introduction and Commentary. TOTC 3. Downers Grove, IL:
Inter-Varsity Press, 2014.
———. “Sin.” OEBT 2:297–308.
———. “Sin and Atonement: Lessons from the Pentateuch.” BBR 22 (2012): 467–92.
———. “Sin and Impurity: Atoned or Purified? Yes!” Pages 18–31 in Perspectives on
Purity and Purification in the Bible. Edited by Baruch J. Schwartz, David P.
Wright, Jeffrey Stackert, and Naphtali S. Meshel. LHB/OTS 474. New York:
T&T Clark, 2008.
———. Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement: The Priestly Conceptions. HBM 2.
Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2005.
Smith, Charles Ryder. The Bible Doctrine of Sin and of the Ways of God with Sinners.
London: Epworth Press, 1953.
Smith, Henry Preserved. “The Laying-on of Hands.” AJT 17 (1913): 47–62.
Smith, Holly M. “Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance.” CLP 5 (2011): 115–46.
Smith, Jonathan Z. To Take Place: Toward Theory in Ritual. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1987.
Smith, W. Robertson. Lectures on the Religion of the Semites. New ed. Burnett Lectures
[Aberdeen University] 1888–89. London: A. & C. Black, 1894.
Snaith, Norman H. Leviticus and Numbers. CB 3. London: Nelson, 1967.
Sørensen, J. P. “Ritualistics: A New Discipline in the History of Religion.” Pages 9–25 in
The Problem of Ritual: Based on Papers Read at the Symposium on Religious
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